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This thesis considers the significance of the Dominions in the early stages of the UK nuclear weapons 
programme, seeking to determine how the Commonwealth, as a constitutional and cultural reality, shaped 
the UK's pursuit of nuclear weapons between 1939 and 1947. The thesis unites two prominent lines of 
historical enquiry: the history of Britain's engagement with nuclear weapons on the one hand, and the 
complex and evolving relationship between Britain and her Dominions in the late imperial/early 
decolonisation period on the other. Both strands are prominent in British (and world) history, but the two 
have always tended to be treated in isolation. The contention of this thesis is that the two are in fact more 
intimately linked than has been thought, and that an understanding of the enduring – and evolving – role of 
the Commonwealth in informing every form of British policy-making can enhance existing interpretations 
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A Neglected Aspect of Nuclear History 
 
This thesis addresses a consistently overlooked and under-researched aspect of British nuclear weapons 
history – namely, the interactions between Britain and the other Commonwealth Dominions as an influence 
on the character and trajectory of the British programme in its earliest stages. The need for fresh scholarship 
in an ostensibly well-served field is best justified by the demonstration of a deficiency in existing accounts. 
In the case of British nuclear history, the core narrative is straightforward enough: recognising the 
possibilities of uranium fission in the early stages of the Second World War, Britain initiated a research 
programme, small in scale but earnest and effective, which was eventually subsumed into its far larger 
American counterpart. The result was the development by the allies of the first atomic weapons, used to 
devastating effect by the Americans over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the closing stages of the war in the 
Pacific. Peace, and the new atomic reality, then introduced a degree of distance between the allies, and an 
official decision that Britain should pursue an atomic capability of her own was soon taken. Historians’ 
accounts of these formative years have sought to add analytical substance to this core narrative, but for all 
their efforts there remains a lacuna in the literature.  
 
The lacuna is this: existing accounts fail adequately to recognise that the ‘British’ nuclear programme was 
not conducted exclusively within, by, or for the United Kingdom, but rather incorporated personnel and 
material from across the Commonwealth. Mark Oliphant, one of the principal actors in the early British 
programme, was an Australian; the first reactor on which British personnel worked was built in Canada, 
under the aegis of the Canadian government, with a mixed Anglo-Canadian workforce; much of the 
engineering work on the first Canadian and British reactors was conducted by a New Zealander, Charles 
Watson Munro. Scientists and policy-makers from the Dominions had exposure to pivotal aspects of 
Britain’s nuclear research and development effort throughout the war and in its immediate aftermath, not 
merely as observers, but as key contributors. Thus even in the earliest stages of her nuclear history Britain 
cannot be said to have acted alone: in varying forms and to varying degrees the British nuclear programme 
relied on interactions with the Commonwealth. Yet the presence of this Commonwealth element in the UK 
nuclear programme has generally been downplayed by historians, and in many instances wholly ignored. 
Some accounts of individual Commonwealth countries’ experiences with nuclear technology do exist, and 
these at least address aspects of these countries’ interactions with the United Kingdom, but no monograph 
yet written has considered the significance of the Commonwealth collectively, nor made adequate reference 
to the liminal state of UK-Dominion relations that formed the constitutional context for the period in view. 
 
It is somewhat puzzling that such a historiographical gap should exist. The inclusion of Commonwealth 
personnel in the British nuclear weapons programme was a de facto transfer of knowledge beyond  the 
bounds of UK government control, and was perceived as such almost from the outset. The fact that the UK 
government willingly (indeed, reflexively) permitted the transfer of sensitive information to states which 
were effectively sovereign, and that it depended on the willing co-operation of these increasingly 
independent-minded partners to develop (and later test) nuclear weapons technologies, might be considered 
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worthy of greater attention. One might also expect more interest to have been shown by historians in the 
overlap between the two great strategic realities facing Britain in the immediate post-war period: the 
emergence of the atom bomb and the reconfiguration (and decline) of the Empire-Commonwealth system. 
The two were synchronous, and, as shall be seen, intimately linked, yet few treatments of one issue make 
serious reference to the other. The result of such omissions can only ever be the restriction of historical 
analysis: neglect of a relevant factor necessarily distorts a historian’s account. This thesis therefore aims to 
provide a corrective narrative. 
   
Since this thesis takes as its starting point an apparent gap in the historiography it is important first to 
demonstrate the reality of that gap, and to situate it within the wider contours of nuclear history. The 
remainder of this introduction therefore examines the ways in which the early history of nuclear weapons 
(and Britain’s relationship thereto) has been written, assessing the biases and detecting the gaps in these 
accounts, and asking what attention has been paid to the role of the Commonwealth, and by whom. This 
process of literature review then forms the basis for the thesis’ historiographical approach. 
 
The Contours of Nuclear History 
 
The first attempt to chart the history of the atom bomb was written before its subject had been deployed in 
anger – indeed, before it had even been tested. The potential significance of the nuclear undertaking had 
become apparent almost immediately the projects were begun, and by the summer of 1945 the Americans’ 
official report Atomic Energy for Military Purposes had been in preparation for months, ready for swift 
publication when the moment came. Its author, Henry DeWolf Smyth, completed his preface on 1st July 
1945, predating the Trinity Test by more than a fortnight, and the report was released to the public on 12th 
August 1945, mere days after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A far shorter British statement 
was released the same day and a Canadian counterpart the next. Both were eventually incorporated into the 
published version of the Smyth Report as annexes, but only from the fifth edition (1st November 1945) 
onwards: the earliest print runs carried solely the American document.1 Smyth himself made no claim 
regarding the completeness of his references to work conducted by the British or Canadians, instead writing 
only from an American perspective.2 The focus of Smyth’s analysis was essentially on the American 
achievement, with the British contribution limited to a handful of helpful interventions (and the 
Commonwealth aspect only implied in passing). Britain’s main role is held to have been as an early 
stimulant to the American effort: Britain’s initial progress helped transfuse a sense of urgency – and 
credibility – into the American project.3 The informal representations of Mark Oliphant, a UK-based, 
Australian-born physicist (erroneously identified by Smyth as English) are portrayed as crucial to this 
process.4 Once the Manhattan Project itself is introduced, Britain recedes from the narrative foreground: 
the involvement of British and Commonwealth personnel, other than in the work at Berkeley, is not 
referenced, although the inclusion of the British and Canadian statements in later editions at least made it 
clear to attentive readers that such activity had taken place. 
                                                   
1 Henry DeWolf Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948 republication), pp.vi-vii 
2 Ibid., p.vi 
3 Ibid., p.53, p.71 




Smyth’s report set the pattern that most subsequent American histories would follow. The most notable 
influence was on Richard Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, whose appointment by the United States Atomic 
Energy Commission in 1958 to the task of preparing an official history was considered by Lorna Arnold (a 
British official historian of later vintage) to have marked the effective birth of nuclear history as a 
discipline.5 Their end product, A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Volume I: The 
New World, 1939-1946, was undoubtedly ‘official’. The privilege of archival access is stressed throughout. 
This sanctioned historical account follows Smyth in depicting America as a broadly independent nuclear 
actor, and surpasses him in stressing the American achievement. The picture of Anglo-American wartime 
nuclear interaction emerging from Hewlett and Anderson’s account is one of patchy and awkward 
collaboration: the fact that the chapter on the US-UK relationship is called ‘An Uneasy Partnership’ is 
indicative of the overall tone. Britain is by no means ignored; much in fact is made of their use of archival 
materials to provide a ‘satisfactory account of the intricate wartime negotiations’ with Britain and Canada, 
but the account is not wholly favourable.6 Britain is largely side-lined, and the early British contributions 
are played down. Canada fares worse still, and whilst a wider imperial dynamic is occasionally assumed it 
is never elaborated.7 The end result is a history that is honest in intention but unduly constrained by its 
adherence to an exclusively American perspective which therefore lacks explanatory power.  
 
Later, unofficial, American accounts have trodden similar paths, almost invariably with even less sensitivity 
to commonwealth dynamics. Richard Rhodes’ The Making of the Atomic Bomb is remarkable in the 
coherence and craftsmanship of his account, but for all its reputation nevertheless omits pertinent details – 
the result, perhaps, of too linear a conception of subject.8 Rhodes is concerned solely with America’s pursuit 
of an atomic bomb, and only when other states’ activities impinge directly on that core narrative are they 
even acknowledged. There is thus no reference made to the laboratories in Montreal and at Chalk River, 
and little analysis of UK-US-Canada dynamics. Oliphant is referenced, however: in common with other 
histories before and after, a quip attributed to the American physicist Leo Szilard about the significance of 
‘meddling foreigners’ is cited, alongside more prosaic assessments, in support of the argument that 
Oliphant’s personal intervention helped catalyse the American programme.9 
 
Although Smyth had prepared the conceptual ground for subsequent America-centric accounts, he cannot 
really be blamed for them. His account was at least balanced by the content of the accompanying British 
statement, Britain and the Atomic Bomb, which sought to recount the entirety of Britain’s experience with 
nuclear technology and highlight the explicitly British aspects of the joint programme. More so than the 
American document, the British account emphasized from the outset that ‘scientists of many countries 
shared in this development’.10 In particular, the British acknowledged the Canadian contribution – although 
the descriptions of Anglo-Canadian relations were somewhat economical:  
                                                   
5 Lorna Arnold, ‘A Letter from Oxford: The History of Nuclear History in Britain’, Minerva, 38 (2000), p.202 
6 Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Volume I: The New 
World, 1939-1946 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962), see especially pp.ix-x 
7 Ibid.; cf. p104, p.202, p.261, p.257, p.272, p.427, p.616 
8 Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster: 1986) 
9 Quoted in Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, p.372; see below, p.54 





A proposal was made to the Canadian Government that a joint British-Canadian research 
establishment should be set up in Canada …. The Canadian Government welcomed the 
suggestion, with the result that, at the beginning of 1943, a large research establishment was 
set up in Montreal …. [The enterprise] represents a great contribution, both in men and 
money, by that government to the development of this new branch of science…11 
 
The British statement was nowhere near as fulsome as the American, and its impact was consequently 
rather more limited. What is significant is the extent to which it, and its Canadian counterpart, reflected an 
early deviation from the American narrative in terms of interpretive approach. Smyth’s account illustrates 
the tendency in American nuclear historiography to portray the bomb project as overwhelmingly American, 
aided in limited (albeit significant) respects by allies, but ultimately testifying only to American power and 
ingenuity. The British statement reflects the emergence of a parallel, officially sanctioned British 
interpretation of the advent of nuclear weapons, in which swift initial progress by the British, eclipsed 
eventually by the growing American programme (which Britain had at any rate catalysed), was followed 
by a joint Anglo-American-Canadian endeavour. This narrative is broader, encompassing the work of the 
Montreal team as well as the work in the US. It also carries a significant emphasis on wartime expediencies 
as explanations for major decisions: the winding down of research in Britain in favour of the Canadian-
American work is justified explicitly in terms of ensuring the timely delivery of a bomb for wartime use.12 
Such interpretive frameworks are echoed in subsequent British nuclear historiography.  
 
The Canadians, too, released an explanatory statement. Prepared in close co-ordination with the British, 
and published a day after the American and British documents, it stressed the multi-national nature of the 
endeavour:  
  
The dropping of the first atomic bombs is … the culmination of the work of scientists from 
many nations, the pooling of the scientific and natural resources of the United States, Britain 
and Canada and the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars in the United States and 
smaller, but substantial, sums in Canada13 
 
The Canadian statement is tonally similar to the British in terms of its portrayal of nuclear interactions 
among the allies. The language with which the body of the Canadian statement addresses the Anglo-
Canadian arrangement is as sparing as the British: ‘Towards the end of 1942, the British proposed that an 
important section of the work should be carried on in Canada as a joint enterprise…’. The passage is almost 
entirely descriptive, rather than analytical, but Canada’s privileged information access is nevertheless 
highlighted.14 Elsewhere, the nuances of Anglo-Canadian dynamics are more apparent: Canada is portrayed 
as a ‘pioneer’ in this new branch of technology and science, and the Dominion government’s decision to 
take over ownership of the country’s uranium mines is justified as a step to ‘preserve this important asset 
                                                   
11 Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, pp.284-285 
12 Ibid., p.287 
13 Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, p.288 




for the people of Canada’.15 Towards the end of the document, which closes with a full list of the names 
and affiliations of the scientists involved (both Canadians and ‘those from abroad’) the Montreal/Chalk 
River project is referred to, with evident pride, as ‘[t]he largest and most distinguished group of scientists 
ever assembled for a single investigation in any British country’.16 More will be said in due course about 
the nature of ‘British’ identity, the extent to which the Dominions could be considered ‘British’, and the 
implications for concepts of sovereignty and collaboration. For the present, all that need be noted here is 
that the Canadian government’s initial presentation of its own involvement in the allied nuclear programme 
relied ultimately on a close identification with, if not the United Kingdom government itself, then at least 
with a broad cultural-civilizational concept of ‘Britishness’, whilst simultaneously promoting the idea of a 
uniquely Canadian contribution.  
 
The initial statements were never intended as scholarly history; they were contemporary government 
releases, serving to inform their interested but largely ignorant populations as to how this paradigm-altering 
technology had been born. For this reason, though, their impact has been significant: their divergent 
approaches to presenting the nuclear narrative set the tone for much of the history-writing that would 
follow. The narrow focus of many American accounts; the awkward balance between pride and exculpation 
in many British accounts; the aspiration to equality with the allies in many Canadian accounts; all are 
prefigured to some extent in these summaries of the wartime nuclear experience. 
 
In the decades following the publication of the official accounts, those wishing to write on early nuclear 
history faced an inevitable paucity of sources. One of the primary purposes of the Smyth Report and its 
Anglo-Canadian supplements had been to forestall public curiosity by collating the barest facts – an outline 
of the scope of the project and the fundamental physics upon which it rested – and to present it as the sum 
total of declassifiable information.17 In this it largely succeeded: much information, political as well as 
technical, remained classified. Lack of archival sources could not dissuade writers for long, though; enough 
information was still in the public domain, or accessible to dogged researchers, for fresh accounts to be 
written. Representative of these early, unofficial accounts are The Birth of the Bomb, a 1961 effort by the 
British writer Ronald W. Clark, and Robert Jungk’s Brighter than a Thousand Suns (‘Heller als tausend 
Sonnen’).18 The accuracy of these accounts left plenty to be desired. The authors’ only recourse, other than 
to the sparse and unreliable information then available, was to interviews with the key figures. These 
certainly had some value, but the passage of twenty years tends to have a deleterious effect on even the 
sharpest of memories. Clark’s roll of interviewees was undoubtedly impressive, but as Hewlett and 
Anderson pointed out, no level of diligence and authorial skill could counteract reliance on recollections 
decades old.19 (Jungk fared worse still: his account was written off as ‘hopelessly inaccurate’; an 
uncharitable assessment, but one which the archival record has subsequently validated.)  
 
Alongside these non-archival histories came the memoirs of key figures. The practice of autobiography is 
somewhat different from that of history-writing: the dispassion at which historians aim is not available to 
                                                   
15 Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, p.289 
16 Ibid., p.295 
17 Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, p.407 
18 Ronald W. Clark, The Birth of the Bomb: The Untold Story of Britain's Part in the Weapon that Changed the World (London: 
Phoenix House, 1961) ; Robert Jungk, Brighter than a Thousand Suns (London: Victor Gollancz, 1959) 
19 Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, p.657 
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the autobiographer, whose subject is himself. Since the autobiographer is manifestly concerned for at least 
some aspect of posterity’s view of their contribution, their impulse will inevitably be to exculpate, to 
embellish, to redirect blame. This propensity is perhaps clearest in the case of Leslie Groves, whose 
centrality to the Manhattan Project and efforts at post-facto reputation-management have had a somewhat 
distorting effect on subsequent retrospective assessments. The version of events presented in Groves’ 1963 
memoir, Now it Can be Told, although replete with biases and omissions, has been widely adopted;20 more 
widely perhaps than is apt. Groves’ later biographers have certainly tended to accept their subject’s self-
interpretation: in a 2002 biography, Groves is portrayed from the outset as ‘the indispensable person’.21  
 
Other key figures’ contributions to the genre achieve rather more restraint; one might cite the 
physicists Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls, whose discursive, anecdote-driven memoirs are each far less self-
absorbed than Groves’.22 It is also interesting to note memoirists’ capacity to omit relevant content: the 
Canadian aspect of the wartime and post-war project is noticeably under-represented even in seemingly 
relevant memoirs; the most frustrating example is that of the American scientific official James Conant, a 
key influence on the fate of the Canadian project, who unashamedly glosses over the entirety of his atomic 
role, instead portraying attitudes towards collaboration with the United Kingdom radically at odds with 
those which emerge from the archives.23 Ultimately the impact of memoir (and by extension much 
biography) on the historiography of the nuclear programmes has been to distort in line with ego. The 
Grovesian view of British insignificance and perfidy has certainly predominated too long.  
 
Whilst the initial shaping of nuclear narratives may have fallen squarely to American authors – a form of 
victor’s history? – the field was not their exclusive preserve for long. In 1959 the British Government had 
appointed Margaret Gowing to write an official history of the British programme, and the fruit of her labour, 
Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945, was published in 1964, two years after The New World.24 
Necessarily catholic in scope, and thus dense with detail, Britain and Atomic Energy was concerned only 
with Britain’s wartime experience, although Gowing always intended future volumes, and a thorough 
consideration of post-war planning was included in the later chapters. The greatest advantage of Gowing’s 
work, especially over Clark et al, was her degree of archival access – her admission into ‘virgin territory’, 
with ‘sole rights of entry’.25 Gowing’s thoroughgoing approach encompassed every aspect of British 
wartime nuclear experience, and the book is particularly strong on the diplomatic and strategic calculus by 
which crucial decisions regarding the Anglo-American-Canadian dynamic were made. In early chapters 
she ably captures the tensions at the heart of the MAUD deliberations: British hesitancy about relinquishing 
primacy in nuclear research, the practical barriers to a UK-only programme, and the emerging prospect of 
a Canada-based project as a form of compromise option. Gowing’s recognition of the Canadian angle is 
not limited to the earlier stages, though the combination of archival access and British focus enabled her to 
produce by the far the most comprehensive treatment of Anglo-Canadian nuclear dynamics that had yet 
                                                   
20 Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (London: André Deutsch, 1963) 
21 Robert S. Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan Project's Indispensable Man (South Royalton, 
Vermont: Steerforth Press, 2002), p.x  
22 Otto R. Frisch, What Little I Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Rudolf Peierls, Bird of Passage: 
Recollections of a Physicist (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) 
23 James B. Conant, My Several Lives: Memoirs of a Social Inventor (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp.273, 288  
24 Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1964) 




been attempted. The relationship is addressed directly, meriting its own chapter (‘Canada’s Part in the 
Project’). Multiple aspects of Anglo-Canadian nuclear interactions are addressed, including the formal 
negotiations between the UK and Canadian governments, and the corresponding informal and technical 
discussions. The Canadians are initially portrayed as having been broadly acquiescent to British requests: 
their response to the suggestion that the French refugee physicist Hans Halban and his team relocate was 
apparently ‘immediate and enthusiastic’.26 Gowing goes as far as to praise the ‘extraordinary helpfulness’ 
of the Canadians.27 Such treatment would seem to hint at a reasonably straightforward interpretation of the 
Anglo-Canadian nuclear relationship, wherein Britain, the senior partner, set the agenda for the pliant junior 
Dominion, which instinctively complied with any request. 
 
As Gowing’s account develops, though, it becomes clear that wartime Canada was not, and could never be, 
simply a useful adjunct to the United Kingdom. Theirs was a special relationship, certainly, but also, 
beneath the surface, an increasingly contested one. Gowing never explicitly frames her understanding of 
the nature of the Anglo-Canadian relationship, but at points she characterizes the dynamic in terms redolent 
of the Canada-as-mediator model prominent in Canadian historiography.28 This was true both in positive 
terms – the Canadian administrator C.J. Mackenzie is described as having been ‘very helpful in smoothing 
relations at the working level’ between Britain and the US – and when things were proceeding less 
smoothly.29 Gowing is clear that when UK relations with the US were at their worst, so too were Anglo-
Canadian relations. Much though the British might have expected it, the Canadians did not simply follow 
the British lead: Canadian strategic imperatives were separate from (although frequently similar to) those 
of the mother country. For Canada, the maintenance of friendly relations with the United States was of 
‘fundamental importance’. Moreover, the Canadians were irritated by British ‘obtuseness’ – an attitude 
which Gowing describes as having ‘smacked of treachery’ for observers in London, where ‘an unbroken 
Anglo-Canadian front’ was desired.30 Apparent here are two key themes: contentiousness around the extent 
to which Canada was viewed as subordinate to Britain, and the Canadian disposition to seek a constructive, 
mediating role.31 
 
Gowing’s handling of Anglo-Canadian relations was undoubtedly more nuanced than that of any previous 
account. Yet it remains under-developed, resting on implicit assumptions about how the two states 
interacted and how each perceived its relationship with the other. At times, the relationship is portrayed as 
straightforward subordination, with Britain the unquestioned superior power. At other points, Canada is 
treated as though fully sovereign, with a decidedly independent streak. The roots of the paradox – or the 
explanation for the transition from one state to the other – are never really considered.  
 
Other Dominions meanwhile receive relatively short shrift in Britain and Atomic Energy. Personnel from 
elsewhere in the commonwealth are mentioned, but the mechanisms of their involvement are never 
addressed, nor are the implications of their engagement with nuclear secrets discussed. Dominion heritage 
                                                   
26 Arnold, ‘A Letter from Oxford’, p.188 
27 Ibid., p.189 
28 cf. D.R. Owram, ‘Canada and the Empire', in Robin W. Winks (Ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume V: 
Historiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 
29 Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p.173 
30 Ibid., pp.196-197 
31 Ibid., p.197 
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is seldom referenced, and never truly explored. To all intents and purposes, Australians and New Zealanders 
are counted as ‘British’. A case in point: Gowing only mentions Mark Oliphant’s Australian heritage on 
page 315, after more than a dozen prominent references to his involvement in the British and American 
projects. The only (partial) exception here is for Canadian personnel, owing to the greater analytical 
attention paid to that relationship and the fact of Canada’s privileged position as a named partner in the 
project. 
 
Britain and Atomic Energy was followed a decade later by Independence and Deterrence: Britain and 
Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, a two-volume treatment of the period from the closing of the Second World 
War to the successful testing of Britain’s first nuclear device. The passage of time may account for the 
slightly more nuanced understanding of the importance of the Commonwealth evident in these successor 
volumes (though the fact of Australian involvement in British weapons testing doubtless contributed too). 
Gowing acknowledges from the outset of the policy-making volume that atomic history is ‘woven into’ 
almost every part of Britain’s post-war history – ‘international, diplomatic, Commonwealth, military, 
constitutional…’.32 This recognition permits a slightly more rounded analysis of at least some aspects of 
Commonwealth (read: Canadian and Australian) nuclear relations with Britain. Much of the analysis here 
lies outside the chronological scope of this thesis, but what Gowing ably highlights is the essential tension 
between the impulse to Dominion collaboration and the imperative to secure close and lasting nuclear 
collaboration with the Americans, which had emerged at a very early stage. Gowing is less concerned for 
the perspective of the Dominions themselves, but at least addresses Anglo-Canadian relations in some 
depth. Canada is presented as ‘torn’ between her ties with Britain and those with the United States. She is 
also held to have posed a problem for the British: what part would she play in a post-war environment of 
diminishing US-UK co-operation? And how could the inclusion of Canada – and the concomitant exclusion 
of the other Dominions – be justified?33 Gowing points out that Britain continued to derive valuable 
information from the Canadian project, and that the exchange was essentially reciprocal: ‘there was full 
exchange of almost all material, classified or not, between Harwell and the Canadian project’.34 The 
Canadians are shown never to have wavered in their belief that they were given ‘cast-iron assurances during 
the war that Chalk River would be the preliminary to a large joint enterprise in Canada, and that the major 
British atomic energy development would take place there’.35 The Canadian cabinet minister C.D. Howe 
had even hoped ‘that the Canadian project would be regarded as the nucleus of the Empire’s future atomic 
effort’.36 This, of course, never materialized. Independence and Deterrence also picks up on the theme, 
apparent in Britain and Atomic Energy, of Canada as a mediating force between Britain and the United 
States. Canada, apparently, ‘could always appreciate much better than the British the viewpoint of her next-
door neighbour’.37 This, too, is a theme this thesis echoes.  
 
Nuclear history since Gowing has benefitted from the gradual (and imperfect) opening of relevant archives 
to public access. With greater freedom to cite original documents, contemporary historians have been able 
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to expand the scope of nuclear history pursuing their studies in one of two directions: towards holistic 
treatments of one major aspect of nuclear history, or towards more in-depth analyses of specific aspects. 
Both forms trace an inheritance to previous generations – where Britain is in any way in view, the debt to 
Gowing is almost ineluctable – but both also reflect more recent sensibilities: they generally make scant 
reference to the Commonwealth as an influence, or indeed a presence, in Britain’s nuclear history.  
 
At the more helpful end of the historiographical spectrum lies a useful monograph by Ferenc Morton Szasz, 
British Scientists and the Manhattan Project. Szasz seeks to deal explicitly with the British Mission at Los 
Alamos, rather than the wider British contribution, and so he has little to say about work conducted at 
Berkeley, Oak Ridge, or in Canada. His concern is rather with the experience and contribution of the British 
scientists (around twenty-four of them, ‘depending on how one counts’) who served at Los Alamos.38 He 
nevertheless offers some important analyses, arguing that the British consciously sought to supply a useful 
contingent to Los Alamos in full cognizance of the likely post-war benefits of exposure to the American-
led programme. Szasz also notes, very helpfully, the continuation of a British presence – and influence – 
in the American programme after the cessation of hostilities, pointing out that five of the British contingent 
(Bretscher, Mark, Penney, Titterton and Tuck) remained at Los Alamos into 1946, and that the latter three 
were involved in the Crossroads tests.39 He further reflects and bolsters the apparent consensus position 
that revelations as to the scale of Soviet espionage, and especially the extent of Klaus Fuchs’ knowledge 
and subsequent treachery, were the principal factor in blocking future nuclear collaboration.40 If a criticism 
must be levelled at this otherwise helpful and self-contained monograph, it is that its narrowness of focus 
shears it of context. No attention is paid to the experience – very nearly to the existence – of British 
Manhattan Project personnel outside Los Alamos (such as Oliphant’s team at Berkeley). There is, as a 
result, little reference to the wider significance of British nuclear work in North America. 
 
 
Commonwealth Historiographies, Nuclear and Otherwise 
 
The natural counterbalance to the limited (and often tangential) inclusion of Commonwealth factors in 
British nuclear historiography is to be sought in the perspectives of Commonwealth historians. Their 
accounts are no more holistic in their treatment of the issue than their counterparts elsewhere – in some 
senses they are noticeably more parochial – but they have the advantage of at least treating the dynamic of 
Dominion engagement with nuclear issues as one of first importance. It would be well, therefore, to 
consider the various countries’ nuclear historiographies in turn, before drawing some preliminary 
conclusions as to the adequacy or otherwise of the existing literature. 
 
First, though, it should be acknowledged that historical analyses of states’ early nuclear interactions with 
Britain will themselves be conditioned by wider historiographical trends. The interpretive lens through 
which the historian studies the past is inevitably influenced by their cultural milieu. This is especially 
evident in imperial history, for here deep historical and cultural legacies conspire with contemporary 
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discourses, such that each generation is shaped by its own experiences with (and attitudes towards) 
imperialism. These fresh lenses can serve welcome functions in redressing old historiographical injustices, 
but any process of reduction to a simple narrative, whether traditional or revisionist, invariably carries with 
it the risk of distortion, as such narratives supersede or mask the complexities of human history. There is 
in particular a tendency apparent in most of the former Dominions to present narratives of national 
independence which are overly linear in conception. Projecting backwards from current conditions of full 
sovereignty, accounts can often be premature in their identification of national distinctiveness, with the 
result that some sources, events and individuals – those that seem to reflect the progressive development of 
the nation – are privileged, whilst those that reflect less straightforward understandings of national 
development are seen as aberrations to be glossed over or explained away.  
  
Several distinctive traits in Canadian and Australian historiography should be acknowledged. First, in 
Canadian historiography, ‘imperial’ history has tended to be interpreted narrowly as ‘the bilateral study of 
Canadian-British events’,41 rather than as a more complex set of core-periphery and inter-territorial 
interactions. Second, Canadian historians have tended to view imperial/Commonwealth dynamics as either 
secondary to, or at the very least ‘augmented’ by, the trilateral US-UK-Canadian dynamic.42 Third, the 
Second World War is widely portrayed as the significant watershed in Canadian historical development, 
being held to have marked Canada’s transition to effective sovereignty. This image of a country ‘coming 
of age’ is widespread. It is found, for example, in J.L. Granatstein’s Canada’s War, which whole-heartedly 
affirms the wartime-transition narrative (‘By 1945 the world was different and Canada with it’).43 Most 
accounts of Canada’s interaction with the British nuclear programme have sought to fit this interpretive 
frame. 
 
Comparable tropes exist in Australian historiography: linear accounts of Australia’s inexorable march to 
independence and nationhood abound, with the world wars framed as crucial turning points.44 The excesses 
of such histories have, however, been countered by more nuanced analyses. Stuart Ward, for example, is 
dismissive of the tendency in Australian-nationalist historiography to portray the relationship between 
Britain and Australia in confrontational terms, with Australia seeking always to assert itself and break free 
from British oppression. This approach, he suggests, forces the historian to view every interaction either as 
a triumph of nationalist self-assertion, or else as a regrettable failure of will; it ascribes nationalist motives 
inappropriately, sees conscious conflict where none existed, and generally subordinates the historian’s 
dispassion to his nationalist sentiment.45 Ward is equally dismissive of historians’ propensity to identify 
‘turning points’ in Australian attitudes (the foremost example being the fall of Singapore).46 He rejects the 
commonplace idea that Australia’s wartime experience signalled (or confirmed) the ‘obsolescence’ of 
imperial ties, instead asserting the opposite: that the experience of conflict and vulnerability reinforced the 
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importance of the imperial relationship. Ward is not alone in having presented such arguments: a chapter 
by J.D.B. Miller in an earlier historical volume offers a similarly structured critique of nationalist historians’ 
tropes, including that of a straightforward transition from one protecting power (Britain) to another (the 
United States). Miller rightly allows political actors more nuanced views than those expressed in their 
speeches: ‘filial piety is capable of a variety of expressions’.47 Unfortunately these helpful admonitions are 
not universally reflected in Australian nuclear historiography.  
 
In spite of Canada’s early prominence in nuclear developments, relatively few Canadian historians have 
sought directly to address Canadian engagement with nuclear weapons in the period of their first 
development. A journalist, Wilfrid Eggleston, made an early foray (with official imprimatur) into the field, 
producing, in Canada’s Nuclear Story, a detailed technical narrative of the first two decades of Canada’s 
nuclear endeavours.48 Eggleston’s account echoes many of the themes present in Gowing’s Britain and 
Atomic Energy, which had been published a year earlier, including the sense that British mis-steps in the 
relationship with America had a concomitant negative effect on the Canadian project (the relevant chapter 
is titled ‘A Promising Partnership Deteriorates’), whilst also accentuating specifically Canadian 
achievements and emphasising Canada’s trajectory towards peaceful nuclear research and development.  
 
More general Canadian diplomatic histories of the wartime and early post-war periods – of which there are 
several – likewise vary significantly in quality. Two of the stronger are John Holmes’ and James Eayrs’ 
accounts, which merit recognition for their nuanced engagement with Canada’s nuclear experiences insofar 
as they influenced the country’s foreign affairs.49 Eayrs also advances the useful concept of Canada having 
‘grown up allied’ as a framework for interpreting Canada’s evolving relations with Britain and the United 
States. Yet their analysis is the exception rather than the rule: most pay scant or no attention to nuclear 
research, and almost never delve especially deeply into the technical and relational contingencies which 
ultimately determined the programme’s course. 
 
Perhaps the most valuable analysis (being more scholarly than Eggleston, and more technically attuned 
than Holmes or Eayrs) is Brian Buckley’s Canada’s Early Nuclear Policy.50 Focusing on the Canadian 
experience, Buckley nevertheless remains alive to Commonwealth dynamics and pays close attention to 
the nuances of the trilateral US-UK-Canada relationship. The reader’s attention is particularly drawn to the 
sheer contingency of Canadian policy-making, which is framed as little more than a series of ‘adaptive 
responses’ to external circumstances.51 Useful points are also made about the character of the post-war 
project as implicitly defence-oriented and the extent to which Canada’s wartime experiences and alliance-
dependent security context shaped official attitudes. Buckley’s close analysis is, however, the exception 
rather than the rule in later historiography. Other Canadian nuclear histories are chiefly concerned, like 
Eggleston, with the tracing the origins of the later, peaceful Canadian nuclear industry; they also tend to 
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emphasize distinctiveness in the Canadian experience rather than acknowledging commonalities among the 
allies. This is as apparent in the official histories as in the works of individual historians.52 There is 
something of a teleological impulse at work here: the assumption is that since Canada ultimately developed 
a peaceful independent nuclear programme, the trajectory of Canadian nuclear activity must always have 
been towards peaceful ends and independence.  
 
Australian nuclear histories are noticeably different in tone. Where Canadian narratives emphasise a 
trajectory towards independence and peaceful applications, Australian accounts fixate critically on their 
country’s apparent subordination to British interests. The root of this difference would appear to lie in 
Australia’s unique experience as a venue for British nuclear weapons testing. Although the British tests in 
Australia lie outside the period of this thesis, they have cast an inescapably long historiographical shadow. 
The 1985 report of the Royal Commission into British nuclear tests in Australia reflected the essentially 
hostile dynamic of the investigation (as well as the prejudices of its rather combative chairman, Jim 
McClelland).53 Capturing something of the anti-nuclear, anti-imperial zeitgeist in his country, McClelland’s 
report proclaimed, as it were ex cathedra, that British nuclear testing in Australia, and by extension all 
Australian interactions with the British nuclear programme, represented an aberrant episode arising out of 
a regrettable excess of imperial deference on the part of the presiding politicians; this was an unpleasant 
phase, belonging to a distant past, beyond which Australia had rightly advanced. This nationalist-flavoured 
teleology underpins most subsequent accounts of Australian nuclear interactions with Britain. The 
unspoken assumption is that the tests must be accounted for as an act of imperial imposition, and their 
ultimate disavowal by the Australian people and state must be construed as progress, the abnegation of a 
previous state of subjugation. A side effect of this is that data-points contrary to this narrative – the 
centrality of Mark Oliphant and the Australians’ persistent early efforts to secure greater involvement in 
the British programme, for example – risk either being passed over in relative silence, or being explained 
away as only minimally relevant.  
 
The strengths and weaknesses of this uniquely Australian-influenced pattern of analysis are evident in the 
works of three prominent historians of Australia’s nuclear experiences: Lorna Arnold, a Briton who wrote 
the official (British) account of UK nuclear weapons trials in Australia; Alice Cawte, an Australian who 
wrote on Australia’s entire atomic history; and Wayne Reynolds, an Australian who has explored several 
relevant facets of Australian nuclear history as it intersected with British imperial interests.  
 
To address Arnold first: in method, analysis and style her writing demonstrates a significant debt to 
Margaret Gowing, whom she had assisted in researching and writing Independence and Deterrence. The 
most relevant of her own works, A Very Special Relationship, provides the official account of British 
nuclear tests in Australia.54 The very name of the book conveys its premise: she explicitly credits the 
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existence of a ‘very special relationship’ between Britain and Australia as the enabling factor for UK 
nuclear tests. Yet somewhat paradoxically for a British-government sanctioned account, much of Arnold’s 
analysis sits within a nationalist interpretive framework. The reader learns that British co-operation with 
Australia on nuclear issues was cursory at best, and that ‘the overwhelming desire for a renewed Anglo-
American partnership, and the fear of spoiling chances of achieving it, inhibited all Britain’s other 
relationships’.55 For Arnold, the ‘very special relationship’ was emphatically that of a senior and junior 
partner. A work which might notionally have served as a riposte to the Royal Commission’s account thus 
seems uncritically to have adopted its premisses.  
 
Alice Cawte is less conflicted. She judiciously makes early reference to her ‘republican leanings’ as an 
influence on her understanding of UK-Australian dynamics, but is sufficiently dispassionate to 
acknowledge the discrepancy between her starting assumptions – which she outlines – and her eventual 
interpretation of the archival record.56 Cawte ably delineates early interactions between Mark Oliphant and 
the Australian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). She does little, however, to interrogate 
the assumption that Australian and British interests could be straightforwardly disaggregated. ‘The British’ 
remain conceptually ‘other’ throughout, and Australia is consistently assumed to have only independent 
interests. Cawte therefore struggles with the temptation to judge decisions retrospectively: at points, her 
account of Australian nuclear diplomacy seems almost to be highlighting missed opportunities, implicitly 
suggesting what should have been done for the benefit of Australia. Negotiations over co-operation with 
Britain are depicted either as fitting a straightforward quid-pro-quo framework, or as having failed to do 
so.57 Cawte cannot envisage any other dynamic between the two countries. The nearest she gets to a 
depiction of an alternative or more nuanced dynamic is in describing the Australians as believing in ‘an 
unstated arrangement…intuitive rather than contractual’.58 Cawte’s analysis of Britain’s wider post-war 
security position as it intersected issues of nuclear co-operation is concise and broadly conventional. Taking 
it as read that the war inflicted an ‘immense loss of power’ on Britain, she he highlights the tension between 
Dominion co-operation (‘one of the cardinal principles of British defence policy’) and the atomic 
relationship with the United States.59 
 
This essentially declinist interpretation of British policy can be profitably contrasted with the thesis 
advanced by Wayne Reynolds, who addressed the nuclear aspects of the Dominion relationship in a series 
of articles in the late 1990s, culminating in a monograph, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb. Reynolds 
posits a far more intentional, far more imperial conception of Australian engagement with British nuclear 
activity. His view is that the co-operation of the Dominions formed a crucial element in British post-war 
planning, including in the nuclear realm; in short, that Britain and Australia actively sought a ‘fourth 
empire’ based on nuclear weapons. 
 
Reynolds’ argument, though chiefly concerned with developments outside this thesis’ period, touches on 
issues discussed in the final chapter of this thesis. Although Reynold’s body of research contains much of 
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value, there is also much that is contestable. It is, however, important not to err into disproportion, or to 
reject his arguments out of hand, as some have: a poor critique by Anna Binnie brands Reynolds’ thesis as 
a ‘conspiracy theory’, refuses to accept any interpretation of Oliphant (’a great Australian’) as having ever 
supported nuclear weapons, and dismisses, almost in passing, the value of any source produced by 
politicians, on the grounds that they ‘are not known for their scientific expertise’.60 This approach, 
seemingly driven more by personal prejudice than close engagement with archival sources, is a good 
example of the approach this thesis seeks to avoid. 
 
New Zealand’s nuclear historiography is a less crowded, less contested space than that of its near neighbour, 
the emergence of New Zealand’s strong anti-nuclear culture in the later twentieth century having perhaps 
served to obscure knowledge of the country’s early dalliances with nuclear development. The most valuable 
treatment of New Zealand’s engagement with nuclear issues in the 1940s is Rebecca Priestley’s Mad on 
Radium: New Zealand in the Atomic Age.61 Like Cawte, Priestley is superficially influenced by the 
contemporary politics of her nation (in this case, supporting New Zealand’s contemporary opposition to 
nuclear weapons) but nevertheless retains sufficient objectivity to provide a useful account of the limited 
scale of New Zealand involvement in the UK/US programme, which she portrays as grounded, on the part 
of the New Zealanders, in a combination of the expectation of eventual advantages for New Zealand and 
an (unelaborated) sense of loyalty to Britain.62 Much of Priestley’s analysis of this period rests in turn on a 
useful and perceptive article by Ross Galbreath, highlighting New Zealand’s ‘Rutherford connection’ as a 
(partial) explanation for the country’s early engagement with British nuclear work.63 Galbreath’s contention 
is that the prestige accruing to the New Zealander Ernest Rutherford as the illustrious progenitor of nuclear 
physics as a discipline, coupled with the personal cross-commonwealth networks which Rutherford fostered 
in his lengthy career, served to position New Zealand as a natural and effective participant in British nuclear 
work. A detailed evaluation of the veracity of this concept is one of the subjects of the fifth chapter of this 
thesis. Here, it suffices simply to note that Priestley and Galbreath both advance conceptions of New 
Zealand’s disproportionately significant contribution as owing to a combination of strong personal 
networks and an ethos – part latent, part instilled – of assumed compatibility between national/New Zealand 
and British/imperial interests. There is no particular tendency to emphasise distinctiveness (as per Canada) 
or to castigate imperial connections (as per Australia).  
 
Regarding South Africa - the least involved of the Dominions in this period – very little has been written, 
for other than in the context of a thesis such as this there is comparatively little to write. Relevant content 
is limited to a handful of journal articles, often on tangential issues. A recent paper by Lucky Asuelime on 
the ‘Uranium Politics of Gatekeeping’ [sic] does, however, furnish a useful set of insights on British 
interactions with the Union over uranium resource issues, and presents a strong argument that Britain, cast 
as the junior partner in the post-war relationship with the United States, sought actively to leverage its 
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Defining the Historiographical Gap 
 
It is evident from this review of the contours of nuclear history that much has been written that is relevant 
to the question of Commonwealth involvement in the British nuclear programme, but that little has been 
done to address the question directly. That the Commonwealth held at least some significance for nuclear 
policy-making during and after the war is readily apparent: one need only consider the full involvement of 
Commonwealth personnel in the programme, the immense scale of the undertaking at Montreal and Chalk 
River, and – beyond the immediate period of this thesis – the relative ease with which British nuclear trials 
were arranged in Australia. What is absent in every case is the comparative element: a whole-
Commonwealth approach is never enterprised, and tentative recognition of the importance of 
Commonwealth dynamics never progresses to deeper analysis. Each of these examples has attracted at least 
passing interest from academic historians, but what is missing is the holistic view, the integrated approach: 
no attention has been paid to the common thread binding such otherwise disparate topics as the career of 
Mark Oliphant, the designing of the ZEEP and GLEEP reactors, and the frantic worldwide search for fissile 
material. The contention at the heart of this thesis is that the Dominion dynamic in its myriad forms acts as 
the common denominator in these and other instances, and that historical analysis is hampered by the failure 
to incorporate reference to it. In particular, there has been no effort to produce a narrative of the programme 
sensitive to the relationships which in some measure underpinned British policy-making. The gap in the 
historiography is not necessarily vast, but it is substantive: addressing it will enhance historians’ 
understanding of a field which remains undeniably complex. 
 
It is in addressing this neglected factor, then, that this thesis’ chief contribution will lie. The thesis rests on 
two foundational premisses. The first is that the known involvement of Commonwealth personnel in the 
programme is a phenomenon meriting explication. The second is that the Commonwealth existed as an 
influence on British strategic thought and as a daily reality for thousands of British and Commonwealth 
citizens. The impact of these phenomena on the British nuclear weapons programme consequently merits 
assessment. The question guiding this thesis can be therefore be cast as follows: What was the significance 
of the Dominions’ interactions with British nuclear research and development work in the pursuit of 
nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom (a) for the United Kingdom itself, and (b) for the Dominions, 
individually and corporately? 
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The Task and the Tools 
 
How then to proceed? The task is clear enough: attention must be paid to the previously neglected aspects 
of early British nuclear history represented by the concept of Commonwealth, through a thorough 
reconsideration of each stage of that history. The principal tool for achieving this must be exhaustive 
archival work: the mode of analysis is to be the close reading and explication of archival material, illumined 
by (and in conversation with) existing scholarship. Accounts which are concerned only with exchanges 
between statesmen –manifesting in infrequent messages, and even rarer meetings, between Prime Ministers 
and Presidents – necessarily overlook these lower strata, and thereby miss crucial detail, for in scientific 
diplomacy, perhaps more so than in other forms, the parameters for interaction are set largely at the 
operational, rather than the executive level. To achieve exhaustiveness in archival work requires 
consciously pressing beyond the level of ministerial and prime-ministerial decision-making to the strata 
where scientists and civil servants themselves engaged with the questions at hand – for it is here, arguably, 
that the true substance of nuclear history will be found to lie.  
 
It is important to note, however, that this thesis is not primarily concerned with the study of previously 
unknown (or even especially underutilised) archives: the vast majority of the materials consulted here have 
been accessed by historians, including several whose works are referenced in the discussions above. The 
innovation here instead lies in the angle of attack. The intention is to approach the material with a greater 
degree of sensitivity to Commonwealth dynamics than is reflected in existing accounts – not in order to 
impose Commonwealth interpretations where there are none, but rather to detect the presence of 
Commonwealth interactions where these have been ignored. Such an approach is entirely in line with this 
thesis’ working hypothesis that the Commonwealth played a more significant role in the UK nuclear 
weapons programme than has previously been acknowledged.  
 
The source terrain for this thesis is vast and by definition multi-national. Myriad official papers relating to 
the MAUD Committee, Tube Alloys, and the post-war project are held by the National Archive and were, 
until December 2018, freely accessible.65 The National Archive’s papers relating to Tube Alloys and the 
early years of British nuclear activity – which form the greater part of the mass of primary sources consulted 
for this thesis – fill several hundred files, covering every aspect of policy, administration and technical 
deliberation. Multiple government departments were involved in the nuclear project at various stages, and 
this is reflected in the wide distribution of relevant content: there is the ‘AB’ file series, relating to the 
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and its predecessors, the ‘PREM’ and ‘CAB’ series, comprising 
materials associated with the Prime Minister’s office and the Cabinet, and myriad smaller clusters of files 
in series relating to the predecessors of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the erstwhile Ministry of 
Supply, and various branches of the British security and intelligence apparatus. In each case, files and 
papers are arranged along primarily administrative lines, a set-up somewhat inimical to the straightforward 
identification of sources relevant to a thematic thesis. This distribution of material across a multitude of 
files has the effect of diluting the various ‘signals’ for which the researcher is searching in reams upon 
reams of ‘noise’. This, indeed, may help explain why important but less immediately prominent aspects of 
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the UK nuclear programme (including, if this thesis’ hypothesis is correct, the involvement of the 
Dominions) have thus far been overlooked by historians. 
 
Other sources of relevance exist elsewhere in the Commonwealth. Significant overlap between the contents 
of the various national archives could be posited, but not taken for granted, so materials from Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand were consulted. Papers relating to the Canadian project, and Canadian nuclear 
policy in general, are held by Library and Archives Canada; here, too, the distribution of material proved 
inimical to speedy research. Materials on wartime and post-war nuclear research and development are held 
in the National Archives of Australia at Canberra, and in New Zealand by Archives New Zealand; in both 
cases there is valuable material on the countries’ experiences of engaging directly and indirectly with the 
British nuclear project. Meanwhile the immense volumes of material generated in the United States were 
not consulted: the British and Commonwealth protagonists of this thesis did not possess the luxury of 
knowing the Americans’ secret counsels, and to have delved too deeply into the American archives would 
have been to imperil the thesis’ Commonwealth focus.  
 
Regarding the sources themselves, there are several broad classes of useful material. Minutes, memoranda 
and technical documents help trace the formal progress of the UK programme through its various stages, 
as well as to determine the roles played by specific individuals and to track the officially sanctioned flow 
of information. The MAUD Committee papers and those of the Tube Alloys organisation are particularly 
valuable in this regard. Files of correspondence, meanwhile, serve multiple useful purposes. Formal 
correspondence serves much the same function as memoranda and minutes, in delineating official positions 
and anchoring the factual account. Some forms of correspondence do, however, offer far greater levels of 
insight. Broadly speaking, the less official the purpose, or the warmer the personal relationship, the more 
likely it is that a set of letters will reflect an individual’s private opinions. The less guarded nature of some 
correspondence can also indicate possible informal means of decision-making and information 
transmission (Mark Oliphant’s particular culpability in this respect is discussed in later chapters). These 
two source-types form the foundation for much of the research here.  
 
Several other comments on the scope and parameters of the thesis are in order. In determining the precise 
period to be covered, it was felt necessary to resist the temptation to use a nuclear explosion as the endpoint 
of the narrative. To conclude with Trinity, Hiroshima or Nagasaki would be to conclude too early, for the 
nuclear bureaucracies’ transitions from war to peace are hugely illuminating. Yet to extend the thesis to the 
first British test in 1952 would draw in myriad additional concerns (including Cold War geopolitics and 
masses of technical discussion). The nuclear decision of January 1947 is a convenient middle-ground 
between these two milestones, and serves as an appropriate book-end, since it represents the end of the 
United Kingdom’s ‘early’ nuclear history and the commencement of a qualitatively new phase in its 
relationship with nuclear weapons. 
 
Bounds must likewise be set on the countries to be considered under the umbrella of the terms ‘empire’, 
‘commonwealth’, and ‘dominion’. ‘Empire’ and ‘commonwealth’ were to some extent interchangeable 
terms (and in this period were sometimes combined) but carried different emphases: the former was 
redolent of colonialism and direct rule from London, whilst the latter (somewhat self-consciously) posited 
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a freer association, echoing Seeley’s concept of ‘Greater Britain’. The label ‘dominion’ interfaced more 
naturally with the ideal of ‘commonwealth’, therefore, since it, too, reflected the idea of a progression 
beyond British control. Dominionhood was a constitutionally fluid status, shaped but not fixed by the 1926 
Balfour Declaration and the 1931 Statute of Westminster, but also reflecting deep-seated (and often poorly 
articulated) concepts as to the bounds of Britishness and the extent to which the empire-commonwealth (or 
at least its white anglophone subjects) formed a single nation. Dominionhood is therefore understood here 
in terms that would have been familiar to this thesis’ subjects, as a status that was part constitutional, part-
psychological. The web of relationships between Britain and the Dominions, and between the individuals 
who lived in them, shaped attitudes on a foundational level, determining who was ‘British’ and who was 
‘foreign’; who could be trusted and who could not; who could be expected to be co-operative and who 
would look only to their own interests. Such concepts were, in a sense, so grounded in culture as to be 
invisible to those within that cultural setting. The human subjects of this thesis could be powerfully guided 
by their understanding of ‘Commonwealth’ without ever making it explicit. There is certainly little reason 
to expect concise definitions and qualifications in the sources consulted. The work of analysis must 
therefore, in some instances, be interpretive. Moreover anomalies abounded. In this period Éire and 
Newfoundland were Dominions in name only, the former having forsworn any connection with Britain, the 
latter having had to accept a Commission of Government in consequence of the Great Depression. India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) would not attain to Dominionhood until after the period of this thesis – 
though the anomalous position of the Raj earns it some reference in the pages that follow. Southern 
Rhodesia possessed some of the features of a Dominion, without having formally attained the position. In 
effect, then, the thesis is concerned with Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa – the oldest, 
most firmly established of the Dominions – whose standing as so-called ‘white settler colonies’ had granted 
their (white) populations the status of British subjects, legally indistinguishable from their counterparts in 
the United Kingdom. Colonial territories – those administered directly from London, with no or restricted 
capacity for self-determination – lie outside the ambit of the thesis, save where referenced for comparison, 
or as part of a wider discussion of imperial dynamics. 
 
No claim is made to comprehensiveness beyond these narrow bounds of period and scope. For example, 
French engagement with the British nuclear project is considered only where directly relevant to this thesis’ 
interests, or else to provide a contrast with the Dominions’ experiences – a shame, for it is a subject meriting 
closer attention. Nor has direct reference been made to American perspectives on Dominion interactions 
with allied nuclear endeavours, save as these were guessed at or interpolated by British or Dominion 
observers, for whom America was an entity to be dealt with, whose whims were to some extent opaque and 
whose policy-making was inscrutable. Here, too, there is space for much profitable archival work: 
American policy-makers’ perspectives on the British empire remain largely opaque.  
 
Finally, whilst a key contention of this thesis is that histories composed of monolithic statements of a 
nation’s policy are hopelessly reductive, the emergence of cliques and caucuses is a perennial feature of 
government and bureaucracy, and it is appropriate sometimes to identify the commonalities upon which 
institutions, or factions within institutions, rested.66 If there is an official mind of imperialism, there is 
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perhaps also a scientific mind. Some measure of synecdoche is therefore unavoidable. References to states 
– ‘the British’, ‘the Americans’, ‘the Canadians’ – should thus be taken as convenient abbreviations for the 
collective policy-making apparatus (in the British cases, the MAUD committee, Tube Alloys, etc.), 




The underlying intention of this thesis is to contribute usefully to historians’ understanding of the early 
development of the British nuclear programme and of the processes by which nuclear knowledge and 
capabilities did (and did not) permeate the British Commonwealth. The thesis itself is arranged 
chronologically, proceeding from the outbreak of war in 1939 to Attlee’s formal decision in January 1947 
that Britain would proceed with a nuclear weapons programme (though part of the underlying argument 
here is that this decision had, in fact, been made in principle far earlier). The chapters themselves are, 
however, thematic, addressing key issues analytically within a broad narrative framework.  
 
The first chapter is concerned with the initial conditions governing the British nuclear programme. As well 
as providing an enhanced narrative of the formation and deliberations of the MAUD Committee, it draws 
attention to the processes by which UK-based personnel from the Dominions enjoyed implicit trust and 
were able to participate in secret scientific research as freely as Britons, in contrast with allied and émigré 
scientists, who were treated with a great deal more suspicion. The chapter proceeds to identify early nuclear 
interactions with Canada, traces the first emergence of the idea that some or all of the British work might 
be transferred to North America, and emphasises the early significance of the Australian physicist Mark 
Oliphant.  
 
The second chapter covers the period in which the centre of gravity of nuclear research shifted, seemingly 
inexorably, across the Atlantic. It traces the implementation of the MAUD report’s recommendations and 
the corresponding intensification of Anglo-American interactions on issues concerning nuclear fission. The 
chapter outlines the challenges inherent in this relationship, and in realising large-scale work whilst 
retaining influence vis-à-vis the Americans, and identifies the factors which led the British to embrace the 
idea of a laboratory in Canada as a means of leveraging the Americans towards collaboration in other fields.  
 
The third chapter discusses the crisis precipitated in January 1943 by the imposition by the Americans of 
new terms for collaboration. The chapter analyses British and Canadian efforts to ameliorate these 
conditions, exploring the processes by which British officials sought to reassess their position whilst also 
considering uniquely Canadian perspectives. These trilateral interactions culminated, after a tortuous 
diplomatic effort, in the Quebec Agreement of August 1943, a reconsideration of which concludes the 
chapter.  
 
The fourth chapter considers the course of the Canadian project after the Quebec Agreement. It is shown 
that Quebec in itself did not settle the question of Anglo-American-Canadian co-operation, and that it was 
only after a further round of negotiations that a consensus was reached and large-scale work in Canada 
began. The post-Quebec process of discussion is seen to have encompassed thorny questions about 
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leadership, and to have prompted the British to think seriously about the relationship with Canada and the 
wider ramifications of collaboration with the Americans and Canadians. The chapter concludes with an 
analysis of the late-war tripartite nuclear relationship in practice.  
 
The fifth chapter covers broadly the same late-war period as chapter four, but addresses the experience of 
the other Dominions, who from this point onwards were able to interact increasingly directly with British 
nuclear work, including through the United Kingdom contributions to the Manhattan Project. Close 
attention is paid to the processes by which Australia and New Zealand both sought to position personnel 
within the British programme: their differing experiences are instructive. The chapter also evaluates British 
efforts to leverage Commonwealth connections in support of resource acquisition. 
 
The sixth chapter is concerned with post-war planning. It traces British efforts to reconfigure wartime 
expectations to suit the new conditions prevailing in the post-war world, and assesses the extent to which 
it was hoped that the Dominions might figure within these new plans. The chapter addresses immediate 
post-war uncertainties around the future of the Chalk River research establishment, portraying a period of 
awkward readjustments in the Anglo-Canadian nuclear relationship. The chapter lastly considers the 
processes by which Britain sought, hesitantly, to articulate a more conscious policy of Commonwealth 
collaboration, and closes at the moment when the UK government formally committed to the pursuit of a 
nuclear weapon – a decision which, it is argued, had been made in principal many years previously, as 
much by instinct as by intent.  
 
The essential contention of this thesis is that existing accounts have paid insufficient attention to the role 
of the Commonwealth in shaping the development of the UK nuclear weapons programme in its earliest 
stages, and that this omission slightly distorts historical understanding. This thesis therefore seeks to redress 
the balance, by stressing the fact that the gradual, piecemeal emergence of nuclear knowledge meant that 
the Dominions – or at the very least Dominion personnel and capabilities – became integral to the UK 
nuclear weapons programme more or less organically. The habitual assimilation of Dominion subjects into 
British society, and the wartime integration of Dominion personnel into the British war effort, ensured that 
neither the programme nor the secret could be kept exclusively ‘British’. As the bomb’s viability and 
destructive potential dawned on officialdom, it became abundantly clear that a degree of restraint was 
required, and that sensitive information on nuclear issues ought not to be transmitted beyond the bounds of 
necessity; yet the borders of knowledge were always porous. Though there was no need at this stage for 
any Dominion other than Canada to be brought formally within the nuclear pale, the message still spread. 
Through Oliphant and others, the Dominion governments learnt that nuclear weapons seemed viable, and 
that Britain was working on them. Whether it had been by accident or design, those who became privy to 
the nuclear secret did what they could to capitalise, motivated by a combination of national self-interest 
and willingness to support the Britain in a potentially war-winning endeavour.  
 
As the nuclear centre of gravity shifted westward, the particular importance of Canada increased. With the 
American future of the project now assured, leveraging of the Canadian connection became a key 
instrument of British nuclear policy. Canada’s location – immune to bombing, near to the US – and its 
ability to provide technical and financial support meant that Britain was able to retain close links with the 
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by now American-dominated programme (and, crucially for the post-war programme, to keep near pace 
with American research). The Montreal Laboratory and the smaller British missions in direct support of the 
Manhattan Project were jointly able to keep Britain in the nuclear game. Scientists from across the 
Dominions played a crucial role: witness particularly Oliphant’s work with Ernest Lawrence at Berkeley 
and Oak Ridge, and Charles Watson Munro and his fellow New Zealanders’ work on reactor designs in 
Canada. Little of this was accidental. Efforts to include Dominion personnel were in many instances acts 
of conscious policy by the Dominions themselves – or by others acting on their behalf. A key case here is 
Mark Oliphant’s effort to ensure that at least a handful of Australian personnel could take part in the 
programme, in order to gain exposure to the concepts and technologies involved. Then, as the war drew to 
a close, with Allied victory and American possession of a deployable bomb both increasingly certain, the 
prospect of a radically different post-war order began to shape thinking. For Britain, there was a haphazard 
and only partially conscious effort to repatriate the knowledge gleaned by participation in the (by now 
emphatically American) nuclear programme, and to envisage a route forward for Britain and her global 
(/imperial) interests. The process revealed the tension at the heart of Britain’s post-war nuclear policy-
making. Britain hoped, on grounds of both well-established imperial instinct and geostrategic pragmatism, 
to incorporate the Dominions into its atomic defence plans, yet Britain could not escape from the new 
strategic reality: the United States possessed the bomb, the power, and thus the ascendancy. The view from 
Whitehall was that Britain needed above all to retain a functioning nuclear relationship with the greater 
power. Such a relationship was incompatible with Commonwealth dynamics as practiced and envisaged 
from Whitehall. The Americans would never stand for it. This reality came ultimately to overshadow all 
other factors in British policy formation – including all the old strategies of empire – throughout the long 




The Earliest Stages 
 
 
This chapter is concerned with the earliest origins of the UK nuclear programme. It covers the two-and-a-
half-year period from early 1939, when the concept of the fission-based weapon was yet undefined and its 
viability unproven, to the completion and dissemination of the final MAUD Committee report in the 
summer and early autumn of 1941, by which stage it had become abundantly clear that nuclear weapons 
research merited whole-hearted pursuit. In this brief period the idea of a nuclear weapon passed from the 
realm of abstract supposition, publicly doubted by most physicists, to a place in the first rank of British 
wartime priorities. The process by which this transition took place merits close attention. The chapter’s 
function is essentially preparatory: it serves to introduce and contextualise some of the key phenomena in 
the history of Commonwealth engagement with the British nuclear programme. Subsequent chapters will 
build on the foundations laid here, tracing the thread of Commonwealth dynamics from their emergence as 
default assumptions and instinctive responses to their acme as a central influence on the UK nuclear 
programme.  
 
As nuclear issues began their (initially slow, then increasingly rapid) ascent of the UK government’s 
priorities list, a host of pressing issues emerged. These were questions demanding immediate, and therefore 
instinctive, answers. How best should Britain seek to explore the emerging nuclear opportunity? What sort 
of person could be trusted with the secrets of this promising new technology? As the balance began to shift 
from scepticism to belief, the questions became ever more urgent. Where should development work be 
undertaken, and by whom? How should it be funded? Where might the men and materials be found for 
such an endeavour, in a wartime economy, on a blitzed and vulnerable island? Might it not be better to seek 
partners overseas? If so, with whom could Britain hope to partner? More vital still, whom could Britain 
trust? And perhaps already at the backs of some of the more percipient minds, that most existential question: 
what might an atomic world look like for Britain and her interests?  
 
Each of these questions, and the mode of their answering, intersects, in one form or another, with the 
question of Commonwealth dynamics. Levels of trust accorded to individuals depended on their national 
backgrounds; dissemination of information and plans for collaboration were shaped by Commonwealth 
ties. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the extent to which the Commonwealth figured in British 
thinking during the ‘emergent’ phase of the nuclear weapons project, and, moreover, to ask how conscious 
a process the varying forms of Dominion involvement really were. This goal is pursued through four stages. 
First, consideration is given to the initial conditions from which the UK nuclear programme emerged. Here, 
the primary focus is on the different experiences of émigré personnel on the one hand, and British and 
Dominion scientists on the other. The next section presents a narrative of the first, faltering efforts of the 
MAUD committee to comprehend the scope and implications of the uranium question, and to articulate an 
adequate institutional response. This naturally demanded engagement with potential partners outside the 
United Kingdom – the first and most prominent of which is shown to have been Canada, rather than the 
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United States. This section on early contacts is concerned primarily with questions of materials and 
knowledge transfer. The next section has in view the weightier matter of where in the world a nuclear 
development programme should be based. The actual transfer across the Atlantic of the bulk of the work, 
along with much of the initiative, is the proper subject of Chapter Two, but attention here is paid to the 
question of when and how the idea first arose. Here, again, Canada is seen to have been more prominent in 
policy-makers’ thinking than is often implied in the literature. Finally, a close examination of the role of 
Mark Oliphant highlights and clarifies his significance as an early influence on the UK programme and 
more widely, as well as amply demonstrating the potential for individuals from the Dominions to exercise 




There is no space for teleology in the history of nuclear weapons. A wartime atomic programme was not 
inevitable, in Britain or elsewhere, but rather was contingent on myriad minor judgements of viability, 
priority and strategic imperative. The watchword for this period in British nuclear history should therefore 
be uncertainty: uncertainty as to whether the known phenomena around nuclear fission really had any 
possible military application, and uncertainty also as to the extent of enemy progress in answering that 
question. Decisions were made with limited information, in response to emerging evidence, in conditions 
of secrecy and fear. There was no blank-slate moment for project design: the men setting the direction of 
the programme had to craft it from existing structures, physical and psychological, in the face of conflicting 
concerns and competing priorities. If this thesis is to achieve its goal of analysing Commonwealth 
involvement in the British nuclear programme, it is important to begin by defining the initial conditions – 
that is, by describing the context from which the UK nuclear programme emerged. This must encompass 
both an overview of the state of weapons-relevant nuclear physics research at the outset of the war and a 
discussion of particular relevant characteristics of the initial research; namely, that the personnel involved 
were not solely British, but instead had varied origins, and that the dynamic by which Dominion personnel 
participated was from the outset distinct from that applying to other nationalities.  
 
To describe fully the rapid advancement of nuclear physics in the late 1930s would be the work of several 
volumes, but the features salient to this thesis are, mercifully, easily outlined.67 The three great loci of 
nuclear physics research in the in the 1930s were Britain, America, and mainland Europe. Throughout the 
decade, distributed across a dominant handful of laboratories, and connected by a close international 
network of collaboration, transparency and peer-review, physicists made rapid progress in their analyses of 
the structure of the atom and the phenomenon of radioactivity. Building on foundations laid by the previous 
generation of experimentalists (above all, by the New Zealander Ernest Rutherford) a succession of 
discoveries each suggested further possibilities for research. In 1932 James Chadwick discovered the 
neutron, which almost immediately earned him the Nobel Prize. The same year, John Cockcroft and Ernest 
Walton ‘split’ the nucleus. Around the world, teams of physicists sought to emulate these breakthroughs, 
and much useful data was obtained. This rapid pace of discovery further accelerated in the twilight months 
                                                   




of European peace. Otto Hahn in Berlin produced a set of startling results regarding the neutron 
bombardment of uranium, which Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch were then able to interpret theoretically.68 
Their concept of uranium fission (so named by Frisch) suggested that the liberation of vast amounts of 
energy would be possible, if only a chain reaction of neutron fission could be produced. This was a dreadful 
prospect: the immense energetic potential of the atom had long been known in physics, but the prospect of 
its actual release at human instigation had for decades been predicted only in science fiction. Now, for the 
first time, the weaponization of nuclear physics had become a realistic prospect. Yet there remained a 
limiting factor: it had also been proven that only the isotope U-235, which comprises less than one per cent 
of natural uranium, was fissile. It therefore appeared that a chain reaction of sufficient rapidity could not, 
in fact, be produced. It was a straw at which many fearful physicists would clutch in the coming months. 
 
War intervened at a crucial moment in this rapid scientific advance. A progression to fully-fledged nuclear 
breakthrough was not at this point inevitable (there remained several theoretical and experimental hurdles 
to be cleared) but the possibilities inherent in uranium fission had begun to emerge. These advances had, 
until 1939 (and later, in some contexts) been public: physics in the 1930s, as now, was an essentially open 
system, with findings shared freely and reflexively through dedicated journals, conferences, and myriad 
interpersonal contacts. Britain, France and Germany can all therefore be said to have entered the war with 
the same essential data, and the same tantalising possibilities, plural, in (distant) view. Yet as the fog of 
war descended, the collegiality of pre-war science was lost: the major players in physics could no longer 
rely on access to, or even knowledge of, the findings of others outside their own immediate communities. 
The previously free exchange of ideas could not be sustained, and for most of the European nuclear 
physicists there must now be other, more immediate priorities: survival for some, war-work for others. Yet 
the final pieces of the theoretical puzzle had already fallen, almost unnoticed, into place. All that remained 
was for someone within the (admittedly somewhat distracted) fraternity of physics to alight on, and pursue, 
the correct line of enquiry.  
 
This ultimately occurred in Birmingham, in the first few months of 1940. Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls, 
both rendered effective exiles from Nazi Germany by dint of their Jewish descent, had each been invited to 
join the Physics Department at Birmingham by its ambitious new Professor, Mark Oliphant.69 Together, 
informally, they were able to make the final conceptual leap: as they discussed a range of hypotheticals, 
they realised that if the proportion of U-235 could be sufficiently enhanced, the critical mass required for 
supercriticality (that is, an exponentially increasing sequence of fission reactions, leading to an explosion) 
would be on the order of kilograms – which in turn implied that a uranium fission device might be realisable 
as a deliverable weapon. This was information of potentially war-shaping significance, as Frisch and Peierls 
were immediately conscious. The usual procedure for such a breakthrough in physics – immediate 
publication and widespread dissemination – was impossible. Yet the two physicists still felt that the 
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information must be shared in at least some quarters. It was, wrote Peierls, ‘our duty to inform the British 
government of this possibility’, though this must be done subtly: it would not be well to draw attention to  
their idea.70 
  
They therefore went ‘to talk it over with Oliphant’.71 Much more will be said in due course about Mark 
Oliphant’s own, significant contribution to British nuclear history; at this point it is sufficient to note not 
only that the first two individuals in Britain to recognise the pathway to an atomic weapon were both 
considered ‘enemy aliens’, but that the third, Oliphant, was not unambiguously British either: he was, by 
birth and education, Australian. He was, however, a natural choice of confidant: a senior colleague and 
proven friend to both men, Oliphant was also known already to be engaged in secretive war work for the 
British government.72 He would know how to access the appropriate channels for passing on information, 
whereas by their own admission Frisch and Peierls ‘did not know how to send a secret communication, or, 
for that matter, where to send it’.73 Frisch and Peierls thus committed their reasoning to paper for onward 
transmittal via Oliphant, their instinct for secrecy stretching as far as to have Peierls type up the 
memorandum himself. Only a single carbon copy was made.74 Frisch and Peierls’ analysis was brief and 
entirely to the point: in two sections – a technical discussion, and a more accessible set of explanatory and 
policy-oriented comments – they explained the basic principle of the bomb and the necessity of enrichment 
(an obstacle they considered ‘by no means insuperable’). The potential cost was described as ‘not 
prohibitive’. It was understood that the resulting explosion would ‘probably cover the centre of a big city’. 
Mass casualties were therefore in view – Frisch and Peierls were entirely upfront about the fact that ‘the 
bomb could probably not be used without killing large numbers of civilians’. Indeed, if viable, ‘the super-
bomb would be practically irresistible’. Most troublingly, they presented an assessment of possible German 
capabilities in the area: 
 
We have no information that the same idea has also occurred to other scientists but since all 
the theoretical data bearing on this problem are published, it is quite conceivable that 
Germany is, in fact, developing this weapon75 
 
In the face of such grave uncertainty, the call to action was unavoidable: ‘immediate steps should be taken’. 
Oliphant seems immediately to have recognized the significance and soundness of the memorandum. He 
passed it on to Sir Henry Tizard, Chairman of the Air Ministry’s Committee for the Scientific Survey of 
Air Warfare, vouching for his protégés’ scientific reasoning and amplifying their call for immediate action. 
From Tizard came the inevitable bureaucratic response: a committee should be formed. It was, however, to 
be a small committee, to assemble soon; its task would be ‘to advise what ought to be done, who should do 
it, and where it should be done’.76 Oliphant was to be a founding member; Frisch and Peierls were not 
invited. In this committee, which would later be named MAUD, the later UK nuclear programme had its 
genesis.  
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This bare-bones narrative corresponds with that to be found in the majority of the literature. It is not, 
however, the complete story. The progression of nuclear physics in 1939 had not gone wholly unnoticed 
by government. Throughout 1939, the emerging possibilities were, as a later summary for the Prime 
Minister put it, ‘widely discussed’ among scientists, many of whom had strong ties with the various 
interested government ministries.77 The physicist A.M. Tyndall, of Bristol, had prepared a report in the 
May of 1939, addressing ‘The Possibility of Producing an Atomic Bomb’.78 This was a remarkably 
prescient analysis for so early a date, containing as it did speculations about the mechanism of chain 
reaction, the industrial potential of a moderated reaction, and the likelihood that only a particular isotope 
of uranium might prove fissionable. Tyndall’s conclusion was that existing experimental programmes 
should be closely watched, and if necessary encouraged financially – a responsibility that fell to the 
Committee on the Scientific Survey of Air Defence, with the Air Ministry as the financially responsible 
department.79 Nor was this the only prod. A group of concerned scientists in Cambridge had even 
approached their MP – though this action led to little more than a brief meeting with Tizard and agreement 
to make ‘discreet soundings’ in Belgium as to uranium sources there.80 That such discussions had borne 
little practical fruit was evident from the desultory official efforts made in subsequent months. By July 
1939 the government had secured a (small) supply of uranium oxide, and the physicist G.P. Thomson had 
begun performing funded experiments at Imperial College, but there was no real sense that any further steps 
needed to be taken (for example, to close down international uranium supplies). Rather, it was felt that ‘the 
position is satisfactory… all that requires to be done is being done’.81 The experimental results had thus far 
been inconclusive, bordering on discouraging,82 but various scientists – including the eminent James 
Chadwick – were nevertheless conducting preliminary, exploratory work, with official cognisance, in 
laboratories around the country.  
 
Acknowledgement of this early exploratory work modifies, but need not overrule, the narrative around the 
origins of the MAUD Committee. The lack of urgency evident in the pre-war period, which carried over 
into early 1940, certainly reflected a degree of complacency, but also stemmed from the burden of 
conflicting priorities. The British scientific establishment had more pressing concerns, and compared with 
the tangible promise of radar the realm of nuclear fission still seemed abstract and speculative. In a time of 
such uncertainty, little more could be spared for nuclear science than a watchful eye. The significance of 
Frisch and Peierls’ memorandum was not in its having spontaneously inspired the British programme, but 
lay rather in the fact that their solid theoretical advance came swiftly to the attention of an apparatus which, 
in its own languid way, had been looking out for such a sign. Their memorandum should therefore be 
understood to have catalysed, rather than strictly precipitated, Britain’s wartime nuclear research.  
 
Frisch and Peierls’ experience as émigré also highlights crucial aspects of the construction of British 
networks of trust. The emergence of uranium fission as an alternative to radar in claiming physicists’ 
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national priorities precipitated a manpower crisis. Uranium’s transition from marginal curiosity to state 
secret was swift, and the requirement for trusted personnel was immediate. Yet trust was in understandably 
short supply in wartime Britain, and enemy aliens – even those with an obvious antipathy to Nazism – were 
the natural focus of popular suspicion and official sanction. The foreign authors of the catalysing 
memorandum could not, therefore, be called upon to deliberate its implications. Worse still, they might yet 
be detained as security threats. Frisch was especially vulnerable: unlike Peierls, he had not been naturalised 
before the outbreak of war and was therefore, in the worst-case scenario, at risk of internment for the 
duration.83 Neither scientist had been permitted to work on radar, despite the fact that Oliphant and his team 
at Birmingham were hard at work on improving the British equipment; they were banned even from the 
building where the work was taking place.84 That said, the bounds of secrecy at Birmingham were far from 
absolute (it was, in Frisch’s words, ‘a bit of a charade’).85 Oliphant would sometimes go so far as to ask 
Peierls ‘hypothetical’ questions, which Peierls would then set out to solve for him. Both men knew what 
purposes those calculations could serve; neither let on. This liminal existence – personally trusted by 
Oliphant, and presumably others, but officially excluded from secret work – could hardly be reconciled 
with the sudden importance their memorandum gave them.  
 
Secrecy, though, was the default position: a message reached Frisch and Peierls, via Oliphant, informing 
them that whilst the authorities were grateful for the memorandum, ‘as actual or former “enemy aliens” we 
would not be told any more about it’.86 Frisch and Peierls’ input was not desired in anything other than 
trivial, arms-length forms. This, thought Frisch, was ‘obviously inefficient’.87 Peierls made representations, 
via Oliphant, to the unknown chairman of the new committee, appealing directly to the national interest, 
rather than dwelling on any perceived slight, and hoping soon to be cleared to join the discussions.88 This 
was what ultimately transpired: cleared by intelligence in June 1940, after three months of background 
checks, Frisch and Peierls were granted membership of the newly-formed technical committee (but not its 
policy-oriented counterpart).89 Even with such accommodations, however, it can hardly be said that these 
two scientists’ early engagement with the nascent British nuclear programme was straightforward. 
Transferring Frisch to Liverpool to join James Chadwick’s team there generated a significant paper trail as 
the requisite permissions for an enemy alien to move into a protected area (Liverpool being a strategically 
important port-city) were sought.90 No such difficulties were encountered with the movements of Dominion 
personnel, for whom the only administrative burden, applying only to younger men, was exemption from 
war service.91 
 
The experience of Frisch and Peierls thus highlights the barrier to inclusion faced by émigré scientists, no 
matter how well-integrated: their national background – their residual non-Britishness – made instinctive 
trust impossible. Nor was the case of Frisch and Peierls necessarily representative of the treatment of émigré 
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scientists more widely. As Peierls had modestly pointed out, a secret they had discovered could hardly be 
kept from them, however much authority might ordinarily mistrust them. For those émigrés lacking 
equivalent exposure to the relevant information the barriers to inclusion were higher still: if not insuperable, 
then at least extremely forbidding. A relevant case is provided by three physicists at Bristol – Heitler, 
Fröhlich and London – who as Jewish refugees had left Germany c.1934-5. By 1940 they were in Bristol, 
and in June the question arose as to their future there: the law required that they be expelled from the city, 
and only the prospect of their involvement in uranium research offered the chance of a reprieve.92 The 
scientists had colleagues willing to vouch for them, but their inclusion was by no means assured – indeed, 
it was instinctively resisted by Thomson and officials of the Ministry of Aircraft Production when the issue 
came to their attention.93 Those closest to the decision-making heartland were least minded to permit their 
involvement, or in any way to vouch for them. Thomson partially relented a little later, conceding that they 
might be permitted to do relevant work provided that Chadwick directly asked for assistance, and that the 
work they were given should be sufficiently generic as not to give away its purpose. He stated his concern 
directly: ‘there might be a leakage of information’.94 The fear was not unfounded: Heitler and Fröhlich 
were both permitted to conduct research on the terms listed above, but the later discovery that they had 
inadvertently been permitted to view papers relating to MAUD prompted a flurry of strongly worded re-
iterations of the project’s secrecy, replete with invocations of the Official Secrets Act.95  
 
It is clear, then, that an element of suspicion of émigré scientists was the default status, amongst the 
administrators of the project as much as in the eyes of the law. The application may have been patchy, and 
there was likely little malice in it, but the operating principle was undoubtedly that unless otherwise proven 
necessary no émigré should be entrusted with tasks or information relevant to MAUD, regardless of their 
bona fides. What is crucial to note here is that no equivalent principle of exclusion existed for 
Commonwealth personnel. Consider Mark Oliphant: privy to the crucial secrets of radar, able to access 
Tizard on behalf of Frisch and Peierls, and immediately co-opted onto the investigatory committee; at no 
point do the archives reflect any suggestion that he should have been subject to any form of screening. 
Other Dominion personnel were accorded comparable levels of trust and responsibility without any 
substantive process of security clearance or review. The same letter from Thomson that sought to distance 
Heitler, Fröhlich, and London from any of the sensitive aspects of the work in Bristol envisaged no issues 
with the involvement of J.K. Roberts, an Australian, and his assistant, Orr, (‘who for a wonder is [also] a 
British subject’); indeed, the only challenge was to ensure that Orr should be exempted from being 
summoned for service elsewhere.96 
 
Every nation had entered the war with access to the same baseline understanding of physics, but the war 
itself had curtailed the usual processes of international knowledge transfer and had redistributed the global 
physics fraternity. Britain was a net beneficiary of the latter.97 Émigré scientists contributed significantly 
to the British programme in all its varied wartime forms. Ultimately, though, where access to nuclear secrets 
was concerned, two categories existed: the implicitly trusted and the instinctively excluded. Membership 
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of the former category was restricted to Britons and British subjects from the Dominions, who were, indeed, 
treated as indistinguishable. All others – enemy aliens and allied scientists alike – were by default consigned 
to the latter category, and could only be drawn within the nuclear pale under exceptional circumstances. 
The barrier to non-Britons was certainly never absolute, and adequately vouched-for personnel from allied 
or neutral states (e.g. Halban and Kowarski from France, Egon Bretscher from Switzerland) would go on 
to make significant contributions to the British programme throughout the war, but it is striking to note the 
extent of the privilege which, by default, encompassed Dominion scientists within Britain.  
 
First Contacts with Canada 
 
Initial conditions for nuclear research in Britain, then, appear to reflect a paradox: the MAUD committee 
and its precursors were at once greatly influenced by external actors and yet profoundly restrictive of all 
but British and Dominion participation. This section progresses from that starting point. From a close 
analysis of the MAUD Committee’s recorded deliberations it is possible to trace the evolution of Britain’s 
approach to nuclear weapons development, and to identify the influence and relevance of the 
Commonwealth within that process. The intention here is not to repeat existing accounts of the Committee’s 
deliberations – Gowing’s account is exhaustive enough – but rather to highlight those strands of 
Commonwealth involvement which have tended to be overlooked or downplayed, and particularly to situate 
emerging attitudes towards the involvement of the Canadian government in the context of British official 
attitudes, especially as regarded the United States. 
  
It was clear almost from the outset that the tasks of the MAUD Committee – assessing the technical 
feasibility of the bomb and envisaging the aptest pathway to its construction – could not be pursued without 
reference to activity outside the United Kingdom. There was the obvious need to track enemy activity, but 
also the countervailing need to determine the extent of, and if possible secure access to, the endeavours of 
allied and neutral parties. There was also the dual imperative to secure stocks of uranium from the enemy 
and for British use. Finally, as the necessary scale of the weapons programme became apparent, there was 
the question as to where facilities might be built. In addressing each of these issues, the MAUD Committee 
eventually looked across the Atlantic to the United States, greatest of the uncommitted powers, and, at the 
same time, to the British Dominion to its north. 
 
The as-yet nameless committee to discuss the implications of the Frisch-Peierls memorandum first met at 
2:30pm on 10th April 1940, at the Royal Society.98 Its chair, by a process of bureaucratic inertia rather than 
any particular inspiration, was the same G.P. Thomson whose experiments had thus far succeeded only in 
vindicating the scepticism of external observers.99 Joining him at this first, somewhat informal meeting 
were the rather more dynamic figures of John Cockcroft, Mark Oliphant and Philip Burton Moon – all 
alumni of the Cavendish laboratory, and all already indoctrinated into the secrets of scientific warfare. Also 
present, for a time, was Jacques Allier, a Frenchman bearing news of the extent of a research programme 
under Frédéric Joliot-Curie which had been transferred to the French Ministère de l'Armement in February 
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1940.100 Nor had Allier brought only news: he had been responsible for the safe transport to Britain of the 
entire available stock of Norwegian heavy water. The meeting seems not to have lasted especially long, 
and the minutes ran to less than a small handwritten page. The committee’s default starting position was 
one of doubt – perhaps tinged, in several cases, with an earnest desire that weaponised fission prove 
impossible or impractical. Still, the precautionary principle demanded that the matter be investigated. The 
only resolutions were to pursue further small-scale experiments, to impress upon Frisch the importance of 
secrecy, and to approach Norman Haworth, a chemist at Birmingham to conduct preliminary work on 
separation. The latter tasks fell, naturally enough, to Oliphant. Allier’s presence notwithstanding, this first 
meeting can hardly be said to have had a global outlook.  
 
When the committee reconvened a fortnight later, though, international concerns were far more in 
evidence.101 The same attendees, plus Chadwick, and without Allier as a guest, resolved (at last) that steps 
be taken to ascertain the status and safety of Belgian uranium stocks. Equally importantly, a request was 
sent to the biophysicist A.V. Hill, at that point engaged on liaison work in America, asking him to find out 
about any activity of interest in the United States. Hill’s task was hopelessly broad, but the committee’s 
initial glance across the Atlantic did presage a sustained exchange of relevant information, leading, 
ultimately, to the American decision to pursue nuclear weapons. Hill’s first report, however, was 
discouraging: on 16th May, the committee learned of the American view that there was ‘no possibility 
within practical range of using uranium either as a power source or as an explosive’.102 (Though Hill also 
sent the committee a number of newspaper cuttings that seemed to suggest otherwise).103  
 
In the course of the next few meetings, two other issues with international dimensions came increasingly 
to the fore. These were, first, the question of uranium supply, the investigations begun after the first meeting 
not having produced wholly reassuring results; and second, the question of where the slow neutron work 
of the French émigrés Halban and Kowarski, now safely domiciled at Cambridge, should be located. These 
two priorities would between them form the basis for Canada’s incorporation into the UK nuclear 
programme. 
 
Canada had first been earmarked as a known source of uranium in July 1939, as part of the United 
Kingdom’s first, tentative enquiries into the military potential of nuclear research, but no branch of 
Canadian government or academia had been approached directly at that point.104 The earliest direct 
communications were instigated by Cockcroft, more or less informally, and concerned the supply, not of 
uranium, but of heavy water. In April 1940, between the first and second MAUD meetings, Cockcroft 
contacted R.W. Boyle, a Newfoundland-born physicist now serving as a senior figure in the Canadian 
National Research Council (NRC), enquiring whether heavy water could be obtained in Canada, and if so, 
in what quantities.105 The perturbing response was that stocks were unexpectedly low.106 These inquiries 
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seem, to have been made at least partially at the behest of the French: Allier wrote to Cockcroft in May 
1940, on the subject of heavy water, invoking an earlier promise by Cockcroft to make enquiries on the 
topic in the United States and Canada.107 At any rate, the French were being kept closely informed of the 
Canadian heavy water position: when Boyle telegrammed Cockcroft regarding Canadian supplies on 16th 
May 1940, Cockcroft soon after told Allier the outcome.108 It is important to note, too, that Boyle’s enquiries 
on Cockcroft’s behalf were not solely domestic: he also reached out to American suppliers in an effort to 
ascertain their capabilities, faithfully passing on their responses.109 These extraterritorial enquiries were 
made in the name of the NRC only; no connection with the UK was avowed.110 It is unclear how 
representative Boyle’s attitude of ready co-operation was of the NRC as a whole, but his (semi-official) 
correspondence with Cockcroft certainly reflects personal warmth and solidarity.111 
 
The Cockcroft-Boyle route was not the only form of Anglo-Canadian nuclear contact established during 
the summer of 1940. Other enquiries were transmitted through different channels (and do not appear to 
have been shared with the French). Questions were asked directly of the NRC about available uranium 
stocks and the potential ability of the Canadians to produce uranium metal.112 This set of enquiries, 
transmitted through departmental channels, met with a prompt response: the Canadian physicist G.C. 
Laurence was enlisted to make enquiries. At around the same time, James Chadwick learnt from the chemist 
Otto Maass of the Canadians’ success in producing uranium metal; Maass even pledged to secure some for 
him. That this was an unofficial contact is evident in Chadwick’s reaction: his interest piqued, he now cast 
around to discover ‘the proper method of approach’.113 Nothing in the correspondence, official or otherwise, 
suggests that the NRC yet had any sense – at an institutional level at least – of the reason for British interest 
in the material; only a handful of more or less fanciful applications are referenced as possible explanations 
for earlier German interest in Canadian supplies.114 The Canadians were, however, able to report (via their 
Department of External Affairs: evidence that these enquiries, at least, were passing through the ‘proper’ 
channels) that they had been working on various production methods and alloys of uranium.115 This in itself 
was significant news to the British.  
 
Was there, then, an endogenous Canadian scheme? Cockcroft, who crossed the Atlantic as part of the 
famous ‘Tizard Mission’ to share some of the fruits of British technological prowess to the United States, 
had also various errands in Ottawa, which included the making of enquiries as to the precise status of 
Canada’s capabilities.116 The British emphasis at this time on establishing the ‘position of the work in that 
country’ certainly implies a genuine ignorance,117 and the phrasing of Cockcroft’s report on his discussions 
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at Ottawa makes clear that at least some of the ongoing Canadian work was not conducted under UK 
oversight:  
 
I have attended a meeting of the N.R.C. and have learned all the work proceeding in this 
country. In general it is proceeding on rather parallel lines to ours, with no outstanding 
developments of greater promise than our own work. They had done a fair amount of work 
on the preparation of uranium hexafluoride…118 
 
One might thus justifiably speak of Canadian nuclear research as initially independent, in that nuclear 
research had taken place of the Canadians’ own volition, not at the behest of the UK. This is not to imply 
that the Canadian work was a nascent weapons programme, though: Laurence’s work was tangentially 
relevant, inspired by the pre-war acceleration of nuclear physics work, but until contacts developed with 
the MAUD Committee his research was small-scale and far from programmatic. The prompt from MAUD 
led, however, to an immediate reconfiguration, aligning it more directly with British interests. Laurence 
and his team subsequently made good use of the technical details (and occasional steers) they received from 
Britain, with the result that several papers – on specific technical issues and on the general state of North 
American nuclear research – were fed back profitably to London.119 The value the British set by this 
(admittedly small-scale) work is apparent in the later willingness of MAUD Committee members to seek 
methods by which it could be sustained.120 Even at this early stage it is therefore clear the MAUD 
Committee’s contacts with Canada were no mere transfer of knowledge from one side of the Atlantic to the 
other: it was, from the outset, a reciprocal interaction.  
 
There remains also the question of how much the Canadians were told, when, and how explicitly. As the 
MAUD report would eventually make clear, the lines on which the committee was working were considered 
to be such ‘as would be likely to suggest themselves to any capable physicist’.121 Canada certainly 
possessed a handful of such physicists, some of whom – Laurence and Maass – have already been 
referenced. The flurry of urgent queries from London relating to the securing of uranium stocks was at the 
very least highly suggestive. Members of the NRC certainly inferred enough from the international 
situation, and from British comments, to have recommended, as early as June 1940, a prohibition on the 
export of uranium from Canada.122 By the end of July it was reasonably evident to the Canadian government 
that the United Kingdom, for whatever reason, had developed an interest in uranium metal; the number of 
requests passing to the NRC through the High Commission proved as much.123 From August onwards it is 
evident that the NRC as an institution was beginning to develop a clearer sense of the specific nature of the 
British interest, for in answer to a question on the uses of uranium hexafluoride the formal response fixated 
on isotope separation, there being few other purposes to which the compound might, in their view, be 
usefully put.124 The arrival of the British physicists Ralph Fowler in Ottawa to conduct general scientific 
                                                   
118 Extract Cockcroft to Gough, 11th October 1941, AB 1/219 (TNA) 
119 cf. Cockcroft to Fowler, 18th Feb 1941, AB 1/346; Fowler to Cockcroft, 24th Feb, AB 1/233 (TNA) 
120 Cockcroft to Fowler, 8th January 1941, AB 1/346 (TNA) 
121 MAUD Committee Report, July 1941, AB 1/347 (TNA) 
122 Snelling to Skelton, 20th June 1940, AB 1/346 (TNA) 
123 Snelling to Gough, 27th July 1940, AB 1/346 or AB 1/210 (TNA) 




liaison would also have allowed face-to-face discussion for the first time, and it may be that a restricted 
few within the NRC had therefore been briefed fully on ‘the uranium position’ by early August.125 Those 
familiarised with MAUD’s activities would have included Boyle, as the initial contact, and C.J. Mackenzie, 
the Acting President of the NRC, who had become the conduit for the formal contacts between DSR and 
the NRC. The other most likely inductee is Laurence, who in addition to having already shared details of 
his own work, had taken a leading role in the NRC’s enquiries in the United States. In December 1940 he 
produced a remarkably thorough set of notes on ‘Nuclear Fission Research in the United States’, which 
covered the topics of isotope separation, uranium hexafluoride, metallic uranium, chain reaction physics, 
and uranium stocks.126 The specificity of his enquiries, and his grasp of the technicalities in each area, imply 
that he had been well-briefed on UK interests; if not, these were remarkably accurate educated guesses. It 
is not therefore stretching the evidence too far to suggest that by late summer 1940 the NRC could 
realistically have claimed to have learnt the basic scope and direction of MAUD’s investigations. It may 
remain an open question as to when Canada was formally inducted into the nuclear secret, since Fowler’s 
writ may not have extended further than the giving of personal briefings to chosen confidantes, but it matters 
little in comparison with the key point, which is that the informal induction of Canadians into the UK’s 
emerging nuclear research programme took place, piecemeal, through the summer of 1940.  
 
The Canadians thus became recipients of significant volumes of information, comparable to (and likely in 
excess of) the volumes passing to the United States at this time. Relevant papers were sent from Britain to 
Canada, partly to support the research being undertaken there, but also as a form of insurance policy. This 
was, after all, a vulnerable period in the war for Britain. In September 1940 there were discussions as to 
whether some of Peierls’ MAUD papers on isotope separation should be forwarded to Cockcroft, who was 
visiting Canada, in order that they might be ‘deposited with the N.R.C. for safe keeping’.127 In the event, 
the papers were sent directly to Mackenzie: the covering note for the first batch (on separation) made clear 
that the papers were to be used by the NRC (‘The papers will…certainly be of interest to those of your staff 
who are connected with this problem’) but that Canadian custody of the information they contained also 
represented a precautionary measure (‘In any case I would like to ask you if you would be good enough to 
preserve these papers in safe keeping for us against unforeseen contingencies’).128 Other papers sent 
included portions of Halban’s slow neutron work. In all, Canada received information almost equivalent to 
the basis of a full nuclear development programme. 
 
Little has been said here about Britain’s corresponding contacts with the United States in the same period, 
not simply because these contacts have received adequate attention elsewhere, but also to redress the 
balance. Instead, it is important to recognise that British nuclear interactions with Canada began early, and 
were not simply a later adjunct to contacts with the United States. This emphasis on early Anglo-Canadian 
interactions is, however, somewhat contrary to the implication even of many Canadian histories. Brian 
Buckley’s Canada’s Early Nuclear Policy, one of the best Canadian accounts, does briefly acknowledge 
that Canada was ‘not without assets in the field’, and recognises Laurence’s independent work, but his 
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assessment is nevertheless that Canada’s wartime endeavours in nuclear physics ‘arose largely from the 
complexities of the Anglo-American nuclear relationship, rather than any strategic initiative by Canadian 
scientists or policymakers’.129 In and of itself, this statement is accurate enough, as the subsequent chapters 
will attest, but it carries with it the unfortunate implication that Canada was wholly marginal to British 
decision-making until far later into the war, and that the Canadian role was far more passive than was 
actually the case. Canadian personnel and resources were not simply subordinated to British requirements: 
this was, from the outset, an interaction between active parties. British interest in Canada was bolstered by 
Canada’s own interest in the field. Had Laurence or Maass been occupied with other interests, and had 
Boyle and his colleagues been less amenable to Cockcroft’s queries, the initial contacts between the two 
countries would have been fewer and more cursory, and the later appeal of Canada as a location for nuclear 
work – still less as a partner in that work – would have been correspondingly less. What Buckley glosses 
over, and other accounts have missed altogether, is that the MAUD Committee’s first glance across the 
Atlantic took in both Canada and the United States, and that the Canadian connection was no mere after-
thought, but rather the forerunner of the more complex ties that would later emerge between the three 
parties.  
 
Looking Across the Atlantic 
 
Fostering a dynamic of exchange is one thing; the commencement of a joint programme is another. The 
idea that the UK might base some or perhaps almost all of its nuclear work overseas, whether in Canada or 
otherwise, was not initially in view. Only with historical hindsight does the impression emerge that the 
British immediately sought to place their research outside the UK (rather than simply to engage in dialogue 
with external partners). The idea of crossing the Atlantic in fact emerged fitfully, and was prompted in part 
by wartime exigencies: Britain was, after all, within range of German bombers throughout this period, and 
any programme in the British Isles, however covert, would have been acutely vulnerable. Two other factors 
contributed, however: the ongoing development of contacts with both Canada and the United States, 
providing a significant lure, and the need to find an appropriate home for the French émigré scientists acting 
as a push-factor. Both of these factors have been underdeveloped in existing scholarship, and are therefore 
explored in depth here. 
 
Hans von Halban and Lew Kowarski, two scientists from Joliot-Curie’s laboratory, had been among the 
many Frenchmen who had managed to flee the fall of France and take refuge in England. They had brought 
with them a significant quantity of heavy water and an enviable knowledge of slow neutron reactions. They 
could undoubtedly be of great value to the British programme, if only they could be satisfactorily 
incorporated into its still rather ad hoc structure. The two scientists wished to continue their research – 
indeed, felt honour-bound to do so – but were not necessarily content to remain in the United Kingdom, 
where resources and safety were equally scarce. The nature of their integration into, or perhaps more 
accurately, the terms of their co-operation with the nascent British nuclear programme, became another 
vexed issue for MAUD to address. 
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The matter was considered at length in the MAUD Committee, though too slavish an adherence only to the 
formal record might give a false impression. In the minutes of the fourth MAUD committee meeting, held 
on 10th July, the Halban-Kowarski issue received little attention, the upshot of the apparently brief 
discussion being simply that the committee would prefer them to stay in the UK, but that since Halban had 
professed himself unwilling to do so, the idea of their working in ‘America’ (a potentially ambiguous word) 
would be explored. Canada is scarcely mentioned, save in two resolutions: that Thomson should instruct 
Fowler, before the latter left for Canada, to ‘make informal overtures with regard to Canadian and American 
co-operation’, and second, that Cockcroft should make further enquiries about the prospects for obtaining 
heavy water from Canada.130 The former resolution tentatively envisaged tripartite co-operation, the latter 
addressed only an issue of supply, but both at least foresaw a role for Canada in what was still very much 
intended as a British-dominated endeavour. Yet the participants’ correspondence immediately after the 
meeting gives a different (and far more confusing) impression. Oliphant’s understanding on 11th July was 
that a transfer to the United States was proposed.131 Cockcroft, on the 12th, accepted the premise that Halban 
should work ‘in America’ in one letter, whilst questioning it in another (‘I think the question… should 
depend upon the conclusion of a general understanding with the U.S.A’; ‘I think that it is best to work on 
the assumption that he will work in… Ottawa’).132 In a further letter on the same day, to Fowler, to whom 
the task of Canadian liaison had seemingly now fallen, Cockcroft managed to give the impression that the 
committee favoured sending Halban and Kowarski to Canada to work under the NRC, with no reference to 
the United States.133 A few days later, both Cockcroft and Chadwick seemed to have settled on the 
assumption that Canada was the preferred option, which Chadwick personally opposed: ‘I think the decision 
to allow them to work in Canada is really wrong although it may perhaps turn out well enough’.134 The 
reason for all this confusion is unclear: Cockcroft’s early departure in the final stages of the committee’s 
discussion cannot have helped, but even this does not explain Chadwick’s similar vacillation between the 
two possibilities, or the stark discrepancy between the content of minutes and the evidence of the 
correspondence. 
 
More perplexing still is Halban’s own account of the meeting, as recorded in a typed diary for 1940 now 
held in the National Archives. In the diary, Halban describes several meetings with MAUD Committee 
members in the run-up to the meeting. He was particularly scathing about G.P. Thomson (‘remarkable 
ignorance.... The whole level of the conversation was extremely low’), but was far more complimentary 
about Chadwick, whom he records as having pointed out ‘that it might be wise to shift the whole work to 
Canada where conditions might be more favourable for long term research’.135 This statement is difficult 
to reconcile with the opposition Chadwick expressed to the idea a fortnight later, unless either Chadwick’s 
mind had been changed in that time, or Halban’s account is faulty. Halban’s account of the fourth meeting 
itself is no more helpful: in it, Halban records his remarks to Thomson (who is again criticised, this time as 
‘unco-operative’ and ‘unpolite’): 
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I informed him that our intention was to help the British War effort and that it was our greatest 
desire that any progress in the chain reaction field should be obtained in England, that in 
proposing Canada we thought to go there as a British team reinforced by British scientists...136 
  
This implies that the idea of working in Canada had originated with Halban and Kowarski themselves, or 
at least that they had been the ones to raise it with the committee. (If the former, Chadwick’s apparent 
support a week previously may perhaps be explained as a result of his having reflected back to Halban, it 
may be over-politely, Halban’s own idea). Halban then describes a scene in which he and Kowarski, having 
left the meeting, were waylaid by Thomson, who told them that the consensus was now that the US would 
be better than Canada. This conversation, continued in a taxi, concluded with Thomson telling them not to 
hold out too much hope about Canada, but reassuring them that Fowler would at least make enquiries in 
Ottawa. Finally, Halban cites a meeting with Cockcroft two days later in which Cockcroft was again 
described as having understood that Canada was the preferred option.137  
 
These are remarkable and suggestive claims. The Halban diary is, however, a problematic source for this 
period, for two reasons. First, despite superficial appearances, it cannot be contemporaneous: Halban at 
points reflects on the long-term significance of some of the incidents he describes, meaning that the text 
was, at the very least, substantively edited at a later (conceivably post-war) date. Second, the dates he 
provides are demonstrably inaccurate. His diary places the fourth MAUD committee meeting – the context 
for a significant discussion, which he recounts at length – on Wednesday 7th July 1940. No such date 
occurred in 1940: 7th July fell on a Sunday. The official minutes of the meeting correctly place the meeting 
on Wednesday the 10th.138 As a source, the diary is therefore vulnerable to the charges of inaccuracy, non-
contemporaneity and – most damning – of advancing some particular agenda (of which disparaging G.P. 
Thomson appears to be a part).  
 
Allowing for all of these caveats, and placing little analytical weight on the specific claims of the Halban 
diary, a number of points can nevertheless be taken as settled. First: Canada seems to have been discussed 
seriously as an option for hosting aspects of the British programme, distinct from and perhaps ahead of the 
United States, at the MAUD meeting on 10th July. Second: regardless of the idea’s precise origin, Halban 
and several of the committee appear to have been amenable to the transfer of the work to the NRC. Third: 
others, including, it seems evident, the chairman, were more seriously opposed to any Canadian venture, 
with some strongly preferring the United States. Fourth: the minutes in the National Archive are not, for 
whatever reason, a comprehensive reflection of all that was discussed. 
 
Fowler, having faithfully discharged his investigatory mission in Ottawa, gave his assessment of the 
prospects for placing a British nuclear team in Canada. He concluded that Canada was ‘the ideal place for 
the work’, but that it was perhaps rather a ‘stiffish proposition’ to expect them to take Halban and Kowarski, 
who were largely unknown on that side of the Atlantic.’ 139 The Halban-Kowarski conundrum was not the 
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only item of MAUD business with a transatlantic component, however. It would be well to recall that 
Halban and Kowarski’s work was on slow neutrons, and was therefore considered a distinct sub-category 
of fission research, by no means the most promising from a military perspective. Fast neutron research, as 
conducted by Chadwick, seemed more urgent – a point Oliphant had made to Cockcroft:  
 
Under the circumstances I agree with the general conclusion that Halban and Kowarski 
should work in America…. I am afraid that I still feel that if this work is important enough 
to go to America, the work which Chadwick has undertaken is still more eligible for that 
move.140 
 
It was, moreover, becoming clear that large-scale uranium enrichment work would also be required, and 
could not easily be undertaken by Britain’s hard-pressed war industry. Fowler, aware of all this, pointed 
out that the Canadians would welcome British fast neutron researchers like Chadwick ‘with open arms’.141 
It is clear, then, that when the British first began to envisage any of their work crossing the Atlantic, Canada 
was seen as the likelier and to some extent preferable candidate. The mantle of leadership in nuclear 
research had not yet passed to the United States, and though interaction with the Americans was to be 
welcomed, the instinct was nevertheless still to work, where possible, with the Canadians. More 
fundamentally, a clear sense was emerging that however desirable a wholly British-located scheme would 
be, at least some of the work must be conducted in North America. 
 
The Significance of Mark Oliphant 
 
As his frequent appearances in preceding pages demonstrate, Mark Oliphant was a figure of some 
significance in the early stages of the UK nuclear programme. This section seeks to outline the extent of 
his early influence, and to highlight his position as the first and most privileged of the many Dominion 
scientists to have engaged with sensitive aspects of the British nuclear programme. This shift from the 
general to the particular – from the abstract interactions of committees and government departments to the 
role of a single individual – is not intended to represent a departure from the theme of the chapter thus far, 
but rather to reinforce it. The contention of this thesis is that from first to last, Commonwealth dynamics 
played a significant role in shaping the development of the UK nuclear programme. This is as true at the 
individual level as at the structural. If anything, these dynamics were more pronounced in the lives of 
individuals, since they emerged from lived experience rather than the more nebulous phenomenon of 
institutional consensus. Paying close attention to Oliphant’s role, then, serves to highlight a unique 
commonwealth experience and, in so doing, to cast light on the mechanisms by which Dominions could 
later engage with the British nuclear programme.  
 
The first thing to note about Oliphant is the extent of his integration into the formal and informal networks 
that would later underpin the British nuclear programme. Although born and educated (to undergraduate 
level) in Australia, Oliphant had been in Britain since 1927. A decade at the Cavendish, the imprimatur of 
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Rutherford’s approval, and an eventual appointment as Poynting Professor of Physics at Birmingham all 
served to place Oliphant firmly within the ranks of the British physics establishment. He was therefore 
doubly trusted, as a British subject (there was no legal disaggregation of UK-born Britons from Australians-
in-Britain at this point) and as a vouched-for colleague. His early initiation into the secrets of British radar 
– which had come, via Cockcroft, in the autumn of 1938 – reflected as much.142 Oliphant’s ostensibly 
unsought position as champion of Frisch and Peierls’ memorandum (the first and most foundational of his 
contributions to nuclear weapons history) was not, therefore, out of place: rather, it was entirely 
unremarkable that a well-regarded Australian physicist, long domiciled in Britain, should be able to access 
the upper echelons of British defence science, and equally unsurprising that he should have been be co-
opted into relevant work on behalf of the British government.  
 
Oliphant’s patronage of the Frisch-Peierls memorandum was certainly crucial to its uptake: without his 
active support and engagement, its conclusions might well have gone unheeded, or unread. It matters, 
therefore, that Oliphant understood, endorsed, and acted swiftly upon the conclusions with which he was 
presented in the spring of 1940. This thesis certainly cannot aspire to the level of omniscience claimed by 
Oliphant’s biographers, who depicted their subject ensconced in ‘the quiet of his office’, reading the 
memorandum ‘with a mixture of excitement and consternation’,143 but Oliphant’s own covering letter to 
Tizard, in which he strongly commended the work, can at least be taken as evidence of his willingness to 
advocate personally for further exploration.144 Oliphant’s words carried weight: they prompted the 
formation of the MAUD Committee, from which, ultimately, emerged the British wartime nuclear 
programme. Oliphant’s, then, was a significant role: he had been the crucial conduit to government, and 
thus a key participant, along with Frisch and Peierls, in the catalysing process. 
 
Yet it would be wrong to cast Oliphant only as the right man in the right place at the right time, as though 
his role in the story were simply to recognise good work and dutifully pass it on. In the spring of 1940 
Oliphant was already working on uranium problems – and not from mere intellectual curiosity, as per 
Laurence in Canada, but in conjunction with government defence science. That Oliphant had engaged in 
nuclear physics work is of course no great revelation, his entire scientific career to that point having been 
in that area, but the closeness of his engagement with government, and the clear military implications of 
his non-radar work c.1939, are somewhat striking. Witness an administrative letter from Henry Tizard (he 
of the Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence, amongst other government roles) dating from 
May 1939, referencing an offer of official help for Oliphant’s ‘preliminary’ work on the uranium problem; 
Oliphant, in responding, requested a few pounds of ‘reasonably pure’ U3O8, from which he would work 
on the manufacture of uranium metal.145 Even more compelling is the letter he wrote on 30th May 1939 – 
before Frisch had even arrived in the UK – to the American physicist Ernest Lawrence:  
 
We are very interested at this time in the problem of nuclear fission and in the possibility that 
it may at some time prove to be a source of power or of explosion. I am quite sure these 
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possibilities are very remote, but the Defence authorities here feel that there must be absolute 
certainty that no possibility is overlooked in this direction, as there are rumours that great 
developments have taken place recently along this line in Germany146 
 
This alone is evidence enough to identify Oliphant as one of the very few active, well-informed participants 
in the (admittedly still small-scale and speculative) uranium work referenced in previous sections. On 24th 
August 1939 Oliphant again wrote to Lawrence, reporting in significant detail on his progress: he explained 
that he was interested in fission, that he reckoned isotope separation would be required, and that he was 
therefore looking into thermal diffusion processes.147 
 
All of this casts new light on Oliphant’s role in the uptake of the Frisch-Peierls memorandum, transforming 
him from an essentially passive actor, responding to the work of others, into a potentially far more dynamic 
initiator of action. Indeed, it leaves open the possibility that Frisch and Peierls’ ‘hypothetical’ discussions 
about uranium fission may have been rather more directed than their later accounts seem to imply. 
Oliphant’s biographers Cockburn and Ellyard seem little interested in evaluating their subject’s actual 
engagement with the uranium question in this period, but even they note how greatly Oliphant stood to 
benefit from Frisch joining Birmingham, if only as an impressive addition to his fledgling physics 
department.148 How much more beneficial, though, to have brought the leading expert on uranium fission 
to one of the very few places in the country where the possibility of weaponising uranium fission was under 
active consideration! 
 
Oliphant was one of the most prominent early members of the MAUD committee. As outlined above, the 
bulk of the actions taken after the first meeting – actions relating to recruitment and security – fell to him. 
His interventions in subsequent meetings were perhaps fewer in number than others of equivalent rank – 
he was, after all, less directly involved in the practical work – but were nevertheless salient and seem to 
have carried significant weight in shaping the conclusions of the committee. His was a positive voice, 
noticeably more open than others of his colleagues to the idea of co-operation with the Canadians and/or 
Americans. Note, for example, the prescient call to action in his contribution to the third technical meeting 
of the MAUD committee:  
 
Professor Oliphant considered that the time had come to take a decision regarding the future 
of the work…. He considered that the work could not be profitably done in this country for 
this war and suggested that it would be desirable to send Dr. Halban and his team to Canada 
and make the work a co-operative effort between the United States and Canada.149 
 
Oliphant’s official standing within MAUD declined as the work of the Committee itself gained momentum, 
and after the distinction was made between the policy and technical functions of the committee (from 17th 
September onwards) he would attend only those sessions relating to the latter.150 This was a relegation of 
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sorts, but not ultimately a substantive one: Oliphant had other pressing priorities, including his longer-
established work on radar, and the streamlining of the policy committee did not prevent Oliphant continuing 
as an advisor and confidant to those more closely concerned with the Committee’s research. This, in fact, 
was Oliphant’s main form of influence during this period, more so than through MAUD meetings 
themselves. The papers of the MAUD Committee reveal a core membership, composed of Thomson, 
Chadwick, Cockcroft, and Oliphant, to whom almost all papers were habitually circulated.151 This extended 
well beyond the formal circulation of minutes: almost all new developments, whether regarding technical 
matters or intelligence on the German programme, were discussed between these four men, with Oliphant 
often the most engaged.  
 
Oliphant, then, was both influential and atypical. He had shepherded the British programme into existence, 
and had helped catalyse the American work. The picture that emerges is of an activist physicist, not content 
simply to be consulted, but willing rather to agitate, on both sides of the Atlantic, for actions he thought 
necessary. This was a man temperamentally and situationally suited to the playing of a central role. None 
of this is meant to imply that these factors in Oliphant’s influence owed, somehow, to his Australian 
heritage. Nationality is seldom the main determinant of one’s character, and portraying individuals as 
representatives of some national archetype, common though it may be, is either poor scholarship or lazy 
writing. At this stage, it mattered little that Oliphant was from Australia: he differed from his colleagues in 
no sense, save in his proactivity. Later, though, his heritage would come to matter a great deal.  
 
Conclusion: MAUD and the Commonwealth 
 
A chapter concerned with initial conditions must strike a delicate balance between nescience and prescience 
as regards what must follow. On the one hand, origins matter: it is reasonable to suggest that in the earliest 
stage of any great endeavour might lie the germ of its eventual course. Yet contingency matters too, and 
subsequent events can overshadow or drastically redirect early trends. This is certainly the case in nuclear 
history, where the later prominence of the United States casts a long historiographical shadow, and where 
the nuances of Britain’s early, tentative engagement with nuclear weapons research can therefore be lost in 
an effort to detect the causes of America’s eventual supremacy. For this reason, this chapter has placed 
significant emphasis on granular details, eschewing wherever possible the sorts of monocausal explanations 
that so often underpin linear narratives. The origins and transitions with which this chapter has been 
concerned are instead taken to prefigure key themes which would emerge, to varying degrees, in the later 
history of the British nuclear programme, but without attaching any connotation of inevitability. Insofar as 
the themes that are emphasised in this chapter – the tentativeness of the British approach, the varied national 
origins of key contributors, the privileged position of Dominion personnel within British defence science, 
the particular significance of Mark Oliphant, and the early association of Canadian personnel and 
institutions with British nuclear research – point to corresponding themes emerging in later chapters, they 
do so indicatively but not deterministically.  
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There was certainly no ‘eureka’ moment to sate the human impulse for narrative excitement, though Frisch 
and Peierls’ memorandum admittedly came close. Rather, initial scepticism gave way to belief only 
gradually, as calculation and experiment demonstrated the feasibility of each stage along the pathway to 
the bomb. This gradual accretion of evidence was mirrored by the gradual articulation of policy, where 
similar reversals and dead-ends were encountered, and a similar spirit of uncertainty prevailed. It is 
frustrating for a historian to admit that his subjects seem genuinely to have been unable to decide 
unequivocally between the various options; but these evident uncertainties reiterate contingency. Such 
caveats are important. Revisiting the preliminary investigations makes clear the extent to which the context 
of war ensured that Britain’s nuclear policy was not developed tabula rasa but rather took on complexly 
multi-national emphases from the outset. The processes by which the MAUD Committee came into 
existence, and acted, reflected providence working through iterative deliberations, rather than the 
inexorable playing-out of linear processes. This acknowledged, several things become clear.  
  
First, and foundationally, it is clear that the treatment of actors in relevant fields (in terms of access granted 
and suspicion accorded) depended primarily on their national backgrounds, with British subjects – a 
category which reflexively included those from the Dominions – automatically privileged over all others. 
This in turn meant that at least one figure from the Dominions, Mark Oliphant, could play a central role in 
shaping the development of the nascent programme, whilst even hugely influential figures from outside the 
Commonwealth were pushed to the fringes or excluded altogether (albeit only temporarily in some cases). 
  
Second, it is clear that contacts with Canada developed at a very early stage. Liaison over material supply 
began almost immediately upon the formation of the MAUD committee, and the exchanges that developed, 
although conditioned to some extent by assumptions (on both sides of the Atlantic) of British primacy, were 
reciprocal in several key respects. The warmth of Anglo-Canadian institutional and personal ties (buoyed, 
in part, by the common thread of past connections with Rutherford) and the existence within Canada of 
relevant research, small-scale and unsystematic though it was, enabled immediate – one might reasonably 
say instinctive – collaborations to develop. These, in turn, helped foster a sense among British decision-
makers that Canada, with all of its geographical advantages, might seriously be considered as a potential 
domicile for both the slow and fast neutron work. Nor only as a domicile: by the time the MAUD Committee 
began to reach its first conclusions it was clear that the Canadians were willing, indeed keen, to engage 
with Britain on whatever programme the United Kingdom might eventually develop.  
  
Third, it is clear that amidst the opacity of MAUD’s deliberations around transferring some or all of the 
programme outside the UK, Canada was conceived of as a possible location in its own right – which at a 
basic level alters slightly the existing literature’s perception of Canada as simply a fall-back option. That 
Canada was later eclipsed by the US as the probable/preferred locus for British work in North America was 
a consequence of eventual practicality and the ebb and flow of alliance politics, not of initial preference: 
Canada was clearly seen by many (but by no means all) MAUD contributors as no less reasonable an option 
than the United States, for the advantages of kinship and the prospect of close, easy co-operation helped 




Above all, though, it is clear simply that the unique circumstances pertaining to Britain’s first foray into 
nuclear research had as their most foundational consequence the extension of British nuclear horizons 
beyond the British Isles, and particularly to Canada and the United States. Canada, in particular, attained 
an early engagement with nuclear affairs that has not been adequately reflected in previous scholarship. If 
nothing else, it is striking to note that long before the Americans had committed to the nuclear enterprise, 
whilst Britain still held the initiative, Canada had been inducted into the nuclear secret. It was in this earliest 
period, when the contours of the British nuclear programme had yet to be determined, that exchanges of 
data within and around the British-American-Canadian ‘triangle’ began.152 These soon became habitual 
and did not fully cease even when transatlantic relations hit their lowest ebb. Relationships had formed, 
pathways for information exchange had been created, and a combination of geography, affinity and 
providence had inclined both parties to expect further close collaboration. As the next chapter will discuss, 
the subsequent inexorable shifting of the nuclear centre of gravity from one side of the Atlantic to the other 
led ultimately to the fulfilment of this expectation – albeit in forms which neither the British nor the 
Canadians could yet have predicted with any accuracy, via processes which belied the expectation of 





                                                   




The Centre of Gravity Shifts 
 
This chapter addresses the liminal period in which the British nuclear weapons programme began in earnest, 
and in which, for the first time, elements of the programme itself were transplanted outside the United 
Kingdom. The chapter is therefore concerned with two sets of transitions: first, the transition from theory 
to practice – that is, from the solely academic preoccupations of MAUD to the industrial-scale ambitions 
of Tube Alloys; and second, the transition of the nuclear centre of gravity from one side of the Atlantic to 
the other, as the American programme supplanted the British in scale and advancement. These two 
transitions cannot easily be disaggregated for the purposes of historical explication, for each influenced the 
other, iteratively and contingently. The cumulative effect of these interlinked processes was a complete re-
ordering of the conditions described in the previous chapter. In the summer of 1940, as the MAUD 
committee began to find its administrative feet, the United Kingdom had clearly possessed the most 
advanced, best-motivated nuclear research programme. The pursuit of comparable work by the United 
States was a matter of natural interest and friendly exchange but otherwise held little sway over British 
policy-makers; the small-scale work conducted by the Canadians was the recipient of semi-official British 
support but had not yet been formally co-ordinated with the British programme. By the end of 1941, though, 
the United States had become the undoubted nucleus of atomic weapons development; the fates of the 
British and American programmes had, in the eyes of British policy-makers, become almost inseparably 
enmeshed; and a joint Anglo-Canadian Laboratory had been established at Montreal to pursue an 
increasingly important line of enquiry. This last development might easily be overlooked or downplayed 
in contrast with the two preceding, and indeed it has been a trend in British nuclear history to treat the 
establishment of the Montreal Laboratory and the entirety of Canada’s engagement with wartime nuclear 
research as a mere side-show to the more important dynamic of British dependence on the United States – 
supposedly the cardinal feature of all subsequent British nuclear history.1 This thesis contends otherwise. 
The argument here is that this period of transition cannot be fully comprehended without adequate attention 
to Canada, for without such attention a crucial element in both British and American nuclear histories is 
lost. The process by which Canada came to be favoured for the relocation of British heavy water work even 
after the United States had become Britain’s more influential nuclear partner requires explanation, as does 
the fact that no corresponding transfer of fast neutron research to Canada ever took place. The question 
underpinning the chapter can therefore be framed as follows: how was it that part, but only part, of the UK 
nuclear programme came to be transplanted to Canada?  
 
Approaching this question with a sensitivity to the Commonwealth dynamics of British policy-making 
makes it possible to revisit and question several tropes of nuclear history. These tropes, inherited partly 
from the archival record, partly from Gowing’s pathbreaking early analysis, and partly from the simple 
agglomeration of historians’ assumptions, whether well- or ill-founded, include the suggestion that the 
creation of the Montreal Laboratory was a simple act of imperial imposition on the part of the British (or 
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at best acquiescence on the part of the Canadians) and the criticism, present in Gowing and implicit in much 
subsequent scholarship, of British handling of American overtures regarding collaboration in late 1941 and 
early 1942 (the suggestion being that British dilatoriness and arrogance resulted in a opportunity missed). 
Each of these tropes requires some emendation in light of the archival record. 
 
The chapter surveys four key themes, introduced chronologically. The MAUD report itself is addressed 
first, since the process of its receipt and implementation set the initial trajectory of British nuclear work. 
This segues naturally into a consideration of the increasing significance of the United States, for it is argued 
that the MAUD report played a crucial role in catalysing the American programme as well as the British. 
Attention is consequently paid to the impact of that catalysis on British policy – including on the nascent 
collaboration with Canada described in Chapter One. A significant consequence of the United States’ 
sudden centrality to British policy was the reification of the idea that some or all of the British work might 
be conducted on the other side of the Atlantic. An analytical narrative of the convoluted negotiations to 
achieve this goal therefore forms the third part of the chapter. These negotiations arrived, finally, at the 
decision to establish the British heavy water work at a Laboratory in Montreal as a joint Anglo-Canadian 
endeavour. The chapter thus closes with a description of the Montreal Laboratory’s creation, coupled with 
a more granular analysis of the processes of Anglo-Canadian interaction by which this came to pass. The 
core narrative related in these four sections is this: that as a result of the MAUD Committee’s investigations 
the United Kingdom committed, gingerly, to a nuclear research programme of its own; that a consequence 
of this process was the simultaneous catalysis of the American programme; that initial co-operation 
between the two states was nevertheless somewhat limited, meaning that early opportunities for joint action 
were never realised; that a new consciousness both of the necessary scale of the programme and of the pace 
of the American development nevertheless prompted the British to pursue closer collaboration with the 
United States; that negotiations for such collaboration faltered; that the relevance of slow neutron research 
increased significantly in this same period; and that the combination of these factors heightened the parallel 
allure of Canada in the eyes of all parties involved, to the point that the British finally resolved to locate 




The MAUD committee was short-lived but astonishingly effective. Gowing thought it ‘one of the most 
effective scientific committees that had ever existed’.2 Its members had certainly worked swiftly: the 
chemist Francis Simon had prepared estimates for a separation plant as early as December 1940, and a first 
draft of the overall report was circulated on 26th June 1941. Only fifteen months elapsed between the first 
meeting at the Royal Society and the submission of the final report. The conditions in which the committee 
worked, and the instinctive expectations of its members, were described in the previous chapter; now its 
conclusions and its impact must be traced. 
 
                                                   




The MAUD Committee’s conclusions had been straightforward, but not especially prescriptive. Having 
established that the uranium bomb scheme was ‘practicable and likely to lead to decisive results’, it was 
reasonable enough to conclude that work should continue on ‘the highest priority’, and should expand in 
line with the core objective of obtaining a weapon in the shortest possible time.3 The committee’s contacts 
with the United States and Canada had, moreover, demonstrated the potentialities of co-operation with 
colleagues across the Atlantic, where industry and academia were not so hard-pressed and where the 
exigencies of the home front could not be so keenly felt. Anglo-centric instincts aside, it made sense that 
the existing collaboration be maintained and, where appropriate, expanded. This, however, was almost as 
far as British policy extended. There was initially no set programme, no definite administrative structure 
that the work would follow, no agreed pattern for governmental/ministerial oversight, and, crucially, no 
policy for inter-governmental collaboration. These were all introduced piecemeal in the coming months, as 
much in response to external stimuli as in execution of any unified plan or vision.  
 
Although its output was almost universally referred to as ‘the MAUD Report’, singular, the MAUD 
Committee in fact produced two distinct reports – one on the use of uranium for a bomb, the other on its 
use as a source of power. The distinction was a significant one, reflecting a clear (but as it proved, 
inaccurate) assumption that the two applications of fission could be straightforwardly disaggregated. The 
reports’ conclusions were rigorously supported and for the most part proved ‘uncannily good’,4 but there 
was one significant lapse: the assessment of the potentialities of heavy water was flawed. Having 
determined, rightly, that only a fast neutron interacting with a uranium-235 nucleus within a critical mass 
of sufficiently enriched uranium could produce an atomic explosion, it was assumed, wrongly, that the slow 
neutron interactions studied by Halban’s heavy water team could have no direct military application. As it 
was, the power report acknowledged the probability that one of the fission products of heavy water reaction, 
a new isotope of mass 239, would prove to possess fission properties similar to U235, but made relatively 
little of the implication that this isotope (that is, plutonium-239) might prove useable in a bomb. Access to 
better information from the United States might have made a difference here, for work at Berkeley had 
already begun to demonstrate that the element bore comparison with, and indeed superseded, uranium-235 
in terms of fissionability.5 MAUD recommended only that a small programme at Cambridge, under Norman 
Feather and Egon Bretscher, should consider the fission products of a heavy water reaction; Halban and 
Kowarski should meanwhile be permitted to work in the United States, with the proviso that such an 
arrangement should not interfere with any Anglo-American collaboration on the bomb. Almost as important 
was the simple implication that the heavy water work, being considered practicable solely for the power 
application, was to be pursued with less urgency in the context of Britain’s war effort. That is not to say 
that the work was to be abandoned: ICI’s appendix to the report stressed the essentialness that Britain 
should press on with its development ‘so that the British Empire cannot be excluded by default from future 
developments’.6 It was, however, very much a lower priority, an investment against some future peacetime 
programme of nuclear energy research. It is in this long-term context that the initial interest in sending 
Halban and his team to Canada should be viewed.  
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Two other implications of the MAUD report should also be noted. The most essential was the simple 
expectation that Britain should function as an independent nuclear actor. Any recommendation for co-
operation with the United States was secondary to the core assumption that Britain would pursue the work, 
with or without partners; as Gowing noted, ‘Britain’s conception of itself as a nuclear power was born out 
of this early work’.7 A subordinate implication was that the report was, by its very nature, destined to pass 
from the hands of scientists into the hands of administrators. A question of hitherto purely scientific 
speculation thus became a matter of government policy. So far as the preference still lay with the scientists, 
their instinct on questions of security and international collaboration was generally internationalist – recall 
the high proportion of refugees, émigrés and (notional) enemy aliens amongst the MAUD contributors – 
and thus generally inimical to the practices of wartime secrecy and government control. It was inevitable, 
though, that questions of high policy would pass out of the hands of the scientists, and equally inevitable 
that those to whom the great decisions would fall would be less cognisant of the minutiae of the physics 
involved than those who had first done the work. For the latter, it was to be an uncomfortable realisation.  
 
The completed MAUD reports entered the machinery of the Ministry for Aircraft Production (under the 
aegis of which MAUD had been constituted) on 29th July. Their formal recipient was David Pye, who as 
MAP’s Director of Scientific Research had been the committee’s effective sponsor. Pye submitted the 
reports to the Minister for Aircraft Production himself, John Moore-Brabazon, who in turn passed on the 
task of detailed appraisal to the Scientific Advisory Committee, under Lord Hankey. It is indicative of the 
somewhat relaxed pace of the MAP bureaucracy that this journey took a full four weeks. Moore-Brabazon 
had asked that the Scientific Advisory Committee dispassionately consider the growing scientific consensus 
amongst MAUD members that the uranium work could prove to be ‘of very great military value’.8 Their 
task was to make concrete, actionable recommendations with an eye to longer-term strategic implications 
as well as to immediate war-needs. This obligation to adopt a dual perspective, addressing both the 
immediate and long-term implications of uranium fission, was emphasized in a personal letter to Hankey 
which Moore-Brabazon sent alongside his official bestowal of the report; Moore-Brabazon told Hankey 
that he felt ‘an exploration of the Isotopes of Uranium is well worth doing from a civilisation point of view 
apart from that of war’ – a consideration which he felt would make the expense of a British facility 
worthwhile (albeit only ‘eventually’; no immediate plan was required).9 He also noted that if the bomb 
proved a practical proposition, there were significant implications for future world order, and for Britain’s 
position therein:  
 
I think if America and ourselves are going to control and police the world the possession of 
such a bomb would give us overwhelming superiority of striking power, without keeping up 
an overwhelming air force. Nor would it be possible for any other nation to hunt along the 
same lines without us being aware of it, and being able to stop such a thing in time10 
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Several intriguing glimpses of an as-yet nebulous post-war grand strategy are in view here: that Britain and 
America should be the joint guarantors of world peace; that the atom bomb would enable them to fulfil 
such a role without the vast expense of absolute aerial supremacy; and that other states would be prevented 
from developing the same capability. The assumption that conventional air power could win wars 
unsupported had not yet been disproven by experience;11 nor had the great engineering challenges of 
weaponization and delivery been solved. More will be said in Chapters Five and Six on the actual 
experience of post-war planning: for the time being it is enough to recognise that there was little doubt that 
Britain would ultimately obtain nuclear facilities of her own – and that a joint Anglo-American world order, 
grounded in nuclear co-operation, was the hoped-for outcome of the conflict.  
 
The scientific advisory committee concluded that the bomb project should be regarded as ‘a project of the 
very highest importance’ and that ‘[a]ll steps should therefore be taken to press on with the work as rapidly 
as possible’. A pilot plant for separation should be constructed in the UK, and it was acknowledged that 
there were technical arguments in favour of constructing another pilot plant, to be followed eventually by 
a full-scale plant, in Canada. The power aspect meanwhile should be seen as a long-term project, but should 
be pursued in close collaboration with the United States and Canada.12 These conclusions amounted to a 
framework for a structured programme: a new organisation was to be created encompassing the power and 
bomb projects alike, with the latter as the priority. Other actions had, however, been taken in parallel. Whilst 
the committee were still deliberating, Churchill had already concluded that action must be taken. On 30th 
August he minuted that ‘Although personally I am quite content with the existing explosives, I feel we must 
not stand in the path of improvement, and I therefore think that action should be taken…’.13 Whether a 
sense of irony or incomprehension shaped Churchill’s phrasing here is unclear, but his subsequent orders 
spoke eloquently enough of his support: he nominated Sir John Anderson as responsible minister and 
requested the Chiefs of Staff Committee to express a view. This they did on 3rd September, urging that the 
programme be based in the United Kingdom – evidence of an early digression from the civilian authorities’ 
impulse towards nuclear partnership: the military impulse was to hold the secret and the capability as close 
as possible.14 
 
Churchill’s nomination of Anderson as responsible minister set in motion what became a lengthy transition 
process for British nuclear research. As the SAC had recommended, responsibility for the work was 
transferred from MAUD and its parent ministry to a new organisation within the Department of Scientific 
and Industrial Research (DSIR). This new entity, given the purposefully nondescript codename ‘Tube 
Alloys’, would take over and reorganise the university work superintended by MAUD. A new leadership 
team was introduced, headed by Wallace Akers, Research Director of ICI. Akers’ character proved apt for 
the role, though his background ultimately did not: his association with British industry raised American 
hackles at crucial stages in the negotiations.15 A key consequence of the transition to DSIR – and more 
generally to a new phase of activity – was that such a move brought real discontinuity: personnel who had 
been intimately involved in the MAUD deliberations became detached from the new programme, and 
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individuals with little or no prior exposure to the work found themselves increasingly responsible for its 
direction. The result was that not every initial assumption identified in the previous chapter was carried 
over into the Tube Alloys programme, while some new principles – including a strong political emphasis 
on British control of the field – were introduced.  
 
The process of putting organisational flesh onto MAUD’s advisory bones occupied much of the last half of 
1941. The news of what was to happen – including the fact that MAUD was to be wound up – was broken 
to committee members in October. Their varied reactions reflected the range of possible interpretations of 
the emerging programme. Mark Oliphant was, as ever, swift to venture an opinion. Having learnt of the 
new organisation, and that he was essentially superfluous to it, he wrote straight back to express ‘very 
serious misgivings’. He particularly objected to the leadership of the programme passing into the hands of 
‘commercial representatives’ (that is, Akers and his lieutenant Michael Perrin, also of ICI), as well as 
criticising the ambiguous policy towards the Americans, who Oliphant understood were to be left 
uninformed of future developments.16 This ‘full-throated’ protest was, however, swiftly muted, in part 
through the good offices of Chadwick and Edward Appleton of DSIR, in part through meeting Akers in 
person.17 It is therefore wrong to suggest, as some have, that Akers’ appointment precipitated a particular 
breach between Oliphant and the new organisation.18 Oliphant’s detachment from Tube Alloys was a 
function of his own research trajectory rather than any particular animus against him.  
 
Efforts to tie up the loose ends of the MAUD days continued into late December. One of the last tasks was 
to account for the mass of sensitive papers which the committee had circulated around the country. Most 
were either returned or destroyed, but a handful were retained by their initial recipients against some future 
need to return to the issue. Oliphant, for example, held on to the papers he had been issued, on the grounds 
that ‘my interest in the problems considered by the M.A.U.D. Committee is very deep, and I am continuing 
my relations under the new arrangement’ (which was only tenuously accurate).19 From an information 
management and security perspective, Tube Alloys could hardly be said to have begun with a blank slate. 
Around the notionally secure organisation swirled a constellation of associated scientists with substantial 
technical knowledge of the nuclear project. At least one of these – Mark Oliphant – would soon form a 
conduit for the transmittal of relevant information outside the United Kingdom, as Chapter Five will 
emphasise. 
 
The Increasing Significance of the United States 
 
Throughout the life of the MAUD committee the idea that nuclear research might ultimately centre on 
American rather than British leadership had not really been entertained. British productivity in this period 
outstripped American by a significant margin, owing chiefly to the ‘intensity and unity of purpose’ 
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demonstrated by MAUD, and the American organisation’s corresponding lack thereof.20 Yet the British 
had not been indifferent to the idea of collaboration with external partners: they had sought it, welcomed 
it, and the MAUD report had endorsed its continuance. A connection with Canada had already been formed, 
via the NRC.21 Such collaboration was easily established, thanks to the Commonwealth connection, and 
the nuclear work took its place alongside parallel collaborative arrangements on, inter alia, radar, sonar, 
explosives, propellants, and chemical and biological weaponry.22 Building collaboration with the United 
States required a more active effort. The initial vehicle for Anglo-American scientific co-operation was the 
British Central Scientific Office (BCSO), led by Charles Darwin. This body, which was later renamed the 
British Commonwealth Scientific Office, in recognition of the attachment of Dominion representatives, 
eventually became the host organisation for the British nuclear research contingent in North America: from 
1943 onwards, BCSO provided useful cover for James Chadwick and his administrative staff, at the slightly 
elevated risk of secret information being exposed to Commonwealth personnel.23 At this point, though, it 
served only as a more formal version of A.V. Hill’s earlier function as a general clearing-house for scientific 
interchange.  
 
BCSO’s existence as a pre-existing conduit for such interchange made it natural that it should become a 
focal point for the articulation to the Americans of the ideal of transatlantic nuclear co-operation which the 
British had held almost from the outset. In June 1941 Darwin went so far as to broach, informally, the idea 
of British personnel (Chadwick and Thomson) being ‘transplanted’ to the United States. The response, 
however, was lukewarm. Vannevar Bush, to whom Darwin had made the suggestion, acknowledged his 
theoretical ability to appoint non-Americans to the NDRC, but stressed that he had thus far deferred to the 
military authorities in not having done so. An exception might possibly be made for someone as exceptional 
as Chadwick, but it would be far less likely for someone like Halban (Darwin detected ‘a profound distrust 
of the reliability of Frenchmen – and I suppose a fortiori of a French-naturalized-Austrian’).24 A month 
later Darwin again informed London of his conversations, writing now to Hankey, whose committee was 
considering the MAUD report. This time it was the Americans venturing a proposal that included the 
suggestive idea that the work should not be treated as ‘merely co-ordinated research’ but rather ‘as a joint 
project for the two governments’.25 The Tube Alloys leadership can hardly be said to have leapt at this 
opportunity. Only in March 1942 was any acknowledgement made of the suggestion, and even then the 
response was essentially dismissive. (The timing here lends credence to Gowing’s supposition that it was 
Darwin’s return to Britain which precipitated the belated British response;26 it seems often to have been the 
case that individuals with closer experience of the American organisation had to act to prompt the London 
organisation to act). Unproductive though it was, Darwin’s relaying of Bush and Conant’s suggestion at 
least highlights two important points. First, the sheer peripherality of Halban’s heavy water work at this 
stage is evident in the fact that Darwin, in suggesting that a small mission be sent from the United Kingdom, 
advocated the inclusion of Halban alongside Chadwick and Simon at least in part because he would ‘serve 
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as cover’ to conceal the project’s actual focus on fast neutrons.27 On both sides of the Atlantic the clear 
emphasis was on the separation of U-235 as the swiftest, most practicable pathway to the bomb. Second, 
Darwin was convinced, given the scale and expense that further development work would demand, that the 
Atlantic must at some point be crossed, but was ambivalent as to whether the United States or Canada 
would be preferable: ‘I think it is fairly clear that if the work is to continue it will have to be done here or 
in Canada’.28 Note, then, that the emerging idea at this stage was that the British work might have to cross 
the Atlantic, more so than that the British work must be united with the American.  
 
BCSO under Darwin thus became the first component in a mutually-desired machinery for nuclear co-
operation – albeit only in the limited form of document-sharing. MAUD materials, including minutes of 
key meetings, were passed to the Americans through an agreed route; in return the British received 
‘American papers … including reports of meetings, specifications, etc.’.29 The exchange at this stage was 
essentially imbalanced, with far more information passing from the United Kingdom to the United States 
than vice versa,30 but the research taking place on either side of the Atlantic was still essentially 
complementary, and was seen as such by both parties. This was, in a sense, the high-water-mark for Anglo-
American nuclear co-operation: it would never again be so straightforward and good-natured. For the 
participants, though, there seemed every hope that this level of exchange would form the basis for closer 
and deeper collaboration in future.  
 
There was, however, one impediment: the American programme had yet to achieve any coherence or sense 
of urgency comparable to that which had gripped the MAUD Committee. Hewlett and Anderson noted that 
the ‘Americans read avidly the reports on British research’,31 but if this were the case it had not had any 
noticeable effect. Indeed the lack of any obvious response to the unprecedented conclusions of the MAUD 
report had prompted suspicions of a blockage in the flow of information. It was in this context that Mark 
Oliphant made another significant intervention. His trip to North America in the late summer of 1941 was 
initially only incidental to MAUD’s work, but ultimately provided a crucial impetus to the American 
nuclear programme. Thomson had written to Oliphant on 18th July 1941, shortly before the latter’s 
departure, mentioning ‘a number of things I should be very glad to have done’ whilst Oliphant was in 
America.32 Reading this letter in its archival context, it is clear that Thomson was in fact responding to 
Oliphant’s prompting in issuing these instructions.33 Regardless, Oliphant interpreted Thomson’s 
comments as a remit ‘to make enquiries in America’ concerning the receipt of the MAUD papers.34 Sure 
enough, Oliphant’s questioning of Lyman Briggs, notionally MAUD’s American contact, elicited the 
discovery that Briggs, whether operating from a surfeit of caution or a failure of comprehension, had not 
circulated the papers he had received.35 Not content simply to have identified the blockage, Oliphant acted 
to circumvent Briggs, advocating for the MAUD report’s conclusions with various American contacts, 
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including his friend Ernest Lawrence, whose championing of the cause helped persuade the American 
authorities to take nuclear issues more seriously. In so acting, Oliphant may well have exceeded his 
authority, for Thomson’s limited instructions had scarcely stretched so far as to condone agitation among 
the Americans. The extent of Oliphant’s personal advocacy is reflected in his having prepared, seemingly 
on his own initiative, a précis of the MAUD report for his American colleagues. Copies of this report appear 
not to be held in the National Archives; little wonder, perhaps, given that Oliphant’s advocacy of 
development work in North America was essentially unsanctioned.36 Oliphant had certainly deviated 
sufficiently from his colleagues’ extreme caution to make valid the questioning of Oliphant’s reliability 
from a security standpoint. (This is a theme to which this thesis will return). The letters he had sent to 
Lawrence about his work on uranium fission were at best unwisely detailed; at worst they represented the 
unlicensed transfer of extremely sensitive secret material to a foreign power. In either case, his intervention 
was certainly significant enough to have given rise to Szilard’s memorable assessment that ‘If Congress 
knew the true history … it would create a special medal to be given to meddling foreigners for distinguished 
services, and Dr. Oliphant would be the first to receive one’.37 
  
Oliphant’s was not the only influence on the American programme, however. In this same period the 
American scientists George Pegram and Harold Urey had visited the United Kingdom, and learnt much 
about the British programme: enough, certainly, that their reports made stimulating reading back home. 
Advocates of a more concerted American effort – Bush chief of all – were gaining traction. By the autumn 
of 1941 their victory was complete. The American government was now wholly committed to the nuclear 
programme, and the Americans were suddenly very keen to have interchange with the British. The catalysis 
of the United States work must therefore be acknowledged to have predated Pearl Harbor: the entry of the 
United States into the war helps account for such later features as the transfer to military control, and the 
immense scale of the ultimate project, but did not, of itself, bring it about. 
 
Historians’ explanations for the sudden animation of the American programme vary significantly. Some 
narratives focus narrowly on American experiences, emphasising domestic rather than external stimuli, 
with news of the British programme serving only to buttress the advocacy of Bush and his fellow-
believers.38 In others – a slight improvement – the British influence is uncritically assimilated into the 
accounts as one of the final influences eroding the ‘dam of doubt’.39 Hewlett and Anderson accepted the 
general principle that MAUD had played a part: they listed ‘News from Britain’ as one of the principal 
reasons, alongside Bush’s leadership, for the intensification of American effort from July 1941 onwards.40 
(They also mention Fowler, whom they describe as ‘the British scientific liaison officer in Canada’, as 
having been an influence on Lawrence earlier in 1941).41 At the time, the British believed Pegram and 
Urey’s visit to have been the deciding factor. Gowing, however, argued more for the impact of the MAUD 
report itself on Bush and Conant, and of Oliphant’s agitation on Lawrence.42 In all likelihood there was no 
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single pathway. Rather, it was the confluence of each of these influences that gave impetus to Bush and 
Conant’s own increasing sense that a more earnest effort was required. This, incidentally, seems to explain 
why the American accounts tend to downplay the British contribution: because it is possible to trace the 
programme from one particular (very early) origin, it is not considered necessary to do the same for the 
notionally external factor of British influence. MAUD became an additional factor in a story that begins 
elsewhere, rather than representing a separate origin of its own. This, with the admixture of the pervasive 
tendency to focus on one’s own national narrative, is sufficient to explain the propensity of even very 
thorough authors – Richard Rhodes, z.b. – to have neglected the British/Commonwealth angle. It is 
reasonable, however, to assert that the Americans’ sudden prioritisation of nuclear work came at least partly 
in response to the MAUD report. More specifically, it was a response to three factors associated with 
MAUD: first, the findings of the report itself, which were sombre and serious, and therefore supported the 
pre-existing inclination of Bush and Conant to take the US programme more seriously; second, the 
advocacy of Oliphant in agitating for the Americans to take more vigorous action, principally, but not 
exclusively, through the leveraging of his existing relationship with E.O. Lawrence; and third, the Pegram-
Urey visit to Britain, which was a partial consequence of the British desire to engage closely with the 
American programme. In having pursued their research diligently, in having reached out to friendly (if not 
yet allied) states, and in having allowed Mark Oliphant a somewhat free (perhaps too free) rein, the British 
ended up catalysing not just their own programme, but the American’s as well. The metaphor of catalysis 
is a particularly apt one, for the British did not initiate the American programme, but undoubtedly 
accelerated it.  
 
With the vivification of the American programme came a renewal of American interest in collaboration 
with the United Kingdom. Roosevelt had written to Churchill in October (slightly before the full activation 
of the American programme) expressing a wish soon to ‘correspond or converse’ about MAUD.43 This time 
the British envisaged an immediate response – a statement suggesting how the two nations might best 
collaborate, preceded by an interim assurance of British interest in full co-operation.44 The statement was 
not forthcoming, and there was no evidence of any particular urgency to respond on the part of the British. 
On the basis of such interactions historians have ventured an implicit (occasionally explicit) critique of 
British policy, framed in the language of ‘missed opportunity’ or ‘failure’. Gowing put it fairly moderately: 
‘the British failure to anticipate the great and very fast growth of the American project was to affect 
profoundly Britain’s own atomic energy efforts for the next decade or more’.45 This is accurate enough, 
provided failure is construed more in its passive sense – lack of success – than in the active sense of being 
at fault. Certainly the British ‘failure’ to secure full collaboration with the Americans when it was on offer 
was unfortunate, and its effects long-lasting, but the rhetoric of missed opportunity obscures the complexity 
of the situation. The British had entered into a fallow period of deliberation and consolidation at precisely 
the wrong time. The fact that the centre of gravity had so inexorably shifted across the Atlantic meant that 
the British had ceded a degree of initiative, but this was not immediately apparent. The autumn of 1941 
was the period in which the United States first became a determining factor in British calculations, but this 
had occurred by an awkward, slightly convoluted process. The high-water mark of American interest in 
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collaboration came at the least optimal moment, from a British perspective, for the programme in the United 
Kingdom was at that point still administratively adrift, caught in a period of relative inactivity. The British 
were under-appreciative of the ramping up of American interest, and sceptical about committing to the US 
given their neutrality in the conflict: the disparity between belligerent Britain and the as-yet neutral United 
States seemed too great to overcome. So the moment passed. Yet this was almost immediately to be 
regretted, for once the true scale of American engagement with the nuclear programme became apparent, 
and particularly once America had entered the war, it became clear that the United States really would be 
the optimal partner: the scale of American industry, and the concentration of so many American and émigré 
scientists there made it pretty much inevitable. 
 
Were the British refusals in 1941 a missed opportunity, then? A case of British arrogance and pride? Much 
has been made of this idea, as though hubris alone explains the various delays and silences, but the archives 
do not wholly support the conclusion. Rather they reveal that the British were labouring under a false 
impression, arising from earlier experience of their interactions. Recall, for one thing, that Darwin had been 
the first to float the idea of closer ties, and had been rebuffed. The Americans had hitherto demonstrated 
little sense of urgency.46 The lackadaisical character of the American programme as the British had first 
encountered it – its disjointedness and complacency – conditioned the British to scepticism about the 
sincerity of American planning, and instilled a fatal sense of superiority in the minds of at least some of the 
Tube Alloys leadership. There is an irony (noted by Gowing) in the fact that British reticence was in the 
first instance framed in terms of security concerns, for within a year the British themselves would be driven 
to despair at the stringency of American security policy.47 In mid-1941, though, the dominant tone in British 
discussions regarding America was one of confusion, rather than aloofness. The issue was that the fast-
moving nature of the US programme from November 1941 onwards had become an impediment to the 
development of collaboration: British information was invariably out-of-date by the time it could be acted 
upon, and efforts to co-ordinate forms of exchange lapsed almost immediately. For example, at the meeting 
in November, the Americans had appeared to ask for recommendations as to how the American 
organisation should be set up.48 By the time a reply was sent, however, the American organisation had 
developed to such an extent that any answer the British gave would have appeared hopelessly 
condescending. That is not to deny that many of the interactional issues which bedevilled Tube Alloys now 
and in subsequent years were of the organisation’s own creation. If nothing else, it was poor form not to 
have replied sooner to American overtures through Darwin about closer integration in the summer of 1941, 
and it is not impossible that some individuals viewed the Americans with an unnecessarily condescending 
air.  
 
The key point is this: that the primary issue in early Anglo-American nuclear relations was not arrogance 
or neglect but rather timing and circumstance. The different and varying paces at which the two 
programmes developed, and the rapidity with which the United States gained significance vis-à-vis the 
British programme, significantly hindered sincere efforts on both sides of the Atlantic to maximise co-
operation. The British had catalysed the American programme, but were unable to capitalise on this early 
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influence precisely because of the stage which their own work had reached; worse, the ensuing negative 
experiences of interactions in this period inclined the Americans slightly against the idea of collaboration 
in the future. 
 
The Challenge of Crossing the Atlantic 
 
Once created, one of the first substantive actions of the new Tube Alloys organisation had been to despatch 
a small mission, comprising Akers, Halban, and Simon, to the United States. Their objective was to foster 
ties with the Americans, assess their progress and share ideas on next steps. Such trips were not trivial. No 
route was wholly ‘safe’. Competition for space on any form of transport was high. One had to choose 
between a passage by boat (slow, and hazardous), on the clipper routes (circuitous, and passing through 
neutral territory, leaving prominent émigré scientists dangerously exposed); or via the only reasonably fast 
form of transport, as a passenger (in some discomfort) in a military aircraft. The risks of transatlantic travel 
were sufficiently grave to have driven Peierls to take special precautions ahead of his first crossing, leaving 
all his papers with Klaus Fuchs for safekeeping.49 Halban suffered the most from the challenges of wartime 
travel: his health, which had never been great, was damaged almost irreparably by his first wartime journey 
across the Atlantic. His subsequent voyages would be greatly complicated by his doctors’ advice against 
various forms of travel.50 The tyranny of distance also made frank communication difficult. An effort by 
Halban to arrange a phonecall with London, for the purpose of dealing directly with his rapidly growing 
list of difficulties, was swiftly blocked on security grounds.51 Throughout the war, transatlantic 
communication on Tube Alloys business necessarily rested almost exclusively on the slower 
communication pathways of cypher telegrams, the diplomatic bag, and delivery by safe hand. These 
constraints on travel and communication are worth highlighting for their impact on the ability of the British 
team to respond quickly to American and Canadian stimuli. In the frequent cases where personal discussion 
was thought to be the only route forward, days or (often) weeks might pass before the appropriate 
representative could cross the Atlantic. Although cables could pass more rapidly these too could be held up 
for days, and letters could go unanswered for weeks, with real and significant consequences for transatlantic 
relations. The inevitable delay in formulating and then communicating a response on the part of the British 
organisation often meant that by the time the Americans learnt of the British position on a particular issue, 
the American view had already changed. These inevitable delays, coupled with the rapidly changing status 
of the American programme, had already impeded early efforts to establish a robust Anglo-American 
collaboration. Now the obstacle of transatlantic communication became even more severe, for in early 1942 
the thoughts of the British had at last begun to turn more resolutely to negotiation with the Americans. 
 
The first Tube Alloys mission was considered fairly successful: their reception in America was, by all 
accounts, genuinely warm. The visitors were allowed, as Gowing described it, to ‘to talk to everyone and 
see everything’.52 A British assessment of the mission, written somewhat later and in rather more fraught 
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circumstances, claimed almost wistfully that ‘Great progress was made in working out the means whereby 
a dream could be converted into a practical reality’.53 The prospects for collaboration ‘seemed rosy’,54 and 
the need for such collaboration was becoming ever more evident. The British visitors were, however, 
consistently struck by the intensity with which the Americans were now tackling the problem. It was this 
above all that brought the British towards the acknowledgement that to achieve the ‘dream’ of a nuclear 
weapons programme would demand ‘a vast industrial effort which it would be foolish to undertake in a 
country stretched to the utmost, exposed to aerial bombardment and even to the threat of invasion’.55 Britain 
could not itself host a full programme: the work must, they began to concede, be conducted elsewhere. 
Where, though? The United States now seemed a natural answer, given the alluring possibility of leveraging 
American scientific and industrial might. This instinct was not necessarily to the exclusion of further work 
in Canada, where Laurence’s experiments continued and where it had been thought the heavy water work 
might be transferred, but for a time supplanted it. There began with the Americans a complex and frequently 
circular series of discussions as to what forms of collaboration might be achieved. What is important to 
note here is that there were in effect two interlinked sets of negotiations ongoing: those relating to the 
uranium-235 pathway, and those relating to the heavy water work. These, it will be recalled, had been 
implicitly disaggregated in the MAUD report, but subsequently proved impossible wholly to disentangle. 
Accounts which neglect this distinction risk lapsing into oversimplification, with severe consequences for 
the quality of their analysis.  
 
1942, then, was dominated by Anglo-American negotiations regarding the design of their respective 
programmes and the extent of their interactions. The main preoccupation of the British team was to get 
their fast neutron project onto a strong footing, which essentially meant locating key aspects of that work 
– such as the effort at separation – beyond the borders of the vulnerable and industrially constrained British 
Isles. A constituency in favour of such a step had, it will be recalled, formed at an early date, and their 
argument had only been bolstered by the rapid progress of the American programme. By the end of July, 
even Anderson, initially very much in favour of retaining all work within the British Isles, had been 
persuaded. Recognising that the Americans had been ‘applying themselves with [an] enthusiasm and lavish 
expenditure’ which Britain could not rival, he had concluded – in conjunction with his Consultative Council 
– that a full-scale separation plant on British lines could only be constructed in the United States, and that 
therefore the pilot plant must also be constructed there. This would require ‘a combined Anglo-American 
effort’. Anderson was only a reluctant convert to this position, but had seen at last that the work conducted 
in the UK was ‘a dwindling asset’, which the British must capitalise quickly.56 This sense of urgency never 
dissipated: much of the course of British nuclear policy in coming years stemmed from the compulsion to 
retain some degree of prominence in a field in which the country had once led. The spectre of the bomb 
ensured that this compulsion became existential in nature: Britain must, at whatever cost, remain in touch 
with the latest developments in fast neutron research.  
 
The parallel question of what to do with Halban’s slow neutron team meanwhile remained. British 
understanding of heavy water’s potential significance had evolved somewhat since the MAUD report was 
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published. It was clearer now that ‘94’ would be fissile, and whilst the power application remained a live 
enquiry it was as a pathway to plutonium production that a reactor was now chiefly desired. This was the 
case on both sides of the Atlantic: the Americans were pressing on with their own programme for plutonium 
production, with graphite as their preferred medium rather than heavy water. The differing lines of enquiry 
implied complementarity rather than competition, and alongside the wider discussions about the 
programme’s future negotiations were begun on the possibility of aligning Halban’s work more closely 
with the American programme (implicitly by transferring Halban and colleagues to America). Diplomatic 
complexities abounded. First, it was feared that pressing the United States too hard on heavy water might 
prejudice a future effort to secure their support for uranium separation in support of the British work.57 
Then there was the problem of Halban himself: the Americans were none too keen on admitting this 
unknown quantity, who was not even a British citizen, into their midst. There was also the vexed question 
of the agreements around secrecy and patents: a British arrangement with Halban would have to precede 
any deal with the United States.58 In short, the British proposal still had far too many loose ends for the 
Americans to feel entirely comfortable.  
 
The British persevered, however, for on both sides a broader desire to collaborate on slow neutron research 
still prevailed: the physicist Arthur Compton, who headed the American slow neutron work in Chicago, 
was particularly encouraging. In the course of myriad discussions, supported by a voluminous 
correspondence, a number of possible options emerged. One suggestion was essentially to transplant a 
British team to the United States, operating as a separate team, paid for by the United Kingdom, ‘working 
independently but in mutual support with [the] Americans’. The parallel suggestion was that Halban, with 
one or two others of the Cambridge team, should join an existing American unit at Chicago, and be paid by 
the Americans.59 Halban himself favoured the former option, on the grounds that the American effort so 
dwarfed the British that the benefits of crossing the Atlantic – especially in terms of practical experience 
and exposure to American research – far outweighed any benefits of remaining in England.60 
 
This was a compelling argument, but placing the whole team in the United States was necessarily contingent 
on American agreement, which clearly could not be guaranteed. Alternative plans might, therefore need to 
be laid: if the Americans refused, ‘the merits of an independent team in Canada should be weighed’.61 By 
the start of May two things were evident. First, the instinctive preference was clearly for some kind of 
collaboration with the Americans, even if it must be on American terms: the disparity in the scale of the 
two countries’ nuclear activities was already too great for this not to be the most logical path to rapid 
development. Second, whilst the basing of a team in Canada was considered a possibility at this stage, it 
was generally held to be less desirable an arrangement than was hoped for with the Americans. The fear 
was that Canada simply could not compare with the United States in terms of industrial facilities. As Akers 
put it in a telegram on 5th May,  
 
                                                   
57 cf. Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p.73 
58 Perrin to Akers, 23rd June 1942, AB 1/701 (TNA) 
59 Halban to Akers, 1st May 1942, AB 1/34(a) (TNA) 





Unless such facilities are negligible we cannot see any advantage in having independent 
team in Canada where facilities believed practically non-existent and certainly inferior to 
those in England.62 
 
There was one advantage that Canada held over the United States, however: it would be far more 
straightforward for British personnel to be deployed there. The British had received word that the main 
sticking point in their negotiations around placing a British team in Chicago was the ‘lack of precedent for 
any group of foreigners to work quasi extraterritorially’ on defence-relevant work within the United 
States.63 Exceptions might possibly have been made, but Conant and Bush were unwilling to press the 
point. Various other permutations were therefore considered. There was some talk of placing Halban in an 
American university – Princeton, say – but Bush and Conant were increasingly unsupportive of that idea, 
too. The alternative to all of these was no collaboration, and a UK-based independent programme, but this 
now held little allure. 
 
Remaining in England was increasingly unattractive: the programme would be too far removed from the 
new centre of gravity for nuclear research. Time, too, was of the essence. Immediate close collaboration 
with the US was the only way in which the vanishing advantage Britain enjoyed could be leveraged into 
longer-term progress; relocation to North America seemed to be the price of that collaboration, and if it 
could not be on the ideal terms at Chicago, why not on Britain’s own terms in Canada? There would be 
disadvantages, of course. Challenges around materials and personnel would be more acute than in 
America’s more highly developed industrial economy. The administrative problem of operating a complex 
project three thousand miles from London was significant. Even the wartime weakness of the pound would 
cause problems. The one issue that appears not to have loomed especially large at this stage, though, was 
the need to secure (and then preserve) the acquiescence and practical support of the Canadian government. 
The British certainly anticipated no issue on that front: ‘Professor Thomson had the impression that a 
British paid independent unit would be very well received in Canada’. Wrote Halban: 
 
Since we cannot afford to make this effort ourselves, on the same scale as the Americans, it 
is the wisest solution that we continue our work on the American continent, allowing some 
of the members of the slow neutron team to have a very intimate exchange of facts and ideas 
with the Americans; since they can gain a lot from such an exchange they will certainly 
favour it.64 
 
In the Americans’ minds, too, the Canadian option had begun to look like a convenient way of reconciling 
geography with sovereignty. At any rate, Compton and his circle remained keen to find a solution, seeking 
to assure Halban of ‘the continued desire of all of us concerned with this project to co-operate to the fullest 
extent with the British group’, which he knew to be of importance both for the present war effort and for 
‘post-war developments’.65 So the British persevered.  
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A further iteration of discussions then brought the roots of the Americans’ hesitancy more clearly to the 
fore. Compton was increasingly unsure that the option still notionally favoured by the British – that of an 
‘independent’ but closely integrated programme on American soil – could be achieved. The bureaucratic-
legislative hurdles on that side of the Atlantic seemed insurmountable. This left two slightly different 
options: for Halban and an assistant to join the American project in toto, or else to establish ‘an independent 
working organization somewhere in Canada, controlled and operated by the British Government with 
which… the United States could share ideas and interchange needed material’.66 A year or so previously 
the first option, of Halban alone (or with a colleague or two) joining one of the American teams, would 
have been a most welcome offer, but the proposal had little now to recommend it: such a step could hardly 
have represented a reasonable return on more than a year’s effort by an entire team at Cambridge in a field 
which now promised weapons-relevant results, and the more astute (or sympathetic) Americans knew it. 
Compton’s preference was therefore now for some variation on the second option as a ‘reasonable 
compromise’; it would not, he thought, be difficult to establish quick and complete interchange.67 
 
This was sound if slightly optimistic analysis. The British, too, could see that Canada would offer many of 
the advantages of proximity without the hindrances of extraterritoriality. The convergence on Canada as a 
positive alternative to the increasingly unworkable idea of sending Halban to the United States can therefore 
be dated to approximately this point, though for the British it was really a return to an idea that had occurred 
to them long before. The difference was that in the early days of the MAUD Committee the idea of sending 
Halban overseas had been given serious consideration on the basis that it was interesting in the long-term 
but peripheral to the main line of enquiry; its revivification stemmed now from the importance which the 
work had gained and the associated desire to parlay that asset into a closer relationship in the field of fast 
neutron research.  
 
Canada nonetheless suffered in comparison with America: the comparative weakness of Canadian industry 
was always an argument against basing major endeavours there rather than in the United States. Akers 
clung to the hope of an American solution well into the summer, reassured by the fact that the Americans 
had continued to make encouraging noises: ‘We cannot have too much interchange on this matter’, Bush 
had written in early September.68 Akers also harboured doubts about the ability of the heavy water work to 
secure American collaboration. He was concerned that it might prove too discrete, too easily separable from 
the main thrust of the weapons programme. The risk, in his view, was that ‘unless we can be quite certain 
that the Americans will really regard the team in Canada as being part of their own team, but domiciled in 
Canada to satisfy certain political scruples’, the programme might become sidelined, separated both from 
the American work and from whatever remained in the United Kingdom.69 Ranged against these fears – 
which later events proved, if not prophetic, then at least perceptive – was the increasingly powerful 
argument advanced by the likes of Darwin that a firm commitment to work in Canada would be ‘politically 
valuable’ as evidence of a joint effort.70 
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Although actuated in part by the prospect of months more tortuous negotiation with the Americans, and the 
increasing risk of their direct refusal to accept a British team, the volte face to Canada as a preferable 
destination for the Halban team was not primarily a defensive decision. On the contrary, the Canadian 
option represented a significant opportunity. If they moved quickly, Britain could assume leadership of 
almost the entire slow neutron project – certainly the heavy water aspect – at the cost only of some 
preparatory work in Canada.71 Britain would thus be well-situated to argue for a broad-based programme 
of interchange. The British had thus arrived at the essence of a strategy: to pursue an Anglo-Canadian 
endeavour on heavy water as a demonstration of the practical value of the British programme, and of the 
extent of British commitment to it, whilst remaining utterly committed to the achievement of some form of 
collaboration with the United States on uranium separation and weapons design. 
 
(Finally) Embracing the Canadian Option 
 
Despatching Halban to Canada had become preferable from about August 1942 onwards, as the result of a 
process of triangulation between British and American policymakers. Earlier exchanges between Britain 
and Canada had lain some of the groundwork for their collaboration (recall the initial interactions with 
NRC officials detailed in Chapter One), but for Britain to pursue true developmental work in Canada would 
be altogether different from the simpler connections that had thus far been forged between Tube Alloys and 
the NRC. It was not even entirely certain that Canada would be capable of supporting such an endeavour, 
nor were the Canadians necessarily au fait with British thinking, not having been party to the negotiations 
with the Americans. If the British were serious about the prospect of pursuing the heavy water work in 
Canada – and there were now increasingly strong political reasons why they should be – it was clear that a 
formal request must be made of the Canadians and a great deal of exploratory work must be conducted. 
Anderson duly wrote to the British High Commissioner in Ottawa, Malcolm MacDonald, who was already 
acquainted with aspects of the Tube Alloys programme, in order to inform him of the request that was to 
be made of the Canadians. Anderson’s letter and its draft between them give the lie to the suggestion that 
the British approach to Canada was seen as a fall-back option in the face of American reluctance to 
collaborate. Both documents emphasise the active intention of transferring some or all of the fast neutron/U-
235 work to the United States. Regarding plutonium, they acknowledged the American focus on graphite 
as likely the quickest (and therefore best) route to weapons-relevant quantities, but still argued for the 
parallel value of the heavy water route as a more time-consuming but more efficient pathway. A 
handwritten amendment to the draft reads: ‘There is not, therefore, the same urgent need to bring Dr. Halban 
and his team to U.S.A., in the same way as we propose to bring the U 235 team’,72 but there would certainly 
be benefits in geographical proximity; hence the idea of transferring the work to Canada, which had already 
been widely discussed. Canada, as the final letter makes clear, possessed ‘many of the advantages and few 
of the disadvantages’ of the United States. Halban and his team would be ‘out of the picture’ if they 
remained in Britain, but the Americans’ single-minded pursuit of the graphite pathway would likely mean 
that Halban’s team would receive less than adequate support. Basing Halban in Canada therefore had much 
to recommend it: the advantage of proximity to and co-ordination with the American graphite work (not to 
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mention the anticipated joint fast neutron endeavour) without the disadvantage of competing directly for 
support within the United States, and with the added allure of greater independence for the British 
programme.73 
 
The British expectation at this point was that Halban and his team would transfer to Canada ‘at any rate for 
the duration of the war’ in order to ‘join up with Canadian scientists and make a joint Anglo-Canadian 
team’.74 Anderson had drily noted to MacDonald that the proposal ‘will not come entirely as a surprise to 
the Canadians’,75 and the alacrity with which Mackenzie engaged with the British proposal proved the 
point. Mackenzie’s diary, like Halban’s in the National Archives, betrays signs of non-contemporaneity,76 
but nevertheless demonstrates the rate at which discussions progressed. At the start of September the United 
Kingdom pressed for definite answers from the Canadians as to the transfer of the Halban team to Canada.77 
Halban was tasked in September 1942 with investigating the arrangements necessary to base his team in 
Canada.78 Discussions about how the scheme could be arranged on a practical level began on 24th 
September, and by 26th September the two parties had agreed to Mackenzie’s proposals around structure 
and collaboration.79 A memorandum was duly prepared. This unassuming two-page document, drafted by 
Mackenzie, outlined the administrative and reporting structures the Canadians proposed.80 General and 
intergovernmental policy issues would be decided jointly by the Canadian minister C.D. Howe and the 
British High Commissioner Malcolm MacDonald, whilst administrative control would be unified under the 
NRC. On a day-to-day basis, this would be a Canadian organisation, an arrangement which Mackenzie felt 
would provide ‘maximum secrecy and flexibility together with government control and responsibility’.81 It 
was also thought – naïvely, as it would later prove – that the NRC would prove an administratively flexible 
host.82 A committee chaired by Halban, with J.F. Jackson of DSIR as secretary, would have a degree of 
freedom to direct scientific and technical policy, and would report directly to the NRC president; that is, to 
Mackenzie. British voices predominated: of the five named members, only G.C. Laurence was Canadian. 
Yet the memorandum further stipulated that  
 
while informal reports and communications may pass directly between the United Kingdom 
members of the team and the High Commissioner and the Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research, all formal reports, negotiations and transactions will pass through the 
office of the President of the National Research Council for approval or decision.83  
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All parties seemed content with the proposed arrangements. Mackenzie was optimistic, telling Appleton 
that ‘if we can make satisfactory arrangements for co-operation with the Americans … the plan of operation 
suggested above will work very well in Canada’.84 Securing the recquisite co-operation with the Americans, 
of course, was at once the entire purpose of the endeavor and the great variable overshadowing it. For the 
time being, however, all augured well: when details of the proposed set-up in Canada were shared with the 
Americans, Conant, Urey and Compton all declared themselves in favour and promised ‘all possible 
collaboration’.85 
 
The senior figures from Britain and Canada met on 12th October 1942 to seal the plan. They first agreed 
that the slow neutron work should be transferred to Canada ‘regardless of the future domicile of the Fast 
Neutron Team’. Three justifications for the transfer were given: 
 
a) The highly co-operative attitude of the Canadian Government. 
b) Willingness of the U.S.A. to give priority, on formal request, for essential raw materials and 
services. 
c) The advantage of proximity to the U.S.A. scientific and industrial development work in the same 
field.86 
 
Mackenzie’s organisational outline was then approved, subject only to minor amendments – one granting 
the technical committee a right to speak directly to the policy committee (that is, Howe and MacDonald) 
should some issue arise in their relationship with Mackenzie, and the other stipulating that if a British fast 
neutron team were to be established in the United States, then all liaison work would take place through 
that office – evidence of the relative importance of the two strands in British eyes.87 Having waited 
impatiently for the British formally to commit, Mackenzie was now demonstrably keen to get going, almost 
to the exclusion of the Tube Alloys representatives with whom he was supposed to be working.88  
 
In November the twin processes of recruitment and site selection began. On the personnel front, Canada 
faced a ‘dearth of talent’ in relevant fields,89 not least because of the centripetal effect of talented researchers 
gravitating to universities in the metropole (compounded by competition from institutions in the United 
States). Much was therefore made of the few exceptional younger candidates Canada could offer.90 The 
British, meanwhile, noted that personnel were to be selected for involvement in every section of the 
laboratory, so that ‘when the project has been brought to some suitable stage it will be possible for the 
English team to return with complete information and experience’ – early evidence of the British 
expectation that there would eventually be a nuclear project located within the British Isles – ‘while leaving 
a similarly self-complete team of Canadians to carry on the work here’.91 
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By December 1942, then, ‘the prospects of the Anglo-Canadian project appeared to be excellent’.92 
Temporary accommodation had been secured (in the just-completed medical wing of the Université de 
Montreal), the basis of a very capable Anglo-Canadian scientific team had been recruited or transferred, 
and although many materials were still lacking they were at least in transit.93 There had been some early 
disappointments. Practical problems crossing the Atlantic ‘were legion’.94 Reams of correspondence were 
dedicated to such vexed issues as the procuring of appropriate priorities for travel; the sourcing and delivery 
of materials and equipment; and the contentious question of whether and on what terms laboratory members 
might be permitted to bring their families with them. Nor was all well in terms of staffing. By 1942 relations 
between Halban and Kowarski had broken down seemingly irrevocably, leading in turn to difficulties with 
the wider Cambridge team. Personnel around Kowarski had begun laying down conditions on which they 
were willing to participate; a number of solutions were suggested, involving various distributions of 
personnel between Cambridge and Montreal. Yet as Akers pointed out, it made little sense to split the 
Cambridge team, since the whole advantage derived from its completeness; this had been one of the 
principal objections to the earlier suggestion that only two or three of the heavy water team should join the 
American organisation.95 Thus it was that Akers was still thrashing out details of the transfer and still 
attempting to resolve the difficulty with Kowarski and the Cambridge team in the final weeks of 
December.96 The Laboratory was certainly not to be fully operational by the first of January, as the 
Canadians had fondly hoped. For all these difficulties, however, there was still much cause for contentment. 
Halban took stock just before Christmas; ‘so far’, he wrote, ‘I am extremely pleased about the attitude of 
the Canadians’.97 The project showed every prospect of becoming a genuine collaboration. The financial 
arrangements made between the governments left each government responsible for the salaries of their own 
personnel with all other costs picked up by the Canadians.98 
 
How, then, to characterise the processes by which the nuclear laboratory at Montreal came into being? It 
would be wrong to assume a dynamic of subservience, as though the Canadians lacked agency vis-à-vis the 
United Kingdom. Canadian acquiescence was never taken for granted by the British. Appleton strongly 
emphasised the ‘need of Canadian approval even to details’.99 Canadian consent was sought for the regular 
despatch of reports and minutes to London and the right of the British Technical Committee to pass 
comment on the programme pursued in Canada, occasionally in such a tone as implied the melding of two 
fully independent programmes.100 Such steps would hardly have been necessary had this been simply an 
act of imperial imposition. The Commonwealth connection was manifested, instead, in a subtler expectation 
– of common interests and fellow-feeling.  
 
This distinction is not immediately evident in Canadian historical writing, which has tended to presuppose 
a hegemonic intent on the part of the British policymakers. Donald Avery notes that ‘Not surprisingly, the 
British team dominated the administrative and senior scientist positions’.101 The statement is broadly 
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accurate, but the implication is a little uncharitable. The initial organizational structure of the Laboratory 
certainly reflected its Cambridge origins, but also left space for Canadian initiative and leadership, initially 
in the person of Laurence, but expanding to others as the work progressed and the Canadian recruits gained 
experience. The NRC’s gain, in terms of access to information, placements for Canadian scientists at all 
levels of experience, and in nebulous future prestige, was greater than its administrative sacrifice. Indeed, 
there had been concerns on the British side that the proposed arrangement left rather too much in the hands 
of the Canadians. 
 
With the establishment of the Montreal Laboratory Canada had, for better or worse, become fully enmeshed 
in the British nuclear programme. It had happened not simply by accident, or by design, but by the 
combined workings of those two forces. Timing had been an important early factor. Because the catalysis 
of the American programme coincided with the consolidatory phase in the British programme, 
straightforward bilateral co-operation had proven impossible to achieve. Assessment of the potentialities 
of slow neutron reactions meanwhile changed, increasing the importance of the endeavour. The intention 
throughout was that the British fast neutron work should be conducted in the closest possible communion 
with the Americans. For this reason, the separation work was not transferred to Canada (in spite of Simon’s 
pleading to the contrary: ‘Do you think it really quite hopeless to build our plant in Canada?’).102 
 
Nor would it be appropriate to characterise the embrace of Canada necessarily as a setback to British policy. 
Placing Halban et al in Canada had not been Tube Alloys’ first-choice policy, but instead represented a 
neat circumvention of the increasingly insuperable obstacles which had stood in the way of transplanting 
the British work to the United States. To view this only as a ‘retreat to Canada’, as Holmes has, would, 
however, be a mistake.103 The British had no intention of retreating overall: almost the entire purpose of 
the transfer of the heavy water work to Canada was to consolidate British nuclear assets as advantageously 
as possible vis-à-vis the United States. The British took a holistic view of the project, envisaging the 
Canadian work as a facet of the wider allied effort for which they still hoped. This theme was echoed by 
the Americans themselves. When Bush wrote to Mackenzie on 1st October he expressed his pleasure at the 
planning for the Anglo-Canadian scheme ‘for I feel that this will be of distinct aid in proceeding with the 
discussion of the broader phases of the relationship on this subject’.104 Six weeks later, with the Canadian 
scheme now confirmed, Conant again wrote ‘I am sure that all recognize that we must consider Dr. Halban’s 
undertaking in Canada as one aspect of the total effort’.105 
 
Yet all was not well. Largely unnoticed, storm-clouds were gathering. For all that the Americans had been 
supportive of the move to Canada, there seemed little prospect of their joining the laboratory: for the 
Canadian organisation to become truly tripartite was considered ‘impossible for political reasons’.106 This 
necessarily introduced a degree of organisational and psychological distance between Montreal and the 
American facilities. Still more seriously, Canada’s entire involvement in nuclear research depended upon 
the provision of heavy water for the Montreal Laboratory, which meant in turn that Britain’s sole 
                                                   
102 Simon to Akers, 8th September 1942, AB 1/357 (TNA) 
103 Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, p.200 
104 Bush to Mackenzie, 1st October 1942, RG77-D-1-b. Box 284 ‘Radiological Research. Policy Vol. 1’ (LAC) 
105 Conant to Mackenzie, 17th November 1942, RG77-D-1-b. Box 284 ‘Radiological Research. Policy Vol. 1’ (LAC) 
106 Akers to Perrin, 11th December 1942, AB 1/357 (TNA) 
 
 67 
established interaction with the United States nuclear programme rested upon the procurement of a material 
of which the only accessible stock lay in American hands. It was an ominous dependency. 
 
Conclusion: Canada as Leverage 
 
The long-term consequence of the establishment of the Montreal Laboratory, at least insofar as the 
relationship with the United States was concerned, was that the British became ‘junior partners in the atomic 
project they had launched’.107 That the nuclear centre of gravity must shift across the Atlantic was a question 
of macro-economics and the military-industrial longue durée, but the character of that transition, and its 
timing, had everything to do with personal interactions and accidents of timing.  
 
The catalysis of the American programme was a partial consequence of MAUD’s own endeavours, the 
committee’s instinctive early glances across the Atlantic having planted the idea of collaboration on both 
sides of the Atlantic. These preliminary contacts formed the context for Mark Oliphant’s intervention, and 
for associated interactions on both sides of the Atlantic. The sum of these interactions was the infusion of 
a sense of confidence into the American organisation – confidence which had been hard-earned by the 
MAUD Committee, but which was gladly gifted to the American organisation. The Americans, reaping 
where they had not sown, and blessed with an economic and industrial base unpressured by war, were thus 
able to leapfrog the British programme. The window of opportunity in which an accord for full 
collaboration (or even the merger of the two programmes) could be agreed was narrow, and the scope for 
an agreement has been overstated. The high-water mark of American interest in collaboration came at the 
least optimal time, from a British perspective, for in the summer of 1941 the British programme was 
administratively adrift, caught in a period of (relative) dormancy, under-appreciative of the ramping up of 
American interest, and sceptical about the merits of intertwining a crucial project with a neutral state. To 
progress beyond personal contacts and the ad hoc exchange of papers nevertheless proved more challenging 
than anticipated, and the peak interest of one party in closer ties never quite coincided with the other’s. Part 
of the problem was that the British were aiming to consolidate two disparate lines of research at the same 
moment that the United States began most earnestly to compartmentalise. Instead of an easy 
accommodation the British were forced to negotiate, hard, for closer ties with the American project – this 
in spite of the fact that the United States was now a belligerent. Alliance, however, counted for little in the 
world of nuclear negotiation. It is pleasingly aphoristic to assert that ‘Nothing promotes co-operation 
between individuals or nations more surely than the existence of a common enemy’,108 but it would be far 
truer to acknowledge, as Victor Rothwell put it, that ‘‘To depict British-American relations from Pearl 
Harbor onwards as a story of continuous friendship, mutual respect and monolithic solidarity would be as 
erroneous as anything in revisionist literature’.109 
  
The complexities of conducting negotiations on two distinct but inter-related lines of enquiry very nearly 
overwhelmed British policymakers, and have continued to befuddle historians ever since. Tasked with 
explaining the fact that collaboration with the United States was not attained, and that Canada was so swiftly 
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embraced in later 1942, Canadian historians have sought to cut the Gordian knot by framing the creation 
of the Montreal Laboratory in terms of British defeat and Canadian acquiescence. John W. Holmes – a 
tangential participant in Canadian nuclear history, as well as its historian – wrote of the British looking to 
Canada ‘for help and sanctuary’, seeing the Dominion as simply ‘a good alternative’ in the face of American 
rebuffs,110 but such an interpretation ignores the underlying premise of the British policy that building 
relationships and demonstrating capability in the field of slow neutron research would bolster British efforts 
to remain abreast of developments in fast neutron research too (not to mention the process of triangulation 
by which the British and Americans arrived largely simultaneously at the idea of the Canadian project). For 
London, the principal utility of Canadian involvement in nuclear affairs was as a means of preserving the 
British conception of the nuclear programme. Canada thus gained effective custody of part, but only a part, 
of the British nuclear programme: ‘a curious twist of wartime fortune’,111 yes, but one grounded in existing 
bonds and rational policy calculation.  
 
By the same token, Gowing’s suggestion that Canada agreed to provide facilities ‘simply in order to help 
Britain’112 seems uncharacteristically lacking in nuance, for the archival record in both Canada and the 
United Kingdom makes clear the alacrity with which Mackenzie embraced the British proposal. That the 
Canadian government was constitutionally and emotionally inclined to render assistance to the British was 
certainly a factor, but this impulse was wholly compatible with the expectation of direct benefits for 
Canada; and at any rate altruism alone, even in the Commonwealth cause, could hardly have moved the 
Canadians to accept an arrangement which they though iniquitous – least of all under Mackenzie King, that 
zealous guardian of Canada’s sovereignty.  
 
How then had part of the British programme come to be based in Canada? Such a manoeuvre required 
implicit confidence in the reliability and amenability of the Canadian establishment; and yet the archival 
record makes clear that the British did not perceive Canada as a territory to be acted on, but as a partner – 
admittedly, a historically obliging one – to be engaged with. The project in Canada was not a consolation 
prize, still less a new departure. Clinging to the hope of a united (if not unified) allied effort, the British 
looked to Canada, not initially as an alternative to the United States relationship, but as a buttress to it. It 
was an arrangement satisfactory to constituencies in all three states. When enthusiasm for heavy water 
temporarily dimmed in the early stages, the idea of a relocation to Canada became a convenient way of 
handling a low-urgency project; when the characteristics of plutonium became more readily apparent, the 
same project became a high priority once more. Thus, counter-intuitively, the periods of minimal and 
maximal interest both served to propel the programme to Canada. The fast neutron work, meanwhile, was 
reserved to the United Kingdom as a result of the tension between the desire for independence and 
possession of the weapon and the desire for collaboration: unlike the heavy water work, which could be 
handled as a discrete project, the elements of the fast neutron work could not be disaggregated from one 
another and could not be safely lodged in Canada as a mutually satisfactory alternative. Whereas the 
positioning of the slow neutron work in Canada could be justified as beneficial to each of the parties 
concerned, including the American and British governments, the fast neutron work came to be seen as an 
                                                   
110 Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, pp.198-199 
111 Buckley, Canada’s Early Nuclear Policy, p.9 
112 Gowing, ‘Britain, America and the Bomb’, p.36  
 
 69 
all-or-nothing endeavour: either a complete merger – necessarily located within the United States – or else 
complete independence was required. The British still favoured the former, and had gambled their main 
asset – the heavy water work – accordingly. In short, it was not chance, nor even mere geographical 
proximity, that made Canada the home of British heavy water research, but rather the deliberate, calculated 






The Road to Quebec 
 
The previous chapter highlighted the fact that, by late 1942, the nuclear initiative lay increasingly with the 
Americans. This new reality had led the British to commit more firmly to a Canadian offshoot of their 
project than they had initially intended. In ceding the momentum to the Americans, however, they found 
that they had also made themselves hostage to American goodwill, which soon turned out to be in strikingly 
short supply. In the final months of 1942, with Britain now recognisably falling off the Americans’ pace, 
relations with the United States began to grow fraught. In January 1943 they collapsed completely. The 
catalyst for this rapid deterioration was an American effort, attributed to Conant and enacted in his name, 
radically to restrict British interchange with the American programme, with severe consequences for the 
prospects of the Tube Alloys endeavour in Britain and Canada. The terms which the Americans now 
proposed were disastrous – ‘far more stringent than either the Canadians or the British had been led to 
expect’ – chiefly because ‘they appeared to be at variance with earlier political undertakings that the British 
thought Roosevelt had given to Churchill’.1 ‘Thought’ is very much the operative word here. As shall be 
seen, British attitudes to planning, collaboration, and the role of Canada, which up to this point had been 
formed very much by instinct, were reformed through bitter experience, as earlier expectations proved ill-
founded and naïve. Exposure to adversity, some of which the British had brought upon themselves, forced 
the re-appraisal of British ideas as to the trajectory of her nuclear development and the part which Canada 
might play. It is this process of reconceptualization, and the steps taken towards the eventual 
reconfiguration of the joint programme as a hybrid endeavour, conceived partly as a tripartite US-UK-
Canadian project, partly as a US-Commonwealth accommodation, with which this chapter is concerned. 
 
The starting point is an account of the process by which the crisis in Anglo-American nuclear relations 
unfolded. The period in which it dawned on the British that the United States now held the upper hand – 
and must therefore serve as an influence on their nuclear own activities, including in Canada – was 
coterminous with that in which the deterioration of the Anglo-American collaboration first began to be felt. 
This was no coincidence, but rather a case of the effect highlighting the cause: it was precisely because of 
the Americans’ rapidly improving position relative to the British programme that Groves, Conant et al felt 
empowered to loosen their end of the collaboration. Although already increasingly on the back foot in their 
relations with the Americans, it was the sudden presentation of stringent new conditions in early January 
that first made the Americans’ newly combative attitude apparent to the British. 
 
The second section delves more deeply into the logic of British efforts to articulate a coherent response to 
the emerging crisis, exploring the tension between rival conceptions of how best to proceed in the face of 
American intransigence. This was not a linear process, but rather an awkward, iterative grasping after 
policy, as with a mix of incredulity and incomprehension the British sought to parse the logic and politics 
motivating their American counterparts. Two rival policy options were articulated, which might crudely be 
described as resistance versus acceptance. Advocates of resistance sought to secure better terms from the 
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Americans, and insure against a permanent breakdown, by redoubling and potentially expanding the British 
programme in Canada, whilst advocates of acceptance to secure or recover American goodwill by 
demonstrating willingness to subordinate Britain’s nuclear interests to the greater cause of ensuring the 
weapon’s wartime development.  
 
Finally, the chapter follows the tortuous negotiations leading to the Quebec Agreement – a process which 
necessarily incorporates reflections on the changes which this period of angst and uncertainty brought 
about, both materially, in the form of the negotiations themselves, and psychologically, in the altered 
conception of Canada which external circumstances had brought about. Forced by American obduracy to 
reconsider the fundamentals of the Tube Alloys programme, the British considered abandoning all hope of 
American collaboration, but were dissuaded from doing so by the realisation that such a policy would have 
no support from the Canadians, on whose partnership the British now realised, for the first time, they had 
come to depend.  
 
 
The Conant Crisis 
 
Establishing the Montreal laboratory had neatly resolved the awkwardness around the location of Halban’s 
team, and a steady and valuable process of information exchange was now in progress across in most of 
the fields with which the allies were concerned. As the year wore on, however, the quality of interaction 
had begun to decline, a result of greater and greater American restrictions. By late autumn, the decline in 
the quality of Anglo-American interactions had become noticeable, particularly around the heavy water 
work for which the British and Canadians were preparing. Discussions, by letter and in person, continued, 
but these all ‘failed to achieve anything.’2 In particular, Bush was now seeking to enforce a new basis for 
exchange: ‘information would be given only where the recipient could make use of it during this war.’3 
This, coupled with an increasingly stringent attitude towards security antithetical to the British 
interdisciplinary approach, seemed to threaten the occlusion of much of the British work (recall both the 
perception of the heavy water work as a longer-term endeavour and the consensus that Britain had not the 
industrial capacity to pursue the work alone). 
 
For Akers, then, 1943 began as 1942 had ended, with efforts to improve relations with Groves and Conant. 
Akers’ chief objective was to establish whether the Americans’ increasingly unco-operative attitude really 
was based only on a desire for secrecy, or whether an ulterior motive might be present. He was beginning 
to fear the latter: ‘it certainly begins to look as if there is, in the background, a desire to build up a monopoly 
in this field for the USA…. I am really getting very worried at the interminable delay in settling anything’.4 
Groves, however, continued to assure him that secrecy was the Americans’ only real object. On 2nd January, 
Akers received a telephone call from Conant, who sought to assure him that most of the outstanding 
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questions around co-operation could be easily resolved; only the slightly more complex question of heavy 
water work presented any real difficulty. Conant also reiterated that ‘the only reason for their wish to 
confine exchange of information… is for secrecy’.5 This doubtful assurance gave Akers his opening:  
 
I deliberately put forward the idea that we might, in Canada, review proposals not to proceed 
to large scale work, if the Americans could not see their way to a proper co-operative 
development in the U.S.A. If secrecy is their sole reason for their general attitude of exchange 
of information, then it is difficult to see why they can object to our proceeding to large scale 
development in Canada.6 
 
This was little more than a threat, utterly reflexive and perhaps impelled by frustration more than considered 
thought, to elevate the Canadian project as a response to (and in defiance of) American antipathy. To Akers, 
the Americans seemed increasingly to be advancing an argument that was very nearly tautologous. It 
seemed illogical, fallacious, to argue that transfers of information could be made ‘only when the receiving 
party can make use of it’, if such judgements lay in the hands of Americans whose assessment was already 
that Britain could not – could never – make use of the information. Groves and Conant were, in effect, 
threatening to lay down restrictions arising from the premiss that the British could not (and thus should not) 
hope to contribute to the project as equals. Very well: the British would respond, not in kind, but in 
proportion, highlighting the Americans’ own illogic to them. If the Americans were to beg the question, 
the British would engage with the resulting restrictions in such a way as to short-circuit the Americans’ 
circular reasoning. Canada and the Canadian project thus became, if only momentarily, a rhetorical weapon, 
a tool not quite of coercion but certainly of leverage vis-à-vis the Americans. This impulsive idea of 
elevating the Canadian project was one to which the British would shortly return more seriously.  
 
In the meantime, what had emerged most clearly for Akers was a sense of frustration. He had little sympathy 
for American appeals to precedent: an attempt by Bush to draw parallels with a particular radar project on 
which the British had withheld information from the Americans was quickly dismissed as a false analogy, 
Akers’ sardonic phrasing betraying some of his irritation: ‘I doubt if even they will maintain with conviction 
that the tube alloy project is an American invention in which the British are not interested’.7 That same 
sardonic attitude was applied to a scheme of Groves’, of which Akers had just been informed, for the 
sequestering of the leading American physicists in a secure and remote location: when Groves 
acknowledged that it might not be wise to fully isolate the ten best physicists, Akers asked whether putting 
apart the ten worst physicists might secure the same ‘cynical pretense at secrecy’.8 Beneath such flippancy 
lay a real concern that a policy of isolation might put key fast neutron physicists beyond interaction with 
Chadwick, Peierls and their other British counterparts – a loss of collaboration which would, in the British 
conception of things, be to the detriment of both programmes. 
 
The year had clearly not begun well. Akers found himself trapped in the labyrinth of American obfuscation, 
frustrated by the circularity of the debate, torn between the vanishing hope that their issues arose only from 
                                                   






miscommunication and the rising fear that it there might instead be some unforeseen mendacity 
underpinning the Americans’ latest policy.  
 
The presenting issue was the Canadian slow neutron work. The Canadian project’s dependency on 
American goodwill around the provision of heavy water had been noted by Mackenzie the previous 
October, but American reassurances then had been sufficiently strong that nobody other than Mackenzie 
seemed unduly concerned,9 and Mackenzie himself was soon after told by Conant that there was ‘no danger 
on that score’.10 Yet difficulties did emerge soon after, both with the supply of heavy water and with 
collaboration more generally. Mackenzie had written formally to the Americans requesting an allocation 
of heavy water for Halban’s team, and Akers had delivered the letter.11 By mid-December the request had 
still not been met. Worse, the Americans were pursuing similar research work at Chicago, and were 
increasingly reluctant to share information about it with the British.12 This placed the British in a difficult 
position, for if this situation reflected the new American policy the entire basis for the Montreal project 
now seemed invalid. 13 Arguing for a return to the original understanding was unlikely to succeed, so little 
recourse was left to Akers but to attempt to reconcile the Americans to a trilateral programme, reconfiguring 
the work at Montreal to complement the Chicago work, and vice-versa. The proposal was that chemical 
work resulting from the heavy water reactors would be treated as a joint Chicago-Montreal endeavour, with 
the majority of the physics work meanwhile being done in Canada; engineers from the Canadian team 
would then join the American design firm to work on the pilot and full-scale piles. Naïvely, it was suggested 
that the transfer of personnel from the Canadian outfit into the US-based engineering teams – a proposal of 
which the Americans had always been chary – would present no ‘political’ difficulty ‘because the engineers 
in Dr. Halban’s group will be British or Canadian born’.14 The penny had yet to drop that it was precisely 
this with which the Americans took issue.  
 
Worse lay ahead. Mackenzie, too, had received a telephone call from Conant on 2nd January. Its import, 
however, was somewhat different. Conant told Mackenzie that he was ‘sending… a letter which might 
sound more harsh than was really intended’.15 This letter set out to answer the earlier query from the 
Canadians about the assignment of heavy water produced at Trail which the Canadians had requested a 
share of on behalf of the project at Montreal. Conant reported that he was ‘now in a position to give a 
definite answer’. By way of explanation, and to excuse his delay in responding, Conant began by 
elaborating two key changes to the American organisation. The first was the recently taken decision ‘to 
supplement the Chicago program by an intensive effort using heavy water in the production of element 
“49”’ – which ‘greatly modifies the basis of our previous discussion’. The second change was an order 
which, Conant claimed, he and Bush had ‘received from the top’, to  
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[restrict] our interchange on this whole subject by the application of the principle that we are 
to have complete interchange on design and construction of new weapons and equipment 
only if the recipient of the information is in a position to take advantage of it in this war. 
Such a principle is, of course, in the interest of secrecy.16 
 
Since neither Canada nor Britain would be in a position to produce elements ‘94’ or ‘25’ for the war, there 
could be no interchange with them on the subject. Interchange on diffusion would, however, be allowed to 
continue, for here the British had made good progress. This, then, was Conant’s answer. Canada would 
receive some (limited) supplies of heavy water, but nothing more. No additional information would be 
forthcoming. The Montreal project, which had been embarked upon with the Americans’ blessing, in the 
expectation of their support, had, in effect, been cut adrift. The nebulous policy of restriction against which 
Akers had already been arguing had now become concrete in an almost gratuitously extreme form. Conant 
then outlined the future he envisaged for the Canadian programme: 
 
We should very much like to have the group of scientists assembled in Canada carry on the 
fundamental scientific work for the use of heavy water so that DuPont Company could base 
their designs on this experience.... We should expect that this Canadian group would direct 
the program along lines worked out in connection with the American engineers… and make 
all their results available to this designing group17 
 
This was justified in the language of joint endeavour – the mutual aim of producing a weapon for use 
against the common enemy as rapidly as possible – but the effect would be simple subservience: the team 
at Montreal would work to American instruction, with information flowing only in one direction. Far from 
sounding ‘more harsh than was really intended’, Conant had unilaterally imposed an almost complete 
stoppage upon the British programme as it had been jointly conceived only a few months previously. The 
British were dumbfounded, as much as anything by the illogic and perceived unfairness of the policy. There 
was an infuriating circularity in the Americans’ new stance: no co-operation would be given in any field in 
which the British were unlikely to make a significant wartime contribution; and the British were unlikely 
to make a significant wartime contribution without co-operation. By insisting on an arbitrary metric, shaped 
by a variable under their control, the Americans were very nearly in a position simply to dictate terms. 
Such, certainly, was the tone Conant had adopted in his letter to Mackenzie.18  
 
The significance of Conant having informed the Canadians first, rather than the British, is difficult to weigh. 
The simplest explanation, that the letter from Conant was the natural consequence of a query originating in 
Canada and was therefore an item of business which could be handled on a purely bilateral basis, has merit 
only insofar as it can be argued that the Americans had not appreciated the wider ramifications of their 
drive to secrecy. Yet this can hardly have been the case: the appeals to high policy (these were ostensibly 
orders ‘from the top’) and the articulation of general points of principle on interchange betokened a 
thorough understanding (much though it may have been denied) of what the Conant letter would mean for 
                                                   





Canadian and British involvement in the American project. More Machiavellian interpretations of the 
American approach are possible. One is that the heavy water issue was seized on by Conant et al as the 
most convenient method for introducing a new, restrictive policy on interchange whilst retaining the 
semblance of ordinary procedure. There is also the possibility that Mackenzie was consciously chosen as 
the first recipient of the news, either as part of an active effort to force divisions between the British and 
Canadian programmes (and thus to secure Canadian acquiescence in useful fields without the burden of 
British involvement), or more passively to treat the two parties as sovereign entities, as indeed they were. 
The truth almost certainly lies somewhere between these interpretations. It is clear that the new policy had 
been in gestation for a long while, and that hints of what would be outlined as American policy had already 
been given to Akers; it is equally clear that the Americans were not especially grieved to learn of fractures 
between the British and Canadians over the future of the project. 
 
At any rate the British were swiftly apprised of the unwelcome new policy. The British attended crisis 
meetings with their Canadian counterparts at the NRC on the 7th January, at which Akers was seen to be 
‘much disturbed’.19 The motive for the Americans’ position was a mystery. Why had they adopted such an 
unco-operative attitude? The tone of the letter seemed so at odds with the previous warmth of nuclear-
scientific relations that it was hard to believe that the American scientists actually endorsed its contents.20 
This was deliberate. Conant conveyed, or at the very least allowed the British to alight on, the narrative of 
a military take-over to which the scientists were reluctantly acceding, but this seems to have been largely 
for convenience’s sake. There is little to suggest that Conant’s conscience was greatly troubled by the new 
approach. MacDonald was on surer ground in considering that the new policy ‘may also be evidence of a 
desire to keep the fruits of these developments as far as possible in American hands, both in the military 
and industrial field.’21  
 
The shock elicited by the Conant letter did not dissipate, but was instead compounded on 13th January when 
the British, in the person of Akers, were handed an American memorandum on the subject of interchange, 
which made explicit the implications of the new policy for each aspect of nuclear research.22 This document, 
although dated after Conant’s letter to Mackenzie (7th versus 2nd January) was assumed by the British to 
represent the ur-text for the American’s new collaboration policy. This certainly seems to have been the 
Americans’ intent, for the structure and phrasing of the memorandum are such as to convey the sense of an 
absolute prescriptive policy. At any rate, from this date onwards the two would be conflated, the letter and 
the memorandum each being significant enough to earn the definite article in British correspondence. In 
the weeks and months ahead exasperated or despairing references to ‘the Conant memorandum’ or 
‘Conant’s letter’, used more or less interchangeably, would litter British cables. 
 
For all the tension it precipitated in Anglo-American nuclear relations, the Conant memorandum has been 
consistently down-played in American accounts. The American official historians Hewlett and Anderson 
gave a defence of the Americans’ behaviour in this respect, arguing that the memorandum was ‘only a 
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working paper’, and that it was never officially presented to the British.23 This is incorrect. As Akers’ 
account makes clear, the British did receive a physical copy, from Conant and Bush, on 13th January – and 
such an argument at any rate seems rather to miss the point.24 The entire course of communication between 
the US and their British and Canadian counterparts in January 1943 was predicated on an American policy 
of extremely limited exchange and the implicit (and occasionally explicit) assumption that the American 
programme was the superior: a rupture in relations, or at the very least a substantial reconfiguration, was 
exactly what the Americans were seeking.  
 
The Conant restrictions, though they can be seen in retrospect to have been prefigured in the struggles of 
late 1942, had taken the British by surprise. The Anglo-Canadian slow neutron project was expressly 
founded on the idea – in British eyes, the promise – of collaboration with the Americans. There had been 
multiple verbal assurances of a division of labour, the Chicago team working on graphite, the Montreal 
team on heavy water. That these principles no longer stood required explanation. The British became 
fixated, for a time, on one hypothesis, hinted at by Bush: that US reluctance to collaborate with the British 
might have to do with an agreement the British had made for general scientific collaboration with the 
Russians. Bush, however, would not be drawn on the details of the Americans’ objection to the agreement,25 
and it was difficult for the British to see why the Americans could imagine the agreement applying to the 
nuclear realm. To establish this took many weeks, however,26 and even after the Russian theory had been 
discredited, the British were willing to clutch at similar explanatory straws. As late as April, Akers was 
willing to seize upon a theory of a more general American reticence around co-operation, encompassing 
other fields than the nuclear. 27 Likewise, in May, Oliphant noted a rumour that the Americans’ real interest 
was commercial.28 What the British were slow to realise is that the Americans had little interest in actually 
enumerating their reasons for restriction, precisely because this would enable the British then to address 
them. The hint of displeasure with the Russian agreement, as with the broader principle of 
compartmentalisation and references to orders from on high, served the convenient function of an excuse.29 
 
The British envisaged, almost instinctively, a number of responses: to seek, through Mackenzie’s good 
offices, to establish from Conant the real cause of the difficulty, if possible to remedy it immediately, and 
if necessary to appeal to higher authorities in the United States.30 Akers meanwhile began to hold back from 
further meetings with Conant, in favour of consultations in Canada, including with Howe and Mackenzie,31 
for there was the question of Anglo-Canadian policy to address. Whether or not the Americans had intended 
to drive a wedge between the two parties through their gradated breaking of the news, the British perceived 
a need on their own part both to ensure unity of policy, and then to make that unity evident to the Americans. 
The ideal manifestation of that spirit of Commonwealth indivisibility would be for the Canadians 
themselves to make strong representations on Britain’s account. A file in the UK National archive contains 
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a draft letter to Conant, in Mackenzie’s name, which argues strongly against the restrictive policy outlined 
in the Conant letter. Taking issue first with the policy’s inefficiency, then its inequity, the letter culminated 
in a strident defence, from a Canadian perspective, of the Montreal work as an earnest large-scale joint 
endeavour: 
 
From the beginning of our discussions with [the British regarding] the moving of their team 
and its enlargement here into an Anglo-Canadian group we have always had in mind that the 
organisation would be a complete one capable of tackling all parts of the project up to the 
point of completion of designs for a full-scale plant… 
 
From this flowed a threat echoing that which Akers had earlier levelled at Conant, to forge on regardless. 
If the Americans persisted in excluding the British, ‘we will have to revert to our original plan of proceeding 
to Pilot plant erection and full-scale plant design’.32  
 
At face value, the letter would thus seem to imply that the Canadians were fully aligned with the British, 
each state resolved on a joint effort to develop a full nuclear programme, each preferring to resist the Conant 
proposals, at the risk of a full breach, than meekly to accept their strictures. This, however, would be the 
wrong conclusion to draw from the document, for not only was the letter not sent: it was also not written 
by Mackenzie. Mackenzie’s diary entry for the crisis meetings of 7th January states that ‘They [that is, the 
Britons present] wanted me to sign a letter drafted by Akers. I refused; said that we should go down to see 
Conant and try to discover the real difficulties’.33 It therefore seems clear that the unsent letter, for all its 
elliptical phrasing and adoption of a Canadian perspective, was of British authorship, and reflected little 
more than an opportunistic and perhaps slightly crude British effort to conscript the Canadians.34 
Mackenzie’s flat refusal meant the effort was stillborn. His reluctance to present a facade of Anglo-
Canadian unity likely stemmed in part from justifiable pique at the idea that he might meekly submit to 
British direction – and certainly Akers never again sought so directly to steer Canadian policy – but would 
also appear to reflect a genuine difference of interpretation. Mackenzie was, after all, personally far closer 
to Conant than any of his British counterparts, and had had the American perspective preached more 
strongly to him in the preceding weeks. He was probably therefore sincere in recording his sense of being 
‘not so sure’ that the Conant proposal was unreasonably imbalanced.35  
 
The significance of this episode should not be overstated. The British were generally sensitive to 
Mackenzie’s perspective, and whilst fissures would eventually emerge between the British and Canadian 
nuclear projects this incident was not their origin. At worst the incident appears to have contributed to a 
slight chill in relations between Akers and Mackenzie (though other frustrations arising from Mackenzie’s 
attitudes and working practices also played their part).36 The British had received a salutary reminder of the 
need for tact in their handling of the nuclear relationship with Canada, and indeed by the end of January, 
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when the British began producing papers outlining their considered response, Akers was at pains to ensure 
that Mackenzie was included in the correspondence and thereby apprised of the latest British thinking.37 
From the perspective of this thesis, however, the incident provides an interesting first indication that 
Canadian perspectives on the relationship with the United States might differ from the British, in ways the 
British might not have foreseen.  
 
Deprived of the comfort of a simple solution, the British were forced to acknowledge that there were deeper 
issues at play, requiring deeper thought than they had hitherto exercised. Yet forming a coherent response 
to the Conant proposals would take time, and time was one of the many commodities the British lacked 
relative to the Americans. From January onwards, the British found themselves engaged in an iterative 
process of internal and external negotiation, sounding out the Americans on various scenarios and 
reconceptualising the Tube Alloys programme in light of their responses. As time passed unfruitfully it 
became clearer and clearer that the American proposals, although not non-negotiable per se, certainly 
represented a very firm statement of intent. The situation had become astonishingly bleak for the British. It 
was hard to see what future there could be for the Montreal project, which had looked such a promising 
venture only a few months earlier. The Canadian historian Donald Avery presents an extreme assessment 
of the Conant restrictions’ endpoint: ‘The answer was obvious: the Montreal Laboratory had a limited 
future, and the NRC should be given the opportunity to cut its losses’.38 This goes slightly too far: as 
Conant’s correspondence with Mackenzie indicates, the Americans were not averse to the idea that the 
Montreal Laboratory might muddle on as a sort of junior adjunct to the American project, conducting basic 
research in support of the engineering design work. But it was nevertheless true that much of what the 
British had feared six months earlier – the dwindling of their leverage vis-à-vis the American programme, 
the loss of access to the best of allied physicists’ thinking – had come to pass. The effort to leverage 
participation through Montreal seemed therefore to have failed. The British were consequently driven to 
ask increasingly fundamental questions about their own intentions. What was the end to which the 
negotiations were being carried out? Was this now simply a salvage operation? If so, what was to be 
salvaged? Was it the collaboration with the Americans, or the project in Canada, or the linkage between 
the two? What mattered most? The process by which the UK answered these questions shaped, and was 
shaped by, the participation of Canada as a third nuclear actor.  
 
Articulating a Response 
 
The extent to which the British were taken aback by the Conant proposals has already been noted. It had 
initially been assumed that the army take-over had prompted the review of American interchange policy, 
but in the wake of the Conant letter and memorandum Akers was less and less willing to allow the American 
scientists the benefit of the doubt. He was personally frustrated with Bush and Conant, neither of whom he 
thought understood, or had time to address, the complexities of the nuclear project. 39 Nor was there much 
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hope that Groves’ growing hold over the project would ultimately lead to any improvement.40 The Army 
may not have borne all the blame, but their attitude was still far from friendly. Moreover, so long as it was 
unclear who held the ultimate authority, the scientific and military components of the American programme 
could each continue to blame unpopular policies on the other.41 Efforts to resolve this tension by meeting 
with both sides simultaneously bore little fruit, however, for there was too much unity in the American 
ranks. Meanwhile, further troubling signs were detected. On 18th January Akers reported on the Americans’ 
intention, already intimated but now confirmed, fully to isolate (that is, physically as well as 
organisationally) their theoretical physics group. The Americans expressed a hope that Chadwick and 
Peierls would be sent out for discussions with the American group before this took place, since no contact 
would be possible afterwards (‘no information to pass out from American Group but British could send in 
written memoranda on British work’, i.e. information would pass in only one direction).42 Akers again 
found himself highlighting the obvious issue: ‘apart from any political aspect this procedure is in our view 
entirely inefficient’.43  
 
The view from London was equally pessimistic. Anderson seems to have viewed the crisis almost 
despairingly in the first instance, describing it as potentially the last stage in the joint life of the projects: a 
‘final effort’ was called for, to win over the Americans to the idea that full collaboration would be to the 
benefit of both countries.44 (Note the reference to ‘both countries’: Anderson at this stage seems to have 
been content to perceive this as a bilateral rather than trilateral issue, with the Canadians arrayed squarely 
behind the British). A swift review of past commitments by the Americans buoyed him slightly, however, 
and there was always a fallback option: Churchill could yet be brought in to tackle the issue directly with 
Roosevelt.45 The momentary comfort which Anderson et al took from revisiting the 1941 correspondence 
is, in a sense, indicative of the flaw in the UK’s nuclear diplomacy at this point. Whether they realised it or 
not, the British were stuck in a 1941 mind-set, increasingly ignorant of the realities of American dominance 
of the atomic enterprise and still somewhat naïve in their treatment of Canada as a conveniently located 
and implicitly acquiescent territory, rather than as a partner in any right of her own. It was, in fact, the crisis 
precipitated by the Conant letters which ultimately drove the Tube Alloys bureaucracy to reconfigure its 
attitude towards (or perhaps more accurately, understanding of) the true position, which was, indeed, 
increasingly tripartite.  
 
The hope which Anderson had expressed of a swift high-level resolution to the impasse was briefly kindled 
when Churchill and Roosevelt met at Casablanca in the second half of January. Word came to Canada on 
23rd January – where Akers and his colleagues were working feverishly to comprehend what had gone 
wrong, and to construct convincing arguments for a restoration of collaboration – that the two leaders had 
agreed upon ‘100% co-operation’.46 Mackenzie, ever the pessimist, doubted it would make any difference. 
He proved correct, in a sense, for this was the first of several such false dawns: it soon emerged that no 
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such agreement had actually been reached. Gowing doubted the subject was even discussed between the 
two leaders.47 Yet throughout the spring of 1943 the British would experience a fresh wave of optimism 
each time there was contact between the two men.48 The evident lack of any Prime Ministerial deus ex 
machina in these months condemned the British to a period of introspection, of drafting and redrafting 
position papers summarising what had gone wrong and how, possibly, things might eventually be put right. 
(The British were prone to such bouts of self-flagellation in their wartime relationship with the United 
States: there was often little else that could be done). The Montreal Laboratory meanwhile lay almost 
dormant, and the gulf between British and American research continued to widen. As time passed the need 
to articulate a coherent strategy for establishing acceptable collaboration with the Americans, already rather 
urgent, thus became existentially important. What was abundantly clear, even in the depths of post-Conant-
letter despair, was that the United Kingdom would never give up entirely on nuclear work; if this was what 
the Americans hoped to achieve, it might be best to disabuse them of the notion as soon as possible. Halban, 
writing in February, suggested as much: ‘Surely we should convince United States that British 
Commonwealth would not give up source of military and economic power, even if work is slowed down 
by lack of exchanges and of material’.49 (Halban’s invocation of the Commonwealth here might appear 
somewhat remarkable, given his French citizenship and cosmopolitan European descent,50 but such remarks 
nevertheless appear typical of his character: his official letters throughout the period 1941 – 1945 convey 
only a wholehearted identification with Britain and the interests of the British Commonwealth. One might 
suggest that Halban, as somewhat of an outsider, had made explicit a conflation which Britons generally 
left unspoken).  
 
There were limits, too, to the methods by which the British could seek to influence American opinion. 
Perhaps a more granular, case-by-case approach might work. There was a chance of salvaging collaboration 
on heavy water and the slow neutron work, if the British and Canadians could demonstrate the appropriate 
financial and political resolve. Hopes of access to information on electromagnetic separation would 
probably have to be sacrificed, since there was no real likelihood of the British entering the field any time 
soon. The most urgently required action, though, was on the fast neutron work, including the crucial 
ordnance question. The Americans’ plan to isolate the theoreticians could not be allowed to stand, for ‘In 
many ways this proposal seems the most foolish and dangerous of all’.51 There seemed to be consensus 
within the Anglo-Canadian project as to the moral and practical impossibility of withholding information 
from the Americans as a mere negotiating tactic: 
 
Unless we are prepared to build a large scale plant to make element[s] 25 or 49, either in 
Britain or Canada, it would seem wrong to [withhold] our information, however distasteful 
the conditions, as presumably this must delay the completion of a plant by the Americans, 
and so increase the risk that Germany may have this weapon first.52 
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Two broad schools of thought emerged. One argued that Britain should adopt a confrontational line, 
resisting as forcefully as possible the strictures the Americans sought to impose. A high-level diplomatic 
campaign should be waged to convince the Americans to relent, with a wholly independent Anglo-Canadian 
programme as the explicit fall-back position should that effort fail. The other school argued for acceptance 
of the Americans’ terms as having the better prospect of securing some measure of participation in the 
American programme in the medium-term. Their suggestion was that Britain should acquiesce, adopting 
an approach of reluctant but demonstrably thorough compliance with the Americans’ strictures in the hope 
of their eventual loosening, and for the sake of retaining the moral high-ground.  
 
There was outwardly much to recommend a policy of resistance. On 19th January Perrin, who along with 
many of those based in the London Tube Alloys office favoured the policy, shared his views with Akers, 
whose experience in America had inclined him more towards acceptance of the Conant restrictions. Perrin’s 
instinct was easily summarised: 
 
American regulations are clearly unwelcome and will lead to inefficient working. Attitude 
here is that every effort up to highest level should be made to change regulations and if these 
fail serious consideration would have to be given to stopping all information from here and 
continuing on our own. 53 
 
This was to be an increasingly popular stance. Chadwick, Simon and Peierls were all reportedly of the view 
that, for the time being at least, the transmission of British progress reports to the US should cease.54 
Chadwick had also made clear that he would be unwilling to make a previously proposed trip to meet with 
the US theoretical group. Prompted by Peierls’ queries as to what should be done with his latest batch of 
reports, which ordinarily would be forwarded to the Americans, Perrin mulled the statement that could be 
made by withholding them completely from the Americans, and on other possible forms of escalation: 
 
Over here we feel that the American proposals must be resisted as strongly as possible and 
that if the technical arguments which we can produce are not accepted the matter must be 
taken to the level of the Prime minister and the President. 55  
 
Advocates of confrontation recognised that an overly assertive British response might impede overall 
progress towards the bomb. Allowing this, though, could not alter the fact that American intransigence 
must equally have a delaying effect. If the greatest imperative was the securing of a working bomb by an 
allied power in as short a timeframe as possible, full collaboration must surely be the best route.56 It was 
galling to think that the Americans could put aside that principle, for seemingly entirely selfish reasons, 
whilst at the same time expecting the British to accept it as a moral absolute, but little else could be done. 
The only other hope – forlorn as it already seemed – was that the gesture of ‘[endeavouring] to get all 
possible information from here to the States as quickly as possible’ might somehow secure effective co-
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operation, whether through goodwill, demonstration of utility, or moral shaming.57 Yet beneath all these 
wranglings about suffering for the greater good, there was always the sense that there might be a more 
palatable alternative available, could they only alight upon it. Perrin reported his view that  
 
If our relations with Americans on T.A. [Tube Alloys] project as a whole do not improve or 
actually worsen I believe consideration should be given to best use of joint British and 
Canadian resources whether for T.A. (1) or T.A. (2) projects58 
 
– a euphemistic way of suggesting that the British should return to the drawing board and design a unified 
Anglo-Canadian programme for nuclear research without any American involvement whatsoever. This 
position clearly had some appeal. Peierls, not ordinarily impetuous on questions of high policy, saw wisdom 
in the laying of contingency plans for working without the Americans: ‘An insurance premium is not 
usually considered wasted if the house does not catch fire!’59 Even Akers, who had advanced the most 
forceful arguments for accepting the Americans’ position, at times found himself drawn back to the 
threat/gambit of a redoubled Anglo-Canadian effort in Canada, having at one stage begun discussions with 
personnel there – including representatives from Canadian industry – on the feasibility of pilot plant 
construction in the near future, the hope, as ever, being that when the Americans learnt of this resolve they 
would relent and permit relevant exchanges. Yet always there was the nagging doubt – could it be done? – 
and the accompanying fear that separation from the American programme would mean falling irrecoverably 
far behind the cutting edge of nuclear research.  
 
The only argument against this position that Perrin and the advocates of confrontation could conceive of 
was that of moral obligation to the allied war effort.60 This, though, was exactly what Akers seemed to be 
suggesting: the idea that Britain should humbly submit to whatever course would be of ‘maximum benefit’ 
to the United Nations’ war effort.61 For all his earlier willingness to warn the Americans of British 
willingness to plough an independent nuclear furrow, Akers had become the exemplar of the ‘acceptance’ 
party. Acquiescence, he argued, was ‘the right course to follow’, for in maintaining at least the semblance 
of collaboration with the United States Britain would ‘appear to lose no advantage which could be obtained 
by severing relations’.62 The hope ultimately was that the Americans would be won round by the practical 
demonstration of the benefits of collaboration and by the moral example of British devotion to the common 
cause: 
 
I believe that our best chance of convincing Americans of advantages of complete 
interchange is to get this working wherever there is a definite request for it to be done, from 
their side, by people who can assert that, without such exchange, quickest realisation of full-
scale plants will be jeopardised…. the useful object of such exchange is to give the 
Americans our latest ideas to enable them to complete their plant as quickly as possible63 
                                                   
57 Perrin to Gorell Barnes, 19th January 1943, AB 1/374 (TNA) 
58 Perrin to Secretary BCSO, 19th January 1943, AB 1/374 (TNA) 
59 Peierls to Akers, 1st May 1943, AB 1/374 (TNA)  
60 Perrin to Akers (via Secretary BCSO), 19th January 1943, AB 1/374 (TNA); ‘Tube Alloy Project. Summary and Observations on 
General Policy’, 19th April 1943, AB 1/374 (TNA); Perrin to Gorell Barnes, 19th January 1943, AB 1/374 (TNA) 
61 Perrin to Gorell Barnes, 19th January 1943, AB 1/374 (TNA) 
62 Akers to Mackenzie, 30th January 1943, AB 1/374 (TNA)  




This was the crux of the case for acceptance. The Americans had manoeuvred the British into an 
uncomfortable position, creating an irresolvable tension between the objectives of the United Nations on 
the one hand and the pursuit of British self-interest on the other. That there might be a moral inconsistency 
in all this appears not to have troubled the Americans overmuch.  
 
What of the Canadian position? This was at once simpler than the British, and more complex: simpler, in 
that only the Montreal project was directly in view, and more complex, in that relations with the state’s two 
most important partners were involved. Clearly there was an appetite amongst the Canadians for a 
resolution of the impasse. They too were experiencing intense frustration, less from the effective suspension 
of the work at Montreal, galling though that was, but rather with Canada’s powerlessness to resolve the 
conflict between her two more senior partners. Canada was caught in the crossfire, too minor a power to be 
able to effect a reconciliation whilst simultaneously significant enough to be materially impacted by the 
stalemate. It was the worst of both worlds, and there was truth in an increasing intuition of Halban’s that a 
more prominent role for the Canadians – for Mackenzie himself – might help resolve the political 
differences. Howe had apparently felt, as early as mid-January, that ‘if they left the negotiations to us, it 
would be more satisfactory’.64 To this end, Mackenzie had offered to see Conant, ‘who would probably 
speak more freely to a Canadian than to an Englishman’.65 
 
Gowing’s account of this period of acute awkwardness in Anglo-American nuclear relations introduced the 
idea of an opposition between the feeling at Montreal that ‘almost anything was preferable to their own 
idleness’ and the feeling in London that ‘anything was preferable to accepting the intolerable American 
terms for collaboration’.66 The archival record would seem to confirm her supposition that this was a 
distinction driven not by nationality, but by location and work programme. The distinction was not absolute 
– the independent option was countenanced at one stage or other by many of the key figures in Montreal 
and Ottawa – but there was nevertheless an emergent sense that perspectives on the Conant crisis night vary 
depending on the side of the Atlantic one viewed it from.  
 
The Path to Quebec 
 
The British continued to vacillate between resistance and acceptance, and even after the disappointment at 
Casablanca (see above, p.79) there was a lingering hope that high level talks might break the stalemate. 
(Note, however, that Mackenzie King’s intercession was never sought; the highest active representative of 
the Canadian government was Howe, whose indisposition at crucial moments in practice left Mackenzie as 
senior Canadian. Even where the Montreal Laboratory was concerned, advocates of a top-level diplomatic 
effort conceived it as an issue to be solved bilaterally.) The main hope now lay in the fact that Churchill 
had entered into a dialogue with Roosevelt’s close advisor, Harry Hopkins, who assured the by now 
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somewhat jaded British of his best endeavours.67 Since the Prime Minister was known to be in 
correspondence with Hopkins – perhaps, at last, on the cusp of a resolution – other contacts ought therefore 
to be minimised.68  
 
It was at this moment that Halban received an invitation to a meeting in New York on the topic of slow 
neutron interactions. The invitation, delivered to Mackenzie by Conant, was seen optimistically by the 
former as possibly indicating ‘a softening of the American attitude regarding co-operation with us’.69 This 
presented something of a quandary: should Halban be permitted to go, as evidence of British goodwill and 
as a tangible reminder of the potential value of the Anglo-Canadian programme, or should his participation 
be forbidden, by way of sanction and in recognition of the disturbed state of Anglo-American nuclear 
relations? In short, should acceptance or confrontation prevail?  
 
The matter was debated at length on both sides of the Atlantic – though not by Mackenzie, away in western 
Canada, who was unable to participate. Halban strongly opposed the idea that he should be prevented from 
going, and particularly abhorred a suggestion (not ultimately enacted) that he plead illness as his excuse, 
but was over-ruled. The final decision was made by Anderson, in London, who felt it best not to weaken 
the Prime Minister’s negotiating position by allowing Halban to pool information unreciprocally with the 
Americans. The consequences were soon felt. Mackenzie took the news poorly, and in subsequent 
correspondence with Conant sought to distance himself and the NRC from the decision, which he blamed 
squarely and unsympathetically on the British.70 The Americans meanwhile had perceived a slight in 
Halban’s non-attendance, and began to increase their pressure on the British. Conant’s correspondence to 
Mackenzie hinted at the adoption of a yet-harder line,71 and made a second demand for a visit from 
Halban.72 Anderson saw this as a conscious effort to engineer a breach between Britain and Canada.73 
Whether or not that was Conant’s intention, the effect was certainly to emphasise to Mackenzie the 
cleavages between his own perspective and that prevailing in London. Halban, too, had sensed the 
divergence, recording his impression that ‘our whole work could progress better if the Canadian 
Government were invited to take a bigger share of responsibility for meeting the political difficulties’.74 
 
The case for resistance had always assumed that the United Kingdom would ramp up its preparations for 
an independent programme, but it was never fully apparent whether this was to be by way of insurance or 
as leverage. The latter assumption had had its proponents in previous months, but the experience with 
Halban had been somewhat chastening. To actively separate from the Americans would be an extreme step, 
and since there remained a glimmer of hope in the discussions Anderson shied away from it. Increasingly 
detailed consideration was, however, given to the question of what could be done, at Montreal and in 
Britain, in the complete absence of American assistance. Halban and the Montreal team prepared 
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programmes for each of the divisions, complemented by reports on the theoretical and chemical work 
already performed. These had all been produced in an atmosphere of extreme uncertainty, and morale was 
correspondingly low: ‘You may imagine that we were rather depressed’, Halban wrote, to learn of the poor 
progress of the negotiations.75  For the project to continue without American participation was so manifestly 
sub-optimal that to have to begin to plan for it was profoundly dispiriting. Yet there was still plenty of work 
ongoing, plenty upon which to build, in Britain as well as in Canada. British technical stock vis-à-vis the 
Americans was declining fast, but there were still capable teams at Birmingham working on theoretical 
physics (under Peierls) and chemistry (under Haworth), along with various sub-teams at Cambridge, 
Liverpool and Manchester under the direction of Chadwick, and at Oxford under Simon. Important 
measurements were being take at the National Physical Laboratory and the Government Chemistry 
Laboratory. British industry had also been drawn in: ICI, through various subsidiaries,76 had been involved 
from the start, but so too now were Mond Nickel, working on metallurgy. Across the UK, there were 
approximately 70 academic researchers at work, and another 100 or so in industrial establishments (more, 
if tangential work at Metropolitan Vickers was included). Nineteen of the university researchers were of 
professorial calibre. (The full complement at Montreal, meanwhile, was far smaller: approximately 36 
scientists and engineers were present, of whom only around two-thirds were British-paid.)77  
 
The problem was that this network of active research, substantive as it seemed, contrasted rather negatively 
with what was known of the American position. American research costs were thought to be running at 
$350,000,000 per year, and at least 500 graduate-level research staff were known to be employed in 
universities and government labs (i.e. five times more than the combined total in Canada and the UK).78 
The British were, however, sceptical of some American claims.79 Even allowing for a healthy degree of 
scepticism, though, it was clear that an independent British programme would trail the Americans by a fair 
margin. It was calculated that for the United Kingdom to produce 1kg U235 per day via the diffusion 
method would cost approximately £50 million and take between three-and-a-half and five years to build 
(including 9-12 months of preparatory work before construction could even begin). The Americans, in 
contrast, believed that their plant would be ready in ‘about 2 years'.80 The position was summarised neatly 
in mid-April in a document containing an ‘outline of further effort and time needed to achieve full-scale 
realisation of T.A. 1 and T.A. 2 projects without American co-operation’.81 On T.A.1, it was concluded that 
a significant expansion was required right across the board. Chadwick, working on bomb design, would 
need perhaps another ten or so senior physicists, plus juniors and support staff; Peierls too might need more 
support. Design and construction of a diffusion plant would require a far greater commitment: 220 chemists, 
physicists, metallurgists & engineers; 500 research assistants; 50 administrative workers, and a further 150 
skilled and 300 unskilled workers for construction. Only about 90 of the scientists were already available. 
Design work would require a further, shorter-term commitment of personnel, peaking at an additional 50 
engineers and 780 support staff for design of the plant. The Americans would clearly beat the British to the 
bomb. That said, it was clear at least that an independent programme was technically feasible. This gave 
                                                   
75 Halban to Akers, 25th March 1943, AB 1/374 (TNA)  
76 viz. ICI Fertilizer & Synthetic Products; ICI General Chemicals; ICI Metals. 
77 Outline of nature and scale of present British effort’, 16th April 1943, AB 1/374 (TNA)  
78 Ibid.  
79 Ibid.  
80 T.A. Project – Note for Lord Cherwell, 6th April 1943, AB 1/374 (TNA)  
81 Outline of nature and scale of present British effort’, 16th April 1943, AB 1/374 (TNA)  
 
 86 
the British the essence of a strategy: they could inform the Americans, in detail, of British plans for full-
scale development. There was a faint possibility that this might at last persuade the Americans to accept 
some new form of collaboration, whilst in the more likely case that they were to decline the British could 
instead rely on Canadian support.  
 
This strategy, of course, rested on Canadian willingness to sever nuclear relations with the United States, 
and was therefore optimistic at best. Even in January Mackenzie had seen little option for Montreal but 
acceptance of the Conant restrictions, and after months of stalled negotiations his pessimism had only 
deepened.82 Both he and Howe had become impatient with British machinations, and were increasingly 
tempted to wash their hands of the whole project. At one discussion, in May, the two had agreed that ‘if 
United Kingdom would not accept American proposal at once, we would not carry on the project’.83 Shortly 
thereafter Mackenzie informed Akers of his view 
 
that the break with the Americans entirely alters the position of the Canadian Government, 
whose co-operation with [us] was on the basis that this brought them into [a] project where 
the British [and] Americans were working together.84 
 
Here was Canadian independence of thought and action made manifest. The British had long assumed that 
Canada was inherently on the British ‘side’, and that Canadian decisions, even with regard to Canada’s 
relationship with the US, would be taken with a view to British interests in their widest conception. They 
were wrong. The Americans, in fact, had been closer to the truth in their assumption that Mackenzie’s 
position lay closer to their own than to the British.85 It was now becoming clear that Canadian engagement 
with the nuclear work had not solely been an act of imperial assistance, nor even of pragmatic self-interest: 
rather, it had been conceptualised, from the outset, as a tripartite endeavour, with the United States at the 
head. In the nuclear realm, as in wider politics, it was now increasingly the American relationship which 
undergirded Canadian policymaking. This had troubling implications for British policy.  
 
Unless relations can be restored between the British and Americans, it means that the 
Canadian Government has got to choose between us. In this case they will undoubtedly refuse 
to take any action which will antagonise the American Government, as the effects of a breach 
will be too serious.86 
 
The British strategy of confrontation, was, in short, unworkable. Yet it was not immediately abandoned. A 
further round of talks between Churchill and Roosevelt inspired fresh hope of resolution, and alongside it 
fresh consideration of the possibility of putting pressure on the Americans by stressing Britain’s absolute 
commitment to large-scale work.87 Yet even Perrin had cooled on the idea that the Americans might be 
manipulated by what amounted to a bluff:  
                                                   
82 Peierls to Akers, 1st May 1943, AB 1/374 (TNA)  
83 CJM diary, 1st May 1943 
84 Akers: Note on Talk with C.J. Mackenzie, 14th May 1943, AB 1/374 (TNA)  
85 Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, p.272 
86 Akers: Note on Talk with C.J. Mackenzie, 14th May 1943, AB 1/374 (TNA)  





the prospects of restoring practical collaboration would be nil if our representatives entered 
the negotiations with the intention of what amounts to holding a pistol at the American 
heads…88 
 
Perrin therefore thought it might be best that the British simply resign themselves to a separation.89 
Anderson, in contrast, felt that a statement of intent, not levelled as a threat but presented as an indication 
of British commitment to action, might serve a useful purpose in inclining the Americans towards an 
agreement. It was even hoped that the Canadians might be willing, as they had not been six months 
previously, to represent the British position to the Americans; Akers thought it would be ‘even more 
impressive’ if Bush and Conant learnt of the plan for a full-scale Anglo-Canadian development programme 
via Mackenzie.90 It was a forlorn hope, however. The Canadians were still in no mood to intercede for the 
British. Mackenzie’s diary speaks of Howe’s annoyance at the United Kingdom attitude: ‘at the slightest 
cause I think he would close the whole thing down’.91 For Mackenzie and Howe the British offer of ‘50/50 
development’, which some in London thought so attractive, paled in comparison with the potential 
consequences of a breach with the Americans. 92 
 
The development which broke the impasse, when it came, was almost anti-climactic. In July 1943 Bush 
and the American Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, were both in London on other business, but Churchill, 
Anderson and Perrin were between them able opportunistically to corral the Americans into a series of 
discussions on Tube Alloys, in the course of which the Americans at last conceded that suspicion of British 
post-war industrial objectives had contributed to the Americans’ opposition to close collaboration. By 
immediately offering a sweeping (perhaps disproportionate) concession on this, the British were able to 
short-circuit the American argument, whilst simultaneous personal pressure by Churchill on Stimson (and 
therefore indirectly upon Roosevelt) at last produced favourable conditions for progress. By 31st July, 
Mackenzie could note in his diary that matters were ‘taking an optimistic turn’; when he saw Anderson on 
the 3rd August he found him ‘a different man’.93 A swift series of negotiations, first in London, then in 
Washington, produced a draft agreement in time for Roosevelt and Churchill to approve it at their 
conference in Quebec (hosted by Mackenzie King, who nevertheless took little part) in August 1943.  
 
The five concise articles of the Quebec Agreement encoded a mechanism for the direction of the entire 
subsequent allied nuclear programme. The drafting was, however, somewhat ambiguous on key issues (a 
fact which may have recommended it to both parties, for each could see in it an interpretation compatible 
with their own desires). The first two clauses were uncontroversial, for neither party was likely to wish to 
use the weapon on the other, and by 1945, American predominance in both the nuclear endeavour and the 
direction of the Pacific War meant that British consent to the use of the weapon against Japan was largely 
a formality (though British personnel participated in, amongst other things, the selection of targets). The 
third clause, though, prohibiting the communication of information to third parties ‘except by mutual 
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consent’, was already mired in complexity. For one thing, there was already the vexed question of Halban 
and his French colleagues, whom the Americans had never fully trusted (and never would). More complex 
still, there were the Dominions: were they to be treated as a third party? Canada was not a signatory to the 
agreement, but would be represented on the Combined Policy Committee which the agreement established: 
a clear exception. But what about Australia, already cognisant of the programme through Oliphant? The 
fourth article, meanwhile, contained the great concession of post-war industrial applications, whereby the 
British disclaimed any interest beyond what the American President would permit, and the fifth article 
outlined the mechanisms by which this agreement would proceed, and contained the crucial rubric around 
‘full and effective interchange of information and ideas’. 
 
In the final analysis, then, the British objective of securing a tripartite nuclear programme was achieved, 
not by the policy of resistance, the brief application of which had only made matters worse, nor by a policy 
of acceptance, for this was never tried, but by a combination of attritional negotiation at the lower levels 
and the ‘moral suasion’ exercised by Churchill on Roosevelt.94 That it should finally have been achieved 
so straightforwardly has puzzled historians. Septimus Paul, perhaps in consequence of having read too 
much into Churchill’s phraseology,95 focuses on the image of Churchill grovelling at Roosevelt’s feet – ‘a 
low point in the dignity of the office’ – as though it were British abasement that finally convinced the 
Americans.96 Avery’s description of Quebec as Conant’s ‘private moment of triumph’, as though the British 
had been bound to something equivalent to his original proposal, is similarly misleading.97 The British 
certainly accepted junior partnership, and certainly submitted themselves to the onerous burdens of 
American compartmentalisation policy, but they also gained their primary goal of collaboration across fast 
and slow neutron research – including on the electromagnetic and centrifuge methods, for which the British 
did not have corresponding programmes. In that sense, given how bleak the situation had appeared eight 
months previously, it bordered on the miraculous.  
 
Both parties were ultimately drawn to Quebec by a gradual realisation. For the Americans, it was the 
realisation that in spite of their sacred new policy of compartmentalisation their programme had become 
almost inextricably intermeshed with the British,98 and that since the British could not be deterred from 
pursuing a large-scale programme of some sort, condescending to some form of collaboration was the safer, 
easier option. For the British, it was the realisation that the Canadians could not be induced to support any 
policy amounting to a complete breach with the Americans, and that Britain could not realistically pursue 
its nuclear ambitions without Canada. Montreal had become too important, as a centre in its own right and 
as one of Britain’s few tangible nuclear assets, for it to become simply a minor research laboratory for 
DuPont – which meant that a policy of meek acceptance of the Conant restrictions could not be 
countenanced. Without Canadian support, meanwhile, there were no meaningful methods by which 
pressure could be placed on the Americans; nor could they simply walk away. So it was that the British, 
lacking any other policy option, simply held the line – and this, paradoxically, worked. Their initial policy 
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of investing in the heavy water work as a method for binding together the British and American fast neutron 
programmes had, almost miraculously, and certainly in spite of subsequent vacillations in British policy, 
proven successful. In short, although Quebec was a wholly bilateral agreement, it could not have been 
concluded had the Canadian influence not been felt. 
  
Conclusion: A Salvage Operation? 
 
The crisis in Anglo-American nuclear relations that had begun in January 1943 created the conditions which 
led ultimately to the Quebec Agreement. It was a crisis which the British should probably have foreseen. 
Yet the British were undone not so much by complacency or arrogance, as by naïvety. In 1942, the British 
impulse had been to avoid the entanglement of the British and American programmes by sharing only 
information, rather than resources: a policy of close co-operation, stopping short of a formal commitment 
to joint development. Politicians and scientists had alike assumed that priority in discovery would carry 
some weight; that early progress could easily be parlayed into continuing relevance; and that rivalry 
between the Anglophone allies would never supersede the principles of fair play and common cause. Yet 
generosity carries no obligation in diplomacy. Good will is a diminishing resource, and by the time British 
thinking had become more amenable to the idea of a North American home for the programme much of the 
intangible asset of primacy had vanished. The problem was almost, in fact, that the British had been 
conceiving of the Americans as though the US were a Dominion, in the idealised sense; Akers, Anderson 
et al seem genuinely to have struggled with the idea that an Anglophone democracy, allied with Britain in 
the same hard-fought conflict, might nevertheless choose to act in such a way as to enhance, intentionally 
or incidentally, its own position vis-à-vis the United Kingdom. The British were psychologically anchored 
on their early experiences of co-operation, particularly with regard to Conant, for whom they long persisted 
in making excuses. The attempted imposition of the Conant restrictions in early January meant that British 
illusions could no longer be sustained as anything other than wishful thinking.  
 
Once it had become clear that the difficulties with the Americans were no simple case of miscommunication 
or interpersonal difficulty, it became necessary for Britain to develop a coherent policy response. One 
possible option was to seek some form of resolution on the basis of a redoubled effort in Britain and by the 
British in Canada. For some, this was only ever to be as leverage for negotiations with the Americans; for 
others, there was solace in the idea that an ‘independent’ programme might actually deliver on Britain’s 
ultimate policy objective of remaining at the cutting edge of nuclear research. Ranged against this policy 
of confrontation, which had its adherents mostly in Britain, was an argument in favour of accepting the 
Americans’ demands, which was advanced most clearly by those more closely affiliated with the Montreal 
Laboratory, British and Canadian alike. The British spent much of the first part of 1943 suspended between 
these two incompatible policies. From either perspective, however, Canada’s importance to Tube Alloys 
had dramatically increased, for having spent the final few months of 1942 diligently entangling their heavy 
water team with the Canadians at Montreal there was now no option but to engage closely with them. 
Paradoxically, this experience at once managed to draw the British and Canadians closer together, and to 




Collaborating more closely with Canada eroded the last residues of the core-periphery dynamic which had 
previously informed British policy-making. Prior to the Conant crisis the British could conceive of Canada 
in one of two ways – as a territory in which to act, or as a sovereign entity with which to engage. The British 
had begun their nuclear adventure conceiving of Canada chiefly in the former manner, but by mid-1943 
this was no longer possible. Canada the territory and Canada the sovereign entity could no longer be 
disaggregated: the project on Canadian soil in which the British had invested so heavily, financially and 
psychologically, had inexorably transitioned into a joint enterprise with the Canadian state. Shorn of the 
American collaboration they had taken for granted, the Tube Alloys organisation fell back on what was 
familiar and available. Desperation, rather than inclination, led the British to engage seriously with the idea 
of Montreal as a stand-alone project. Not for the first time, the British found themselves looking to a 
Commonwealth partner to help overcome a setback. Yet as Mackenzie consistently demonstrated, Canada 
was not straightforwardly subaltern. It was the dawning realisation that Canadian support in the nuclear 
endeavour must now be earned, rather than assumed, and that the Canadians were increasingly inclined to 
sympathise with American rather than British perspectives – that tempered the British impulse to pursue 
radical independent options. 
 
In the final analysis, then, Canada’s emergence as a participant in the nuclear endeavour can be seen as the 
result of two distinct but inter-related processes. First, it was the unintended consequence of the almost 
absent-minded delegation of administrative authority to the NRC which meant that the crucial influence at 
a moment of crisis lay in Canadian as well as in British hands. Second, it was the conscious reconfiguration 
of British plans around the idea of an Anglo-Canadian project at Montreal which – although never enacted 
– forced the Tube Alloys establishment to engage more seriously, and more directly, with the potentialities 
of an Anglo-Canadian programme. Thus, ultimately, it was the temporary breakdown of the bilateral US-
UK relationship and the concomitant discovery of the Canadian conception of their participation in the 
project as dependent on American support that led to the consolidation of the tripartite collaboration in the 




Canada after Quebec 
 
Any hope that the Quebec Agreement might lead to an immediate revitalisation of the Montreal Laboratory 
faded with astonishing rapidity. Instead of progressing immediately into the sunlit uplands of swift action 
and easy collaboration, which a roseate reading of the agreement seemed to promise, the British found 
themselves entering perforce into yet more laboured, often labyrinthine, negotiations – a continuation, in a 
sense, of those which had preceded the signing of the Quebec Agreement.  
 
This chapter traces the development of the Anglo-Canadian nuclear project from August 1943 onwards. It 
seeks to untangle the complexities of British, Canadian and American nuclear policy interactions in this 
period by paying closer attention to the underlying diplomatic, strategic and imperial dynamics. The focus 
here is purely on Canada and the Canadian project. Parallel developments elsewhere, involving Australia, 
New Zealand and the wider British Empire, are discussed in Chapter Five. These two chapters, read 
together, amount to a full history of British and Dominion engagement with nuclear weapons research from 
the Quebec Agreement to the end of the war. Less prominence is given to the processes by which British 
personnel were incorporated into the Manhattan Project, in part because tolerable accounts of these 
processes already exist,1 and in part because to focus too closely on these could only be at the expense of a 
closer examination of the complexities of the tripartite discussions as to the fate of the Canadian project, 
the relevance of which this thesis seeks ultimately to demonstrate.  
 
The chapter proceeds chronologically, from an elucidation of the initial struggle to convert the rhetoric of 
the Quebec Agreement into practical action, through an examination of British perspectives and underlying 
premisses as these negotiations evolved, to an analysis of the ultimate ‘triangular’ nuclear relationship in 
practice. At each stage the intention is to disaggregate the uniquely British and Canadian perspectives 
during this period, and to account more holistically for the two states’ interactions than previous scholarship 
has attempted. Underpinning all this are the twin convictions, gleaned from the archival record itself, that 
in spite of appearances the work in Canada was no mere sideshow to the main event at Los Alamos but 
rather a crucial influence on the early history of the atomic bomb, and that from the levels of high diplomacy 
to the individual experiences of scientists and administrators, the tensions and assumptions associated with 




The agreement signed at Quebec, achieved after many gruelling months of diplomatic effort, seemed to the 
British to augur instantaneous change for the better.2 In expectation of immediate action, Oliphant, Peierls 
and Simon had been despatched to the United States even before agreement had formally been reached. 
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They arrived in the United States on the 19th August, only to be informed by their American counterparts 
that nothing could be done until the newly-conceived Combined Policy Committee had met. John 
Llewellin, one of the two nominated British members, spent much of the next fortnight trying to secure this 
first meeting, but Stimson and Bush – two of his American counterparts – were each either unavailable or 
evasive. Informal discussions with Conant were the best that could be achieved until Stimson at last became 
available, in the second week of February.3 Whilst the Americans were proving difficult to pin down, the 
Canadians at least seemed agreeably complaisant. Howe, the designated Canadian member, appeared to be 
intensely relaxed about his nation’s representation; he declared himself ‘completely satisfied’ to delegate 
to Mackenzie where appropriate and, more strikingly, was also ‘quite content to leave the Canadian side of 
any question in the hands of the British delegates’.4 Such an attitude on the part of the senior responsible 
Canadian implies that in spite of the notionally tripartite composition of the CPC (or perhaps, in part, 
because of it) the Canadian government still conceived of itself in some respects as a junior partner in the 
British programme, rather than a discrete participant in the wider allied effort. This attitude, which reflected 
the bipartisan nature of the Quebec Agreement, would not necessarily endure.  
 
For the time being, the question of Canadian representation mattered little. The initial discussions were 
effectively bilateral, with the Americans setting much of the agenda. In this they were overwhelmingly 
task-oriented, and the actions they envisaged were ad hoc rather than programmatic: they wanted specific 
individuals for specific tasks. They were keenest to get hold of Chadwick and Oliphant specifically and 
‘senior physicists’ more generally, the latter to be distributed between Los Alamos and the uranium 
enrichment teams.5 The British position that ‘the most effective method of collaboration will be to join 
forces as fully as possible’, which would involve the placement of the best of the British scientists in 
appropriate groups in the United States proved complementary to this approach.6 The outline of a plan 
therefore began to emerge, with names and locations pencilled in: Chadwick, based either at ‘Y’ (the 
Americans’ secret camp at Los Alamos) or in Washington, would have seniority within the British 
contingent. Oliphant would initially go to Berkeley to work with Lawrence on electromagnetic separation, 
before joining the team at Y. Some limited support would be given to the diffusion work, probably by 
Peierls and a handful of colleagues. For the British, this all constituted progress. What mattered was that 
there would be a British contingent working within the American programme, with American blessing.  
 
The exception, perversely, was Montreal. Groves had visited on 18th September – a good first step – but as 
yet there were no guarantees that the laboratory would have any part to play in the post-Quebec 
collaborative structure. It was all very well discussing a proposed budget for Montreal, as the laboratory 
leadership did that autumn, but nothing could actually be decided until Montreal’s future programme was 
known. This depended on the formulation (and acceptance by the CPC) of Anglo-Canadian proposals for 
slow neutron work, which in turn depended both on the trajectory of the wider British programme and the 
Americans’ attitude to it.7 Neither variable was yet settled. The British were caught in somewhat of a bind: 
they dared not push too hard on Montreal, even though the Quebec Agreement itself had been sought in an 
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effort to save it. There was now something circular, even contradictory, in British policy. The British sought 
the fullest possible access to the American project, and were inclined to reject ‘partial’ collaboration; and 
yet they could not afford to imperil collaboration by seeming to violate the spirit of the Quebec Agreement. 
It was a challenging negotiating position for the British representatives to maintain, and it was recognised 
that they might have to play their hand in such a way that any ultimate decision could be left to the Prime 
Minister.8 Montreal had thus become an unwelcome complication. Its ultimate purpose was ambiguous, 
and its relevance to the American programme unclear. Little wonder that the American leadership, already 
sceptical of any work that lay outside their country’s borders, still hesitated to commit American resources 
to the laboratory. The complexities of the Montreal position could even be described as having acted as an 
anchor on the negotiations around other aspects of the programme, which might otherwise have proceeded 
more smoothly. The lack of any substantive agreement in late 1943 certainly had a deleterious impact on 
the life of the Montreal laboratory. Plans for further staff transfers had to be put on hold.9 Morale began 
once more to decline. By November, Akers was forced to confess to Halban that he had been ‘too optimistic 
in [his] calculations about how long it would take to get definite decisions agreed with the Americans’.10  
He insisted that progress was being made, but the impression is one of a brave face. As the year ended it 
seemed as though the British were, in fact, back in the familiar territory of negotiating in the face of 
American obfuscation, with Groves and Conant the familiar antagonists. (Paul suggests that Bush and 
Conant, unreconciled to Quebec, sought to erect barriers to collaboration where possible: there may be a 
modicum of truth in this, but the great advantage of the CPC system was that it at least created a forum in 
which such barriers could be challenged on the record.)11  
 
The British were forced to play a delicate diplomatic game. Groves had made clear the American position 
that heavy water work was considered a secondary priority – something they were willing to countenance 
the Canadian Group working on, but not at the expense of the core project.12 The Americans’ (relative) 
disinterest worked in Montreal’s favour, for so long as good progress was being made in high-priority areas 
it would be possible to make modest proposals for Montreal without attracting American opprobrium. The 
duty of negotiation now fell to Chadwick, for Akers, who as an ICI man had never found favour in 
American eyes, had been quietly rotated away from his liaison role in September.13 Central to Chadwick’s 
approach was the deft handling of the relationship with Groves, and a corresponding effort fully to 
appreciate the American perspective. Much intellectual effort was expended on the latter within Tube 
Alloys. When the T.A. Technical Committee met in New York in January 1944, it was considered possible 
that Groves’ reticence might stem from concerns with the diffusion project. If this were, as seemed possible, 
to be cancelled or scaled back, its budget might possibly be used for an American effort on heavy water.14 
This, however, would imply that American interest in heavy water was contingent on the success or 
otherwise of the diffusion work – an approach which would be at odds with the Americans’ established 
practice of running each aspect of the programme in parallel. Moreover, it seemed that Groves rather 
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favoured the idea of a large-scale effort in Canada as going some way to ‘balancing’ the UK effort with 
that of the US.15 Chadwick also believed Howe would be amenable to a three-way programme if it had 
good prospect of success.16  
 
Chadwick, instinctively acknowledging a dictum of Akers’ that ‘Groves does not like to be hustled’,17 
worked patiently to persuade Groves and his colleagues of the merits of the British case, and by the end of 
the month, when it had been decided that the question of whether Montreal should host a large-scale effort 
on heavy water reactors would be resolved by the CPC, he had reason enough to be positive, since in his 
view ‘the American approach towards co-operation [had] been excellent’, giving Montreal ‘everything we 
could reasonably ask for at this stage’.18 
 
One thing, however, was clear: Groves had explicitly stated his unwillingness to give heavy water for use 
in England instead of Canada.19 As had always been the case, the price of American collaboration was the 
basing of the work in North America. The hope of an independent UK-based programme, which had been 
considered once in the dark days before Quebec, and been ruled out, was nevertheless revivified by a 
frustrated Perrin, who seeing the American stance as still overly restrictive argued instead for a refocussing 
of British efforts on activity in the UK, both on heavy water reactions and enrichment of U-235. Such a 
policy would require Britain to bring back ‘as many of the Montreal team as will come’.20 Chadwick could 
sympathise with this impulse towards a more independent programme, but thought it unwise, given the 
circumstances. Writing in early February, he noted that  
 
The American effort is on such a scale that we could not compete with it even in peace time. 
We could not, for example, devote the number of scientists required for the project at this 
stage without paralysing our Universities…. It is essential that we should acquire the fullest 
possible knowledge and experience of all phases of the project so that we shall be in a position 
when the time comes to start work in England on the right lines, profiting by American 
experience.21 
 
In other words, quite apart from the Quebec obligation to secure a nuclear weapon for the allies as soon as 
possible, a degree of subordination to American strictures was in the long-term national interest. 
Conversely, a small-scale, introverted programme would leave the United Kingdom adrift, detached from 
the cutting edge. In the same way, too combative an approach on the issue of Montreal would imperil the 
gains made by the British contingent in the United States, which aspect of collaboration appeared to be 
working well. This was not to say that collaboration would be unlimited. Sensitive subjects such as 
plutonium separation chemistry were likely to be off-limits, at least for the time being. Still, the prognosis 
seemed reasonable: Chadwick was ‘convinced that true co-operation will be established’.22 From his 
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knowledge of the situation, he could see that the stakes were high: ‘[Montreal] is a somewhat disorganised 
and unhappy place at present and, unless I can bring off the large scale proposal, I see a very poor future’.23 
On the other hand, the prospects for an agreement seemed good: 
 
Our relations with the U.S. are excellent. Our standing at the moment is very high indeed and 
it will be fortunate if we can retain such a level. I am trying to make every use of our 
reputation while it is still good.24 
 
An actual agreement still lay some way off, but some of its prerequisites were becoming clear. One source 
of American disquiet over Montreal was traced to ‘mistrust’ of the present management. Chadwick did not 
concur in the diagnosis (‘I do not go so far as that’) but he agreed with the prescription: new leadership was 
needed. All three nations agreed that John Cockcroft was the man required: Chadwick thought him 
‘essential’.25 This question of leadership is one to which this chapter will return; for the time being it is 
important to note the significance of Cockcroft in British, American and Canadian eyes. This significance 
is reflected in the record of an informal meeting held by the Montreal team on 14th February. After more 
than a year’s delay, the personnel of the laboratory were understandably impatient. Immediate agreement 
to a full scale plant in Canada would be the ideal, with or without complete interchange on chemistry. 
Whatever the outcome, though, it must be enough to justify bringing Cockcroft in; this, in fact, now became 
their main criterion for whether they were satisfied. A lesser programme – a pilot plant only – might still 
be acceptable, provided the overall programme was sufficiently ambitious as to merit Cockcroft. This did 
not necessarily betoken dissatisfaction with Halban as a leader (he himself being present at, and active in, 
this discussion) but rather represented the extent to which Cockcroft had become emblematic of the serious, 
worthwhile project which the members of the laboratory ultimately demanded. The need was pressing:  
 
it was quite certain that the members had now reached a stage where they were so 
dissatisfied… that they were on the point of asking to be allowed to resign or to be 
transferred.26 
 
Turning to the wider implications, the meeting agreed that if the worst should happen – if no satisfactory 
programme could be agreed – each government would ultimately have to decide for itself what course of 
action to take: Halban’s own idea was that a skeleton staff should be kept on, to keep things ticking over, 
with all others to be given leave of absence for other work, then to reconvene the group after the war.27 
 
The pressure, then, was squarely on Chadwick’s shoulders. He had continued to focus his entreaties on 
Groves, but Groves had deferred to Conant, who in turn declared it a question for the CPC. This was 
reasonable enough, but engineering a meeting of the CPC was somewhat less than straightforward; just as 
the CPC itself had taken time to establish, the scheduling of meetings was now becoming a recurring 
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problem. For one thing, ‘Howe’s presence is absolutely necessary for Canada’s consent and he has been 
completely tied up’.28 (No suggestion here that Howe’s earlier professed willingness to be represented by 
the British members be taken at face value: a decision principally about Canada self-evidently required 
Canadian buy-in. In the event, Howe missed the meeting, his plane having been grounded at the last minute, 
but Mackenzie attended instead, and gave ‘some degree of support’).29. The British representatives, Dill 
and Campbell, were eventually able to make their case for a large-scale heavy water programme in Canada 
at the February meeting of the CPC, but the American representatives wanted more information. The matter 
was referred to a sub-committee.30 Comprising Groves, Chadwick and Mackenzie (note the strictly 
balanced tripartite composition) it worked well enough when its members were able to convene, but was 
held up by Groves’ frequent visits to the far-flung sites of the Manhattan Project.  
 
Although the forum of the subcommittee notionally afforded them an equal voice with the British and the 
Americans, the Canadians were far from pro-active participants in the negotiations. Wrote the British 
members of the CPC to Anderson: 
 
You should know that though Howe and Mackenzie see great advantages of project for 
Canada, indications are that they are not anxious to try actively to influence the decision. 
H[owe] regards matter as one for United Kingdom and United States Governments and would 
accept their decisions31 
 
This was not indifference on the part of the Canadians, for they had invested too heavily to be truly 
unconcerned, but rather a tactical reticence, arising from their sensitivity to the trilateral diplomatic tangle 
in which they found themselves the junior participants. To participate more actively in the discussions 
would have risked the appearance of picking sides, and Canada’s strategy was above all to avoid such a 
dilemma. Better, then, to allow Britain and the United States to resolve their disputes bilaterally, for this, 
indeed, constituted the most desirable outcome from Ottawa’s perspective – assuming, of course, that the 
outcome of the bilateral process was not deleterious to Canadian interests.  
 
Anderson wrote to Chadwick and the two British representatives referencing the ‘danger’ that the American 
representatives might suggest arrangements 
 
which would, on paper, appear to justify the continued existence of our team in Montreal but 
which would, in fact, provide no certainty of a large-scale heavy water pile being built in 
Canada.32 
 
In such a scenario the Montreal laboratory would again be consigned to an awkward, hollow existence, 
conducting little or no useful work but still consuming valuable resources. A draft version of this message 
was more intemperately phrased, expressing a fear that the Americans might present options which would 
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not be ‘justifiable or fair’. If that were the case, Anderson thought it would be better to ‘retain complete 
freedom to decide their future for ourselves’; that is, to recall the team and strike out alone. 
 
Fears of further American obstreperousness were valid. Conant in particular seemed intent that any decision 
be based on a ‘strict interpretation’ of the Quebec Agreement, which given its probable timescale would 
seem to rule out heavy water work. This would present the British with ‘something of a dilemma’. As they 
were now forced to admit, if only to themselves, 
 
the real reason for which we attach importance to this project is that we believe that, although 
slower to come to fruition, it may well, in the long run, prove the simplest and most 
economical method of producing a military weapon.33 
 
That is, the British wanted the heavy water project because they wanted to retain the option of an effective 
long-term weapons programme. Yet the Quebec Agreement, so fervently desired a year ago, was predicated 
on the idea that the collaborative programme was to be planned in relation to the war effort alone. This 
‘absurdity’ seemed inescapable in light of the firmness of the Americans’ attitude.34 It therefore followed 
that a programme in the UK should be considered. The Americans would be just as opposed, again on 
grounds of the Quebec Agreement, but the UK could argue that the CPC was ‘not a supra-national body 
and that in the last resort each Government is free to take its own decisions’.35 The practical upshot for the 
British was obvious: ‘We are clearly on very delicate ground’.36 The British were, yet again, in a bind over 
the workings of the tripartite relationship: 
 
Nothing but a willing agreement of the U.S. authorities to proceed with our proposal as a 
joint project will be of any use to us. Even if we succeed in forcing the Americans to agree, 
in principle, against their real desire, to the execution of a project on a combined basis, they 
would obviously be able to wreck it by obstructive tactics. And experience shows that the 
Canadian Government, owing to their material dependence on the Americans, would feel 
unable to join us in fighting such obstruction. In this connection it seems questionable 
whether we would achieve any concrete results by attempting to enlist Mr. Howe’s personal 
support; and, owing to Mr. Howe’s “casualness” there is always the danger that the 
Americans would come to hear of any such approach to him.37 
 
The British were gradually coming to realise the Canadians’ structural dependence on the Americans. 
Paradoxically, the Quebec agreement had solved their fast neutron problem, but not their heavy water. The 
British were left fighting for a programme in Canada without direct Canadian support, and with the strong 
temptation to abandon it. 
 
  
                                                   







Questions of Leadership 
 
On-site in Montreal, too, things were becoming more complicated. Longstanding administrative issues were 
now increasingly freighted with diplomatic implications. The laboratory’s hastily devised administrative 
structure had been found wanting, but was already too firmly entrenched to be easily reformed. Threaded 
through all of this was the question of leadership. This difficulty has already been alluded to, but merits 
close attention, for from the articulation of difficulties around leadership emerged broader themes.  
 
The hasty ad hoc creation of the Montreal Laboratory, and the blurred lines of the wartime Anglo-Canadian 
relationship more generally, meant that by the autumn of 1943 confusion had arisen ‘concerning the 
relationship of the Laboratory to the U.K. and Canadian ends of T.A.’.38 The responsibilities of each party 
were inadequately delineated, and it was unclear which forms of communication and direction were 
legitimate. Re-reading the original memorandum governing the creation of the laboratory, it seemed clear 
enough that Montreal lay under the actual jurisdiction of the NRC, even if much of the direction had thus 
far emanated from London. A process of administrative untangling followed. It was agreed that ‘free 
channels of communication’ should exist between the policy committees in Montreal and London, between 
Mackenzie and the whole of the Canadian organisation, and between Chadwick and both organisations.39 
This clarity benefitted both countries, but amounted to an actual strengthening of the Canadian character 
of the Montreal project. Crucially, all involved agreed that the theoretical route by which Halban could 
bring his concerns directly to MacDonald, the British High Commissioner, should be closed; Mackenzie 
had viewed this as potentially ‘short-circuiting’ the NRC. Such refinements give the lie to the idea that the 
Canadians were only ever acquiescent hosts, giving the British free reign on their territory. It had never 
quite been so, and Canadian engagement with the nuclear work at Montreal grew steadily as the war 
progressed. 
 
Amongst these very sensible administrative reforms there also was raised the idea that an administrative 
director might be appointed, to ease Halban’s burden and act against ‘certain frictions’ between him and 
the NRC. The expectation was that such a director should be a Canadian.40 This was the first suggestion 
that the laboratory might require some form of leadership restructure, though the long months of discontent 
had helped foster a sense that something would soon have to change, and Halban, as the laboratory’s 
figurehead (and, in the earliest stages, almost its raison d’être) became its focal point. The Canadian writer 
Wilfrid Eggleston’s early account of Canadian nuclear research makes no reference to the idea that there 
was dissatisfaction with Halban’s leadership per se, instead, construing Mackenzie’s emerging keenness 
for new blood only in the positive sense of wanting an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ of the Chadwick-Oliphant calibre to 
head the laboratory.41 (This chauvinistic preference for ‘Anglo-Saxon’ leadership was as much Canadian 
as British;42 despite its location, vanishingly few of the scientists and technical staff at Montreal were 
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French-Canadians – an absence hitherto noted only by Quebecois historians.43 Later accounts, though, 
made much more of Halban’s personality, with most – including the prominent American narratives – 
portraying Halban as ineffective and divisive. Hartcup and Allibone, Cockcroft’s biographers, subscribe to 
this idea of Halban as poor leader, explaining that he ‘ran the Laboratory in an atmosphere of extreme 
secrecy and would not tell McKenzie [sic] or other Canadians about decisions regarding the research 
program’ – hence the need for a new head, acceptable to US and Canadians.44 Gowing’s interpretation is 
more even-handed, but accepts the essential premise that Halban was the source of discontent; Avery 
recognises that Mackenzie undermined Halban somewhat, equally does not exculpate Halban.45 
 
The principal source for the narrative that Halban was the problem was Mackenzie, whose diary paints an 
extraordinarily critical picture of his colleague: Mackenzie thought Halban ‘a mere child and a 
temperamental one at that’.46 Yet a close reading of the archives suggests that Halban may well have been 
a man more sinned against than sinning. His own diary for the period is as partisan as one would expect, 
but makes clear at least that there were serious differences of opinion between him and Mackenzie. There 
are multiple references to facets of ‘the Mackenzie problem’, and a marked frustration with the allegedly 
limited extent of Mackenzie’s engagement with the minutiae of the laboratory’s research programme. 
Bluntly, Halban felt that Mackenzie was ‘not in a position to comment on technical performance of the 
lab’. More seriously still, Halban’s diary contains the suggestion that Mackenzie misunderstood the very 
purpose of the laboratory: as Halban had it, Mackenzie had yet to acknowledge that the team at Montreal 
were ‘working not on power production but 49 and 23 production’. If Mackenzie had failed to comprehend 
this, it could only be because he had paid inadequate attention to the laboratory from the outset. Thus, if 
Halban’s accusations have any merit, it would seem he was caught in an awkward situation. If Mackenzie 
was both ill-informed and inadequately engaged, he could only really act as a constraint on the laboratory’s 
activities. It would have been better – for Halban at least – to have had either Mackenzie’s blind confidence 
or his informed engagement.47 
 
Halban’s own writings are not the only source to suggest difficulties with Mackenzie in this period. A 
memorandum of a meeting in September 1943 (at which Halban was present) mentions that Mackenzie 
‘now appeared to be avoiding the institution as a whole’.48 Quite why this should be was not clear, but there 
was a sense both that the US seemed to have cooled on the idea of co-operation, and that Mackenzie’s 
original (positive) attitude towards the UK team had changed. Disputes over personnel appointments 
furthered the rift, as did the apparent inflexibility of the NRC in matters of supply. Myriad minor disputes 
around salaries and working conditions, in which there were significant discrepancies between British and 
Canadian norms, cannot have helped.49 The result was a situation of ‘interruption by Mackenzie’ and 
‘considerable acrimony’ overall.50  
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A dispassionate attempt at a reasonable interpretation of the leadership travails of the Montreal Laboratory 
might therefore run as follows: Halban, convinced of the importance of his work, and frustrated by long 
delays, kept pressing for more resources, for deliveries to be expedited, and for administrative hurdles to 
be minimised or removed. Mackenzie, hard-pressed for resources and sympathetic to American scepticism 
about Halban, Montreal, and the British scheme in general, reacted poorly to demands for special treatment. 
Minor grudges and incompatibilities compounded until the situation had become almost irrecoverable. It 
was unfortunate, but perhaps inevitable, that such a breakdown had coincided with the crucial stage in 
negotiations. Had the Montreal laboratory been a purely bilateral affair between Britain and Canada, its 
problems might yet have been easily solved, but it was not: its fate was now bound up in the vexed issue 
of Anglo-American co-operation. Halban had had the impression for some months that some of the senior 
Americans objected personally to him, and by April he had at last extracted from Chadwick an 
acknowledgement that this may, indeed, have been the case. Between them they sought to account for it, 
and could derive only two hypotheses: either ‘some influence of Mackenzie’ on the Americans had been at 
work, with Mackenzie having perhaps elaborated, in partisan fashion, on the recent difficulties between 
them, or else – less plausibly – that somehow they were displeased by the ‘publicity’ (a relative term) 
accorded to his earlier Cambridge work.51 Akers at least, thought the Mackenzie theory ‘quite possibly well 
founded’, but was unconcerned about its long-term impact:  
 
I do not think, however, that this effect is likely to last because I do not believe that people 
can have much to do with Mackenzie without soon realising that he is certainly not a big man 
nor is he particularly reliable. 52  
 
(Note, again, the personal animus which Mackenzie seems to have inspired in some quarters of the British 
team, recalling that this was not the first such instance of disparaging marks about his competence). Little 
could be done, though, to ameliorate whatever deficiencies he may have had in British eyes: at such a 
crucial juncture it would not have been wise to have precipitated a breach with the Canadians on a point of 
principle. Questions of fairness, blame and responsibility mattered little in the final analysis. Halban was 
part of the problem, and he knew it. The inclination of some of his colleagues (chiefly Chadwick) to fight 
his corner was personally gratifying, but more was at stake now than principle. Halban thus wryly noted 
that ‘injustices to individuals have sometimes to occur in war time’,53 and stoically accepted the necessity 
of his own replacement.  
 
The question thus arose: to whom should the laboratory now be entrusted? Allen Shenstone, a Canadian, 
had been mooted in the earlier conversations about the desirability of appointing an administrative 
director,54 but the role to be filled was now several grades senior, with responsibility for scientific direction 
and – assuming negotiations were successful – the project to develop nuclear piles. It was doubtful that any 
Canadian scientist had the requisite stature in nuclear physics, and anyway part of the purpose now was to 
convey to the Americans the extent of British seriousness about large-scale work. The candidate must 
therefore be a British scientist of considerable international standing. The obvious candidate was John 
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Cockcroft, in whom converged solutions to the practical and diplomatic challenges posed by Montreal. He 
was British. Having ‘split the atom’, he had ample scientific cachet. Although currently focused on radar 
work, he had had a hand in the MAUD Committee’s work. His appointment would help banish the lingering 
perception, in American and Canadian eyes, that Montreal was an after-thought, nothing more than 
Halban’s heavy water sideshow. More than that, his appointment could serve as the very mechanism by 
which the Americans could be persuaded to engage seriously with the work at Montreal. Cockcroft visited 
Montreal just before Christmas 1943,55 and it seemed that he could be persuaded to accept the role as its 
director.  
 
All depended, however, on the sort of work the laboratory would be permitted to conduct. Cockcroft made 
clear that his acceptance would depend on Montreal’s taking a ‘proper share’ in heavy water pile 
development.56 This introduced a degree of circularity in the discussions. Cockcroft could only be expected 
to lead the Montreal work if its new programme of work was to be sufficiently substantive; the Americans 
would only give their support for a substantive programme if Cockcroft – or someone very much like him, 
and very much unlike Halban – were appointed. There were, moreover, complications. If Tube Alloys 
wanted Cockcroft, they would have to fight for him. He would have to be released from his Admiralty 
work, and from his employment by Cambridge; in both cases, a process of mediation, complicated by the 
inevitable vagueness produced by conflicting secrecy edicts, was required. The loss of Cockcroft would be 
a blow to the radar work, but it would have been difficult for the Admiralty to have made a case that their 
programme, now reaching maturity, had greater need of Cockcroft’s expertise than a project for which he 
was uniquely qualified and to which he had been called not simply by the British government, but by two 
key allies. In fact, pulling him from radar work at this stage made strategic sense: although the ultimate 
impact on the British radar programme would be low, the ostensibly sacrificial redeployment of a senior 
scientist from another secret project would convey precisely the right message of earnestness to the 
Americans and Canadians. Severing the Cavendish connection was more emotionally fraught. Lawrence 
Bragg, at Cambridge, was resistant to the idea that he might lose one of the few remaining stars in the 
Cavendish’s waning firmament, and as negotiations around Montreal continued into 1944 he would 
continue to clutch at any sign of wavering in Cockcroft (of which, given the fluctuations in the wider 
negotiations, there were a few) to argue that he should not go. There was never much hope for Bragg; his 
argument that ‘the Cavendish is too important to sacrifice entirely to the war effort’, was superficially 
compelling, but paled against the cacophony of voices calling for Cockcroft and the seemingly inexorable 
demands of the nuclear programme as a whole. 57 There is a sense in which the Cavendish was sacrificed 
to the war effort, with Cockcroft one of the last on the altar.  
 
The strange centrality Cockcroft’s appointment assumed in the post-Quebec negotiations for Montreal is 
instructive in several senses. Personality mattered; that much is clear. A history of the Anglo-Canadian 
project which spoke only of impersonal diplomatic imperatives in tension, as though of plate tectonics, 
would be incomplete. In reality, personality clashes intersected awkwardly with questions of high politics, 
and the incompatibilities of individual characters came to be interpreted through the lens of nuclear 
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diplomacy. There is a temptation also to over-compensate, and to see in these questions of leadership the 
project in microcosm: the Canadian Mackenzie torn between British and American expectations, favouring 
the latter but still dependent on the former, taking against a mode of collaboration that had almost been 
forced on him, compelling the British to offer, in Cockcroft, a compromise option. That would, however, 
be too neat, too literary. Academic history can admit analogy, but nothing more. All that the leadership 
question actually offers the historian is an insight into certain Anglo-Canadian-American dynamics, and a 
salutary reminder that individual character and individual choices can shape events. The transition from 
Halban to Cockcroft was as much about the shifting attitudes of the British and Canadians as it was about 
personal aptitude. Montreal under Halban had been speculative: part insurance policy, part mechanism for 
leveraging the Americans. The context had now changed. Under Cockcroft, Montreal had hope of a purpose 
and a programme for itself, but also represented the hope of a reconciliation of British, American and 




Securing Cockcroft for Montreal was necessary for the negotiations to progress, but not sufficient to 
conclude them satisfactorily. Beneath the politics of personality lay more essential tensions which had not 
yet been resolved. There was much rumination in London, as there had been in the face of earlier impasses, 
and under Anderson’s leadership a policy of caution seemed set to hold. Akers thought that perhaps his 
superior’s diffidence around the Montreal negotiations stemmed from a fear that too forceful an approach 
(i.e. the presentation of an ultimatum) might somehow impede collaboration on other aspects of the project. 
Akers, in a slight departure from his earlier adherence to the ‘acceptance’ policy, dissented from such an 
analysis, believing that ‘the Americans in general do not object to having a bluff called’.58 If that were so, 
perhaps now a more assertive approach might actually work. This idea resonated with two unanswered 
questions about British nuclear policy: what would happen to the Montreal Laboratory if no programme 
could be agreed? and what should be done about the elements of the British programme which had not been 
incorporated into the American? As the Americans continued to prevaricate and delay, an idea which had 
previously been avoided came once more, through desperation, to be considered seriously. With the post-
Quebec naïvety having by now completely evaporated, the British considered abandoning the Canadian 
work altogether and refocusing on the idea of a wholly British programme.  
 
The idea of revivifying the work in Britain was born of frustration and an acute sense that Montreal’s 
awkwardly inactive existence was untenable. There was little in the British heavy water proposal to appeal 
to the Americans, and if no progress should be made a minute from January 1944 foresaw a retreat to the 
UK as a likely, if undesirable, outcome: 
 
If it should be that the United States authorities continue to “hedge” or to say definitely that 
the Canadian team cannot have the necessary priorities, it seems very likely that the only 
thing to do will be to bring the entire Canadian team back to Britain.59 
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The essential problem was that the Canadian work required American support to be viable. American 
policymakers, though, paid scant regard – indeed, were often inimical – to British interests. Montreal’s 
survival was therefore predicated on the ability of the British to persuade the Americans that a bolstered 
programme in Canada served American interests. This was by no means straightforward, for in 1944 the 
Americans seemed inclined to argue that there was no inherent merit in heavy water over graphite, with 
which they had already made great progress. If graphite could secure all the gains of heavy water, in a 
shorter timeframe, it was ‘entirely logical’ for the Americans to disregard heavy water as a wartime project. 
What was logical to the Americans was not so to the British. They, lacking the Americans’ graphite pile 
experience, saw the heavy water work as their only route to an understanding of plutonium production. In 
Akers’ view the one consolation of an American rejection of the Montreal heavy water programme would 
be that such a clear-cut decision would simplify things enormously for the British. If his assessment of the 
situation were correct, the Canadians ‘would not want to express any opinion’: 
 
Obviously they would not wish to continue to devote any substantial effort to a joint 
programme with us, in Montreal, in the face of the American attitude, so that the Montreal 
Laboratory would automatically close down. This would enable us to bring back to England 
all those members of the Montreal team who are willing to come to this country. 60 
 
The stakes were therefore strikingly high. If the Americans should argue in the CPC that heavy water piles 
could not be considered a war priority, the effect ‘would be to remove any reason for the joint Anglo-
Canadian Montreal venture’.61 Akers was ‘certain that the Canadians will not join in any really active effort 
which is not supported by the Americans’.62 There would therefore be no choice but to admit defeat and 
return to the United Kingdom. They would have lost about 18 months, but Akers’ conscience at least would 
be clear:  
 
If we have to take this drastic action we shall still not feel that we were wrong to send this 
team to Canada in the first instance because, at the time we took this decision, we had clear 
promises from the Americans of full co-operation.63 
 
An assessment was made in mid-March which, after rehearsing the basic situation – that the Americans 
were not building a heavy water plant themselves and had not decided on whether to co-operate with the 
UK and Canada, despite also accumulating heavy water supplies – returned to core principles. British T.A. 
policy in the previous two-and-a-half years could be described as resting on two premises: that it was ‘not 
justifiable to divert from the immediate war effort… for the design and building of large-scale plants in this 
country’ if such plants were also being built jointly in the United States, and that Britain’s ‘considerable 
contribution’ would be merged with the American for the duration of the war ‘with the certainty that the 
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post-war development and use, both militarily and industrially… would be handled by the two countries 
on the basis of complete co-operation’.64 
 
Anderson was also worried that an apparently satisfactory American proposal might ‘turn out to be illusory 
and lead only to delays which would complete the moral disintegration of our Montreal team’; in which 
case he would have preferred to have the team recalled to work on something in the UK instead.65 Perrin, 
too, was concerned that the Montreal team could not be held together without an adequate programme of 
work; any ‘half-hearted’ programme in Canada would be a waste of time.66 Why, after all, should the 
Americans support another, less rapid, less proven method, over which they must have less control? It could 
only ever be ‘reinsurance’ for their electromagnetic and graphite pile processes, and a useful, but by no 
means vital, source of information on a possible future line of enquiry.67 
 
It had by now become abundantly clear that relations with the United States were ‘neither as simple nor as 
complete’ as had been hoped. Reappraisal and re-formation of policy were therefore urgently required.68 
The starting point had to be the American programme – primarily focused on achieving the quickest 
possible development, but with ‘serious consideration’ given also to the longer-term implications; Groves 
et al had said that their policy was to have ‘exclusive control’ over both the weapon and essential supplies.69 
British support on the EM and diffusion plants, and on fundamental physics and ordnance issues, would 
allow the UK to ‘acquire a detailed knowledge’, but this accrual of experience alone would not suffice: a 
policy was now required for the longer-term interests of the UK nuclear project as distinct from the 
allied/American-led effort. The British, though, were almost entirely ignorant of American plutonium work: 
they knew only that they had been kept apart from the main centres of research, and could rely only on the  
gleanings of gossip. Yet present knowledge suggested very clearly that plutonium would be the preferable 
form of fissile material, rather than uranium-235, which had utility primarily as a wartime ‘short-cut’ to a 
weapon. Britain therefore needed a plausible 94 pathway of its own. Tube Alloys. as a whole was something 
‘this country cannot afford to neglect or only to take a mild scientific interest in’.70 
 
The plan should therefore be  
 
[to provide] the maximum possible help to the Americans in their efforts to develop a military 
weapon during the war; to provide our specialists with full knowledge of the design and 
operation of the American plants for the separation of U.235 and to carry out, in the U.K., a 
research and development programme leading up to the building of a large-scale plant for the 
production of 94 as quickly as possible.71 
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From this flowed two implications. First, an adequate supply of uranium was required. This would have to 
come ‘either by allocation from joint British-American controlled production’ – not necessarily a reliable 
source, given the vagaries of American co-operation and the occasionally obstreperous attitude of US 
officials – or else from ‘sources developed in the British Commonwealth for which British preference could 
be secured’.72 This second option was inherently appealing, and more shall be said on the matter in 
subsequent chapters. The second implication was that Britain must, at all costs, make progress on 94. Thus, 
‘If full co-operation with the Americans on the building of a large-scale plant in Canada is not obtained the 
Montreal team should be recalled and intensive work should be started here’.73 
 
The idea of an ultimatum was broached: if the Americans could not commit within two weeks, Britain must 
assume that the Americans were not interested in collaboration.74 The CPC might, quite reasonably, 
conclude that a full-scale heavy water plant could not be treated as a wartime project. In that case, Tube 
Alloys could either bring the British sections home, along with ‘as many good Canadian scientists as would 
come’ and aim for a large-scale effort at home; or else ‘allow the team to break up and individual members 
to enter the American teams or to take other war work’ (a course which the Americans would not be likely 
to approve). At any rate, the situation could not be allowed to continue: Halban’s cables were by this point 
making clear that the Montreal team, ‘desperate at the delay’, had come to the point of disintegration.75 
British analyses began to be tinged with paranoia. On 20th March, Akers wrote to Halban that ‘Protraction 
of discussions with Americans on large scale programme in Canada appears unreasonable and may well be 
deliberate in order to prevent your organisation and this country starting useful work’.76 Anderson 
meanwhile was drawing towards the view that unless the Americans were willing to commit 
wholeheartedly to large-scale work in Canada ‘he would prefer, in the national interest, to face the 
difficulties in carrying out the work here [in Britain]’.77 
 
Akers and his colleagues therefore began to consider what might in fact be involved in such a move. Might 
the Americans be willing to collaborate with a programme based in the United Kingdom? It seemed 
unlikely, and perhaps undesirable. Anderson ordered Dill ‘not to take the initiative in suggesting American 
collaboration in any large-scale development [in the U.K.]’. Yet if on the other hand the United States 
should ‘suggest such collaboration, I am quite ready to agree to it provided that fully reciprocal 
arrangements are made as regards the work on element 94 being carried out in the US’.78 
 
This is not to say that the British had wholly committed to forsaking Canada. Thoughts of repatriation were 
entertained in parallel with earnest endeavours to secure a future for Montreal. Enthusiasm for repatriation 
was most enthusiastic when the prospects of such a future seemed worst. March 1944 was a low ebb, 
Anderson confessing ‘I do not think that we can expect to get top priority for the Montreal project’.79 There 
was, however, a lingering hope: a lesser priority, equivalent to some of the lower-priority pathways within 
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the American project, might still be achievable. Whether or not it would be desirable was another matter, 
for this might still constitute the ‘half-hearted acquiescence’ which Anderson feared.  
 
Unless the Americans clearly do not want to give any support to the Montreal project it will 
be difficult to tell them that we are going to set up on our own in England – and still keep up 
their co-operation which we now have so fully.80 
 
After many months of seemingly fruitless discussion, there was great appeal in the idea of spiting the 
Americans altogether and striking out with an alternative programme, unbeholden to the stifling restrictions 
of Groves and company. Anderson wrote to Dill on 22nd March 1944, giving the perspective from London: 
 
Our position is as follows: We believe that the simplest and most effective way of producing 
the military weapon will eventually be by the use of element 94 either as such or indirectly 
rather than of U235; and to the extent that power generation is of possible importance for 
military as well as other purposes 94 would certainly be preferable. We also believe that the 
best way of producing element 94 on a large scale is through a heavy water pile. We also feel 
that we have a moral obligation to the Montreal team which was recruited on the express 
understanding that they were to work on a project to which the very highest importance was 
attached.  
 
We are, therefore, determined that the programmes for which we are either solely or jointly 
responsible must include, as an item of the highest priority, really active and large scale 
development of heavy water pile. 
 
We have, hitherto, urged that this development should be undertaken as a joint enterprise in 
Canada. We still think that, given American goodwill and the highest priorities, this would 
be the best course. If however, we cannot be completely satisfied that these will be 
forthcoming, we are bound to conclude that it is only by bringing the Montreal team back 
and starting on large scale developments with the highest priorities here that we can achieve 
our object and make the best use of the Montreal team81 
 
Anderson understood that the Americans, having resolved a pathway to 94 production, might reasonably 
be reluctant to give priority for a project which would essentially duplicate that effort (and proceed more 
slowly), but still felt it reasonable to hope for ‘the same kind of collaboration as we have been giving them 
on U 235’. They would not be beholden to American preferences: ‘In the last resort we must exercise our 
right to carry out in this country any work we consider it essential in the national interest to undertake’.82 
An earlier draft of this message was even more combatively phrased: unless the British representatives 
were ‘entirely satisfied’ that a tripartite project would be ‘at least as effective as anything we could do here’, 
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there would be ‘no option but to recall our Montreal team and start here’.83 The same day, Anderson cabled 
instructions to the British High Commissioner in Ottawa, asking him to 
 
personally visit Montreal and assure Halban and senior members of his team that it is our 
policy that a large scale heavy water project should be carried out in this country unless we 
are satisfied with American proposals for co-operation in Canada. 84 
 
The High Commissioner did so on 28th March. For the long-embattled Halban and his jaded colleagues, 
there was reassurance in the High Commissioner’s words. ‘Everybody’, Halban reported, ‘was considerably 
encouraged by the attitude taken by the U.K. Government, and cheered up by conversation with the High 
Commissioner.85 He also sensed a hope amongst many of his colleagues 
 
that the United States will say no and that we will put up an organization in England. Whilst 
I am in my heart in agreement with those who think so, I do not think it a very reasonable 
attitude in view of the time schedule. I still hope that we get either a large scale project started 
here or at least a loan of a substantial quantity of Heavy Water which will keep us going until 
British Production starts86 
 
This hope prompted Halban to think seriously about how he and his team could approach the practical 
problems of a move back to England – something he had, it would appear, been pondering for a while. He 
was chiefly concerned to avoid the earlier experience in Montreal of having arrived without a pre-prepared 
laboratory, having to share space with another institution. He took a somewhat roseate view of the prospects 
of a continuing relationship with the Americans: ‘if the shifting to England is done without a complete 
break in relations with the States we might be able to get quite a lot of information’ – though this would 
require a residual presence in North America to be maintained. There would also be challenges to be faced 
with the transport of equipment, and there was likely to be some considerable difficulty in bringing 
Canadian personnel over to the United Kingdom. (‘There are certainly some Canadian scientists whom we 
should like to have with us if they should be willing to come’). Plans, indeed, had been lain for such an 
eventuality: ‘The High Commissioner mentioned that the Chancellor has forwarded for such an eventuality 
an invitation to Mackenzie to send some of his people’.87 
 
Halban also foresaw further awkwardness around the Free French, and – most serious from the point of 
view of morale – likely issues with the transportation of personnel and dependents back to the United 
Kingdom. In all but exceptional cases, it seemed likely that the families of staff could not actually expect 
to be allowed to return: the priorities for travel simply would not be forthcoming. All the administrative 
wrangling that had been required to unite families in Canada would thus have proven counter-productive.88 
Whether such realities had dawned on the faction at Montreal advocating for a return to Britain is unclear, 
though it seems unlikely. Nor did such logistical challenges carry undue weight amongst the British 
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decision-makers. Morale mattered, of course, and the deft handling of temperamental scientists was fast 
becoming the chief métier of the Tube Alloys administrative staff, but the discomfort of individuals counted 
for little when weighed against paradigm-shifting significance of the nuclear project. Whether the British 
were to abandon Montreal, or commit ever more fully, it would be for reasons of high strategy rather than 
majority sentiment or personal preference.  
 
The Canadians were of course unlikely to be particularly happy about this new policy, especially given 
their significant commitment of resources to date, but the British must nevertheless try to persuade them. 
In this, they would make a virtue of supposed necessity, arguing, first, that it ‘would clearly be infinitely 
easier to do the work here’ than to ship necessary materials to Canada from Britain. Second, there was a 
financial inducement: ‘our exchange position is such that we could not carry our fair share of the financial 
burden’ of an Anglo-Canadian programme in Canada (and therefore denominated in dollars). Last, there 
would be efforts at mollification:  
 
If it is eventually decided to carry out the project here, we would, of course, welcome the 
maximum co-operation which the Canadians as well as the Americans could afford by 
inclusion in the team of any Canadian or American scientists who could be spared and by the 
exchange of information.89 
 
Not much solace for the Canadians, perhaps, but it might be better than nothing. The Canadians, true to 
type, continued to hope for an agreement. As Holmes put it: 
 
The Canadians’ hopes and expectations were constantly frustrated by the compromises the 
great powers exacted of each other and of them, but they tried not to forget that great-power 
agreement was the sine qua non of any order in which Canada could flourish.90 
 
Privately, though Mackenzie was beginning to doubt what the future might hold. The whole Canadian 
programme seemed still to be in the balance: ‘As far as we are concerned whether or not the work proceeds 
in Montreal will depend entirely upon the outcome of the pending negotiations. We will either go forward 
on a real scale or cut down to a token effort only’.91 
 
Neither transpired. The subcommittee instead recommended a compromise option: construction of a 
smaller-scale pilot plant. This was less than the British had hoped, but still held some appeal. Acceptance 
of a pilot plant at Montreal would make immediate use of the Montreal team in an application which would 
suit British post-war development plans, but whereas repatriation might well scupper all other forms of 
collaboration – including the valuable work at Los Alamos and Berkeley – this approach would satisfy 
American scruples about Britain’s relative priorities.92  
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The subcommittee’s recommendations were unanimously adopted by the CPC on 13th April 1944.93 No 
time was lost by Howe in requesting Cockcroft’s release,94 which Anderson swiftly arranged, 
simultaneously promising to reinforce Montreal with additional British scientific personnel.95 Halban 
initially felt the compromise plan ‘a big disappointment’ – as indeed it was, in comparison with early 
hopes.96 In context, though, the Americans’ acquiescence in granting the Anglo-Canadian project a future 
seemed a triumph. With the CPC united, there was, Appleton told Chadwick, ‘no difficulty at all’ in getting 
the proposals agreed in London: ‘I think we have got as much as we could reasonably expect and certainly 
much more than I anticipated’.97 The Canadians, too, were contented. Mackenzie, recommending that Howe 
cast Canada’s vote in favour of the proposal, had stated his view that  
 
Canada has a unique opportunity to become intimately associated in a project which is not 
only of the greatest immediate military importance, but which may revolutionize the future 
world in the same degree as did the invention of the steam engine and the discovery of 
electricity. It is an opportunity Canada as a nation cannot afford to turn down.98 
 
The desperate expedient of a return to the United Kingdom had been averted. That it had been considered 
at all is a measure of how vital plutonium production had become to British interests.  
 
The Triangular Relationship in Practice 
 
Montreal had a future, at last. The details of interchange and the extent of American engagement would 
have to await the change of leadership,99 but Cockcroft was on his way, and there was every reason to 
expect rapid advances.100 Although there was some reason to be disappointed with the promise only of a 
pilot plant,101 the team would be at least be ‘properly occupied’.102 Reports began flooding in that Howe 
and Mackenzie had suddenly become enthusiastically engaged with the problem of finding a site for the 
pilot plant,103 and indeed the difficulty now was to persuade the former that it would not be possible to 
“pour out concrete on Thursday next”.104 This exuberance extended to a professed willingness that Canada 
should shoulder the full cost (though this need not preclude British contributions).105 By the start of May 
Cockcroft had arrived in Canada – after a swift trip on an American Douglas transport aircraft, no less – 
and leapt straight into action. Within a week he had visited a possible site with Groves and Mackenzie, 
drafted a policy on exchange with Chicago, resolved a range of administrative difficulties with Mackenzie, 
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and pledged to ‘help build up the Chemistry Division from Canadian stock’.106 Progress from this point on 
was rapid. At its new home at Chalk River, the Anglo-Canadian team designed and constructed two 
reactors, ZEEP and NRX. On 5th September 1945 ZEEP became the first operational nuclear reactor outside 
the United States; the whole process had taken less than 15 months.  
 
The problems of site selection, reactor design and construction were chiefly technical, rather than political, 
and therefore need not be dwelt upon here.107 Instead, it would be well to consider the final tripartite 
arrangement in more detail. One immediate consequence of the resolution of the heavy water question was 
that the idea of a substantive wartime programme in the United Kingdom was at last laid to rest. On taking 
up his directorship, Cockcroft expected to arrange with Chadwick ‘the allocation of remaining U.K. 
personnel to projects over here’ (that is, in Canada),108 and for a time it seemed possible that there would 
cease to be any active work in Britain. Some work did in fact continue in a handful of locations, but this 
was (relatively) small in scale and scant in significance, amounting to little more than a vestigial outworking 
of the research programme instigated by MAUD  
 
The awkward triangular relationship had passed through several iterations, and at times were held together 
only by ‘the common goal and the common fear’, as Holmes put it.109 Now, though, they had achieved a 
form of equilibrium. For the British the focus shifted from the diplomatic to the practical, motivated in part 
by a sense that they must now justify their hard-fought inclusion.110 There was, however, no doubt about 
the hierarchy implied by the CPC structure. The price of inclusion was junior partnership. Chadwick 
appreciated better than anyone the extent to which the British achievement must be tempered by humility 
in the face of the Americans’ drive for the bomb: 
 
I am convinced that [the agreement] is the best that can be got and also that it is quite 
satisfactory from a purely British point of view. It gives us the opportunity of investigating 
heavy water systems on a reasonable scale and within a reasonable time…. On the other 
hand, if demands from Montreal were to clash with requirements for the other U.S. projects 
we must expect Montreal to take second place, for it is not and cannot be a war project.111 
 
This subordination to the Americans played out in several ways. Most notably, there was still great 
sensitivity, verging on fear, as to how the Americans might interpret any action on the part of the United 
Kingdom. For example, the natural desire to bring together senior British personnel from each of the teams 
in North America for a meeting in Canada to coordinate next steps was hindered by a concern that such an 
action might be misconstrued by American observers. Chadwick worried that ‘that a meeting in Canada 
might cause some misgivings in United States minds’.112 Chadwick spoke from experience. It was he who 
had had to allay American suspicions aroused by the seemingly indecent haste with which the British had 
sought to act after the Quebec Agreement; knowing Groves, he could well imagine how an all-hands 
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colloquium of British interests, held outside the United States, with no American voice present, might be 
viewed. Groves had conceded much: it would best not to give him undue cause to regret his munificence.  
 
An additional consequence of the new equilibrium was a united effort to resolve the previously vexed 
question of uranium supply. This took the form of the ‘Declaration of Trust’, conceived by the CPC as a 
vehicle for the effective and equitable distribution of global uranium supplies, in the wider context of the 
overriding need to prevent the material from falling into the wrong hands. It had been relatively painless to 
draft. It was proposed that each government would take responsibility for controlling uranium ores ‘in the 
territories under their respective control’ and that the United Kingdom would additionally ‘approach the 
Governments of the Dominions (other than Canada) and of India’ to ensure that those governments would 
take similar steps.113 The trust would act corporately to gain control for all other territories. Uranium and 
any other materials obtained by this mechanism would be held in trust ‘for the three Governments jointly 
and disposed of or otherwise dealt with in accordance with the directions of the three Governments’.114 The 
six trustees would reflect the same three-two-one composition of the CPC. 
 
Churchill had readily signed off the first draft of the declaration, and when a slightly altered version came 
back to him from the Americans there seemed nothing with which to take issue. Only two substantive 
changes were introduced. The first – that the CPC would appoint the trustees, rather than the national 
leaders, was palatable enough. The second, though, was that the agreement was now to be only bipartite. 
Canada, originally intended to be a party to the agreement, would not now act as signatory, though it 
remained the intention that one Canadian be named as a trustee. This was not deliberate exclusion by the 
British (‘We have of course no reasons of a political nature for wishing to exclude Canada from 
participation as a signatory in the Declaration of Trust’),115 and the Canadians in fact favoured this 
arrangement.116 Howe, indeed, ‘expressed strong preference for it’, arguing that it was ‘ more logical and 
practicable’ in light of the equally bipartite Quebec Agreement and, in practical terms, for the conduct of 
uranium supply negotiations with other Governments, such as those ongoing with the Belgians.117 This all 
made sense. The negotiations with the Belgians were delicate, and the addition of another party – 
particularly a mid-level power like Canada – would likely alter the dynamic of negotiations unhelpfully. A 
final, bipartite formulation was therefore agreed,118 with the British undertaking simply to ‘approach the 
Governments of the Dominions and the Governments of India and of Burma’.119  
 
These revisions conveyed the idea that Canadian participation was predicated on, or subsidiary to, the 
British relationship with the United States. Bipartite treaties with a three-two-one representational structure 
implied the marriage of an American project with a British-led Anglo-Canadian one. Canada was, in a 
sense, subsumed into a Commonwealth identity, making the CPC representation not unevenly tripartite, 
but evenly bipartite. At this stage, such an arrangement suited the Canadians perfectly. As Holmes has 
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(rightly) noted, what the Canadians essentially, wanted was ‘a chance to state their requirements, not the 
responsibility of the grand decisions’.120  
 
The Quebec Agreement, and the agreements over Montreal and uranium which flowed from it, held for the 
rest of the war. There were no further crises in Anglo-American nuclear relations, and instead a period of 
industrious stability ensued, whose fruits became public at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That is not to say that 
the Anglo-American nuclear relationship was henceforth plain sailing. There were various alarms and 
excursions associated with the course of the wider war: the liberation of France raised again the question 
of the Free French physicists, of whose presence the Americans had long been suspicious, and although 
after Cockcroft’s arrival Halban had been honourably side-lined lingering resentment later broke forth in 
new bitterness.121 The British remained nervous of American intentions, and kept a wary eye on anything 
that might disturb the delicate balance of their nuclear relationships, framed as they were partly in Anglo-
American and partly in Commonwealth dynamics.  
 
Conclusion: A Tripartite Project? 
 
An appreciation of the trajectory of the Canadian project after Montreal both supports, and adds nuance to, 
two of the great themes of Canadian historiography – the depiction of Canada as a mediator between Great 
Britain and the United States, and of Canada maturing into true independence in consequence of the world 
wars. That the British seriously considered repatriating the Canadian programme certainly demonstrates 
the limits of the Dominion ideal, but it is nevertheless the case that British engagement with the United 
States was shaped and influenced by the fact of Canadian partnership with the United Kingdom, and that 
the post-Quebec development programme at Montreal and Chalk River amounted to a substantial joint 
endeavour for the three states.  
 
Assessments of the significance of Chalk River have varied, often in line with each historian’s particular 
standpoint. The challenge here, as in all historiography, is not to identify a single dominating factor, but to 
weigh all of the relevant factors appropriately. Canada was not a trivial sideshow in the allied nuclear 
programme, but nor was it the main event. Many have been content to portray the Chalk River programme 
as a relatively minor abutment to the Manhattan Project – an American sop to British sensitivities, granted 
not so much because of British pressure as because of the United States’ overwhelming desire to secure the 
bomb rendering it politic not to disturb the balance with a key ally. Others have ignored the Canadian 
programme altogether, likely on the grounds that it contributed little to the wider wartime project and led 
to no post-war weapons programme (Canada, after all, never developed the bomb). 
 
The historian Andrew Pierre, in contrast, characterised the work in Canada as the ‘cornerstone’ of Britain’s 
post-war programme, on the grounds that ‘British scientists in the United States gained knowledge of the 
theory and technology. In Canada they acquired experience in running an atomic energy establishment.’122 
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This was not quite how it was seen at the time. The sending of personnel to Los Alamos and Berkeley, and 
the desire for a substantive programme of work for Montreal, were both aimed at the same overall goal: to 
secure for the United Kingdom an adequate exposure to all wartime nuclear development work in 
anticipation of a significant post-war programme under some form of British control or influence. The 
awkward symbiosis of each of the key strands of the British nuclear programme rested on that assumption. 
This, of course, resulted in the interesting paradox of British policy in this period: the ‘virtual extinction’ 
(Akers’ phrase) of much of the UK-based TA work, in order to align as closely as possible with the 
American programme,123 pursued simultaneously with a plan to repatriate the entire Montreal programme. 
Only if the United Kingdom had in view a tripartite post-war programme – a nuclear endeavour grounded 
in transatlantic relations, marrying Commonwealth unity with a strong Anglo-American alliance – can such 
apparent contradictions make sense.  
 
The reality of tripartite collaboration was consistently less comprehensive than the British had hoped. Had 
the interactions simply been between Britain and the United States, a straightforwardly hierarchical 
interaction might have emerged, with a clearer delineation of junior and senior partnership from the outset: 
the British would have had to have followed either a path of realism and resignation, able to hope for little 
more than a handful of secondments of personnel into closely-monitored areas of the American project, or 
else venture on a string of ever more quixotic efforts to secure a British programme in spite of clear 
American opposition. Canada – the Commonwealth connection – added complexity. The Quebec 
Agreement had bound Canada into the nuclear alliance in a form which seemed at once to recognise its 
sovereignty and to portray it as subaltern to the United Kingdom. 
 
This ambiguity was encapsulated in the three-two-one distribution of CPC and CDT positions. This 
distribution could be construed as a straightforward ranking of the three parties’ importance and prestige, 
or as an equal partnership between the American programme on the one hand and the Anglo-Canadian on 
the other. If the Canadian representative held the British position, their combined three votes would 
counterbalance the three votes of the Americans. Canadian deference to British wishes could not, however, 
be guaranteed; a system predicated on a unified Empire position might at any time transition to a united 
North American position, four votes against two. This granted the Canadians an effective power of veto. 
Mackenzie King had had little to do with the design of this system, but he could have every reason to be 
pleased with it, for it allowed Canada to access the benefits of Empire membership without any risk of 
losing independence of action. There was always the possibility of tension and miscommunication between 
Britain and Canada, though, and it would be reasonable to suggest that (on a conceptual level) one 
consequence of the war was a widening of the Atlantic. Britain would continue to seek to leverage the 
Anglo-Canadian project for the sake of its wider nuclear policy, but could do so only in the twice-learnt 
knowledge that such a policy was contingent on Canadian alignment with British objectives. Avery’s 
metaphor of Canada being treated as a pawn in a scientific chess game therefore needs modification,124 if 
only to acknowledge that as the game of chess progresses a pawn can so often prove a most vital piece, 
influencing decisions right across the board. So it was with Canada. There were, moreover, other pieces – 
other Dominions – in play; it is to these that this thesis must now turn.  
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The Dominions and Tube Alloys 
 
The previous chapter highlighted the unique position enjoyed by Canada in the western allies’ nuclear 
counsels. Canada lay within the nuclear pale; the other Dominions did not. Yet whilst the Canadian 
experience shows that in nuclear affairs the Commonwealth was not perceived as an undifferentiated bloc, 
it is equally clear from the contrasting experiences of Australia and New Zealand that these differences 
were not so simple as a narrative of inclusion and exclusion might suggest. Both Australia and New Zealand 
contributed personnel to the UK contingent in America, but through different mechanisms and with 
different results. The other Dominions, meanwhile, made few appreciable contributions to the work, but 
were nevertheless accorded a privileged degree of insight and exposure, engaging with Tube Alloys in a 
way in which the colonial empire, and still less the non-British world, was not permitted.  
 
This chapter is concerned with the interactions of the non-Canadian Dominions with the British Tube 
Alloys organisation. As such, it acts as a counterpart to the previous chapter, which addressed the Canadian 
experience. The chapter recounts the corresponding experiences of Australia and New Zealand in their 
interactions with Tube Alloys, first individually, then in comparative context, with a view to identifying 
commonalities and accounting for differences. Lastly, the question of resources is considered. Here, the 
wider empire is in view, in all its constitutional complexity: the approaches adopted by Britain in her 
dealings with these entities are instructive. Throughout the chapter, an attempt is made to ascertain the 
extent of reciprocity in these relationships. The historiography of the British empire is often constructed in 
terms of core-periphery interactions, and it is important to determine whether this pattern holds true for the 
wartime nuclear interactions.  
 
Even without such a goal, it is clear that the other Dominions’ wartime engagement with nuclear issues 
merit attention. Long before the first nuclear weapon was tested in the Jornada del Muerto, the Prime 
Ministers of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa had been informed by the British of the programmes’ 
existence. They knew of the military and industrial potential of nuclear fission, and the strategic importance 
of uranium; they knew much about the immense American-led effort to produce the bomb; most 
significantly, they knew of, and had in effect been recruited into, British plans for a corresponding post-
war effort. They were, in short, early inductees into the nuclear world. (Of course, not all of the Dominions 
were so engaged. Unique constitutional circumstances attached to Éire and Newfoundland, and neither 
government engaged directly with the United Kingdom nuclear project during the war. They therefore do 
not figure in this chapter, or even this thesis.) 
 
It is important from the outset to contextualise the Dominions’ contributions to the allied nuclear project. 
The claim here is not that these Dominions’ contributions represented coherent programmes on the 
American, British, or even Canadian scale. The total Australian and New Zealand contribution amounted 
to fewer than a dozen personnel, whose impact, though valuable, cannot be considered essential or decisive. 
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The other Dominions, and the colonial empire, contributed even less. What matters though is the 
significance of the act of contribution in British and Dominion eyes, and the longer-term consequences of 
the Dominions’ nuclear experiences.  
 
Oliphant and the Australians 
 
Much has already been written in this thesis about the early influence of one Australian, Mark Oliphant, on 
the early trajectory of the British nuclear programme, and in turn on its nascent American counterpart. Of 
course Oliphant’s early impact had little directly to do with his Australian origin, and much to do with his 
character, capabilities, and context; from the perspective of this thesis, it was sufficient only to note that 
Oliphant, by birth and education an Australian, was nevertheless treated, conceptually and practically, as 
unambiguously British. In this chapter however, Oliphant’s Australian-ness comes rather more to the fore. 
An examination of his late-war return to nuclear physics serves as a convenient gateway to a wider 
examination of Australia’s wartime engagement with nuclear research, for Oliphant, as shall be seen, served 
as a key conduit for the Australian Government’s nuclear initiation.  
 
Australia learnt of the nuclear project at a surprisingly early stage. The first revelation seems to have been 
in August 1941, during Oliphant’s trip to the United States, in the course of which he gave the Australian 
minister in Washington, Richard Casey, an overview of the uranium question. Alice Cawte’s assessment 
that Oliphant’s transmission of this information was ‘almost certainly unauthorized’ is likely correct,1 
though the lack of censure directed at Oliphant for what was in theory a substantial breach of secrecy 
implies either tacit approval of the act, or complete ignorance of it. Later insouciant references to early 
interactions may constitute evidence in favour of the former interpretation. Little in fact came of this 
interaction in the immediate term, for this was the period in which MAUD was winding down and Tube 
Alloys still taking shape. Moreover, Oliphant had little to do with the early life of the Tube Alloys 
organisation, his formal responsibility having ended, in effect, with the MAUD Committee. In the absence 
of a defined British programme there was little with which Australia could engage. The real effect of 
Oliphant’s memo was to have piqued the interest of David Rivett, the head of Australia’s Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR; DSIR’s direct counterpart), and to have alerted him to the 
potential significance of uranium as a resource and Oliphant as an informant.  
 
Further information came later, and again through Oliphant. After his involvement with the MAUD 
Committee ended Oliphant had continued his radar work at Birmingham, but in February 1942, greatly 
troubled by the imminent fall of Singapore, he offered his services to the Australian Government. This was 
an impulsive act, for which even his biographers have struggled fully to account. Shock, and the associated 
sense of Australia’s sudden strategic vulnerability seem to have played a significant part. The route by 
which Oliphant made his offer – directly to the Prime Minister, through the Australian High Commissioner 
in London – is indicative of the level of impact he hoped to have. Having obtained release from his 
Admiralty work, and with the better part of his Birmingham salary to be covered by the Australian 
                                                   




government, he left for Australia on 20th March.2 His reception, however, proved lukewarm: Australia’s 
peril had been overstated and the radar work was more advanced than Oliphant had initially assumed it 
would be. The need for his input was minimal. He began the journey back to the United Kingdom on 26th 
October 1942. It had been, in all, a frustrating and largely fruitless trip. 
 
It is tempting, in retrospect, to read this abortive stint in Australia as a mere interlude between two periods 
of more significant activity. Oliphant certainly failed in his notional primary purpose of spearheading the 
Australian radar defence. Yet his trip had two significant consequences in the nuclear field. First, Oliphant 
had forged personal and institutional links with Australian government science. His relationship with Rivett 
and the Australian defence science establishment was preserved both by a regular correspondence and by 
the provision of a retainer of £250, paid by the Australians through their Scientific Liaison Office, and 
administered, in the UK, via Australia House.3 Second, Oliphant had had ample time to reinforce, to Rivett 
and perhaps more widely, his earlier notices about the future significance of uranium. Although he no 
longer had any formal connection with the British nuclear programme, Oliphant still possessed an enviable 
knowledge of the state of the research and the likely contours of future organisations on both sides of the 
Atlantic. The amount of information Oliphant could have passed on was significant, given that the mere 
fact of there being a plausible route to a uranium fission weapon which the United Kingdom and United 
States were actively pursuing would have been significant enough in Australian eyes. The implications for 
Australia were immense. If the nature of warfare was likely to experience imminent, irrevocable change, 
and if uranium might soon become the ultimate strategic resource, Australia must act.  
 
Back in the UK, Oliphant continued to communicate with Australian officials. Soon after a meeting with 
Oliphant, the Australian High Commissioner in London, Stanley Bruce, wrote to his Prime Minister, John 
Curtin, to inform him, elliptically, of developments around Tube Alloys ‘which apart from their 
significance in relation to the war will have profound economic repercussions in the post-war period.’ These 
developments, he related, were too secret to be communicated by telegraph: Curtin should instead consult 
Rivett for further details. Noting that Australia possessed strategic deposits of the relevant materials, Bruce 
advocated their safe-guarding before suggesting that Australia should seek to be ‘brought in to the picture 
as to the present position’ and be ‘kept in touch with all future developments.’4  
 
By the end of 1943, then, and chiefly by Oliphant’s hand, the Australians had learnt much about the British 
nuclear programme. They were understandably keen to learn more. In November 1943 Akers made 
reference to Rivett’s interest in engaging with the United Kingdom, particularly around the securing of 
uranium oxide.5 From this interest flowed a desire for action which coincided with British interest in 
Australia’s uranium resources. The British were instinctively minded to draw the Australians further into 
their project, but hesitated in light of the evident diplomatic ramifications.6 As a result, nothing came of 
these conversations in the immediate term.  
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Oliphant, meanwhile, had once again become an important figure in the British programme. His return to 
England had meant also a return to the nuclear fold – this time more firmly in the upper echelons of the 
organisation. Oliphant had been despatched to America in the first flurry of post-Quebec activity. The 
Americans, still perhaps in awe of Oliphant’s crusade on behalf of MAUD, had asked for him by name; the 
discussion was not about whether he was wanted, but where: at Berkeley for the electromagnetic work, or 
at Los Alamos to work on the bomb.7 It was agreed that he would serve at Berkeley first, transferring to 
Los Alamos after perhaps six months or so.8  
 
Oliphant made a significant impression at Berkeley, becoming, by the spring of 1944, ‘Lawrence’s de facto 
second in command’.9 This was, at least initially, an informal deputyship,10 but the net effect by April 1944 
was that ‘When Lawrence is away at site X, Oliphant takes charge’.11 Helping lead the Berkeley team was 
no sinecure: there were ultimately more than one thousand scientists working on the project there.12 From 
Groves’ perspective, the particular utility of Oliphant and his colleagues from the British mission, at least 
initially, was their ability to offer knowledgeable external review of the US enrichment methods at crucial 
stages in their development. Oliphant, for example, began his stint at Berkeley by familiarising himself 
with the entirety of the electromagnetic separation project, and sent Groves a full technical appraisal. It was 
a valuable exercise for Groves: bitter prior experience of war projects meant that Oliphant was more 
pessimistic on timescales than Lawrence and his team had been, but he was still confident of the underlying 
principles, and therefore able to endorse the project’s overall feasibility.13 Constructive commentary of this 
type, coupled with the demonstrable efficacy of his leadership and the capabilities of the team under him, 
confirmed Oliphant as a significant figure within the electromagnetic enrichment programme. He visited 
the Americans’ vast production facility at Oak Ridge in November 1943, returning frequently throughout 
1944, along with flying visits to Washington and the United Kingdom.  
 
Oliphant’s position in later 1944 was enviable: he was, after Chadwick, the best informed of the British 
contingent in the United States. He and his team were not, however, immune to American constraints 
around secrecy. Cockburn and Ellyard report that the British team were required to borrow books from the 
library at Berkeley using false names ‘to avoid anybody noticing how many of them there were’.14 (It is not 
wholly clear how this method – by which Oliphant became ‘Michael Oliver’ – would have served this 
purpose). A complaint was also received from Groves’ office ‘that [Oliphant] had once received a visit in 
[his] Berkeley office from a British officer in uniform, who is believed to have been a New Zealander’.15 
The identity and motivation of this uniformed antipodean remain obscure, but it is clear that a close watch 
was kept on the British team’s adherence to security regulations. Even so, Oliphant managed to learn 
substantially more than he was technically entitled to, and may sometimes have shared his knowledge too 
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widely. An example: Oliphant wrote to Lawrence in February 1944, saying that he had learned from Bohr 
and Chadwick that the team at Los Alamos was now focussing primarily on the plutonium weapon.16 Such 
information, irrelevant to the electromagnetic enrichment programme at Berkeley, ought not to have 
reached Oliphant, and certainly should not have been passed on by him to Lawrence: this was, in theory, a 
serious breach of American compartmentalisation. 
 
Incidents of this kind may help explain one of the more curious aspects of Oliphant’s time in the United 
States – that he never transferred to Los Alamos as originally planned. Peierls had relocated there from 
New York, and many more were assigned directly from Britain. Oliphant, in fact, was comfortably the most 
senior of Tube Alloys scientists not to have gone, despite being one of the very few requested by 
Oppenheimer himself. His biographers acknowledge that ‘the transfer never eventuated’ but venture no 
explanation as to why that should have been.17 They also mention his having made a brief ‘sojourn’ at Los 
Alamos in this time,18 though the evidence for this having actually happened is scant. There was perhaps 
less need for him by the time his work at Berkeley had reached a satisfactory position, the earlier dearth of 
senior physicists having by that point been amply met. There seems to be no indication in the archives that 
the question-marks which the Americans would later raise as to his political reliability had yet emerged, 
but the possibility cannot be entirely discounted: he had certainly ruffled a few feathers by this point. It also 
seems reasonable, however, to suggest that the same strict enforcement of compartmentalisation which 
meant that Lawrence was not permitted information from Los Alamos was applied also to his deputy. It 
was a missed opportunity, perhaps – certainly for the Australians, who would therefore have no insight into 
the life of Los Alamos; less so for the British, who already had plenty of eyes there; and perhaps, least 
knowably, for Oppenheimer and his team, for Oliphant was a very capable and imaginative physicist. Even 
without having reached Los Alamos, though, Oliphant had had a significant impact, and had accumulated 
a vast store of insight and experience.  
 
Oliphant’s impact was not simply in the research he performed and the information he retained, however. 
He also served a liaison function between Australia and the United States. While at Berkeley, Oliphant kept 
Rivett informed of the ‘amazing vigour’ with which the American work was progressing. His reports were 
a useful counter to Tizard’s more sceptical assessment, which the Australians had also heard. Oliphant also 
received several letters through the Australian liaison office.19 In December 1943 Rivett used this channel 
to enquire ‘whether any official request may be expected regarding production of certain Australian ores’.20 
Oliphant was hardly the logical point of contact for such a query. If official channels were to be followed, 
it should have ended up at Tube Alloys headquarters on Great Queen Street, in the hands of Akers or Perrin, 
or on the Whitehall desk of Anderson or Appleton; in the United States, it ought ordinarily to have come 
to Chadwick. That it came to Oliphant makes sense only because Oliphant was Australian, and was bound, 
relationally and formally (recall his £250 retainer) to Rivett and the Australian Government. Not that 
Oliphant was simply an informant for the Australians. The British used Oliphant, too, as a conduit for 
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messages, especially those of a more exploratory nature. Nor was Oliphant content to act only as messenger. 
It was generally accepted that Oliphant would be consulted on matters relating to Australia,21 and his words 
carried weight. As the British discussed Rivett’s queries about whether and when Australia could expect a 
formal approach from the United Kingdom about Tube Alloys, Oliphant felt sufficiently empowered to add 
his own gloss on Rivett’s message, and to interpret the Australian position to his (notional) superiors, going 
so far as to offer his own policy recommendation.22 
 
This Anglo-Australian liaison work was, for the most part, a self-appointed role. Occasionally Oliphant 
risked exceeding his authority by asking for too much information from the Tube Alloys administration, as 
a note by Perrin from January 1944 illustrates: 
 
[Oliphant asked] that I should keep him in touch with what might take place on the question 
of supplies of oxide, and in particular with any information about Australia. I have not given 
any of such information to Oliphant… it seems to me that this is a purely policy matter or, 
insofar as it is technical, one to which Oliphant could not possibly be able to contribute23 
 
Here, then, was the limit of British toleration. Oliphant was a useful intermediary, but a line must be drawn 
at a brazen request for information far outside his purview. There was such a thing as secrecy within the 
British programme too, and though they may frequently have deprecated compartmentalisation they did at 
least practice it. This rebuff to Oliphant’s curiosity was, however, the exception rather than the rule. His 
dichotomous position, looking out for both British and Australian interests, persisted until the end of the 
war, and beyond. Oliphant essentially had two masters: he was fortunate that the demands of the two could, 
for the most part, be readily reconciled. 
 
Oliphant’s influence was unique, but not his situation. There was, in Harrie Massey, another Australian-
born physicist sent to Berkeley from Britain. The parallels, indeed, go further: both were ex-Cavendish 
men; both had led work at Birmingham. Massey, though, is relatively unsung in nuclear history – at least 
in comparison with Oliphant. He is prominent in the British archives only when Oliphant’s absences (at 
Oak Ridge and elsewhere) placed upon him, as senior member of the British contingent, responsibility for 
administrative matters concerning that team; he was, in effect, Oliphant’s deputy.24 Unlike Oliphant, 
though, he appears not to have made any communication with the Australian government about his work. 
Massey had arrived in the United States late in 1943, and after six weeks had become convinced that the 
importance of the work outweighed that of his previous endeavours for the Admiralty on mine design, from 
which he had been wrenched only with difficulty.25 A week later, he argued for the release of two (British) 
colleagues, Bates and Gunn, from the same work, on the grounds that their contribution at Berkeley was 
likely to be ‘of much greater national importance’.26  
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A third Australian, Eric Burhop, embodied a different experience altogether. Unlike Massey and Oliphant, 
who had each been drawn into Tube Alloys from their peacetime roles within British academia, Burhop 
was recruited directly from Australia. Massey had made the request for Burhop even before his departure 
for the United States. Burhop was a former student of Massey’s – each of the men he requested by name 
had worked with him before – and Massey wanted him now as an assistant. In spite of the administrative 
novelty of recruiting from outside the United Kingdom, Akers, to whom the request had come, claimed he 
could foresee no problems.27 Massey’s desire for Burhop seems not to have had any root in Burhop’s 
nationality, only in their shared history. Yet to Oliphant, who also advocated Burhop’s recruitment, his 
Australian-ness was the entire point. Oliphant’s communications with Rivett had ‘hinted… that he would 
like an Australian or two to be associated with the work’ and in January 1944 he telegrammed to ask 
specifically for the release of Burhop on the grounds that he could ‘advance materially the use of the new 
weapon’. This, to Rivett, seemed ‘a good opportunity to get one of our fellows into a line of work, and 
amongst a group of people, which will give him wonderful opportunities for activity’.28 Rather than simply 
acceding to the British request when it came, Rivett said that whilst Burhop would of course be released if 
the British so desired, he nevertheless preferred that ‘recommendations covering both his transfer and 
proposals connected with prospecting for ores in Australia should be made to Australia at the highest 
possible level’.29 This was an effort at diplomatic legerdemain on Rivett’s part. Parcelling together the 
distinct questions of Burhop’s transfer and uranium resources (to which British thinking had lately turned) 
would make the Australian engagement with Tube Alloys programmatic rather than ad hoc. Insisting on a 
high-level approach – necessarily directed to the Australian Prime Minister, through either the Dominions 
Office or the Australian High Commissioner in London – would lend it official imprimatur and a greater 
cachet. 
 
The effort failed. Akers thought it preferable that Burhop be released from Australian service and then 
engaged by DSIR, rather than having him seconded directly by the Australians;30 there was to be no parallel 
exchange about uranium. Burhop duly transferred to Berkeley, and began reporting home, his reports 
echoing Oliphant’s in their enthusiasm. He told Rivett ‘There is no doubt of the stupendous implications of 
the work’. One such implication was the likelihood that the bomb would be used in the war. Burhop went 
on to stress his own view that ‘this project is very important for the future of Australia’, and that his presence 
at Berkeley was therefore ‘a golden opportunity to get knowledge of the techniques that, it seems, will 
prove vital for the future of the country’. Burhop went on to name five other scientists whom it would be 
in the ‘ultimate interests’ of Australia to send.31 
 
To achieve the placement of additional personnel in the nuclear work, Rivett sought again to leverage his 
country’s natural resources. The British had long had half an eye on the Australian uranium deposits, which 
their geological researches had indicated as ‘the most likely source for rapid expansion of Empire 
supplies’.32 Now, post-Quebec, they had embarked upon a concerted effort to identify and secure sources 
across the empire – hence Rivett’s efforts to find out, via Oliphant, whether a formal approach might be 
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forthcoming. It was, but not in the format Rivett might have hoped. Australia was approached in May 1944, 
concurrently with the other Dominions, in the conducive setting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
Conference. The request for action on uranium was therefore made first at the highest level, rather than 
through Rivett. Instead Anderson spoke with Curtin, the Australian Prime Minister, in person, to ask that 
Australia begin surveying her known deposits.33  
 
The survey was duly begun, but the Australian hope of using this asset to obtain access to the wider nuclear 
project – including Montreal, where they had no personnel – did not fade. In September, Bruce was 
instructed to approach Anderson, and inform him that ‘prospecting of ore fields is in full swing’, and in the 
same conversation to ask whether Australia should send more men ‘both to help present teams and also to 
gain experience for possible application later in this country’.34 This was presumptuous in itself, and the 
Australians’ case was not aided by their unwelcome suggestion, presented in parallel, that the British option 
on Australian uranium should be limited to the period of hostilities (the British interest in securing the 
uranium being inherently long-term).35 Bruce pressed again in October, still with the goal of somehow 
getting another Australian into the North American work (Montreal, if he could manage it). This time, he 
was told that no further physicists were required, and although Anderson was willing to make a vague 
reference to the idea that there might at some point be call for a chemical engineer, the practical subtext 
was that the Australians should cease pestering for further access.36 This certainly was the conclusion Rivett 
reluctantly drew, for he soon after informed Oliphant that he felt it would be ‘inadvisable to attempt to 
introduce any more Australians into the U.S.A. team’.37 
 
How, then, to assess Australia’s wartime nuclear experiences? They had learnt much, and learnt it early. In 
Mark Oliphant they had the unique advantage of both a reliable informant and well-placed advocate. His 
unsanctioned but for the most part unimpeded efforts to equip Australia for the nuclear future by binding 
her closer to the British (and thereby the American) programme have no parallel in any other country’s 
experience. Australia was, moreover, custodian of one of the most promising sets of uranium deposits in 
the world. They had even had advance warning of the likelihood of British interest in the mineral. These 
were advantages which ought, theoretically, to have given great leverage. Rivett certainly thought so. Alice 
Cawte’s account frames Rivett’s negotiations as a ‘diplomatic campaign’, consisting of ‘numerous and at 
times disingenuous démarches to the scientific establishments of the UK, the USA and Canada’. The returns 
on this effort, though, were minimal: the release of Burhop (not even on secondment) and an entirely 
separate, small-scale uranium exploration programme. This was disappointing in its own right, and doubly 
so compared with what was achieved by New Zealand. As the war drew to a close, it would have been hard 
for Rivett and his colleagues to avoid the conclusion that they had failed to capitalise on the head-start 
which their compatriot Oliphant had given them four years previously.  
 
  
                                                   
33 Draft memorandum, 15th June 1944, AB 1/667 (TNA) 
34 PM’s dept to Bruce, 8th September 1944, DAFP, Vol.VII, Doc.274  
35 Bruce to Curtin, 15th September 1944, DAFP, Vol.VII, Doc.284  
36 Bruce to Prime Minister’s Department, 12th October 1944, DAFP, Vol.VII, Doc.316 
37 Rivett to Oliphant, 25th October 1944, AB 1/214 (TNA) 
 
 122 
The New Zealand Connection 
 
New Zealand came later to the nuclear table than Australia, learning officially of the British project only in 
the spring of 1944 (and unofficially perhaps only a few months earlier). They had had no information prior 
to this, for there was no figure equivalent to Oliphant through whom it could have passed. There was little 
in New Zealand’s scientific or industrial track record to suggest that it would play any prominent role. Yet 
in terms of wartime collaboration, theirs was by far the most successful, and by far the most straightforward, 
of all the Dominions. Whereas the Australians managed only to release Burhop for work at Berkeley, the 
New Zealand DSIR, under the leadership of Ernest Marsden, were ultimately able to place seven personnel, 
on secondment terms, at Berkeley and Montreal;38 the senior officer among them, Charles Watson Munro, 
soon came to hold a position of real influence within the Canadian branch of Tube Alloys. It is important 
to reflect on how this came to be. 
 
The earliest nuclear contact between Britain and New Zealand is difficult to date conclusively. The historian 
Rebecca Priestley, whose monograph Mad on Radium is the principal account of New Zealand’s nuclear 
history, places it in the December of 1943. Priestley recounts an anecdote of Oliphant’s, recorded some 
decades later, in which Marsden, head of the New Zealand DSIR, passing through Washington, came across 
Chadwick, Oliphant and Bohr in the lobby of their hotel. 
 
Oliphant later recalled they were in their hotel lobby waiting for the elevator when they felt 
taps on their shoulders and turned to find Marsden in full military uniform. They were taken 
aback to hear Marsden say, ‘I can guess why two nuclear physicists are here!’ During the 
elevator journey Marsden put in a good word for New Zealand’s participation in the bomb 
project. He followed this up in London with Sir John Anderson…39 
 
How much weight should be given to such an anecdote? In the face of such neat, seemingly fortuitous 
incidents the historian’s natural tendency is to scepticism: in telling their own stories humans are apt to 
substitute a pithy vignette for the convolutions of lived experience, and in an anecdote a potentially 
fabricated part may stand for the more complex whole. The reality is unlikely to have been as neat as 
Oliphant later narrated. Yet it is also true that providential moments of such a type can occur, and can shape 
the course of history. The encounter need not have been exactly as described: if the conclusion is that 
Marsden’s passage through Washington inclined him to curiosity about British physicists’ wartime 
interests, it is enough. If any New Zealander would have been able to deduce the existence of an allied 
nuclear programme, it would have been Marsden, whose scientific training (he had worked with 
Rutherford) and professional responsibilities alike would have equipped him to recognise the import of the 
three scientists’ presence in Washington. There is, moreover, archival confirmation that the problems of 
nuclear physics were on Marsden’s mind at this point: in December 1943, from Washington, Marsden wrote 
to the director of the New Zealand geological survey from asking him to start surveying for radioactive 
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material.40 At any rate, the latter part of the anecdote is where the account definitively ventures into archival 
fact, for Anderson and Marsden certainly spoke in the spring of 1944. 
 
Oliphant’s anecdote savours of truth in one other respect: Marsden seems to have been clear from the outset 
that New Zealand should be allowed to contribute in some measure to the programme. In the April of 1944 
he reported that he had ‘complained, unofficially, to the high Authorities… that New Zealand should have 
been made aware earlier of such an outstanding development and been allowed to participate’.41 This desire 
to contribute was no idle aspiration. The idea that a small contingent of New Zealanders should be attached 
to Tube Alloys had already been floated. A document in the National Archives implies that Oliphant was 
involved in the discussion. Wrote Appleton:  
 
I believe that you have had a talk with Marsden about some New Zealand people who might 
be absorbed into the T.A. organisation. I wonder could you let me know what decision you 
have come to about these people and whether you are advising Chadwick that you should 
have them42 
 
Thus, if Marsden had ‘put in a good word’ in Washington, he must also have followed it up in the following 
months. It is tempting to identify Marsden as the New Zealander in British uniform with whom Oliphant 
was alleged to have spoken in Berkeley, but this would be to rely far too heavily on supposition, and is 
anyway not necessary. Oliphant would have been a good informal point of contact for Marsden, and was 
himself very much in the market for additional manpower for his team at Berkeley. 
 
In any case, the British welcomed the suggestion that a handful of New Zealanders might be attached to 
Tube Alloys in spite of (or perhaps because of) the slow progress being made with the Australians. There 
was also a clear sense as to who was wanted. Top of the list was Charles Watson Munro, whom Marsden 
thought ‘the outstanding man in New Zealand for the job’.43 To secure the release of five men, all of whom 
were already engaged in important war work, would require official sanction at a level far higher than 
Marsden, senior though he was. Marsden therefore made his case to the acting Prime Minister, Dan 
Sullivan, stressing the empire-wide shortage of suitable scientists, the potential implications of the 
technology, and the consequent desirability of associating New Zealanders with the programme.44 
 
The concrete proposal was that five men be sent: C. N. Watson Munro, K.D. George, W.W. Young, R. M. 
Williams, and G. Page. All were already involved in relevant, secret war work, George as Scientific Liaison 
Officer in Washington, the others for DSIR in New Zealand. It was decided that Watson Munro and Page 
would be sent to Berkeley, the other three to Montreal.45 These were young, capable men, very much of the 
‘1851 standard’. In his stint as scientific liaison officer in Washington, George had married a Canadian – a 
more parochial instance of Commonwealth interaction.46 
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This was undoubtedly a coup for Marsden. Williams, one of those to be sent, described Marsden as ‘cock-
a-hoop’ at having secured the secondment of the New Zealanders.47 The terms for the DSIR men stipulated 
that they were to be seconded for ‘a period of one year or for the duration of the war, whichever is the 
longer’.48 This would be be a long stint, but the terms were favourable to New Zealand: there was an 
expectation that the men would return home for at least one year after their service was completed, a 
stipulation which Priestley casts as evidence that ‘Marsden was very keen for New Zealand to launch an 
atomic research programme when the war finished’.49 
 
One alteration was ultimately made to this scheme: by the end of May Cockcroft was keen to have Watson 
Munro at Montreal, where it was felt that he would ‘fill a gap in our present organisation in design of 
control mechanisms’. Work on these was due to begin within the next month, so the need was sufficiently 
urgent that a precious permit for air transit was in order.50 Watson Munro was duly reassigned to Montreal; 
he would go on to play a significant role in the development of ZEEP, the Canadian heavy water reactor. 
 
The first group of New Zealanders settled well at Montreal and Berkeley, and messages to Marsden – 
chiefly from Watson Munro, their de facto leader – made clear the value to New Zealand of having 
successfully seconded their personnel to the programme. The value, moreover, was mutual: their work was 
clearly well-regarded by the British, and in January 1945 Cockcroft cabled Marsden (seemingly at Watson 
Munro’s suggestion) to ask that a few more personnel be sent. The greatest need was now for electrical 
engineers or electronic physicists. This was a clear vote of confidence, both in the capability of the New 
Zealand personnel already sent and in the discretion and effectiveness of Marsden and DSIR as the sending 
party. Whereas the Australians had struggled even to get Burhop placed at Berkeley, the New Zealanders 
were now being asked for further secondments. 
 
Marsden was naturally keen to meet the British request. In the face of competing claims on New Zealand’s 
thinly-stretched cadre of engineers, he asserted his belief that ‘the T.A. project is the more important, both 
from the Empire point of view and from that of future development work in New Zealand’.51 This two-fold 
argument – that the sending of more men was equally in the interest of New Zealand and the wider empire 
– was backed by appeals to authority. Marsden cited a communication from the New Zealand High 
Commissioner in Ottawa, opining that additional men ‘could make [a] valuable contribution to Allied war 
effort here if available quickly’ and that their experience would be ‘useful to New Zealand’ post-war. He 
emphasised the extent of support for it amongst the New Zealanders already in North America: ‘I have full 
faith in Mr. Watson Munro’s judgement in the matter’. He even invoked Rutherford: ‘It is not inappropriate 
that New Zealand should help in this project since it owes its origin to the work of the New Zealander, Lord 
Rutherford’.52 The appeals worked. Three men – Manssen, Allan, and Fergusson – were identified, and the 
administrative processes for their secondment were begun. Domestic complications delayed Manssen’s 
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release until after the war, but the other two were able, after some minor administrative delays, to reach 
Canada, where they, too, contributed positively in the closing months of the war.  
 
Parallel with the secondment of personnel, and also under the aegis of Marsden’s DSIR, was the question 
of uranium exploration. New Zealand had never looked as promising a prospect as Australia or Canada, 
but it was equally impossible to rule out the discovery of exploitable deposits there, and the British were 
therefore keen to ensure that steps were taken to identify, and if necessary secure, any uranium sources 
within the Dominion’s territory. New Zealand geologists had been forewarned by Marsden, and when the 
request was made they were ready for it. There were, moreover, no complications: Marsden made no effort 
to intertwine the uranium question with that of personnel. The war cabinet duly approved funding for a 
uranium survey in July 1944.53 The resulting effort was substantial, a significant proportion of the survey 
work having to be conducted by boat, owing to the inaccessibility of the areas surveyed. Marsden, 
inevitably, took a considerable interest in its progress, intervening at points to keep the work on track. The 
urgency of the task was reinforced by messages home from Watson Munro, which Marsden was not averse 
to quoting in his memoranda to ministers. Witness the following excerpt, which Marsden included in a 
memorandum for his minister in February 1945: 
 
I trust the search (for Uranium and Thorium) is proceeding well. The work is very important 
from an Empire point of view as many tons will be wanted in the next few years and Uncle 
Sam has a stranglehold on the Canadian ores.54 
 
These appeals to empire interests helped maintain the momentum of the search. Privately, though, it had to 
be admitted that there had been little success. Marsden acknowledged that ‘This chasing of radioactive 
minerals is interesting but tantalising’ – tantalising in the strict classical sense, for the prize of a rich seam 
of uranium seemed just out of reach.55 It never, in fact, materialised. Skilled manpower was to be New 
Zealand’s only realisable asset in the imperial nuclear marketplace. Recognition of this was the hallmark 
of Marsden’s approach. Unlike the Australians, the New Zealanders made little or no effort to tie one strand 
to the other. Instead, they willingly made separate but vigorous efforts on both.  
 
Marsden’s centrality to New Zealand’s early nuclear history is recognised in the (slim) historiography of 
the New Zealand nuclear programme, though there he must compete for the ultimate credit with Ernest 
Rutherford, upon whom both Priestley and Galbreath ground their accounts.56 It is true that ‘Nearly every 
British physicist involved in the wartime atomic energy effort had been one of Rutherford’s ‘boys’’,57 and 
a testament to the scale of his influence in (Anglophone/British empire) physics, but the suggestion that 
‘the Rutherford connection’ – Galbreath’s concept – served a practical purpose in positioning New Zealand 
scientists within the wider Tube Alloys contingent is harder to substantiate. By the outbreak of World War 
Two that ‘connection’ had undeniably been stretched by Rutherford’s death and long absence from New 
Zealand. Residual goodwill towards the legacy of Rutherford is not, of itself, adequate explanation for 
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sensitive decisions around personnel. It would perhaps be fairer to say that Marsden’s connection with 
Rutherford carried an almost life-long imprimatur, enhancing his credibility and consequently his influence. 
Even so, the credit for the actual conduct of New Zealand nuclear policy during the war is Marsden’s. 
 
Priestley and Galbreath’s unanimity on the significance of Marsden and Rutherford is typical of their 
accounts of this period. There is little to choose between them; Priestley’s work acknowledges a debt to 
Galbreath, and builds on many of his core themes. What deviations there are emerge on seemingly basic 
points, such as the overall number of New Zealanders who participated in the nuclear programme. This 
question of headcount is an interesting one, and is not exclusive to the New Zealand team: similar confusion 
as to numbers exists in reference to the British scientific presence at Los Alamos, for example. It does, 
however, highlight one of the problematic ambiguities in the idea of British citizenship in this period. 
Priestley, describing the arrival of Williams and Page at Berkeley in late July 1944, notes that ‘two other 
New Zealanders were already working at Berkeley, having arrived from the United Kingdom with the 
British team’.58 One of these was Maurice Wilkins, a physicist who represents a good case study in the 
ambiguity of Commonwealth nationality and the pitfall it represents for the historian. In what sense could 
Wilkins be described as a New Zealander? He had been born there, at Pongaroa on the North Island, but 
had left with his parents at the age of 6; his education, and later academic career, were all in Britain. Nimmo, 
the other New Zealander claimed by Priestley, had an even more itinerant background, and neither he nor 
Wilkins had joined the Manhattan Project by dint of any New Zealand connection. These ambiguities 
explain the various counts – Galbreath counts Nimmo, but not Wilkins, and Priestley counts both Nimmo 
and Wilkins. This thesis holds that, for anything other than retrospective national bragging rights, it is 
meaningful to consider only those who were sent under the official aegis of the New Zealand Government. 
This, in the period of the war, amounted to seven secondments: the five of the first contingent (George, 
Page, Watson Munro, Williams and Young), and the two of the second (Allan and Fergusson).59  
 
New Zealand’s wartime nuclear experience had been almost entirely positive – certainly compared with 
that of their neighbours across the Tasman Sea. The British had thought so too: not a word of recrimination 
seems to exist in the archives about the New Zealanders’ conduct. If, by the end of the war, Rivett in 
Australia had had cause for disappointment, Marsden had cause for pride. He had been central to the success 
of his country’s collaboration with Tube Alloys. He had been an enthusiastic advocate of New Zealand 
participation from the outset. His excitement for the project was unfeigned: at one point, following 
Cockcroft’s request for additional men for Montreal, he volunteered himself for the project.60 This boyish 
enthusiasm for the idea of the project belied a shrewd appreciation of its probable impact on the world. 
There need not be any hyperbole in his comment that the programme was ‘of more significance than any 
other project with which we have had opportunity to collaborate’.61 Time and time again, he made the case 
that ‘By helping with the loan of men from N.Z. we shall render greater services to the Empire and ourselves 
than in any other way I know’.62 It was this identification of empire service and national self-interest as 
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mutually compatible that rendered his argument so strong; his belief in its truth may also account for his 
guileless approach. 
 
Australia and New Zealand in Comparative Perspective 
 
How was it that New Zealand succeeded where Australia failed? One might reasonably have predicted the 
reverse to be true: New Zealand had none of the advantages that Australia seemed to possess. So complex 
a course of events requires a multifarious explanation, but underpinning any explanation must be the simple 
fact that the New Zealanders were able to provide the British with something that the Australians were 
unable, or unwilling, to offer.  
 
Both Dominions were sensitive to the differences in their experiences with Tube Alloys; all the more so as 
these differences became more pronounced. There was some measure of interchange between Marsden and 
Rivett in mid-1944. Rivett had hoped to rendezvous with Marsden at some stage in the latter’s journey back 
to New Zealand in July/August 1944 – he told Marsden that ‘there are many things about which I would 
like to have talked to you’ – but the meeting never took place. Rivett seems to have had the idea of 
Australian reinforcements for Oliphant still in mind, and was therefore keen to learn what he could of the 
New Zealanders’ experience: 
 
From what I have heard, you are likely to send several people from New Zealand and I should 
be most interested [to] hear anything that you would care to tell me about the situation.63 
 
Whatever Rivett may have learnt through his contact with Marsden availed him little, for there was no 
change of policy on the part of the Australians. By the end of 1944, the two countries’ experiences had 
diverged yet further, and observers from both were keen to establish why. One of the most perceptive 
interactions came on 4th January 1945, when Coop, the New Zealand scientific liaison in London, briefed 
Marsden:  
 
Apparently the Australians have been trying to get the low-down and have failed even at 
High Commissioner to Minister level. I gather that the root of the matter is that Australia 
wants the evidence first before going in boots and all, and the powers that be say that it has 
to be vice versa.64  
 
The Australians, by this interpretation, were guilty of greed. They had demanded too much – information, 
attachment of personnel, a cohesive programme of collaboration – before they would commit anything. For 
the New Zealanders, the reverse had been true: 
 
Your case had been entirely different in that you had offered five good men without 
questioning the soundness of the purpose and the good faith of the British Government. Your 
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action was very much appreciated and Oliphant [with whom Coop had discussed it] drew a 
sharp distinction between their dealings with New Zealand and with Australia. They were 
very pleased indeed with our five men….65  
 
Marsden’s eagerness had paid off. His willingness to provide capable scientists with no conditions had 
resulted in an ongoing secondment relationship, with all its associated benefits. On one level, then, 
Galbreath’s interpretation is sound:  
 
The New Zealanders were able, adaptable, and hard-working; the New Zealand government 
made no demands in return for their participation; and with the decline in DSIR’s radar work 
… more were available for deployment66 
 
It is, however, an incomplete explanation for the differing experiences of the two Dominions, for there was 
no reason why the Australians could not also have supplied able, adaptable, hard-working physicists. The 




It is hard to escape the conclusion that Rivett overplayed his hand. He seemed to have hoped that the 
granting of access to Australian uranium ‘might serve as a quid pro quo for access to information’.67 This 
attempt to associate the British request for survey work with the Australian desire to send more staff to the 
United States proved profoundly counter-productive, and it is difficult in retrospect to understand why it 
was attempted. Galbreath refers to it as an ‘ingenuous approach’, and notes that it achieved the very 
opposite of its intention, for ‘consideration of further Australian scientists for the atomic energy projects 
was deferred and then dropped, and access to any information was firmly denied’.68  
 
Both Marsden and Rivett grasped the likely significance of nuclear power and the advantages that stood to 
be gained by their Dominions from involvement in its development. ‘It is more important’, Marsden said, 
‘than anything yet brought to our notice not only for the war but to us in N.Z. afterwards’.69 Rivett, by his 
actions, demonstrated the same perspective, which Oliphant had repeatedly impressed upon him. The 
difference came in how they responded to the opportunity when it arose. Rivett sought to maximise 
Australia’s gains, by leveraging each of his Dominion’s resources in a straightforward negotiation with the 
British. Marsden, perhaps guided by a more acute understanding of the relative contribution his small 
Dominion was likely to make, made no effort to leverage his position, or really to negotiate, but rather 
trusted that the mere exposure of their personnel to the programme would, in time, reap dividends. The 
offer that came from Australia was conditional, almost confrontational – the first gambit in a negotiation. 
The offer that came from New Zealand was enthusiastic, unencumbered with conditions, a sincere 
contribution to the allied/imperial war effort. Little wonder the British favoured the New Zealanders.  
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It is tempting to extend this line of argument, and suggest that the different approaches pursued by Rivett 
and Marsden reflected the wider proclivities of their Dominions, the Australians inclining to a more 
independent line than the acquiescent New Zealanders. This would fit the historiographical meta-narratives 
of the two countries, which in accounting for wartime policy-making stress pro-active nationalism in 
Australia’s case and a more subservient, empire-oriented tendency in New Zealand’s. It would, however, 
be excessive. For one thing, Rivett cannot bear all the blame; there were other personalities and other 
prerogatives at play in the Australian case. Watson Munro, seeking an explanation for the administrative 
delay which had postponed Fergusson and Allan’s departure for Montreal, advanced the following theory: 
 
apparently the delay in London was associated with the offer of men by another Dominion 
(Australia) being rejected. I don’t know why, because the Aussie boys would have been 
useful – now this is pure guesswork on my part – it may have been White who offered them 
and the U.K. may not have liked the way the cake was offered70 
 
White was a figure in CSIR. Oliphant appears also to have disliked him.71 It is unlikely that personal animus 
alone could have led to the rejection of the Australian offer, but it cannot have helped. Equally, Marsden is 
not unambiguously representative of New Zealand (no one figure ever could be). Although many historians, 
including Gowing, have assumed that he was born a New Zealander, Marsden was born in Britain, and 
owed his role in New Zealand DSIR to Rutherford, under whom he had studied at Manchester.72 
 
Other explanatory factors might be invoked. Rivett may simply have played the diplomatic game less well 
than Marsden, though neither was a trained diplomat. Marsden may have had a few advantages which 
inclined the Tube Alloys hierarchy to trust him: Rivett, a chemist, had not studied under Rutherford: 
Marsden, a physicist, had. These can only ever be supplementary to the core explanation, however: that the 
attitude underlying the New Zealand approach proved attractive to the British, whilst the Australians’ 
proved unattractive. These two attitudes were shaped, in turn, by variant understandings of how their 
Dominions could hope to relate to the British nuclear programme. That, perhaps, was the essential 
difference: between a conception of British and Dominion interests as complementary, verging on identical 
(the Marsden/New Zealand model) and as distinct and potentially irreconcilable (the Rivett/Australia 
model).  
 
Resources of the Wider Empire 
 
It was not solely to New Zealand and Australia that the United Kingdom looked for aid. Britain had gone 
to war alongside her empire, and with the instinct to make use of its full strength in collaborative endeavour. 
This was as true in the nuclear field as elsewhere, for although the constraints of the Anglo-American 
relationship and the burdens of secrecy precluded most forms of collaboration with the wider empire, there 
remained a crucial sense in which it could be leveraged in support of Britain’s nuclear interests. The 
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acquisition of uranium was fast becoming a strategic priority – not for the wartime programme per se, but 
for all that would follow. It seemed logical, from a British perspective, that her imperial connections should 
serve to benefit the British programme. The Declaration of Trust strengthened this impulse, for it encoded 
the idea of British pre-eminence within the empire, self-governing or otherwise. It acknowledged the 
empire as, in effect, a mineral sphere of influence. The exploitation of empire resources is a well-worn 
historiographical trope, but is true enough in the context of the colonial empire. In the Dominions the 
dynamic was somewhat different, as Australia and New Zealand have already demonstrated, for the 
Dominions possessed what the colonies lacked: agency. These variant dynamics are the subject of this 
section of the chapter. 
 
The process of seeking out a British-controlled source for uranium began prior to the implementation of 
the Declaration of Trust. A paper on ‘Sources and Supplies of Uranium’ was prepared in December 1943, 
discussing the extent of global uranium supplies. The only known exploitable deposits lay in the United 
States, the Belgian Congo, and Canada, but a further ten countries were listed as having known or suspected 
deposits of unknown quality. These were Portugal, Australia, Tanganyika, Madagascar, India, Uganda, 
South Africa, Britain, the USSR, and China.73 The majority of these lay within the British Empire: Britain 
itself, two Dominions, two colonies, and the grand anomaly of India. It was reasonable to hope that at least 
one of these territories would be found to have viable deposits – thereby securing for Britain an independent 
source of the mineral which seemed set to dominate world affairs. The paper therefore gave concrete 
recommendations. It urged that the Australians (who were already aware of the potential significance of 
uranium) be requested to start surveying. It also made clear that a decision would soon be needed about 
surveying and prospecting in ‘other territories under British control … from the long term point of view of 
assuring supplies of uranium for British T.A. work during the next decade’.74 To be thinking on a decade 
timescale was, of course, to be thinking post-war.  
 
Here, again, was the essential tension between Britain’s fealty to the pressing objective of an allied bomb 
(as required in the Quebec Agreement) and her longer-term desire to develop her own nuclear programme. 
Chadwick, though, was clear that the settlement of the Montreal question and the subsequent prioritisation 
of the work in North American did not preclude the pursuit of preparatory work in England, such as the 
accumulation of a stock of uranium oxide.75 Akers concurred, arguing in April 1944 that in order to begin 
large-scale work in the United Kingdom, and ‘as an insurance against a possible breakdown in American 
co-operation in the Montreal project’ the UK should take immediate steps to secure ‘essential raw 
materials’.76 
 
By ‘essential raw materials’ Akers had in mind the basis of a post-war programme: the requirement would 
be approximately 400 tons of graphite, the capacity to produce one ton of heavy water per month, and 1000 
tons of uranium oxide.77 It was widely accepted that uranium was the most pressing of these to obtain – in 
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part because of its natural scarcity, but also because ‘the Americans are apparently trying to get a 
monopoly’.78 Some territories were obviously to be prioritised over others, but it would be well to take 
action more widely, against the possibility that deposits might later be discovered. This meant looking to 
the empire, both the Dominions and the colonial possessions. Doubts about Australian and Canadian 
supplies – certainly as long-term prospects – had already been expressed.79 An approach therefore had to 
be made to the Colonial Office (tentatively, giving away ‘no more than was necessary’). Although neither 
the Colonial Office nor Tube Alloys were aware of any significant supply within the Colonial Empire, both 
nevertheless agreed on the advisability of immediate action, first, because of the risk that new deposits 
might accidentally be found, and second, that wartime conditions were uniquely amenable to rapid, secret, 
sweeping action: 
 
while the war is on there is always the chance that any desirable new regulation can be hitched 
on to some omnibus regulation which a colonial Government may be issuing for war 
purposes, and so secure the minimum of publicity. Action of the kind we want might not be 
so easy to take unspectacularly once the war is over80 
 
Although the British were satisfied that the were no deposits unaccounted for, they could not rule out future 
discoveries, especially in ‘India, S. Africa, S.W. Africa, Rhodesia, Uganda, Tanganyika, Kenya and 
possibly Nigeria’.81 Policy towards those territories under British control was further elaborated in a paper 
on ‘T.A. Control in the Colonial Empire’. Secrecy was to be the order of the day; only a handful of Colonial 
Office staff were to be informed of the interest, and little information was to be given as to the reason.82  
 
For the Dominions, a rather different approach was required. One could not simply dictate from Whitehall 
to acquiescent British governors. Consent must instead be sought, and from the highest levels. This, in turn 
required explanations, delivered, if possible, in person, of the nature of the problem. An opportunity was 
presented by the presence of the Dominion prime ministers in London for their conference. None of them 
had yet been formally approached, except Curtin, and him only very recently.83 The timing was 
serendipitous, for this was the period of the negotiations for the Declaration of Trust, which would commit 
Britain to safeguarding empire nuclear resources.84 The urgency of the approach varied. There were no 
known uranium sources in New Zealand, but it was still considered necessary to appraise Fraser of the 
element’s importance (his government already having learnt, via Marsden, of the existence of the 
programme). In South Africa there was only a set of pitchblende deposits at Gordonia, about which further 
information would be welcomed.85 Only the approach to Curtin was predicated on any real expectation of 
results.  
 
Australia and New Zealand have already been discussed in this chapter, and need not be revisited here – 
save to reiterate that Australia’s apparently vast resources availed her little in the attempt to secure greater 
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access to the nuclear project, and that New Zealand’s lack of comparable prospects may ultimately have 
been a blessing, for it spared them the hubris of attempting to do the same. Instead, it would be well to 
consider the last of the Dominions to enter into the nuclear secret during the war. South Africa did not 
contribute any personnel to the British contingent in North America; there appears not to have been any 
suggestion that she should. Yet by the summer of 1944 news of the work had reached the Union’s 
formidable Prime Minister, Jan Smuts, via several routes. In May, Lord Cherwell had reflected, in a note 
to Churchill, on the fact that Smuts, alone of the Dominion prime ministers – all of whom were then present 
in Britain – had not been exposed to the secret. The others were all, to varying extents, au fait with Tube 
Alloys, and in most cases appeared keen to talk about it: 
 
Mackenzie King knows all about it and Curtin – owing to our endeavours to secure 
Australian ore – a good deal; Fraser, having evidently been kept abreast by his own 
scientists, opened the subject…86 
 
To Cherwell there therefore seemed little harm in inducting Smuts, too. Anderson clearly concurred, for on 
25th May he asked Churchill for permission to discuss the programme personally with the South African 
Prime Minister. His reasoning was similar to that which Cherwell had outlined: the rest of the Dominion 
Prime Ministers were by now relatively well-informed, and keen to discuss the subject.87 Churchill, rather 
a fan of Smuts, readily agreed with his lieutenants, telling Anderson that he was ‘quite willing that you 
should discuss Tube Alloys with Field-Marshal Smuts. I propose to do so myself’.88 There was no pressing 
need for such an action: only at Gordonia were there known to be any even vaguely interesting resources.89  
 
Churchill’s eventual discussion with Smuts clearly went beyond the essential facts, for in June 1944, Smuts 
wrote, by hand, to Churchill, noting, seemingly without irony, that ‘You mentioned to me the agreement 
between you and the President about the scientific secret and also that you were not willing to disclose it 
to a third party’.90 Nor was Churchill the only Briton to have shared such information with Smuts 
(‘Anderson and the Prof [that is, Cherwell] have also raised the matter with me’).91  
 
Smuts’ analysis was concise, and he seems to have been fully cognisant of the future implications of the 
new power. He cautioned Churchill not to mention the weapon to Stalin, insisting that any move to consult 
others should come first from the Americans. (One must assume that both men mentally exempted the 
British Empire from that principle, for it was obvious that consultation among the Dominions had already 
taken place, and would continue). Still, the secret could not be kept forever, and ‘its disclosure after the 
war may start the most destructive competition in the world’.92 Smut’s conclusion was therefore clear: ‘If 
ever there was a matter for international control this is one’.93 What is absent from Smuts’ otherwise very 
thorough letter is any suggestion that South Africa might somehow participate in the British programme. 
Perhaps this had to do with the context in which he learnt of the project. Churchill’s concern seems to have 
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been with questions of the Anglo-American relationship and future world order, rather than with the 
development of a uniquely British weapon. Smuts’ induction also came later, and since there had been no 
previous contacts at other levels he had no Marsden/Rivett figure primed to advocate his Dominion’s 
involvement. Dire warnings from Niels Bohr may also have shaped some of Smuts’ thinking.94 Whatever 
the reason, no appetite for South African participation was evident. Smuts’ counsel to Churchill was pretty 
well the sum of his country’s wartime contribution to the programme.95 
 
Another case, more marginal even than that of South Africa, was that of Southern Rhodesia, where no 
deposits had hitherto been found, but which was considered, on the basis of its geological characteristics, 
a sufficiently promising future source that here, too, ‘immediate steps’ should be taken. 96 Advice was 
sought from the Dominions Office, which informed them that since Southern Rhodesia had self-governing 
status the aptest approach would be for the Chancellor to ‘have a word’ with the Prime Minister, Godfrey 
Huggins, before his departure from Britain;97 in short, the same approach as had been used for the 
Dominions, but with less information shared. (Recall that Southern Rhodesia was not, in a constitutional 
sense, a Dominion, though it was at times treated comparably). There was little or no prospect of 
collaboration, no expectation of active interchange: the concern in this case was simply to ensure that the 
government of Southern Rhodesia would inform the United Kingdom of any relevant developments, but 
otherwise keep very quiet on the matter.98 
 
By July 1944 the necessary work was well underway in each of the key Dominions. Promising deposits in 
Australia were under exploration. Requests had been made of the South Africans and New Zealanders, who 
had taken appropriate measures. Huggins had likewise been informed, though the sense from Southern 
Rhodesia was now that not much of interest was likely to be found.99 The approach in the colonial empire 
necessarily had to be different. Governors had been told of UK government interest but no reference had 
been made to specific elements.100 Restricting legislation to the broad category of ‘radioactive minerals’ 
served to obscure the two or three substances of genuine relevance. The precise approach to be adopted 
would depend on the policy adopted by the CPC and CDT, but a legal framework could be prepared now 
– for which an understanding of the legal position in each of the colonies was required. A number of legal 
instruments were envisaged: restriction of new mining concessions, qualification of existing concessions, 
and/or export controls were to be introduced as necessary. Alongside these pre-emptive legal actions would 
also come the active investigation of sources, directed from London, beginning with likeliest candidates – 
Tanganyika and Uganda – and expanding to others where necessary. This would be a TA-led process, 
conducted by a geologist/mining engineer, but using the good offices of Colonial Office, who would 
additionally help to compose ‘a list of the territories whose Governors should at once be made aware of the 
necessity for referring to us any information or action affecting radioactive minerals’.101 
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In all of this the contrast with the Dominion experience is clear: the colonies were only ever treated as 
subsidiary. There was little sharing of information, even with British governors. A visiting delegation of 
Indian physicists to Canada was consciously given a very wide berth by the nuclear elements of the NRC.102 
This was, in part, a reflection simply of constitutional realities: the sovereign independence of the 
Dominions meant that relations must be consensual; Britain could not simply dictate. Unlike the Colonies, 
the Dominions were not simply sources of material to be suborned or exploited, but rather were seen as 
actual or potential collaborators to be cultivated.  
 
Conclusion: Mobilising the Commonwealth 
 
The Dominions interacted with Tube Alloys, and the very world of nuclear weapons development, in 
complex ways. This chapter has sought to convey both the commonalities and the distinctions. Canada, of 
course, had gained the most: by no real act of her own, but rather as a result of her location and her 
Dominionhood, she had gained a seat at the highest table, playing host to an increasingly ambitious 
programme and with access to secrets which were otherwise held scrupulously close. The other Dominions 
could hardly have hoped to have achieved the same. Yet they still gained information, access, and 
experience. Australia and New Zealand were both able to place personnel into crucial research centres – 
something which few other states managed, by fair means or foul. They had gained advance knowledge of 
the future importance of uranium resources, and had been able to commence exploration work, subsidised 
by the British government. In a world in which even the knowledge that the phenomenon of uranium fission 
might be militarily exploitable was considered the most secret of secrets, it must be recognised that the 
Dominions’ collective interactions with nuclear technology were remarkably deep and wide-ranging. With 
the end of the war in sight, they could rest in either the satisfaction or the consolation that, albeit to varying 
degrees, their governments had made tangible contributions to a grand Empire endeavour, and that they 
could expect to reap the benefits; not simply those already accrued, but those that would surely come in the 
brave new world of the allies’ nuclear peace.  
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The destruction of Hiroshima occupies a unique position in human history. In historiography, as in literature 
and the human psyche, it has come to be regarded as a watershed, at once representing the culmination of 
the carnage of the Second World War and the grim dawn of the nuclear era. The use of the atom bomb 
instantly initiated global society into a scientific secret which had formerly been held so closely that few 
even of the allied leadership had known of it. Prior assumptions about the nature of the long-anticipated 
peace were challenged; old axioms about conflict and statecraft no longer stood. The obliteration of 
Hiroshima on the 6th of August, and of Nagasaki three days later, occasioned a fundamental transition in 
the strategic, political and cultural perspectives of every state even tangentially concerned in the late war, 
and of Britain foremost. Yet from a perspective of policy-making and institutional change this transition 
did not take place at precisely 0815 on 6th August 1945, but progressively, across months and years either 
side of that terrible moment. The atomic peace had been conceptualised and prepared for by the atomic 
allies. Plans had been lain, jointly and severally, for future work. That few of these wartime expectations 
were realised in their original forms does not diminish their relevance, for it was through the interaction of 
these expectations with the realities of the post-war period that subsequent policy was set. This chapter, 
then, is concerned with post-war planning both in the abstract – as envisaged by the scientists, politicians 
and policy-makers concerned – and as the material process of prioritisation that emerged from the effort to 
give substance to those idealised visions. Commonwealth dynamics will be seen to have had significant 
influence in both instances. 
 
This chapter emphasises three themes in Britain’s post-war policy-making, addressing each in turn. First, 
it is noted that the transition from war to peace brought with it, after the grim revelations at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, an alteration in the conditions of nuclear policy-making on both sides of the Atlantic, from a 
situation of extreme secrecy and limited oversight to one of full publicity and intense (though frequently 
ill-informed) public and political scrutiny. Variant political approaches to these new circumstances further 
complicated the already fraught tripartite nuclear arrangement, which for the British meant the frustration 
of many wartime plans. Yet some wartime planning did bear fruit: the conditions may have changed, but 
the expectation that Britain would use the advent of peace to pursue large-scale work in the United Kingdom 
as soon as practical was met, even against the backdrop of American prevarications. Second, this chapter 
traces the awkward recalibration of Anglo-Canadian nuclear ties, which peace and the pursuit of 
independent work in the United Kingdom disrupted. Differing conceptions of the nature of the Canadian 
nuclear work, which had been masked somewhat by the exigencies of war, now came to the fore, and the 
minor cleavages of previous years grew more severe as a result of divergent ambitions and poor 
communication. Yet even as the British and Canadian programmes drifted further apart from one another, 
new forms of collaboration and interaction emerged, still with unique Commonwealth dynamics. Third, 
and finally, the chapter considers the role played by the other Dominions in this period, both as independent 
actors with nuclear assets, and as contributors, real or potential, to Britain’s post-war nuclear programme. 
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Dominion experiences in the immediate post-war period were as varied as they had been during the war. 
Australia and New Zealand each sought to build their own nuclear capabilities on the basis of their wartime 
engagement with the United Kingdom, the Australians still placing great emphasis on Mark Oliphant as 
their fount of nuclear knowledge, the New Zealanders under Marsden continuing to emphasise their small 
programme of secondments as mutually beneficial. For South Africa, meanwhile, the question of resources 
loomed largest, as Smuts’ government sought to capitalise on the global surge in demand for uranium. In 
each of these cases the British attitude towards collaboration was shaped by an instinctive desire to leverage 
Commonwealth connections, tempered, and in some instances almost wholly frustrated, by the 
overwhelming importance of the American connection.  
 
British Expectations, Before and After Hiroshima 
 
The atom bomb precipitated the end of the war, but was not necessary to secure it. Victory had been 
achieved in Europe without nuclear weapons, and the material balance in the Pacific War so strongly 
favoured the allies that by 1945 victory was essentially a question only of time, blood and treasure. Little 
need be said here on the vexed issues of the morality and utility, in strategic and political terms, of the use 
of the bomb, the topic having been more than adequately debated elsewhere. It suffices to note that – 
courtesies associated with the Quebec Agreement notwithstanding – this was essentially an American 
strategic decision. American operational control did not, however, preclude British thinking about (and 
planning for) the wider nuclear future. The purpose of this section is to consider the essential features of 
these British plans for post-war nuclear work, both as they were formed during the war, and as they evolved 
in the early months and years of peace. In this, of course, the relationship with the United States looms 
large, and this section can therefore also be read partly as a condensed history, from a British perspective, 
of Anglo-American nuclear engagement from August 1945 to January 1947.  
 
The paradigm shift portended by the development of nuclear weapons had been acknowledged in Britain 
from the earliest stages of the war. Frisch and Peierls had spoken of the weapon’s likely military 
implications in their memorandum, and Moore-Brabazon, reflecting on the work of the MAUD Committee, 
worked through some of the implications for world order of an Anglo-American bomb;1 the concept of 
post-war control had been on Anderson’ mind even in the negotiations with the Americans in 1942.2  
 
Wartime priorities had motivated the transfer of the bulk of the British work across the Atlantic, but the 
expectation of post-war activity meant that the British never loosened their grip on any element of their 
basic programme. As earlier chapters have shown, British policy on collaboration was consistently 
predicated on the idea that Britain should remain as near to the cutting-edge of nuclear research as possible. 
The fruit of that dogged (and risky) application of policy was the eventual agreement of the Americans to 
endorse the Anglo-Canadian heavy water project, in spite of its negligible relevance to the Manhattan 
Project. It was readily apparent that neither ZEEP nor NRX would produce weapons-relevant material in 
time for deployment during the war, and the Anglo-Canadian work on plutonium extraction was hardly 
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necessary to the allied effort. The Canadian plant at Chalk River was thus tacitly recognised by the British 
and their allies as a post-war endeavour: references to post-war conditions, and to tripartite co-operation as 
the expected bedrock of those conditions, began to appear more consistently in Tube Alloys correspondence 
from then on.3 By the summer of 1944, Akers and Perrin felt able to recommend that ‘consideration should 
be given to planning the direction of T.A. work in this country’ for the post-war period, ‘under the 
assumption that full co-operation is maintained’.4  
 
Planning for such an eventuality began in earnest in late 1944. A cross-section of senior figures in the 
British contingent in North America met in Chadwick’s office in November 1944. Their intention was to 
put flesh on the bones of an idea broached in the Tube Alloys consultative council, that an experimental 
establishment should be created in the United Kingdom. ‘It was generally agreed’, the minutes read, ‘that 
the establishment would be designed primarily for work on T.A. as a weapon’, though other, more 
peaceable developments were to be expected in due course. The gathered scientists envisaged a small 
permanent staff, but with a ‘continual flow’ of younger personnel spending a year or two at the 
establishment as part of their doctoral work, and with senior university staff passing through in their 
vacations.5 Dominion involvement was explicitly anticipated – in fact, it was to be encouraged; they were 
to be invited ‘to co-operate as free partners, contributing men and possibly factories’.6 The idea of 
contributing men was nothing new; it would require only the continuation and expansion of the secondment 
system which the New Zealanders had piloted. The idea of the Dominions contributing factories was, 
however, somewhat novel, and speaks of the emerging hope that post-war conditions might enable the 
construction of a collaborative inter-Dominion programme centred on British strategic requirements. A set 
of notes in Oliphant’s hand likely pre-dating the group discussion, echo the themes of the meeting so closely 
that it would appear that Oliphant himself was the chief advocate of a Commonwealth-oriented programme 
in the United Kingdom. His notes envisaged the new UK establishment as the centre of a web of 
Commonwealth connections: 
 
The British Dominions should be invited to co-operate in the T.A. project as full partners, 
contributing men to work and to be trained and possibly providing factories where a process 
can more easily and more quickly be carried out in the Dominions. In this way we will tap a 
very useful supply of good men and will strengthen the whole project by giving the whole 
Commonwealth a stake in it.7 
 
The wording here, more so than that minuted for the subsequent discussion, draws attention to the potential 
of the Dominions to supplement British manpower – an opportunity to which the late success of the Anglo-
Canadian collaboration and the proven efficacy of the New Zealand contingent attested – but also highlights 
the idea of achieving Commonwealth buy-in to the British programme. Certainly the conception was that 
the new facility should serve as the focal point for the United Kingdom’s nuclear-scientific diplomacy: 
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another source from the same period states that ‘The Establishment shall take the responsibility for 
scientific liaison with U.S. and the Dominions’.8 There was, in essence, an expectation that Britain’s 
Commonwealth and nuclear policies could be readily aligned.  
 
These plans were not necessarily to the exclusion of the work at Chalk River. Some form of continuity of 
Anglo-Canadian collaboration into the post-war period had always been assumed: there was a commitment 
to ‘…an orderly transition to a post war basis of work’ in the September 1944 five-year plan for Chalk 
River.9 The British seem not to have foreseen any issue even if the greater part of the British staff in Canada 
should eventually return to staff the UK establishment.10 A discussion was held in Canada in November 
1944 on the topic of the future development of piles in Canada and the UK, which anticipated, amongst 
other lines of research, the construction of a pile for the production of fissile material.11 (Power generation 
and multiplication of U233 stocks were also envisaged). The next month a new committee, the ‘Future 
Systems Group’, was convened at Montreal under Cockcroft. The group met seven more times before the 
end of the war, discussing technical problems associated with planned and potential new systems. Though 
based in Canada, the group – composed primarily of British team members – was steered to a considerable 
extent by an understanding of British priorities: in May 1945, after a trip to England by Cockcroft, the 
minutes record a distinct shift in emphasis, with the clear priority now breeder piles for fissile material 
production.12 Chadwick attended the seventh meeting, held on 21st June 1945, and expressed his sense of 
the primary requirement: ‘to accumulate an adequate stock of pure fissile material for military purposes’.13 
The Future Systems Group was in no sense a wartime undertaking as the Americans would have understood 
it, nor was its scope wholly, or even primarily, Canadian. This was a committee orientated towards Britain’s 
postwar nuclear programme. (The group was resurrected at Chalk River in the spring of 1946, with a 
somewhat more Canadian bent, but met only three times; in June 1946, after the departure of many of the 
British personnel, it was subsumed into the Chalk River design groups).14 
 
The British proposal, then, was to create a nuclear research establishment of their own, but to do so on the 
basis of the continuation of wartime ties and the introduction of further Dominion contributions. To achieve 
this, though, would require immediate practical action. Personnel must be recruited; a site must be found; 
and above all an actual programme of research and development work must be decided upon. Oliphant, 
stressing the urgency of action in Britain for the sake of the whole Commonwealth, advocated the early 
withdrawal of some or all of the the British personnel.15 Chadwick disagreed: the imperative to support the 
joint programme and to proceed only on the basis of mutual agreement through the CPC outweighed the 
desire to get started on Britain’s post-war project.16 There the matter rested. The manpower requirement 
for the new establishment, and for British nuclear physics work more broadly, was to be met through the 
return of staff from North America after the war had ended. This could not be achieved through the simple 
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reassignment of personnel, however, for one obvious consequence of peace would be that civilians could 
no longer be so easily marshalled in support of government projects. Demands that had been tolerated in 
the context of the war effort could not continue to be made in peacetime. As a result the coming of peace 
would precipitate a mass return of mobilised scientists to academia and industry. Steps were therefore taken 
to ensure that at least some proportion of the existing staff might instead be attracted to work in the new 
establishment. A survey of North American staff in February and March of 1945 indicated that a reasonable 
number were, indeed, interested in joining.17 It is worth noting that recruits were to be drawn from the 
British contingents in the United States, too; many of the Britons who participated in the ‘exodus’ (Frisch’s 
phrase) from Los Alamos immediately after the end of the war took up posts with AERE.18 Many of these 
returnees from Los Alamos travelled via Montreal and/or Chalk River, staying, in some cases, for weeks at 
a time. The opportunities for knowledge transfer this afforded cannot have been one-directional. 
 
The first of the prominent returnees was Oliphant, who in the spring of 1945 had flown back to the United 
Kingdom, and ostensibly to academic physics; he reoccupied his chair at Birmingham, seemingly desiring 
only to complete his cyclotron and to build a synchrotron.19 Yet the impression this gives of a return to 
civilian life – Cincinnatus to his plough – is false. Back at Birmingham, Oliphant remained closely 
associated with the British nuclear establishment, and though his star waned rapidly in the post-war period 
his involvement in the establishment of Harwell and the initial deliberations of the peace-time technical 
committee attest his significance in the first few years. One of Oliphant’s principal contributions in this 
period was in the selection of a site for the new establishment. Site visits were conducted at more than a 
dozen possible locations throughout the spring of 1945. Some were conducted by Oliphant alone, though 
most were joint efforts with other colleagues.20 Although no final decision was made until after the war, it 
was Oliphant’s first choice, Harwell, an airfield south of Oxford, that was eventually chosen.21  
 
With an earmarked site, and a workforce in potentia, all that remained to be determined was the precise 
programme to be pursued. The production of fissile material was to be the principal objective of Britain’s 
post-war work, but it was not necessarily clear which type would be desired. Britain had a reasonable 
knowledge of enrichment methods, so a focus on U-235 would make sense; but all evidence pointed to 
plutonium as the superior material. Work on heavy water piles was well under way at Chalk River, so from 
the point of view of speed and complementarity a graphite pile appealed. Design of such a pile would be 
difficult, though, not least because of a lack of information from the Americans: British knowledge of the 
precise design of the piles at Hanford was ‘confined almost entirely to hearsay evidence’.22 
 
The global shock of Hiroshima had likewise been prepared for by all three of the nuclear partners, whose 
immediate statements (already discussed in the introduction) illuminate interesting differences in 
perspective. The Americans’ report contained only tangential references to early British work, and to the 
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contributions of the British team.23 The British long regretted the ‘omissions and worse’ in the American 
account,24 which survived into the published version in spite of British efforts at correction. There was 
particular embarrassment around the treatment of the French and the general question of the chronology of 
(and impetus for) the early work. Akers, inured by now to American insensitivities, observed stoically that 
‘Nothing we can do will ever prevent the Americans from claiming priority in all inventions’.25 There was 
solace, however, in occupying the moral high ground in their own account, issued 13th August, which 
elicited the satisfying prize of French appreciation, in writing, of the sense of ‘fair play’ by which credit 
for early work was apportioned.26 The British account, written rather more hastily than the American, was 
consciously portrayed as complementing the Smyth Report, emphasised cross-border interactions and 
glossed over the frictions: there was no hint given of the trials which the negotiators endured before and 
after the Quebec Agreement (which itself, as a secret agreement, was left unmentioned).27 The parallel 
Canadian account meanwhile reflected uniquely Canadian emphases. On the one hand, it was produced to 
enable the media and the public to ‘evaluate the part Canada has played’,28 and stressed Canada’s entry ‘as 
a pioneer into an important new field of technology’.29 Yet these emphases emerge alongside references of 
a more imperial character. Most notably, the team in Canada was described as ‘The largest and most 
distinguished group of scientists ever assembled for a single investigation in any British country’.30 The 
Canadian statement also gave detailed lists of the scientists on the staff of the Montreal Laboratory, in two 
categories: ‘Canadian scientists’ and ‘scientists from abroad’. The latter category covered the British, 
French, American and New Zealand contingents. The fluidity of Commonwealth identity rendered some of 
the distinctions somewhat arbitrary, however: A.G. Ward (‘Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada; 
Cambridge, Eng.’) is listed amongst the ‘scientists from abroad’, whilst N. Miller (‘(University of London), 
Liverpool, England’) is counted amongst the Canadians.31  
 
The revelation of the bomb’s existence and the transition to peace both demanded organisational change. 
The administrative footing of Tube Alloys was changed, bringing with it a departmental shift and a new 
home at Shell Mex House on the Strand, less than a mile away from their wartime digs on Old Queen Street. 
The change also coincided with new leadership: Lord Portal, formerly Marshal of the Royal Air Force, was 
appointed to oversee the new organisation. The first meeting of Portal’s technical committee was devoted 
primarily to discussions as to ‘the most efficient and quickest way of getting production of fissile material 
started on a scale that would be militarily significant’. 32 Oliphant, present at the meeting and as willing as 
ever to plough an independent furrow, took issue with the emerging consensus around graphite pile 
construction, arguing that if speed were truly of the essence, a programme of uranium enrichment – about 
which the British already knew a great deal – would be preferable.33 
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In Canada, meanwhile, policymakers who had previously been uninformed of the nuclear programme had 
suddenly to comprehend both the topic itself and Canada’s role within it. As Buckley has noted, the 
extremely limited dissemination of information within the Canadian government meant that almost nobody 
was in a position to think through the long-term implications for Canada.34 Senior policymakers were left 
guessing, even in policy papers, as to the extent of Canada’s engagement with the Anglo-American 
programme,35 and one of the diplomats most closely concerned, Hume Wrong, had to resort to sending 
Mackenzie a list of questions which he confessed read ‘rather like an examination paper’.36 Wrong’s 
questions included the extent of British and American dependence on Canada, the ‘absolute and relative 
importance of Canada’s part in the development related to the employment of the atomic bomb’ 
(encompassing raw materials, research, development, manufacturing, and finance), and the  ‘potential 
importance’ of the technology to Canada’s future position in global affairs. 
 
Even if her diplomats were ignorant, Canada enjoyed one asset which her allies lacked: continuity of 
leadership. In Britain and the United States alike the problems of the future – those posed by the bomb, and 
those external to it – were to be faced by new governments still finding their feet. Harry S. Truman and 
Clement Attlee had both come to power before shortly the end of the war. Truman’s programme was 
perforce a continuation, for the most part, of his predecessor’s, but Attlee’s Labour government proposed 
to follow a radically different programme in almost every area of policy. What that would mean for the 
British nuclear programme was, however, unclear: there had scarcely been time to formulate a cogent 
policy. With the advent of peace Attlee was able to give the matter deep thought. His oft-quoted assertion, 
in a memorandum of 28th August, that ‘only a bold course can save civilisation’ has often been read as 
idealistic, with British post-war policy consequently cast as a process of gradual disillusionment as initial 
utopian enthusiasm for international control faded into a grudging acceptance of the ‘necessity’ of an 
independent programme.37 Closer attention to Attlee’s analysis, however, shows that the policy was shaped 
by desperation, rather than idealism: Britain, ‘the heart of the Empire’, was now supremely vulnerable. This 
was ‘the one fact that matter[ed]’, for unless Britain’s own safety could be secured, it would be ‘no use 
bothering about things on the periphery’.38 This was, to some extent, an inversion of traditional imperial 
strategy, which held that Britain’s primary interests lay in the preservation of key imperial possessions and 
the routes between them. Whether Britain’s salvation lay in nuclear weapons or in the hope of international 
control, it was clear to Attlee that there must be discussions with the Americans as soon as possible. He 
resolved to engineer a discussion with Truman, composing a lengthy and thoughtful letter – to which the 
Americans did not initially respond.39 A follow-up telegram precipitated a slightly terse correspondence in 
which the British desire for direct talks was made explicit.40 Mackenzie King approved of Attlee’s initial 
approach to Truman; he privately described it as ‘one of the best letters I have ever read’.41 He shared 
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Attlee’s views as to the desirability of keeping the Commonwealth fully informed, differing only on the 
question of precisely when that should be.42 The backing of the Canadians was of great value to Attlee in 
his approach to Truman: it was helpful to be able to mention that he had already discussed the matter with 
Mackenzie King, and to stress the unison of their views.43 At the same time, British internal documents 
reveal their understanding of the need to handle the Canadians with care. One note cautioned, ‘On imperial 
grounds’, that  
 
it is most desirable that Mr. King should feel that we treat him with at least as much 
confidence as we treat the Americans or the Americans treat us. It is also desirable that Mr. 
King should draw his ideas as to the handling of atomic energy from us rather than from the 
Americans.44 
 
A contemporaneous note by Attlee’s Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin similarly observed that it would be 
‘useful if you could get Mackenzie King into line first’.45 This paradoxical position of viewing the 
Canadians both as independent partners and as pliable subordinates is indicative of the liminal stage which 
Anglo-Canadian relations had reached. The British had now to acknowledge the relationship with Canada 
as an alliance to be fought for, rather than a vassal to be taken for granted. Yet the very fact of Attlee’s 
having met with Mackenzie King in advance of the meeting with Truman speaks also to the lingering 
significance of the Commonwealth connection.  
 
The other Dominions, lacking Canada’ privileged position within the nuclear fold, were informed rather 
than consulted. Copies of Attlee’s correspondence with Truman were only forwarded to the other Dominion 
Prime Ministers on 17th October, with a promise that they would be kept posted on any further 
developments.46 The Australians were particularly keen that this should be the case. Chifley telegrammed 
Attlee on 8th November: 
 
I regard the discussions which you are to have in Washington on the Atomic Bomb as most 
important and I would like to be kept informed. As you know, Australian scientists made [a] 
contribution and we should like to share in the decisions which might be taken as to the future 
use of the knowledge which has been acquired47 
 
This desire to ‘share in the decisions’, advocated on the basis of an Australian contribution, has echoes of 
Rivett’s wartime policy of leveraging Australian assets to achieve access to information. Indeed, the 
Australians were not wholly content simply to be informed in retrospect of the outcomes of the discussions: 
in the same message, Chifley noted that H.V. Evatt, his Foreign Minister, would be in Washington at the 
time of Attlee’s visit, and hoped that he might therefore be brought into the conversation. The British were 
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unmoved: there seemed to be an ‘insuperable difficulty’ in actually bringing Evatt into the tripartite 
discussions,48 and no appreciable effort seems to have been made in that regard.  
 
In terms of resolving the future of allied nuclear co-operation, the Washington meeting ultimately achieved 
very little. Beyond a public declaration and a three-point secret agreement, the only tangible product was a 
memorandum, composed and signed by Groves and Anderson, comprising recommendations for the CPC 
to consider as the basis for a ‘new document’ to replace the Quebec Agreement, ‘which should be 
superseded in toto’.49 The historian Greg Herken casts the Groves-Anderson memorandum as ‘a 
masterpiece of ambiguity’, intended only as a prompt for some future substantive negotiation.50 This was 
certainly the British understanding of the document,51 though it was hoped and expected that those 
negotiations would be moulded by the spirit of the memorandum rather than the letter.  
 
This expectation was put to the test at the CPC meeting held in February 1946, the primary purpose of 
which Dean Acheson, one of the American participants, saw as being to recast the Quebec Agreement. It 
was first agreed that the contentious fourth clause would be best dealt with through an exchange of letters 
between the President and the Prime Minister, drafts of which were agreed. Attention then turned to a draft 
memorandum of agreement, based, as the British had hoped, upon the Groves-Anderson memorandum. Its 
key features were its tripartite character – elevating Canada from its previously ambiguous position – and 
commitments neither to use the weapon against other parties without prior consultation, nor to disclose 
information to ‘other governments or authorities or persons in other countries’ except as part of agreed 
policy or after prior consultation. This last point was somewhat ambiguous in its implications for 
Commonwealth interactions, although the Americans’ reading would certainly have prohibited them. The 
suggested agreement also required each government to take steps to secure control and possession of 
uranium and thorium resources within their individual territories, which for the United Kingdom included 
its colonial dependencies. When it came to relations with the Dominions there was, however, a departure 
from the formula under which the CDT had previously operated. The proposed agreement contained a 
commitment that the parties would ‘severally or jointly use every endeavour with respect to the remaining 
territories of the British Commonwealth and other countries’ to secure supplies.52 In this case the UK would 
no longer have absolute priority in nuclear material negotiations with the Dominions.  
 
This change had not been to Anderson’s taste: of the various (mostly minor) changes he proposed to the 
sub-committee’s draft documents in the lead up to the CPC meeting, the most substantive was a request 
that the reference to ‘the remaining territories of the British Commonwealth’ should be deleted.  
 
It would be improper on constitutional grounds to refer in this way to action to be taken in 
respect of Commonwealth countries about which they had not been previously consulted. 
The phrase “other countries” includes the British Empire, and it is, of course, to be clearly 
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understood that action in respect of the Commonwealth countries will be taken by us. If 
necessary we can exchange letters to this effect.53 
 
The effort seems to have failed, however, and Anderson’s opposition to the new formulation was weakened 
somewhat by the fact that wording to the same effect had been present in the original Groves-Anderson 
document. It mattered little, however: no agreement was reached on a replacement for Quebec. The greatest 
impediment to a new agreement turned out to be the very architecture of world order to which the United 
Nations had so emphatically committed. It had been supposed that any new agreements to replace Quebec 
and the Declaration of Trust could be kept secret, but the Americans now seemed increasingly certain that 
such commitments must be published. This might not be a disaster: it might be ‘wholesome’ for the United 
States ‘to commit itself publicly to this specially intimate collaboration with the Canadians and ourselves’.54 
The likely charge of hypocrisy would, however, present an almost insuperable obstacle to this course of 
action: to make such commitments publicly in the context of ongoing negotiations for international control 
would be to hand the Soviets an immediate propaganda gift. The answer, then, was to proceed on the basis 
of the old agreements, amending them where necessary through the mechanism of the CPC. Acheson wrote 
later of his disquiet at the sense that ‘having made an agreement from which it had gained immeasurably, 
[the United States] was not keeping its word and performing its obligations’.55 At the time, though, neither 
he nor his colleagues took any particular action to mitigate the effects of such an approach. 
 
Britain and Canada Adjust to the New World 
 
One thing that was abundantly clear in the months after Hiroshima was that the early Cold War nuclear 
landscape – the ‘New World’ about which Hewlett and Anderson would write – belonged utterly to the 
Americans. It was a fact to which both the British and the Canadians must adapt. The two countries, 
however, adapted at different paces and in different directions, and in so doing were forced also to alter 
their conceptions of their own nuclear relationship.  
 
A British assessment of Canada’s position in early October 1945 confessed that it had hitherto been ‘a little 
anomalous’. Canada had made important contributions both in terms of raw materials, and in financing, 
hosting and staffing research and development work. She was not a party to the Quebec Agreement, but 
was nevertheless represented on the CPC and CDT. Public statements made since Hiroshima had 
meanwhile treated Canada ‘as a full partner in the enterprise’.56 This progressive elevation of Canada to 
full partnership was broadly welcomed by the British: 
 
The conception that Canada is in every sense an equal partner with us and the U.S.A. has 
grown up naturally in spite of past anomalies and is basic to any future discussions. This is 
greatly to our advantage both from the scientific standpoint and also politically.57 
                                                   
53 Anderson to PM, 9th February 1946, CAB 130/3 (TNA) 
54 Minute to PM from Foreign Office, 27th February 1946, CAB 130/3; Halifax and Wilson to Anderson, 19th February 1946, CAB 
130/3 (TNA) 
55 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969), p.164 





A consequence of this new conception of Canada-as-partner, though, was that the Canadian government 
would require increasingly careful handling, and in the months following Hiroshima the British were alive 
to opportunities for immediately realisable adjustments to the tripartite collaboration. The Canadians 
themselves now felt the administrative absurdity of the Canadian representative on the CPC being treated 
as part of a three-man British grouping: the appointment of a Canadian joint secretary proved an easily 
agreed solution.58 Less straightforward was the wider question of representation, for it remained unclear 
whether the CPC would be reformed or replaced. Either way, the Canadians hoped (and the British agreed) 
that Canada should adopt a greater role – whether as signatory to a new agreement, or as an equal participant 
in whatever became of the CPC. Canadian attitudes to the CDT were more complex. In December 1945 
Howe expressed a strong desire to distance Canada as far as possible from the Trust’s operations, and 
certainly from any financial commitment thereby.59 Howe’s unlooked-for critique of the CDT was 
undermined somewhat by his ‘cloudy comprehension’ of its original basis,60 but was coherent at least in its 
rejection of anything that might impinge on Canada’s peacetime position as the allies’ leading uranium 
supplier. A British proposal that ‘in the case of any material produced in any Empire country which might 
be sold to the Trust, the sale in the first instance should be to the U.K., and from the U.K. to the Trust’ 
consequently met short shrift, and never made it to deliberation by the full CPC.61 The Canadians, 
meanwhile, acknowledging that the CDT proceeded from the CPC, ultimately accepted the necessity of 
participation in both. 
 
Aside from these procedural issues, the advent of peace had left the Canadians acutely conscious of the 
new position in international affairs which their possession of both exportable uranium and the only 
substantial nuclear facility outside the United States afforded them. There were three obvious 
consequences: Canada’s importance to the United States had grown exponentially; she must now expect to 
attract more attention from the Soviet Union; and her relationship with the wider empire must also be 
expected to change. For the time being, Canada possessed the Empire’s only nuclear pile – a potentially 
exploitable asset. Mackenzie certainly thought so. Relishing Canada’s ‘very strong cards’ relative to the 
United Kingdom, he hoped that the United Kingdom might decide against their proposed expenditure on a 
large-scale programme in Britain in favour of establishing  
 
a large Commonwealth plant in Canada, which could supply the material for the other parts 
of the Empire, and to the research laboratories of which teams from the various Dominions 
and Britain could come for research work.62  
 
If a decision could be made in favour of keeping Chalk River as the main focus of British work, ‘It would 
mean that the heart of the war-making power of the British Commonwealth was located in Canada.’63 The 
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Canadian relationship with the British Empire might, by this point, have become fiercely ambivalent, but 
there was still some appeal in the idea. 
 
Mackenzie’s was not an irrational hope, for in the first months of peace British plans remained in a state of 
flux, and a reasonable case could be made for keeping Chalk River as the focus of British efforts. Chadwick, 
considering the matter in September 1945, adopted the following logic. It seemed ‘essential for the defence 
of the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth’ that Britain should have a production plant of its 
own. The need to produce weapons ‘as quickly as possible’ meant that the plant should be orientated to 
plutonium production.64 This, in turn, would mean that projects oriented towards uranium enrichment, such 
as the diffusion or electromagnetic methods, should effectively be ignored, and instead, a graphite pile 
comparable to the Americans’ should be constructed; and if speed were really the priority, the pile should 
be water-cooled, which in turn meant, in Chadwick’s view, that it should located on the Canadian site.65 ‘I 
realise’, wrote Chadwick, ‘that this proposal will meet with strong objection from some quarters, and 
naturally so’; he was at pains to stress that he proposed Canada as the location ‘only for the first pile… I 
would make no commitments whatever about subsequent piles or other plants’.66 
 
Chadwick’s reluctant logic was sound on the level of general principle but failed under more granular 
consideration. Cockcroft, giving a technical appraisal of the idea, noted that the design work would still 
need to be done in the United Kingdom, owing to the lack of appropriate personnel in Canada, and that it 
would be better – not least for dollar economy – that manufacture of engineering parts be conducted in the 
UK. On the other hand, the civil and chemical engineering work could all be done in Canada without need 
for any additional personnel.67 
 
The debate over the extent to which Chalk River might serve as a Commonwealth endeavour and the entire 
tone of post-war Anglo-Canadian nuclear relations were both irrevocably shaped by one particular incident: 
the withdrawal of Cockcroft from Chalk River to take up the directorship of the new research establishment 
at Harwell. The idea had clearly had a long incubation. Although Cockcroft’s appointment to Chalk River 
had initially been envisaged as outlasting the war, he had participated in many of the AERE site visits in 
the spring of 1945. His initial appointment had been very dear to the Canadians, and misgivings over 
Canadian reactions to his withdrawal within a year would have been more than justified. Chadwick, for 
one, demurred; he doubted that Howe would take kindly to Cockcroft’s departure, and anyway felt that 
Cockcroft would, for the time being, be of greater use in Canada, with the work at a crucial stage, than in 
the United Kingdom, where little had yet been prepared.68 His warning appears to have gone unheeded, 
however, for by September the formal offer of the directorship of Harwell had been made. This presented 
Cockcroft with ‘a very difficult decision’, not so much because he should have to leave Canada but because 
he had been looking forward to returning to Cambridge. This, at least, was how he expressed himself to 
Anderson, whilst acknowledging that ‘the National Interest should come first’ and that he would, therefore, 
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be likely to accept – albeit with a number of stipulations, including that he should have a voice on policy.69 
Cockcroft, in common with many of his junior colleagues, had chafed against the strictures of wartime 
security, and he had told Anderson that he would have declined the directorship if the establishment were 
to enforce secrecy on the wartime pattern.70 Assured otherwise, Cockcroft confirmed to Mackenzie on 3rd 
December both that he had been offered the role and that he intended to accept.71  
 
The immediate impact of this step was a catastrophic degradation of Anglo-Canadian nuclear relations. The 
Canadians had good reason to feel aggrieved. It was not simply the loss of Cockcroft, but what they feared 
that loss symbolised: withdrawal of British interest and rejection of Canadian partnership. In October 1944 
the Canadians had expressed some disquiet about the possibility that the British might unilaterally withdraw 
their staff from Montreal after the war, and had received assurances from Anderson, via Chadwick, that 
Britain would ‘continue to collaborate with Canada on this project after the war’.72 Such assurances now 
seemed rather hollow. 
 
The die, however, was cast. A crumb of consolation was available to the Canadians in the British 
commitment that Cockcroft would remain in post at Chalk River until a successor had been appointed. This 
was not to be mere time-serving: Cockcroft continued to work diligently on long-term projects for Chalk 
River throughout this period, writing a paper on future piles in April 1946, in which he envisaged several 
possible pile configurations, all requiring either US or British support.73 Still, the wound festered.  
 
In October 1945 the British thought it apt, in light of their intentions around the AERE, to make a statement 
in the CPC describing their plans, clarifying their desire for continued collaboration and explicitly their 
desire for full co-ordination with the Canadian project.74 Forewarned of this statement by the British as an 
ordinary courtesy, the Canadians, still in the throes of pique over the planned withdrawal of Cockcroft, 
prepared a somewhat intemperate statement with which their representative should respond: 
 
Canada offers no objection to the proposed programme, but since the programme involves 
withdrawal from Canada of scientists presently directing the Chalk River project, Canada 
considers that the partnership arrangement as between the United Kingdom and Canada 
previously recorded in the Minutes of the Combined Policy Committee will be ended with 
the withdrawal of these men.75 
 
It was to be made clear that whilst UK personnel would be welcome as occasional guests, and whilst the 
Canadians hoped for reciprocal treatment at the UK establishment, this would no longer be a joint project. 
The threat was never actually carried through – the Britons on the ground having managed to mollify the 
Canadians sufficiently – but Howe and Mackenzie were ‘evidently still resentful’, not just of Cockcroft’s 
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appointment to Harwell, but also ‘the fact that they have not been brought into consultation over [the British 
programme]’; Reports from Washington meanwhile indicated that the US War Department thought it best, 
‘for strategic reasons’ that the British pile should be located in Canada.76  
 
Anderson rightly acknowledged these developments in the Anglo-Canadian relationship as ‘rather grave’, 
though from his perspective somewhat unjustified, since he had earlier assured Howe of Britain’s 
‘continuing interest in the Canadian pile and gave him an assurance that in the matter of Cockcroft’s 
successor, [Britain] would not let him down’.77 Cockcroft had not yet been withdrawn, nor had many others 
of the British staff; those who had left were those who had completed their agreed terms of service, and 
who could not, now that the war was over, be compelled to stay. As to the statement of plans, the British 
intention had clearly been misconstrued: the whole purpose of making a statement in the context of the 
CPC was to permit comment and appraisal. Reassurances were swiftly offered. The message was to be 
shared that ‘the decision to build a pile here to meet our own requirements in no way implies that we reject 
the idea of a similar development, possibly on a Commonwealth basis, in Canada’.78 
 
This statement may have been a sincere after a fashion, but as ever the UK dollar position militated strongly 
against the idea that there should be further substantial expenditure in Canada. For the Britons seeking to 
comprehend the Canadians’ irritability in all this it was almost sufficient to note, as the High Commissioner 
did, that ‘Howe is an extremely tired man’, and that circumstances had combined to foster a profoundly 
negative mood in him.79  
 
It will no doubt be agreed that we should continue to give as much support as we can to the 
Canadian project and any further developments in Canada, if only in interests of maintenance 
of full co-operation with Canadians. If Canadian activities can be given a fuller 
Commonwealth character so much the better80 
 
The appointment of Cockcroft’s successor was itself a fraught task. The Canadians were insistent that the 
appointment should be made by themselves alone, and strongly preferred that a Canadian should be chosen. 
The British had no choice but to acquiesce: the withdrawal of Cockcroft and the return home of British 
staff meant that Chalk River was by now an essentially Canadian establishment. Recognition of such 
niceties required a degree of mental readjustment on the part of the British government. The original draft 
of the Prime Minister’s statement to the House of Commons noted that Cockcroft was ‘at present acting as 
Director of the experimental atomic energy plant in Canada’, and that he would remain there ‘pending the 
selection of a suitable successor’.81 Fortunately, someone was canny enough to realise that this was ‘not 
altogether happily drafted’, not least since it implied that the selection of a successor lay in British hands.82 
Staff in Washington likewise stressed Canadian sensitivities, insisting that any announcement would 
require their consultation.83 
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Deference to Canadian sovereignty over the appointment did not absolve the British of interest in the search. 
It was very much in British interests that the right candidate be found, and the British government had 
anyway promised to assist in the search for a qualified replacement. An appropriate candidate, W.B. Lewis, 
was soon identified, and Chadwick was asked to sound out Mackenzie as to whether he might be acceptable 
to the Canadians.84 Mackenzie was reportedly ‘somewhat lukewarm’ about Lewis.85 More worrying still, 
the search for suitable Canadians seemed to have taken a very unfortunate turn. Canada’s limited pool of 
experienced scientific leaders had led to the net being cast rather too widely. Some months previously, 
Mackenzie and Howe had asked Groves for suggested replacements if Cockcroft were to leave. Groves had 
recommended two Canadian-born naturalised Americans, Thornton and Zinn.86 Mackenzie was ‘much 
impressed’ with Zinn, who swiftly became the front-runner.87 
 
Troubling though this was, the British were now at pains to declaim any idea that they sought unduly to 
influence the Canadians’ appointment processes: ‘In bringing forth the name of Lewis… we were not 
attempting to force their hand but we were offering our help by finding the most suitable man in England 
who was available for the post.’88 Cockcroft, keeping a keen eye on the process, reported back that  
 
There appears to be no suitable Canadian citizen available and whilst there are possible 
candidates amongst the Canadians who have taken U.S. citizenship [i.e. Zinn and Thornton], 
it would be against our interests if such an appointment were made, since we desire to retain 
the closest ties with the Chalk River Laboratories89 
 
The risk that the Canadians might put an American citizen at the head of the Chalk River project appalled 
Anderson, too; he was reportedly in favour of any steps that Chadwick or Cockcroft could take to put 
pressure on the Canadians to accept Lewis instead.90 The grounds for this opposition to the appointment of 
an American were, as Cockcroft intimated, the fear that such a step would preclude the continuation of 
close ties between Harwell and Chalk River. An American would presumably orient Chalk River towards 
the United States rather than the nascent development programme in the United Kingdom. This risk was 
mitigated slightly by the quality of the leading candidate, Zinn, whom Cockcroft, glossing over the matter 
of Zinn’s new American citizenship, had described as ‘Probably the best of the Canadian physicists 
abroad’.91 He and Chadwick were in fact both ‘favourably impressed’ with Zinn, whom they thought would 
be ‘a reasonably satisfactory choice’.92 Providence, however, favoured the British cause: although an offer 
was made to Zinn, he chose not to accept. (Mackenzie suspected the Americans had had repented of their 
earlier suggestion and put pressure on him to remain in the United States.)93 This left the way open for 
Lewis, whom Cockcroft was encouraged (tactfully) to urge on the Canadians.94 In the absence of a suitable 
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‘Canadian’ candidate, Mackenzie had little choice. Lewis was the successful candidate, and Britain the 
ultimate beneficiary.  
 
The whole affair had propelled Anglo-Canadian nuclear ties into new realms of awkwardness. Lingering 
Canadian resentment over the handling of Cockcroft’s transfer to Harwell became the new backdrop to 
discussions between the two countries, which at times resembled a salvage operation on the part of the 
British participants, who sought rather frantically to reassure the Canadians of Britain’s continued support 
in the nuclear realm. Consider, for example, the meeting of 23rd March 1946, intended primarily to assure 
Howe of Britain’s continued interest in the Canadian project. He was told that a substantial British team 
would remain at Chalk River, including senior personnel, with a corresponding hope that Canada ‘would 
help to make collaboration closer and more profitable to us both by sending a team to Harwell’.95 
 
The discussion brought out the apprehension in the minds of Howe and Mackenzie that we 
wanted some control over the Canadian project, beyond that provided through the mechanism 
of the C.P.C. We disclaimed any intention of this kind, agreeing that the Chalk River Project 
was essentially a Canadian undertaking, although it had taken shape from a joint endeavour 
in the setting up of the Montreal Laboratory. We pointed out a general analogy between this 
project and our own Harwell Establishment96 
 
This was a far cry from the original dynamic of Anglo-Canadian nuclear research. What had begun as a 
British-led project in Canada had become a wholly separate establishment with which Britain simply had 
strong ties. The High Commissioner’s account of the same meeting casts further light. Although Howe and 
Mackenzie began by arguing that Cockcroft’s withdrawal had removed the basis for Anglo-Canadian co-
operation, his appointment having been foundational to the Canadian government’s commitment to the 
project, they were eventually mollified to the point that they could accept British assurances: 
 
They said that provided we would continue to furnish them with a number of good men and 
to accept the position that the administration of the Canadian project was a wholly Canadian 
matter, they would be satisfied and would be glad to co-operate on the same basis in our 
undertaking and to regard both as part of a co-ordinated Commonwealth effort.97 
 
Throughout these discussions Howe and Mackenzie made much of their insistence that British staff should 
be answerable to the Canadian authorities, despite the fact that this was effectively the existing state of 
affairs. Fear of further withdrawals of UK staff must account for most of this fixation, though bad memories 
of poor relations in the Halban era cannot have helped. At the same time, there was a notion that the United 
States might view Canada as a more important partner than the United Kingdom,98 reflective of a hardening 
of Canada’s latent empathy for the American perspective into a more explicit sense of North American 
solidarity. The Canadians were not therefore particularly supportive of British efforts to secure 
collaboration with the United States. Much depended upon the interpretation of the phrase “full and 
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effective co-operation” which the tripartite discussions in Washington had promised, and the British 
pressed the Canadians for their construal, in the hope that this would align more closely with the British 
than the American. The Canadian answer was carefully phrased and far from helpful; in fact, it side-stepped 
the question altogether.99 The evasion was very much the point. The Canadians were at particular pains to 
avoid furnishing the British with ammunition that might precipitate rash action; hence the scrupulously 
inoffensive response that ‘we felt that a direct and simple statement of the way in which Canada had acted 
throughout in these matters would be the most helpful contribution’.100 Canada, in short, was unwilling to 
pick sides. That is not to say that they were indifferent to the progress of the negotiations. The Canadians 
were clearly concerned that the emerging Anglo-American breach should not widen, not least for the 
deleterious impact it would have on international relations: ‘if it could not be patched up, [it] must be 
covered up, or [the] effect on world opinion would clearly be disastrous’101 It did, however, mean that 
Commonwealth loyalty was not so great as to override Canada’s other interests. The war had proven that 
the Canadian voice in allied nuclear affairs was not merely an echo of the British, and the consequences 
were now being felt in peacetime.  
 
The saving grace for the British was that the essential connection between Chalk River and Harwell was 
preserved, and that the interpersonal relationship between Cockcroft and Lewis remained strong. As well 
as exchanging formal reports the two directors corresponded freely with one another, and Lewis felt 
sufficiently comfortable in his position to have ventured, as a ‘general criticism’, his view that  
  
the U.K. policy seems to me very insular. Can’t you depend on the Commonwealth to co-
operate? I cannot yet speak as a representative Canadian but I would expect Canadians, if 
they knew, to feel rather left in the cold. Must all the preliminary work be done in the U.K. 
to start the world fires of fissile 23?102 
 
He did, however, exempt Harwell-Chalk River co-operation from this critique (he thought it ‘very 
satisfactory on both sides’).103 Various other forms of interaction also persisted between the two 
establishments. On metallurgy, Cockcroft wrote to Mackenzie about his desire ‘to see that the field is 
covered without too much overlapping’.104 It was agreed in a meeting between Howe, Mackenzie, 
Chadwick and Cockcroft that ‘interchange of staff should continue’. There were to be two categories of 
interchange: short visits for specific tasks, and longer stints (of greater than one year) for general work. 
Three months’ notice was to be given of any withdrawals. Salaries and expenses for British personnel in 
Canada were to be paid by the United Kingdom, and there was to be an agreed schedule for moves. The 
overall number of British-employed personnel in Canada would fall, from 67 in October 1946 to 30-40 by 
March 1947, to settle at a consistent level of only 15-20 in the latter stages of the year. It was meanwhile 
expected that as work develops in the Harwell Establishment, arrangements would be made for some 
secondment of Canadian staff. They also identified a number of items ‘of joint interest’ in the Chalk River 
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experimental programme, including research on a continuous process for extraction of plutonium, and 
confirmed the various steps thus far taken to co-ordinate (there were not very many: material testing and 
metallurgical discussions regarding beryllium). A future development programme was discussed, to include 
various pile types (a low power/100kw plutonium homogeneous reactor; a high temperature 
beryllia/graphite moderated reactor; a high temperature liquid metal cooled fast reactor; and a U-235 
breeder study pile). ‘It would seem desirable’, they agreed, ‘to divide this development programme between 
the two establishments according to the facilities and resources’. Interchange of information was to cover 
all technical reports, technical committee meeting minutes, monthly and bi-monthly progress reports, and 
small-scale equipment exchanges were to be facilitated. There were plans, too, for the interchange of 
materials including British-sourced uranium for NRX from January 1948 (approximately 10 tons per year); 
600g plutonium for Harwell for experimental work from 1948 to 1950; and plutonium from the UK to 
Chalk River for pile development once UK production was established (anticipated in about 1950). This, it 
was noted, ‘would no doubt require agreement at high level between the two Governments’.105 In short, a 
very comprehensive process of co-ordination and interchange was envisaged, with the clear objective of 
accumulating fissile material for the United Kingdom and amassing relevant knowledge and experience for 
both parties. A memorandum produced in Harwell that September summarised the aspiration: 
 
It is the earnest hope of the U.K. Atomic Energy Establishment at Harwell that the Canadian 
and British projects be so closely in touch that an agreed research and development 
programme can be arranged to avoid duplication and waste of effort and public funds, and 
this applies particularly in the engineering field.106  
 
There were, however, limits to the extent of interchange. A suggestion in December 1946 that certain 
internal reports might be made available to the Canadians was scotched, arguing that ‘no useful purpose 
would be served by sending reports of domestic difficulties which would not be fully appreciated by the 
Canadians’.107 Pas devant les enfants? There was confusion, too, about the obligation of the Canadians to 
contribute to the design of the UK chemical plant, stemming from cases where it had been expected in the 
UK that work would be done in Canada, but for which the Canadian teams had not planned. It was 
established that the design work properly resided in the UK, and that the only expectation of the Canadians 
was the supply of relevant information, and even then, only on areas of mutual interest: ‘the present program 
is undoubtedly limited to the common phases of the work, that is, to those problems which are of common 
interest to the U.K. and Canada.’108 The UK staff at Chalk River could be tasked with the collection and 
transmittal of information already available at Chalk River, whilst information of mutual interest could 
legitimately be performed by the Canadians, and would be passed to the United Kingdom as a matter of 
course. Work of relevance only to the British programme was, however, notionally impermissible – though 
here the minutes betray an expectation that such work might, at British request, be performed, with a letter 
from Cockcroft to Mackenzie envisaged as the only required formality. 
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A Role for the Dominions? 
 
Of all Britain’s Commonwealth relations in the nuclear realm it was Canada that mattered most to British 
plans; even the awkward process of adjustment and dissociation described above could not alter that 
fundamental fact. Yet that is not to say that the other Dominions were an irrelevance in this period. Quite 
the opposite: the liberating effect of peace and the perceived urgency of Britain’s nuclear programme 
inclined British and Dominion policy-makers to embrace new or renewed opportunities for collaboration 
and exchange, and even seemed, for a brief moment, to offer an opportunity for a coherent Commonwealth 
programme. As had been the case during the war, the individual experiences of the Dominions differed 
significantly from one another, primarily in consequence of their differing contexts. Prior wartime 
interactions influenced but did not wholly determine these experiences: South Africa, for example, figured 
far more prominently in British nuclear thinking in 1945-6 than its limited engagement with nuclear 
developments during the war would have foretold. The purpose of this section is to determine what role, if 
any, it was considered that the Dominions might play in British nuclear research and development, and to 
trace the decisions made. 
 
The governments of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa had all received some degree of 
indoctrination into the nuclear secret, but this was certainly not as extensive as Britain, or the Dominions, 
might have liked. Gowing was stretching things somewhat in suggesting that ‘The Australian and New 
Zealand governments knew nothing’,109 but it is true at least that the Dominions had not been told as much 
as either they or the British would have chosen. In a post-war strategic environment informed above all by 
Britain’s desire to make rapid progress on nuclear development, the UK looked instinctively to the 
Commonwealth to fulfil various roles, the most crucial of which was in the provision of raw materials. It 
was becoming increasingly obvious that Canada could not produce uranium in sufficient quantities to meet 
Britain’s projected needs, so it made sense to look elsewhere;110 and the uniquely privileged position Britain 
retained in the CDT of being able to approach the Dominions and Colonies seemed almost to demand a 
concerted Empire approach. An idea was even floated by Viscount Addison, the Secretary of State for the 
Dominions, that there might be set up ‘some special machinery, such as a Commonwealth Liaison 
Committee, for keeping Dominion Governments in touch with the organisation and progress of our 
scientific work in this field’.111 As with everything else, though, such a step must await the conclusion of a 
new agreement with the Americans. For now, the British must tread very carefully. It was still hoped that 
a balance could be struck between fealty to the strict secrecy associated with the tripartite nuclear alliance 
and the desire to maximise Commonwealth connections, though doing so would prove remarkably difficult 
in practice.  
 
The test came in the spring of 1946, when the Dominion prime ministers convened in London for their first 
conference since the end of the war. A paper on ‘Dominion Co-Operation in Atomic Energy’ was prepared 
for Portal to deliver at a session of that meeting, and the light it sheds on British aspirations and thought-
processes is such that it merits quotation at length: 
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As Dominion co-operation is one of the cardinal principles of British defence policy, it 
follows that we must hope to secure the closest possible co-operation from the Dominions in 
the development of atomic energy. Dominions will naturally wish to organise research and 
development on this subject irrespective of any prompting from the U.K. The greater the 
effort which individual Dominions can devote to atomic energy, the greater will be the benefit 
to the Commonwealth as a whole. The question remains, however, whether each Dominion 
and the U.K. should proceed with independent plans, or whether there should be a co-
ordinated effort based upon the plan recently approved by H.M.G. in the U.K., and the present 
plan of H.M.G. in Canada. 
 
There can, in our opinion, be only one reply to such a question. The development of atomic 
energy requires intensive research in a number of scientific fields. If the U.K. and the 
Dominions are acting in pursuit of independent plans, there must inevitability be a great deal 
of duplicated work, and consequent loss of time; whereas if research is organised in 
accordance with a general plan, each partner devoting particular effort to a specific group of 
problems and pooling results, progress will be greatly accelerated. 
 
If this method of operation, which H.M.G. strongly support, commands general assent, we 
could propose at the earliest possible moment to institute the fullest interchange of 
information and the fullest sharing of facilities with the Dominions. For instance, we would 
welcome the attachment of Dominion scientists for duty in all parts of our organisation. We 
shall be glad to lend help for research work in the Dominions either in the form of scientists 
or in the form of the latest information on research plant and equipment. As development 
proceeds, we should be very ready to consider with the Dominions the proper distribution of 
production between the various countries of the Commonwealth, together with the proper 
distribution and co-ordination of their research programmes.112 
 
All this reflects an expectation, on the one hand, of significant benefits arising organically from the pursuit 
of independent nuclear research and development activities on the part of individual Commonwealth states, 
weighed against the infinitely preferable scenario of a co-ordination of programmes, resting on the model 
of personnel exchanges which had been envisaged in November 1944. The timing of such overt acts of co-
operation depended, however, on the unresolved question of the relationship with the United States. Access 
to the knowledge still retained by the Americans was seen as vital to the British programme, and by 
extension to any corresponding work in the Commonwealth. Without access to American-held information, 
any programme would be delayed ‘by at least several years’. Negotiations were proceeding slowly, and it 
was vital not to give the Americans any excuse not to proceed: American anxieties about ‘the circle being 
widened’ meant that it seemed inadvisable even to brief the Dominion Prime Ministers in too much detail, 
let alone to plan joint activity prematurely.113 (Similar concerns had already put paid to a final effort by the 
Australians to place one of their personnel at Chalk River by approaching the Canadians directly: the 
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Canadians proved no more keen to prejudice collaboration with the Americans than the British, and the 
question was finally dropped).114 This left the British with little to offer the assembled prime ministers other 
than a plea for patience: 
 
We feel… that while full Dominion co-operation is essential for the defence of the 
Commonwealth, the timing of administrative arrangements must be related closely to the 
progress of negotiations with the U.S.A., because of the direct bearing of these negotiations 
on atomic energy development in the whole Empire.115 
 
A cohesive inter-Dominion programme would not be forthcoming. The Dominions could take concerted 
action in only two respects: by participating in a whole-empire geological survey, and by consenting to 
second scientists to Harwell in the same manner as the British and New Zealanders had demonstrated at 
Chalk River. The case for the latter hardly needed to be stressed: ‘First rate scientific ability is extremely 
scarce in the world and we are very anxious to secure the fullest possible pooling of Empire resources’.116 
 
These considerations had all informed the line Portal proposed to adopt in addressing the Dominion Prime 
Ministers. His starting premise was that ‘We naturally desire Dominion co-operation to the full’, and 
preferably in co-ordination rather than through multiple independent paths. The ideal was ‘a co-ordinated 
effort based upon the plan recently approved by H.M.G. in the U.K. and the present plan of H.M.G. in 
Canada’.117 A set of preparatory notes for his speech went further still: ‘We think it would be an excellent 
thing if Lord Portal could exert all his influence to secure such Dominion team for Harwell, so that the 
Establishment could become an Empire Establishment’.118 Yet the meeting in the end proved rather a 
haphazard affair; the vagaries of the various prime ministers’ schedules meant that not all could be present 
at the same time, so in the end two separate discussions were held: one with Chifley of Australia present, 
but not Mackenzie King, and a second with Mackenzie King (who after all could not be left out of a 
discussion on a topic in which his country held such an important stake) after Chifley had departed. –  
 
The conversation at the Prime Ministers’ meeting was not unidirectional: the views of the Dominion prime 
ministers were actively solicited. Mackenzie King noted that ‘Canada would certainly be able to help by 
the provision of raw material and would gladly make whatever contribution they could through the 
seconding of scientists to work for a period in the United Kingdom’, sentiments which Evatt, standing in 
for Chifley, echoed: ‘[Australia] would certainly be willing that their scientists should continue to co-
operate in work carried out by the United Kingdom Government, as had been done during the war’.119 On 
the basis of such bland assurances the meeting concluded. In terms of substantive commitments or joint 
plans, little had been achieved – which was very much the point. In the absence of a satisfactory 
arrangement with the United States the British could only aspire to future collaboration, and pursue 
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piecemeal initiatives in the meantime; the Dominions could only exercise patience and develop their own, 
independent plans in the hope of future consolidation.  
 
New Zealand had planned its own programme, consisting of several distinct courses of action. First, the 
existing programme of uranium and thorium survey work would be continued. Second, a team of up to ten 
scientists would be established at the Dominion Physical Laboratory, working to a programme of 
‘Fundamental atomic research in co-operation with scientific organisations abroad’. This team, working, 
on the whole, without ‘expensive apparatus’, would also cover health issues, mineral testing, technical 
advice, and – most interesting – ‘methods of enrichment’.120 The third strand built upon the wartime 
secondments, envisaging the despatch of four personnel every two years to ‘nuclear organisations in the 
United Kingdom and Canada’ in order to ‘ensure that New Zealand keeps up to date with new developments 
and techniques’. Salaries and expenses would be met by the New Zealand government; in return for this 
largesse, they expected a veritable shopping list of quid pro quo from their partners, including: ‘Assurance 
of the return of the scientists sent abroad’; ‘Supplies of artificially radioactive elements’; ‘technical 
information’; and ‘Co-operation and liaison work in connection with the laboratory in New Zealand’. A 
range of administrative steps were taken to allow for the administration of the country’s new Atomic Energy 
Act, including the constitution of an advisory committee and the advance approval of spending up to 
£19,000 per annum. This all was approved by the New Zealand Cabinet on 25th January 1946.121 
 
As of April, the idea was that Watson Munro, Fergusson, Page and Manssen would come to the UK, with 
George, Young, and Allan remaining in Canada for the time being, with some combination of these 
counting as the official complement of four New Zealand secondees, and the remainder being kept on the 
United Kingdom payroll. A separate New Zealand-Canadian arrangement would be required if any of the 
three personnel to remain in Canada were to be classed officially as New Zealand secondments.122 
Mackenzie was not averse to the idea of further New Zealand secondments, but noted that he would prefer 
to have ‘experienced members… rather than inexperienced juniors who would be of little use to us’; Chalk 
River could not simply be used as a training venue for British and Dominion personnel.123 
 
The Australians, too, had been active, persevering in their hunt for uranium and hoping soon to leverage 
the information obtained by their nationals overseas. As Evatt noted, Australia was ‘vitally interested in the 
subject, not only on account of its military applications, but because of its vast industrial possibilities’ – a 
point worth stressing in light of his country’s lack of oil and limited coal reserves.124 Evatt therefore wanted 
to know if Australia could get hold of the report of the Anderson Committee regarding the research 
establishment (plus ‘sufficient technical information to form a true appreciation of the possibilities’). He 
told Attlee: 
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My Government is determined that Australia shall keep abreast of the rest of the world in 
industrial developments. In the case of atomic energy we are starting at a disadvantage, since 
so far we have not been able to share in the information obtained because of the military 
considerations involved; there now seems to be no reason why we should be excluded125 
 
He therefore wanted discussion to be instituted ‘immediately’ to permit ‘full Australian participation’ in 
nuclear work.  
 
It is unnecessary for me to stress the advantages of a Commonwealth effort in this supremely 
important field of research. In Australia we are anxious that this should be started; if it is not, 
however, we shall be forced to enter the field on our own. The contributions we could make 
to an Empire scheme are significant. Primary research and development might best be carried 
out in the United Kingdom, but we could send skilled scientists to assist in this purpose.126  
 
He also noted, tantalisingly, that for later work Australia had ‘large open spaces’ and plentiful hydro-
electric power, plus extensive thorium reserves, and reiterated their countervailing desire for ‘as complete 
information as possible of technical details and future plans’.127 
 
What the Australians seem to have desired most of all, however, was for Oliphant himself to return, 
however briefly, to Australia to brief them in person on the nuclear future. The British would have much 
preferred Australia to have sent someone to the United Kingdom, rather than sending Oliphant to them. 
The Australians were, however, fixated on Oliphant, who had, after all, been a reliable conduit for 
information for the past five years. A meeting in London to discuss the question would appear, from the 
account given, to have become rather tense: the Britons present were asked, ‘somewhat pointedly’, if there 
were any personal objections to Oliphant at work. The Minister simply glossed over the comment.128 The 
record also makes clear that it was Oliphant in particular that the Australians wanted: they might equally 
have pressed for Massey, for example, but they do not appear to have made any such effort. The British 
had no real grounds for blocking the Australian request, however, and so ultimately relented. The 
suggestion was made that before he left, he should be given ‘a tactful intimation concerning the need for 
discretion in the subjects he discusses’, in order to ensure that there might be no ‘disclosure of secret 
information’.129  
 
Part of the objection to his going had been that Oliphant’s stock had faded dramatically in British eyes. An 
instance of ‘indiscreet talk’ with a Member of Parliament had led to details of the Quebec agreement being 
made public,130 and patience with his manner of engaging with colleagues and superiors was wearing a 
little thin. For the Australians, though, Oliphant remained a real asset, a valuable source of information and 
advice on an issue of immense consequence. The Australians may, in other words, have been rather 
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counting on Oliphant’s indiscretion. In the event, no trip to Australia took place in 1946. Oliphant did, 
however, serve as adviser to the Australian delegation at the UN talks on international control of the atom, 
and in so doing placed himself in the ‘impossible position’ of having to give them advice without breaching 
the strict requirement, of which he was explicitly reminded, that atomic energy should not be shared with 
other Commonwealth Governments.131  
 
This phase in Anglo-Australian discussions coincided with confirmation that Australian uranium prospects 
were not, in fact, as promising as had been hoped, a voluminous but ultimately disappointing report on the 
wartime exploration work having now been filed.132 There was hope that other sites in Australia might 
prove more promising, but exploration in the country progressed only very slowly. The lack of progress 
was unsurprising given the inadequate staffing of the state geological surveys, none of which had more 
than eleven geologists on the strength. In Western Australia and Queensland, the notional area of land 
covered by each geologist was greater than 100,000 square kilometres.133 Frustratingly, little could be done 
to ameliorate the situation: a quirk of Australian federation reserved mining and associated matters to the 
state level, and repeated efforts to construct a national geological survey had failed – making Australia the 
only Dominion without one.134 
 
Britain’s other great hope for the procurement of uranium resources was South Africa. Smuts had been 
well-briefed on nuclear issues, and there had been a number of interactions around the uranium prospects 
in the country, but Union personnel had been absent from British wartime work, and South Africa had had 
no equivalent programme of its own.135 They now sought to make up for lost time, establishing a Uranium 
Research Committee under Basil Schonland, a physicist, who as head of South Africa’s newly-constituted 
CSIR was well-suited to the role. To his committee fell the tasks of co-ordinating South African research 
and, importantly, of liaison with Britain, the United States, and, ‘where necessary’, other Dominions on 
technical and scientific matters (issues of inter-governmental policy being reserved to the Department of 
External Affairs).136 It was swiftly agreed that the channel of communication between this committee and 
the British Government should run directly between Portal and Schonland, and that such communication 
should encompass regular reports in both directions.137 
 
On the question of resources, however, relations were less constructive. The geologists now seemed 
positive about the prospects of uranium mining in South Africa and though the work was still at a very 
preliminary stage a formal approach was made to Smuts via Attlee, seeking an agreement on the disposal 
of whatever uranium might eventually be produced.138 The response, however, was disappointing. Smuts 
claimed to have been ‘at pains to discover’ whether British wishes could be met, but pleaded the ‘serious 
difficulty’ posed by what he described as ‘the dearth of knowledge with regard particularly to the economic 
possibilities of uranium’ as grounds for his government’s reluctance to ‘commit itself even in principle to 
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an obligation the implications of which none can foresee’. The British proposals, which had been rather 
modest and favourable to South African interests, were to be left ‘in suspense’. There was thus little comfort 
in Smuts’ caveat about ensuring control so that ‘supplies of this new source of frightfulness and power will 
not find their way to hands that might abuse it’.139 
 
The British were mystified by this unenthusiastic response. After all, ‘to whom else but the United Kingdom 
would South Africa wish her supplies to be made available[?]’.140 The obvious answer, which the British 
seem to have ignored, was the Americans. The South African historian Lucky Asuelime’s suggestion that 
Smuts likely had not appreciated the United Kingdom’s delegated function of approaching the Dominions 
on behalf of the CDT finds support in the archives, which show the British first envisaging briefing the 
South Africans on the CDT in January 1947,141 and Asuelime is also right to note that the South Africans 
would anyway have been drawn to the prospect of access to American dollars.142 The British, however, felt 
sure that Smuts and the South African government understood the ‘plain fact’ that  
 
it is vital in the interests not only of the United Kingdom but of the Commonwealth as a 
whole, including South Africa, that there should be the widest possible development of 
atomic energy in this country.143  
 
The issue could therefore be construed as one of Commonwealth solidarity. This was a context in which 
the abiding tension between communicating freely with the Dominions and respecting American-imposed 
secrecy 
 
We are very conscious that we have not been able to take up these matters officially with 
Dominion Governments since [the] whole topic has had to be treated with extreme secrecy… 
We should hope that if picture were put fully before General Smuts we could look for a 
favourable response and that he would appreciate [the] vital need in the general 
Commonwealth interest for the United Kingdom to be assured of supplies of raw material, 
and to be put in the strongest possible bargaining position vis-à-vis the Americans, on whom 
we are still dependent for much in this matter144 
 
It was consequently vital ‘both in our own and the general Commonwealth interest, that there should be 
earliest possible production of atomic energy in this country’. Apart from large-scale expenditure, this 
required two essentials: raw materials, of which supplies were thought to be limited, and American co-
operation, the latter being ‘indispensable to early progress’. The expectation that American consumption 
of the major part of the material falling under CDT control (that is, all material outside the Empire and the 
United States) would continue, and that the CPC would be unlikely to condone a more equitable division, 
meant that to avoid a shortfall for the UK programme new sources must be discovered. Yet the exchange 
of scientific and technical information with the United States, ‘of first importance on Imperial as well as 
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domestic grounds’, had hitherto depended at least in part on Britain’s ability to develop uranium sources 
for the CDT; if a new arrangement was to be implemented, it was clear that ‘we on our part must be 
contributors as well as receivers’.  
 
In short, [the] position is that our ability to make a substantial contribution to the raw material 
pool may prove to be a decisive factor in our continuing to obtain essential requirements 
(both by way of information and otherwise) from the Americans whose full co-operation will 
be indispensable to us until our own research programme has developed further.145  
 
The continuity of Britain’s participation in the mechanisms of the CPC and CDT, which meant by extension 
the effective continuance of British nuclear development, and ultimately the prospects for other Dominions’ 
nuclear development, depended substantially on the establishment of a durable arrangement with the United 
States.  
 
Once satisfactory arrangements have been concluded… and are firmly under way we hope 
to broaden their scope so as to ensure benefits of exchange of information to other Dominions 
as well as Canada, but our ability to do this will perforce depend upon whether we can 
negotiate a satisfactory agreement with the Americans in the first place, and this in turn… 
may be dependent on our ability to count on supplies from South Africa146 
 
It followed that the United Kingdom’s ability to dispose of the balance of South African output ‘for some 
years ahead’ was of ‘crucial importance’ both to Britain and the Commonwealth. The precise terms were 
less consequential; what was needed was South African assurances.147 
 
The thread was picked up again with Schonland in June 1946. Data on South African ores was still 
remarkably patchy, given the levels of allied interest in the country’s potential: Schonland confirmed that 
good data on the Witwatersrand ores really only stretched to a single mine, Blyvooruitzicht. It seemed 
reasonable, however, still to proceed with exploration. Portal asked ‘whether further action… depended on 
this country’, to which Schonland answered that ‘Smuts had made up his mind that the scheme should be 
pursued, but Lord Portal’s opinion would strengthen his determination.’ The discussion then turned to the 
idea that South African scientists might be posted to the UK for research work; notionally for a stint of at 
least a year, with the scientists – physicists and engineers, preferably – to be recruited and paid by the South 
African Government. Schonland was understandably keen.148  
 
British subordination to the terms of the CPC and CDT, and beyond that to American good will, can 
therefore be seen to have severely limited opportunities for the more obvious forms of joint endeavour with 
the Dominions, but there remained space at the margins for more imaginative solutions to be advanced. 
The most striking was a scheme advanced by the foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin. Bevin understood that 
concern over a UK-based development facility’s strategic vulnerability was one of the Americans’ chief 
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reasons – or ‘excuses’, as he put it – for withholding further collaboration, and he also knew that although 
the Chiefs of Staff were inclined to discount that risk, the Canadians seemed to be erring towards the 
Americans’ perspective on the issue. He therefore ventured an alternative approach, which promised to 
solve the issue of Britain’s proximity to Europe whilst avoiding excessive dependence on American 
goodwill:  
 
I wonder whether we should not consider erecting our pile elsewhere; if not in Canada, 
possibly in Africa, taking advantage of the water power at Victoria-Nyanza or even in 
Australia149 
 
Bevin did not mention the idea in any of the meetings with Dominion Prime Ministers, but returned to the 
theme a week later, writing to the Prime Minister that 
 
I hold the view strongly that our main atomic energy development ought to be placed at the 
Victoria Falls. This location is protected, has the necessary water and electric power, and 
would ensure the necessary prodution [sic: production]. It should enable us to assure the 
safety of the Pacific and Indian Oceans150 
 
Bevin left little doubt about his sincerity, telling Attlee ‘I do hope you will hold out for this proposal. Smuts, 
I think, would agree with it’.151 Smuts may well have agreed, not least because the prospects for South 
African engagement with a programme in Africa would have been excellent. Whatever its strategic merits, 
though, the scheme was too ambitious. Montreal had been remote enough, and although direction of a plant 
in Kenya would be more straightforward constitutionally and administratively than Canada the mere 
tyranny of distance would still play a confounding role. Assembling a workforce would be far harder, too. 
Politically and practically the centre of gravity was now in the United Kingdom, and must remain there 
whatever the risks. Bevin’s final point, about assuring ‘the safety of the Pacific and Indian Oceans’ was, 
meanwhile, hopelessly confused. By any reckoning, security would emanate not from the placement of a 
nuclear facility in the empire, but from the deployment there of nuclear-capable forces, which even in these 
early years of the Cold War could be achieved. If anything, the reverse was true: dispersal of production 
facilities beyond the British Isles was a safeguard not to those regions, but to the United Kingdom. What 
the idea shows is a brief vignette of the thought processes at work; it highlights the alternatives which were 
considered and rejected. This, in turn, highlights that while the preservation of the empire was one impetus, 
of several, for the pursuit of a British bomb, the empire itself could not ultimately form the basis for the 
programme.  
 
British policy throughout this period had been based upon the ‘tacit assumption’ that bombs were to be 
produced in the United Kingdom.152 Such assumptions had served well in the design of Harwell, but the 
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question of actual weapons-relevant work now loomed, and such actions required official sanction. Portal 
discussed future plans with both the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff in November. The essential 
features of the programme were already determined: Harwell was the experimental and theoretical hub, and 
planning for production was in hand elsewhere. There was also hope that ‘under the counter’ support from 
the Americans might ultimately be forthcoming.153 It was already clear who should lead the work: the 
British physicist William Penney was the only logical choice. Penney had served at Los Alamos, had 
developed a particular rapport with the Americans, had seen first-hand the devastation in Japan, had 
participated in the Americans’ ‘Crossroads’ weapons tests, and had held comparably complex 
administrative roles within British defence science. At about the time Portal broached the topic with Attlee, 
Penney had written (and for secrecy’s sake typed himself) a report on the organisation of a British atomic 
weapons programme.154 He too had suggested that immediate steps could be taken towards a full weapons 
programme. This was undoubtedly true: there was plenty of development work that could be done even 
without fissile material to hand.155 Indeed it would be unwise, if speed were of the essence, to delay on the 
preparatory work: the two programmes could work in parallel. It would be best, though, to proceed under 
the camouflage of existing institutions: ‘new wine into old bottles’, as it were.156 
 
On the last day of 1946, Portal formally submitted to the Prime Minister ‘a decision is required about the 
development of Atomic weapons in this country’.157 Three possible courses of action were suggested, but 
the implication that there was a decision to be made is perhaps somewhat illusory: the Chiefs of Staff, and 
in all likelihood Attlee himself, had already endorsed a secret programme under Penney. Still, the legal 
forms must be observed. Rather than consider the issue in full Cabinet, Attlee convened a special cabinet 
subcommittee, a ‘highly atypical, and arguably unconstitutional’ step.158 Their decision on 8th January 1947 
was therefore no major policy departure, but rather an acknowledgement of a programme already tacitly 
agreed.  
 
Having begun with the impact of one supposed watershed – the destruction of Hiroshima – this chapter 
thus closes at another. The Attlee government’s decision to pursue a nuclear weapon may not have been all 
that much of a policy departure, but it still serves as a convenient historiographical book-end, for it marks 
the moment at which the Prime Ministerial imprimatur was finally placed upon a policy to which each 
administrative iteration of UK nuclear research and development from 1940 onward had been orientated: 
that Britain was committed to the development of an independent nuclear weapon. Of course much 
remained unsettled. Policy-makers clung doggedly to the hope – faint, but enduring – of a return to wartime 
patterns of collaboration with the United States. For as long as such a hope remained, the prospects of actual 
Commonwealth collaboration on nuclear development remained diminished. There was still a space for 
Dominion participation in the work, but that participation could only complement, rather than underpin, 
British plans. For the increasingly assertive Dominions, that was likely to prove hopelessly inadequate.  
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Conclusion: Britain's Nuclear Future 
 
The end of the war was also, perforce, the end of the period of governmental silence on nuclear issues. The 
hellishly public advent of the atom bomb meant that influence over nuclear policy passed from the hands 
of a small cadre of scientists advising a yet smaller cadre of officials into the wider arms of government in 
all its multifarious, bureaucratic complexity. Entire programmes of work were placed on new footings, and 
although much remained secret the ranks of those inducted into the deliberations on technical, diplomatic 
and military policy grew almost exponentially. This was the case for each of the nuclear partners, but also 
for states – Commonwealth or allied – whose exposure to nuclear knowledge during the war had been 
limited (e.g. France) or non-existent (most of the rest of the United Nations). The scramble to articulate 
nuclear policy, and to capitalise, where possible, on relevant assets was almost universal. For the United 
Kingdom, though, there were two other significant and particular consequences of peace.  
 
First, peace brought confirmation of American dominance as the presiding influence in British decision-
making. The relationship with America was at once indispensable and galling. It could not be reversed and 
would long stand as a constraint to be chafed against. The increasingly forlorn hope of salvaging further 
gains, in terms of material, information and exchange, from the wreckage of the post-war settlement, 
compounded in the iniquitous McMahon Act, shaped British nuclear policy for the best part of a decade. 
Britain never wholly forsook the Commonwealth as a nuclear partner however. Bevin’s idea of a 
commonwealth nuclear facility in Africa, fanciful though it almost immediately proved, underscores the 
extent to which the leveraging of empire – Dominions and colonies alike – remained an aspiration of British 
policy, even as circumstances consistently conspired to prevent their realisation. The hindsight of multiple 
generations sees Bevin’s concept of an imperial nuclear hub in sub-Saharan Africa as little more than a 
flight of late-imperial fantasy, but viewed in context it made a degree of sense. There was nothing inherently 
illogical in Bevin’s embracing the Mackinderian idea of leveraging empire as a counterweight to the grand 
continental powers, nor was it incompatible with Labour’s distinctive imperial policy, which Bevin and 
Attlee had chiefly designed.  
 
Second, peace necessitated a radically different relationship with Canada, conditioned by the unique 
wartime conditions that had shaped their nuclear relationship operating in conjunction with the wider 
constitutional and psychological evolution of Canada into a middle power. The idea of Chalk River as a 
united Commonwealth endeavour was consequently still-born: it was evident to all concerned that the 
Americans would never countenance such an enterprise. The more limited aim of a joint Anglo-Canadian 
programme similarly foundered, though the extraordinarily close collaboration between Chalk River and 
Harwell significantly mitigated the technical separation of their programmes. 
 
Britain began the war suspended awkwardly between a status of notional suzerainty and a position of primus 
inter pares. By the end of the conflict, and only vestiges even of the idea of primus inter pares remained. 
This is not to say that the Dominions repudiated the Commonwealth entire: there was still much in it of 





The Dominions and the Bomb 
 
 
Historians, as John Lewis Gaddis has pointed out, swim in the medium of complexity.1 In historical 
explanation a phenomenon cannot be reduced, as in the social sciences, to causation by a single independent 
variable, but rather emerges from the complex intersections of multiple factors, their antecedent causes 
multiplying back exponentially into the past. This blessing and curse of complexity is compounded, in the 
case of nuclear history, by the lingering shroud of state secrecy – a phenomenon encountered even in the 
preparation of this thesis – and the pall of tragedy which still lies, after seven decades, over this most 
destructive of human technologies. Yet for the historian this complexity is not so much daunting as 
intriguing. Viewed rightly, the appearance of opacity and intractability is an opportunity for explication.2 
This mentality informed the present work. 
 
This thesis originated in the observation of a lacuna in existing accounts of the early British nuclear 
weapons programme. A great many of the prominent scientists and engineers who participated, often very 
prominently, in British nuclear research were not themselves unambiguously British, and yet the 
phenomenon of their participation had scarcely been acknowledged by historians, still less considered in 
the depth it deserved. This thesis therefore sought to fill the gap, by examining directly the nature and extent 
of Dominion participation in British wartime nuclear work. British nuclear interactions with the Dominions, 
which prove to have been surprisingly extensive, have been downplayed or ignored in the literature 
primarily, it seems, because they did not subsequently bear much fruit. This, however, is unfortunate. The 
practice of history is not simply the narration of what happened (wie es eigentlich gewesen), but the 
consideration of precisely why it happened – and this requires, in turn, a consideration of what the 
protagonists hoped might happen, what they expected might happen, and what they actually sought to make 
happen. Commonwealth dynamics figured in each of these processes.  
 
The working hypothesis here was that the Commonwealth, as an underlying concept, as a set of pre-existing 
relationships, and as a contested ideology, formed key dynamics influencing the development of the 
programme. Only an appreciation of these Commonwealth dynamics within the United Kingdom nuclear 
programme can account for such phenomena as Mark Oliphant’s foundational role in three nations’ nuclear 
histories, or the fact that New Zealanders helped build the first plants at Chalk River and Harwell; only a 
holistic view of Commonwealth interactions can fully explain the course of British nuclear policy in this 
period. 
 
Much of the focus of this thesis has been on granular analysis of individual processes and decisions – 
unashamedly so, for it is here that Commonwealth dynamics are most directly evident, and here too that 
misapprehensions can arise. To engage with nuclear history only at the level of high diplomacy is to 
                                                   
1 John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.65 




overlook much of what actually determined the course of nuclear history. Much, of course, depended on 
the interactions of Prime Ministers and Presidents, but much also depended on the individual interactions 
of scientists, engineers and administrators, whose technical work, correspondence and personal reflections 
are preserved in shelf upon shelf of archival material, both in the capacious National Archives and in its 
counterparts around the world. These archival materials corroborate one another: the picture that emerges 
from one national archive tends to be mirrored in another. Direct references to the Commonwealth were 
proportionally rare: the concept of Dominion relations was not the lens through which the protagonists of 
this history consciously viewed their decision-making, and few files were created or catalogued on the basis 
of imperial concepts. In history, though, the phenomena of greatest relevance are not always those which 
the archives name, but rather those which, by being taken for granted, go un-named.  
 
Here, in this concluding chapter, it would be well first to recapitulate the narrative of the preceding pages; 
then to identify the key themes at work; and lastly to present the sum of this thesis’ argument and its 




Nuclear weapons have a long pre-history. Building on developments in human understanding of the 
structure of the atom in the early decades of the 20th century, the discipline of nuclear physics advanced 
apace in the inter-war years. Advanced scientific enquiry within the British Empire was concentrated within 
the metropole, but drew in personnel from all its disparate territories through mechanisms such as the 1851 
scholarships, and redistributed many of these men (they were almost exclusively men) back to the imperial 
periphery, there to pursue work of (ordinarily) a more prosaic or industrial bent. This concentration and 
dispersion of personnel thus led to the organic formation of inter-Dominion scientific relationships, of 
which the informal network that grew up around Rutherford – himself a New Zealander – is the most 
conspicuous example. This network, nestled within the close-knit confraternity of pre-war nuclear physics, 
provides the context for many of the internal and cross-border interactions that shaped nuclear policy-
making in its early stages, when the prospect of harnessing atomic energy release (explosive or not) became 
too alluring and terrifying to be ignored. A flurry of experimental results published in 1939 had left the 
field in a state of flux, but in spite of uncertainties as to the precise mechanism of nuclear fission there were 
certainly strong grounds for state-backed investigation of the newly discovered phenomenon of uranium 
fission. British science was well-placed for this endeavour. 
 
The thesis’ narrative opened at this parlous moment. The first chapter discussed the origins of the United 
Kingdom’s wartime nuclear research programme, highlighting the fact that initial conditions favoured the 
inclusion of individuals with their origins in the Dominions but who by providence or design were at that 
point domiciled in the United Kingdom, with Mark Oliphant their exemplar. It was in this early period, too, 
that the first contacts with Canada were made, and the idea of crossing the Atlantic first arose. The impetus 
for the UK programme came from two emigres, Frisch and Peierls, though they were not the first to have 
considered the question, and their memorandum was not wholly unanticipated. Chadwick had been at work 
longer, and was nearing a similar conclusion, but was far too rigorous a Rutherfordian to circulate a theory, 
even a rigorously coherent one, without strong experimental support. Frisch and Peierls did, however, have 
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Oliphant as their highly credible champion, and the advantage of a clear and compelling set of well-
supported hypotheses; consequently it was their insights which propelled the MAUD committee into 
existence. Judged by its own limited aims, MAUD was an efficient committee, not especially urgent in its 
undertakings, despite the overshadowing threat of invasion and the alarm occasioned by the 
misinterpretation of the MAUD RAY KENT message, but thorough and effective in its investigation. 
Crucially, the Committee sought a fuller understanding of – and to establish links with – the work of other 
nuclear physicists around the world. This desire, coupled with the need to identify and if necessary 
accumulate resources for a future programme, drove contacts with the United States and Canada. Canada, 
indeed, became a key subject of MAUD discussions, as a source of uranium, as a potential location for 
Halban’s heavy water work (initially conceived as a lower-priority, long-term endeavour, divorced from 
weapons applications), and, importantly, as a locus for nuclear research in its own right. Laurence’s 
independently initiated work in Canada was hardly a coherent programme (certainly not in comparison 
with even the early work in the United States) but the British were nevertheless very interested to learn of 
its extent, to study its conclusions and to ensure its continuance.  
 
The second chapter reflected on the implementation of the MAUD report and the processes by which the 
centre of gravity of nuclear research shifted from one side of the Atlantic to the other, as the American 
work gained momentum and the British work stalled. MAUD recommended two parallel endeavours: a fast 
neutron programme (directed towards the bomb) and a slow neutron programme (directed towards power 
production). Both were important, but the two were conceptually disaggregated, with the fast neutron work 
accorded by far the greater priority. The desire to secure American partnership in fast neutron research and 
the need to find a host for Halban’s then low-priority slow neutron work led the British to look across the 
Atlantic, to Canada as well as to the United States. Ongoing research meanwhile began to indicate more 
clearly that the slow neutron programme might in fact have weapons-relevance, via the newly identified 
plutonium pathway. Recognition of this changed the complexion of the Halban conundrum. This also was 
rather a fallow period for the British programme, a time of organisational change and personnel churn, and 
so they lost momentum relative to the American programme, which the British half-inadvertently catalysed 
via several influences (including the probably unsanctioned intervention of Mark Oliphant). Oliphant’s 
exploitation of his personal network to advocate strongly for MAUD’s conclusions is evidence of his 
personal hawkishness on the bomb, but also says something interesting about the way the British and 
American programmes became intertwined: rather than having been high level and programmatic, contacts 
began at the personal level. This helps explain, alongside the question of timing, the very awkward 
interactions between the two programmes: their priorities never quite coincided, and whenever one state 
was willing to endorse closer ties, the other would shy away. It was not simply that the British rejected the 
Americans, though some accounts may give that impression. The first overture on collaboration came from 
the British, and though they were admittedly guilty (if that is an appropriate expression) of rejecting 
subsequent approaches, their reticence made sense given past experience and the United States’ non-
belligerence prior to Pearl Harbor. The sudden invigoration of the American programme was such that the 
British could not respond quickly enough: they were forever reacting to the previous American position. 
By 1942 the British were thus ready to embrace the Canadian option, albeit with the clear motive of 
leveraging that work vis-à-vis the negotiations with the Americans for fast neutron work. There were, 
however, intimations of trouble to come: the relationship with the United States, which had already become 
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central to British policy-making, underwent a transition precipitated by the United States’ entry into the 
war and the corresponding transfer of the American programme to civilian control. Then the question of 
Halban became compelling once more, but again it is important not to try to disaggregate the slow neutron 
question from the fast: by early 1942 the British were trying desperately to bring the Americans onside in 
both fields, with a far stronger emphasis on the fast neutron work, which still seemed by far the most 
promising field of research. The offer of slow neutron collaboration was an additional inducement, a 
potential form of leverage. The British attempted to use the asset first by offering to place Halban and his 
colleagues in the United States. This ought notionally to have been a win-win situation, but there were 
impediments on the American side – structural issues around secrecy, for example, even before the army 
takeover and the legacy of complicated relations made it difficult. Yet both sides remained amenable to the 
development of some kind of collaboration, and at length they triangulated on a mutually acceptable 
solution: they could locate the slow neutron programme in Canada. This was a reflexive step, perhaps, but 
one built upon earlier contacts and pursued in full conversation with the NRC: it was no act of imperial 
imposition. (Indeed, the terms on which the Montreal programme was ultimately based proved less than 
optimal for British interests in the longer term: a significant degree of control was ceded to the NRC.) Each 
of the three parties concerned derived a benefit. The Americans gained proximity to a team pursuing 
complementary work, without the headaches of hosting them; the British likewise gained proximity to the 
American work, and the chance thereby to demonstrate the utility of closer ties; and the Canadians gained 
trusteeship over a major joint endeavour, and through it exposure to a vast amount of information and 
experience.  
 
The third chapter addressed the awkward adolescence of the project in Canada, as British hopes of equal 
partnership with the American programme were repeatedly disappointed. The US emphasis had become 
more and more on secrecy – they were more confident than ever that they could develop a full programme 
alone. Whilst it was not necessarily Groves’ fault that co-operation faltered, there is a sense in which the 
new regime did play a part, if only in enabling the instincts of Conant and Bush to raise barriers to co-
operation. The Conant letter and memorandum sealed the adoption by the Americans of a directly 
combative strategy towards the UK, severely restricting interchange to a point where, if applied, 
information could flow in only one direction. This was the exact opposite of what the UK had hoped for. 
Britain therefore launched a concerted diplomatic effort to change things. Two schools of thought emerged, 
one advocating acceptance, the other advocating the adoption of a reciprocally hard line. The latter 
approach assumed Canadian acquiescence, but the Canadians (and British and émigré personnel associated 
with the Canadian project) were, for both technical and political reasons, far more inclined to the opposite 
view, believing, with good reason, that Britain could ill afford a protracted, aggressive negotiation with the 
Americans, and considering it better instead to salvage what collaboration they could, and by demonstrating 
good faith seek to claw back access and influence. Comprehension of this ‘Canadian’ perspective swayed 
the British from their impulse to adopt a hard line – albeit only after several months of a composite policy 
which had the effect only of straining relations at Montreal. The British eventually managed, through a 
combination of perseverance and forced affability to untangle and undermine at least some of the 
Americans’ objections, leaving them relatively little room to manoeuvre by making generous concession 




The fourth chapter covered the period in Canada after the Quebec Agreement in which, following a final 
diplomatic effort, the future of the Anglo-Canadian project at last seemed assured. Yet the narrative of the 
fourth chapter reads almost like the third, for the British found themselves again trying to persuade the 
Americans to grant collaboration, again debating amongst themselves the benefits of going it alone, and 
again being deterred by Canadian conditions and perspectives. The Quebec Agreement institutionalised the 
process of negotiation – but it was still a negotiation, and the British position was one of relative structural 
weakness. Conceived as a bloc, the Anglo-Canadian project had representational parity with the Americans, 
with three representatives each, but as the Canadians had already demonstrated, their sympathies lay as 
frequently with the American perspective as with the British. The notional three-to-three ratio of the CPC 
in fact reduced to an unfavourable three-to-two ratio for the British: they could never pursue too 
confrontational a line for fear that the Canadians might array their vote alongside the Americans, thereby 
shattering the precarious illusion of a united Anglo-Canadian (i.e. Commonwealth) position. The Montreal 
work, having saved the British fast-neutron connection with the United States in an elaborate and unlooked-
for way, now found itself at risk, for it was becoming ever-clearer that it amounted to a post-war project.  
 
The question was hashed out in a subcommittee of the CPC and – somewhat remarkably – the British were 
able to secure American support for a pilot plant. This was less than had been hoped, but more than was 
really realistic. American acquiescence is best explained as part insurance policy, part effort to bind the 
British in: they were, after all, already too tightly enmeshed into American secrets. Securing the future 
relevance of Montreal required significant changes. Frictions between Halban and Mackenzie had reached 
an intolerable level, and something must give: the politics aligned against Halban, who amongst other 
impediments had his non-Commonwealth origins against him. His replacement was Cockcroft, 
unoffensively English and blessed with an eminent scientific reputation. Cockcroft’s appointment was not, 
of itself, sufficient to secure American support for Montreal, though. There followed a repeat of the pre-
Quebec debate as to whether the United Kingdom might pursue its own wholly independent programme: a 
last hurrah for the advocates of an independent line. The combined risk of forfeiting American goodwill on 
the bomb project and of losing Canadian support meant that such an idea was finally rejected. The British 
were thus bound into the collaboration with the US and Canada at least in part by the dynamics of the 
triangular relationship. The British had turned to Canada as a reliable partner, for Canada’s merits shone 
brightest when compared with the United States. Yet Canada’s trajectory was much more towards the 
United States than towards the United Kingdom, and so the counterbalance which the British had sought 
to set up became the mechanism that bound them more closely to the US.  
 
The ultimate practice of the triangular relationship was, however, fairly straightforwardly hierarchical for 
what remained of the war years: the United States and Britain made the running, and the Canadians were 
content with their more parochial concern for the maintenance of the heavy water project. Canada was 
represented on the CDT, but primarily as a courtesy; they made few significant interventions in the 
deliberations of the CPC, and the three-two-one representation pretty well approximates the ranking of the 
parties’ importance. 
 
The fifth chapter traced the late-war nuclear interactions of the other Dominions with the British 
programme. Ties with Australia were mediated, unofficially but fairly systematically, and from an early 
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stage, by Mark Oliphant, whose lax attitude to security may have been a factor in his having communicated 
significant information to the Australian government. Both Australia and New Zealand sought to contribute 
to the Anglo-American programme, hoping thereby to derive future benefits for their own states. The two 
countries fared rather differently in these endeavours, though, for whilst the Australian government sought 
to leverage all her assets into a broad-based agreement on co-operation (in essence, to be admitted to the 
nuclear club wholesale) the New Zealanders were content to provide support as and when the British 
required it, with few expectations attached. Thus the New Zealanders, despite having far fewer assets to 
leverage, achieved a proportionally far greater return: they placed seven well-qualified men within the 
British contingents in Canada and the United States, gaining first-hand experience of crucial fields of 
operation. Moreover, these men were secondees: they still ‘belonged’, as it were, to their home government. 
The Australians, in contrast, were able to attach just one man, Burhop, to the electromagnetic work, and 
not on the same advantageous secondment terms as the New Zealanders. Factors relevant to these two 
divergent trajectories include the differing personalities of the principals, and perhaps also differences in 
national outlook (New Zealand being far more associated with the ideal of imperial solidarity, for example), 
but it may be truest  simply to say that Marsden and the New Zealanders better understood the paradox that 
humbler, more straightforward support of discrete projects actually secured greater national benefits, whilst 
adopting too transactional an attitude attracted far less preferential treatment. New Zealand, having pursued 
a more ‘Commonwealth’ conception of alliance than the Australians, accrued the lion’s share of the 
benefits. The rest of the Dominions meanwhile tended to miss out – though it is worth noting that the South 
African Prime Minister, Smuts, was brought into Churchill’s counsels on crucial questions of nuclear 
diplomacy – and the colonies were only ever treated as utterly pliable.  
 
The sixth and final chapter was concerned with post-war planning. The prospect of the end of the war 
presaged a radical change in each state’s decision-making calculus, the challenges associated with which 
were exacerbated by changes in government on both sides of the Atlantic. The British had laid plans, of a 
sort, for what would follow the war: Oliphant was a key mover in this. The main thrust of the British 
programme was to be the establishment of a large-scale facility within the British Isles (much though the 
Canadians might have hoped that their own centre at Chalk River, only just hitting its stride, might fill the 
role for the Commonwealth, and much though the Americans might fear the idea of a nuclear centre in what 
to them appeared a still acutely vulnerable location). The British were not to be deterred, however. The 
principle that had motivated the British from the outset, of having a programme of their own, proved 
dominant, and the impulse to plough a doggedly independent furrow, which had twice reared its head when 
things had become difficult with the Americans, finally had its victory – though there was no intention on 
the British side to sever ties with the Americans in consequence. This, however, was the likely consequence 
of such an action, and would have been a risk even without such a development, for the trajectory of post-
war American nuclear policy was always towards full independence. One factor in this was the transfer to 
a broader basis of governance – from a small clique with limited oversight to the full might of political 
control. This happened everywhere, of course – it was a significant transition in Canada, particularly, where 
diplomats like Hume Wrong had very quickly to get up to speed in a dizzyingly complex new arena of 
international diplomacy – but was most pronounced in the United States, where an atmosphere of 
triumphalism had followed victory. American predominance in the manufacture of the bomb became, in 
the popular mind, American exclusivity in its manufacture; and although the British and Canadians were 
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given their due in the official communications, the details of the Quebec Agreement remained secret, and 
the Hyde Park memorandum doubly so – being unknown even to many of the American administration. 
This indeed was one of the key issues with the transition to post-war arrangements for the bomb: that too 
much emphasis had been placed on personal accommodation between Roosevelt and Churchill. Quebec’s 
construction left too much to the assumption of American goodwill, and to the existence of a ‘special 
relationship’ which then as now was little more than a phantasm, a rhetorical flourish covering a multitude 
of colder calculations. Roosevelt’ tendency was always to allow himself room to manoeuvre; quite possibly 
he never intended to preserve the close atomic relationship which he seemed to have promised Churchill.  
 
It did not matter either way, for Roosevelt died, and his successor, though harbouring no ill will towards 
the British, was hardly inclined to extend them any favours, particularly as regarded the weapon which 
seemed, for the briefest of windows, to present his administration with the ultimate diplomatic trump card. 
And so the British were left once more to recalculate. The same essential plan was pursued – a research 
centre in the United Kingdom – but with a clearer emphasis on independent capability, and perhaps a degree 
of stoicism in the intention to get there with or without American help. The hope of a return to joint 
operation was never abandoned, however: the story of much of the early cold war was, for Britain, the story 
of the search for a nuclear accommodation with America.  
 
It was this, more than anything, that restrained Britain’s other impulse, to leverage the Commonwealth as 
a source of power. The British were unwilling to sever the American link completely, and so had to leave 
unfulfilled various half-ventured projects to create a coherent Commonwealth basis for their nuclear work. 
The distance that had emerged between the British and Canadian programmes perhaps contributed to this 
also. The Canadians were deeply wounded by what they saw as the British abandonment of Chalk River: 
the loss of Cockcroft felt, to them, like the withdrawal of British co-operation, for he more than anybody 
had symbolised both the importance of the work and its character as a unified endeavour. Thus, intriguingly, 
the Canadians seemed briefly to embrace the idea of Chalk River as a potential hub for Commonwealth 
nuclear research and development work. Yet that was not the whole of it, for there was also a strain of 
nationalism involved: they were almost adamant that they wanted a Canadian to replace Cockcroft, and it 
was only grudgingly that they accepted another Briton. It was not just the loss of the individual: the 
Canadians had felt that they held something of a trump card in their relationship with the British, being the 
location of the only plant, and they were disappointed to realise that it was not so strong a hand as they had 
hoped.  
 
Ultimately, it was the American ascendancy that put paid to the tripartite alliance. The three states went 
their separate ways: the Americans into a frantic arms race with the Soviets, the British into a dogged and 
in some ways remarkably patient effort to catch up with their great ally, never wholly abandoning the hope 
of a return to tripartite action, and the Canadians to a future of nuclear power production rather than 
weapons development – the latter rooted more in the security guarantees that flowed from alliance with the 
United States, Commonwealth bonds with Britain, and ultimately from close alliance with both through 







Even from this crude precis, and quite apart from the recurring motif of divergent Anglo-American relations 
prompting the British to conceive of a radical independent course only to be reined in by explicit or implicit 
Canadian influences, a number of underlying themes are evident. These merit brief commentaries before 
the final argument of the thesis is presented.  
  
The Significance of Individuals 
 
Whilst it would be wrong simply to emphasise individual figures at the expense of wider historical trends, 
it would be equally wrong to deny the agency of individuals, for, as the narrative highlights, certain names 
are almost ubiquitous in British nuclear history. Oliphant, Groves, Cockcroft: for good or ill, the words and 
actions of these men carried particular weight, shaping their nations’ nuclear programmes for decades to 
come. Less prominent in the literature, but of great significance here, are the Dominion scientific 
administrators Mackenzie, Marsden and Rivett. They too, in their achievements and failures, shaped their 
nations’ nuclear destinies. 
 
Consider Mark Oliphant. Quite apart from his own scientific research, Oliphant’s impact on nuclear history 
was vast: witness his early patronage of Frisch and Peierls; his championing of the MAUD report in the 
United States; his wartime transmittal of information to the Australian government; his leadership of the 
British team at Berkeley; his role in shaping Manhattan’s electromagnetic programme; and his enthusiastic 
participation in the establishment of Harwell. It is curious, then, that historians’ summations of his legacy 
should be so conditioned by his later positions (and recantations). Oliphant also disseminated rather more 
information than perhaps he ought to have done: thanks to his efforts between 1942 and the end of the war, 
the Australian government (or at least elements thereof) were better informed on nuclear issues than almost 
any other state. Only those countries privy to the Quebec Agreement possessed more precise information, 
and at a conceptual/programmatic level (as opposed to an experiential/technical level) Australian 
information compared favourably even with the other states whose personnel had had access to the 
programme (that is, New Zealand and de Gaulle’s Free French through legitimate means, and the Soviet 
Union through espionage).  
 
Next, consider Leslie Groves, who merits the historical cliché of the ‘towering figure’, but also highlights 
the extent to which such figures can be misrepresented. In Groves’ case the caricature has often prevailed 
over the actual character of the man. In particular, Groves’ Anglophobia has been over-stated, skewed by 
his own post-war efforts to dictate the history of the Manhattan Project. He was not instinctively warm to 
the British, and seldom made concessions without a substantial quid pro quo, but he was consistent in his 
attitudes and for the most part wholly frank in his (wartime) communications: he was unmoved by emotive 
appeals or the concept of fair play for its own sake, but he could be swayed by a persuasive argument and 
delivered upon his pledges. His relationship with Chadwick was genuinely effective. His later summations 
of the impact of the British programme read harshly, but has been divorced somewhat from its context: 
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although a jealous guardian of his government’s nuclear dominance, he was ultimately glad to have such 
an array of first-class minds at his disposal, and readily acknowledged the value of British contributions.  
 
Then there is John Cockcroft, who for a time served as the emblem and goal of Anglo-Canadian co-
operation; his withdrawal from Chalk River and appointment to Harwell came to represent something of a 
parting of the ways between the British and Canadian programmes. He holds the apparently unique 
achievement of having overseen the creation of two states’ nuclear research establishments, and his 
leadership set the tone for nuclear research in Britain and Canada for decades to come.  
 
Lastly, consider the four Dominion scientific administrators: Mackenzie for Canada, Marsden for New 
Zealand, Rivett for Australia, and Schonland for South Africa. Providence dealt each a different hand, and 
each adopted a different approach to the handling of his country’s nuclear relationship with Britain. 
Marsden’s deft and enthusiastic handling of his country’s nuclear relationship with the United Kingdom 
bore tangible fruit; Rivett’s assertiveness proved almost fruitless. Mackenzie’s relationship with his British 
counterparts swung from close and collaborative to decidedly fractious, and back again; at times it served 
as a barometer for the state of Anglo-Canadian relations, and at times as an influence on them. Schonland, 
meanwhile, had to forge a nuclear relationship with Britain from scratch in a radically different post-war 
world. Yet amidst all these different experiences, one might also detect some commonalities. Each of the 
four sought to leverage, in one way or another, the Commonwealth connection, and all seem to have been 
genuinely committed to the idea of Dominion collaboration as logical and desirable. Where they differed 
was in their understanding of the nature of the connection and the form of the collaboration that could be 
pursued – a reflection, ultimately, of the polysemous character of Dominion status and the liminal position 
of the British Empire in the mid-twentieth century.  
 
One might equally reflect on other individuals: Akers, whose private-sector career prior to Tube Alloys 
simultaneously equipped him for, and debarred him from, a leading role in the Anglo-American 
collaboration; Halban, whose research formed the basis for the entire Anglo-Canadian project, but who 
ended the war wholly detached from the allied programme; or Chadwick himself, whose unassuming 




It is clear that the precise events related in this thesis were not inevitable: the labyrinthine nature of the 
negotiations, and the occasional dramatic policy reversals, attest to the contingency underpinning all that 
transpired. In some instances, very minor developments had significant consequences, and reflecting on the 
marginality of these cases raises some interesting questions. If Chadwick’s health had been better, he would 
have been able to travel to the United States at an earlier stage in the negotiations with the Americans; 
might he have achieved better results than Akers? If Marsden had not learnt, through chance and his own 
acuity, of the existence of an Anglo-American nuclear endeavour, the New Zealand contingent might never 
have been sent to North America; might this have bolstered Rivett’s case for Australian access to the 
programme? Or might the British have kept a greater distance from the Dominions altogether? If Zinn had 
accepted the directorship of Chalk River, which for a time he seemed inclined to do, might there have been 
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a cleaner break in the post-war Anglo-Canadian nuclear relationship? Or might Zinn’s American contacts 
actually have helped maintain tripartite collaboration around the Canadian heavy water work? So it goes. 
To pursue counterfactuals is seldom helpful, but the knowledge that even slightly different circumstances 
might have altered the progression of events in potentially radical ways is a helpful corrective in the face 
of the historian’s natural impulse to attribute the course of all history to grand impersonal trends (or, in the 
more archaic Carlylean fashion, to the visionary actions of great men).  
 
Multiple tiers of interaction 
 
The archival record makes clear the extent to which crucial interactions took place through direct 
institutional contacts and commonplace diplomatic channels. Indeed, it is striking how little time national 
leaders actually devoted to the issue. Much lay with Akers, Chadwick, and Mackenzie, under the often 
laissez-faire supervision Anderson and Howe; relatively little ascended to Churchill and almost nothing to 
Mackenzie King. The substantive discussions lay, for the most part, with the senior scientists and their 
administrative colleagues, under the oversight of a trusted cabinet minister. Issues rose from lower to higher 
levels, rather than percolating down. Escalation – particularly to Prime Ministerial/Presidential level – was 
as often a tool for obfuscation and delay as for resolution of a problem. The British, from Churchill down, 
often fell victim to Roosevelt’s habit of ‘genial deception’.3 Conant and Bush were able lieutenants to 
Roosevelt in this respect. John Holmes’ point about the occasional need for high-level reinvigoration of 
moribund negotiations stands,4 but with the caveat that such instances were rare, contingent, and sometimes 
counter-productive. It would be wrong to assume that the history of Anglo-American nuclear relations is 
nothing more than the history of Prime Ministers’ conversations with Presidents. The tone for inter-state 
nuclear interactions was set at lower levels, in individual encounters, institutional frictions, and the interface 
of bureaucracies, and thus ultimately influenced by cultural affinities and expectations. 
 
Secrecy and Security 
 
Secrecy was and is the inevitable concomitant of any matter touching on nuclear weapons. In the period 
before Hiroshima the very concept of the bomb, its plausibility and essential mechanism, were secrets of 
immense importance, kept with incredible zeal. This culture of secrecy never sat easily with most of the 
scientists involved, though few disputed its wartime necessity. Structures of recruitment and security 
clearance were also interwoven to an extent incompatible with a strict interpretation of national sovereignty, 
with direct consequences for the transmission of nuclear knowledge across borders. Crucially, since each 
of the nuclear partners conceived of secrecy and security slightly differently, the net effect was to foster 
division between allies.  
 
  
                                                   
3 Bernstein, ‘Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb’, p.29 





If the allies differed on issues around secrecy, they can equally be said to have differed on the very meaning 
of their alliance. Given how the two sides approached the question of nuclear collaboration, one might 
argue that the British set greater store by the idea of alliance than the Americans, or perhaps more simply 
that they placed a greater emphasis on the spirit of an agreement rather than the letter. Did the British side 
contain fewer realists and more idealists? The shrewder of the British observers realised the futility of 
appeals to fair play and the spirit of wartime collaboration: ‘Nothing makes less impact upon the American 
mind’, noted one message, ‘than British personnel harping upon past actions and moral rights’.5 The British 
attitude was rather different when it came to the Canadians and the other Dominions, though, for here there 
was far more of an expectation of common ground. One might possibly go so far as to suggest that the 
recent experience of (relatively) easy inter-Dominion co-operation misled the British as to the likelihood 
of similar ease with their Anglophone allies. Then, as now, alliances were hard work. The very concept of 
the special relationship – so prevalent in contemporary discourse – has its roots in these interactions 
 
Associated with this ambiguity in the interpretation of alliance as a concept is the ambiguity of language. 
In approaching a text, whether a treaty such as the Quebec Agreement or an informal telegram, the British 
tended always to a permissive interpretation and the Americans to a restrictive. In contrast the British appear 
to have felt moral obligation more keenly than the Americans – perhaps partly as a function of their 
dependence on such constructions in the absence of more binding commitments. The terms ‘co-operation’, 
‘co-ordination’, ‘collaboration’ and ‘exchange of information’ were used almost interchangeably, but could 
imply markedly different interactions. Also striking is the tactical use of that ambiguity by the Americans 




Each of the above-mentioned themes buttresses, in some fashion, the overall argument of the thesis, the 
essence of which is this: that the narrative of Britain’s nuclear weapons programme is incomplete if its 
commonwealth context is ignored. That the Dominions ultimately came to play only a peripheral role in 
the overall history of Britain’s nuclear deterrent matters little; the false starts and awkward reversals of the 
early period are as much a part of the narrative as the influences which would eventually predominate.  
 
In broader context, it is reductive to portray the Second World War as presaging or catalysing Britain’s fall 
from great power status: the narrative cannot be so simple as that Britain was an empire before and a non-
entity afterwards. Nor can the narrative solely be one of the onset of imperial decline, for although that was 
the net effect measured over a space of decades, for those in positions of power and influence there was 
neither an expectation nor a desire to dissolve the bonds of empire.  
-  
                                                   
5 JSM Washington to Cabinet Office, 25th November 1946, PREM 8/679 (TNA) 
6 See Chapter Six 
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The unique contribution of this thesis is therefore hoped to exist at several levels. Other than its novel angle 
of attack, several minor but important correctives to particular historiographical tropes have been suggested 
throughout the text, and at several points an effort has been made to challenge or build upon existing 
historiography. Prominent examples are easily summarised. In Chapter One, it is suggested that Oliphant 
exercised a rather more active influence on Frisch and Peierls’ exploration of the fission question than has 
previously been noted. The same chapter demonstrates that nuclear ties with Canada were earlier and deeper 
than one might gather from existing accounts, and presents a detailed examination of the place of Canada 
within the deliberations of the MAUD committee (as well as analyses of Halban’s diary etc.). Chapter Two 
particularly argues that the shift from the United States to Canada as the preferred domicile for Halban’s 
work should be interpreted not so much as a retreat as a coherent, triangulated response, building on 
previous connections, intended to bind the UK and US programmes together. Chapter Three offers a 
detailed explication of the Conant Crisis with sensitivity to the Canadian perspective, and in particular 
presents a narrative of Canadian influence as having shaped British perspectives on how to approach the 
Americans. Chapter Four offers a somewhat novel perspective on the Canadian programme’s leadership 
change, challenging the narrative of Halban as the problem per se, whilst also seeking to foreground the 
British difficulties post-Quebec, highlighting the renewed impulse to an independent programme and 
demonstrating the extent to which the Canadian influence again constrained British policy. Chapter Five 
places New Zealand and Australian experiences of interaction with wartime nuclear work in comparative 
perspective, drawing on additional archival material to build upon and enhance the analyses ventured by 
Galbreath and Priestley, and places British approaches to the Commonwealth on questions of uranium 
acquisition in their appropriate context. Finally, Chapter Six addresses British post-war nuclear research 
and development policy more firmly in the context of wartime experience, rather than treating it as a 
question approached tabula rasa; emphasises the extent of the challenges of the transition (recall Wrong’s 
exam questions); considers the issue of Cockcroft’s departure from Chalk River in context; and presents 
additional material on UK perspectives on commonwealth collaboration.  
 
Returning to the broader perspective – for historians ought not to confine themselves only to painstaking 
reconstruction of l’histoire événementielle – two particular significances suggest themselves.  
 
First, there are implications here for the understanding of nuclear history itself. This thesis shows the 
dynamics of early nuclear policy-making to have been less straightforward, and therefore to a historian far 
more interesting, than might first be believed. Adequate recognition of the significance of Commonwealth 
dynamics enriches the historian’s understanding of key developments in the British nuclear programme, 
but also the United States’ and the Dominions’: Canadian nuclear history, in particular, is entirely 
conditioned by its origins. New Zealand and Australian nuclear histories from 1947 onwards meanwhile 
reflect a process of gradual disenchantment, associated with, and shaped by, the wider process of separation 
from Britain these states experienced. Application of a Commonwealth lens adds complexity to the 
narrative of nuclear history, but also makes possible sharper, more coherent explanations.  
 
Second, there are parallel implications for commonwealth historiographies. Historians of empire have not 
tended to adopt nuclear technology – whether for military or civilian applications – as a lens for their 
studies. It is hoped that this thesis has demonstrated the potential merits of doing so. (Such a line of enquiry 
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might be situated equally profitably within the more fully developed literatures on ‘imperial’ science and 
decolonisation.) There is also the challenge of incorporating Commonwealth states’ individual nuclear 
histories into their wider imperial and post-colonial contexts. National histories almost inevitably 
accentuate distinctiveness, and perhaps rightly so: Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa each 
have their own particular histories of interaction with Britain and British imperialism, none of which can 
be reduced to a template. Yet these particularities were complemented by similarities, by common status 
and patterns of interaction. Moreover, the Dominions often construed their relations with the United 
Kingdom in comparison with their sister Dominions: witness the exchanges between New Zealand and 
Australia over wartime secondments, or South African desires for parity with Canada in post-war mineral 
negotiations.7 This thesis demonstrates interesting interactions, especially between NZ and Australia, and 
implies that closer attention to common dynamics would be to the benefit of the individual countries’ 
historiographies as well as to the wider historiography of the British empire.  
 
Viewed concurrently, these two significances reiterate this thesis’ core premise, that there was an inter-
relation of imperial and atomic experiences. These inter-relations could exist at every level, from individual 
lived experiences to the very heights of state strategy. In the latter case, the overlap between the imperial 
and atomic imperatives occurred in a limited but determining form during the Second World War and 
became more substantive in the early Cold War: looking beyond the chronological scope of this thesis, it 
is clear that conditions around past and present Dominion engagement with nuclear development continued 
to shape attitudes to the waging of the cold war well into the 1950s. 
 
The Relative Significance of Commonwealth Dynamics 
 
So what role did the Commonwealth ultimately play in the shaping of Britain’s early nuclear programme? 
Much depends on one’s understanding of the term. The very label is a slippery one: it has always been 
somewhat of a convenient fiction. Yet there were tangible realities associated with Commonwealth and 
Dominionhood in particular that could influence events: constitutional bonds, networks of interchange, and 
personal connections. Alongside and in some senses underpinning these connections was a kind of shared 
cultural framework, a way of seeing the world that assumed that ‘British nations’ had certain core interests 
in common and should enjoy a closer form of alliance than could exist beyond the bounds of the Empire-
Commonwealth. Thus conceived, it can be concluded that whilst the concept of Commonwealth was not 
the main driver of British or Canadian policy, it was at least a significant influence on the conduct of their 
relations with each other and with the United States; and that for Australia and New Zealand it was the 
principle lens through which those states encountered nuclear technology and developed nuclear policy. 
None of this is intended to overstate the significance of Commonwealth dynamics relative to other factors: 
in the holistic study of nuclear history it is a piece of the puzzle, not the key to the lock. The piece, however, 
is an important one: without it, the puzzle is incomplete.  
 
  
                                                   
7 See Chapter Six 
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Commonwealth Historiographies Revisited 
 
That the nuclear theme is underdeveloped in Commonwealth historiography is amply demonstrated in the 
fact that several recent works concentrating on Anglo-Dominion interactions within the periods of war and 
decolonisation bear nary a reference to the atomic bomb, never mind its bearing on Anglo-Dominion 
relations.8 Yet the advent of the atomic bomb and the United Kingdom’s post-war reckoning with its new 
fragility as a great imperial power were parallel, closely-associated challenges, and deserve to be treated as 
such. Britain in 1945 was already Lepidus in the triumvirate of great powers, and could justify her position 
only by reference to the diminishing asset of her empire and the potential of her nuclear arsenal. To choose 
between these two options was nigh impossible, but so too was it impossible to reconcile them.  
 
Keeping in step with the Americans on nuclear developments had become an obsession in the war years, 
but the nuclear ‘special relationship’ which was the notional prize of British perseverance proved a double-
edged sword: Britain could never have developed the bomb alone, and the necessity of securing it drove 
the MAUD Committee into ever-closer discussions with America, Britain’s proto-ally and great hope, from 
which discussions emerged a fatal dependency that shaped British strategy for the duration of the Cold 
War. Dependence on the United States precluded closer ties with natural allies. Much though the British 
might wish to, they could not fully leverage the Commonwealth as an alternative to Anglo-American 
nuclear collaboration. 
 
The wider literature carries the idea of an expectation of unconditional support from the Dominions, but 
even during the war this was never quite the case in the nuclear realm. Other than in the very earliest 
interactions with Canada, where acquiescence to British appeals was perhaps rather too readily assumed, 
every contact with a Dominion institution had the character of request and negotiation rather than diktat 
and expectation. Though its necessity may have been resented, implicitly or explicitly, a significant 
sensitivity to Dominion concerns was almost always observed. It is, however, true to state that the British 
generally mischaracterised or misinterpreted Canadian positions: it took a long time to realise that the 
interests of the two were not wholly aligned. 
 
Similar perspectival shifts might equally be helpful in the nuclear historiographies of Canada and Australia. 
Canadian historiographies, concerned with the particularity of their nation’s experience as the third point 
in the North Atlantic triangle and the corresponding transition from imperial attachment to one partner to a 
mediating sovereignty between the two (encapsulated in the title of a Canadian historical staple: ‘Empire 
to Umpire’), might benefit from sensitivity to, and comparison with, wider imperial dynamics. In Australia 
the history of interaction with the British nuclear programme is forever interwoven with the complex 
legacies of nuclear testing on its territory – the only known instance of a sovereign non-nuclear state 




                                                   
8 cf. Andrew Stewart, Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War (London: Continuum, 2008) 
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The Future of Nuclear History 
 
It is a curious thing that the first, official history of the United Kingdom’s early nuclear programme should 
remain, five and a half decades after its completion, the authoritative account; but Britain and Atomic 
Energy and Independence and Deterrence between them retain an authority which no subsequent work has 
quite matched, and sketched out an analytical line from which few have deviated. This testifies in part to 
Gowing’s exceptional scholarship, but perhaps also to lingering deficiencies in the field of nuclear history 
– one of which, this thesis has contended, is the neglect of Commonwealth dynamics as a relevant factor in 
every tier of nuclear decision-making. Gowing wrote in a period in which the British Empire, though 
truncated, was still extant, and this goes some way to pardoning her relative lack of attention to it: Empire 
was not, for the most part, a front-of-mind concept for those Britons who lived through it. The same excuse 
is not available to contemporary historians, who – perhaps lulled by decades of nuclear peace, and in the 
belief that imperial history constitutes a discipline apart – seem mostly to have been content either to 
conduct a kind of technical antiquarianism, listing and evaluating every new development in Britain’s 
nuclear arsenal, or else to offer top-level analyses of British nuclear policy-making in the apparent belief 
that no source worth citing lies outside the PREM series at Kew.  
 
In this respect the discipline of imperial history, more accustomed to moving between the particular and 
the general, the micro- and macro-historical domains, may provide something of a model. The discipline 
might equally provide useful case studies in the dispassionate handling of morally sensitive issues. Faced 
with the enormities of nuclear destruction it is all too easy to fall prey to the morally satisfying narrative of 
the scientists’ loss of innocence at the hands of wily military men and politicians, and their subsequent 
moral awakening (‘how inexorable was the trap into which the atomic scientists fell’).9 Hiroshima was a 
chastening experience for a great many of this thesis’ protagonists, but instantaneous conversion to the 
cause of nuclear disarmament was seldom a consequence: the majority continued directly or indirectly to 
contribute to their states’ nuclear development.  
 
This thesis’ acknowledged deficiencies might meanwhile point to possibilities for further research. For 
example, little has been said about French interactions with the British wartime nuclear work, though the 
contrast with Dominion experience is, in this sense, illuminating, and there is plenty that could be said 
about the extent to which the trajectory of French nuclear development was set by the wartime experiences 
of her émigré scientists at Montreal and Chalk River. Further research might also flow from simply 
continuing to trace the inter-relation of nuclear and imperial themes into later decades. Commonwealth 
dynamics remained a crucial influence on British nuclear policy for many years. The dynamics of 
Commonwealth interaction continued to evolve, as new Dominions came into existence and the older 
Dominions ploughed increasingly independent furrows, but the nebulous concepts of Commonwealth and 
Empire continued to have significance well into the Cold War. Only an appreciation of Commonwealth 
dynamics can explain the presence of a Canadian, Omond Solandt, on the bridge of HMS Campania to 
                                                   




watch the first British nuclear test in 1952, let alone the fact of that test having been conducted on Australian 
territory.10  
 
Finally, it might be well to consider what relevance, if any, the practice of this kind of nuclear history might 
have for present issues. The inter-Dominion exchanges described in these pages would, by contemporary 
standards, constitute proliferation interactions. That Canada has since pursued only peaceful nuclear 
applications, that Australia never made good on tentative plans to explore nuclear weapons, and that New 
Zealand ultimately renounced nuclear technology altogether, may diminish the shock of this realisation, 
but it is nevertheless the case that the same basic assets of conceptual awareness, access to data, and 
practical experience which the Dominions gained from Britain underpin contemporary proliferation 
interactions. Current nuclear weapons states, including members of the Commonwealth, have benefitted 
from such exchanges. It would be dangerous to seek to apply the lessons of the past too directly to the 
present, but more dangerous still to ignore the past altogether, or blithely to accept a caricatured version of 
its complexities. There now exists an opportunity to inject a degree of historicity into a policy debate which 
is presently dominated by other disciplines. History presents few easy answers to contemporary problems 
– it never will – but there is nevertheless value in historians’ presence in the discussion, if only to note that 
monocausality is a chimera of the social sciences; that the diffusion of nuclear knowledge can take place 
through routes other than gift or espionage; that inter-state nuclear interactions can occur simultaneously at 
multiple interconnected tiers of exchange; and that early experiences, even at very low levels, can shape 
states’ attitudes to nuclear issues for decades to come. In sum: nuclear and imperial history both remain 
deeply relevant to contemporary concerns, and nowhere more so than in the spaces in which they overlap.  
 
 
                                                   
10 Solandt’s presence at the test – in an official capacity, and with a significant degree of access to technical information – appears 
not to have been discussed in any hitherto existing historical work.  
 
 180 
Appendix One:  




3 May  'The Possibility of Producing an Atomic Bomb: A Review of the Position'. 





1 February  Transfer of Joliot's research programme to the French Ministere de l'Armament. 
10 April First meeting of the (not-yet-named MAUD) committee to discuss the implications of the Frisch-Peierls 
memorandum. 
20 April   Cockcroft writes to Boyle on behalf of MAUD, enquiring about heavy water in Canada. 
22 April  Peierls complains about his and Frisch's exclusion from nuclear work. 
24 April  Second meeting of the MAUD Committee. 
16 May  Boyle responds to Cockcroft’s query about heavy water supplies; 
 MAUD Committee learns of the American view that 'there was no possibility within practical range of using 
uranium either as a power source or as an explosive'. 
17 May  Informal MAUD meeting at Birmingham. 
19 June  Third Meeting of the MAUD Committee. 
20 June  Frisch and Peierls cleared to participate in MAUD Committee;  
  MAUD Committee make official enquiry of NRC regarding Canadian uranium supplies. 
10 July Fourth meeting of the MAUD Committee: transfer of Halban and Kowarski to North America is discussed. 
7 August  Fifth meeting of the MAUD Committee. 
17 September Sixth meeting of the MAUD Committee, now reconstituted as the Policy Committee;  
  First meeting of the MAUD technical committee. 





8 January   Seventh meeting of the MAUD (Policy) Committee. 
  Second meeting of the MAUD Technical Committee. 
9 April   Third meeting of the MAUD Technical Committee. 
19 May   Eighth meeting of the MAUD (Policy) Committee. 
26 June   First draft MAUD report circulated. 
15 July   Final MAUD report signed by Thomson. 
29 July   Completed MAUD reports received by Pye, MAP Director of Scientific Research.  
27 August   Moore Brabazon passes MAUD report on to Lord Hankey and SAC. 
30 August  Churchill supports action on MAUD report (i.e. establishment of Tube Alloys). 
3 September  Chiefs of Staffs Committee urge that the programme be based in the UK. 
17 September Casey informs Rivett that Oliphant has briefed him on uranium work. 
23 September Oliphant meets with Lawrence at Berkeley (to 24th). 
25 September Scientific Advisory Committee Report sent to Anderson. 
3 October   MAUD report officially transmitted to US. 
11 October  Roosevelt writes to PM suggesting possibility of US and UK conducting joint programme. 
27 October  Pegram & Urey visit United Kingdom. 





15 February Oliphant, troubled by the imminent fall of Singapore, offers his services to Australia. 
20 March   Oliphant departs UK for Australia. 
27 May   Oliphant arrives in Australia. 
15 June   Mackenzie King discusses UK nuclear work with Malcolm MacDonald – his first formal briefing. 
2 September  Agreement that Halban's team should go to Canada. 
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24 September Discussions begin regarding practical arrangements for Halban's team to be based in Canada. 
26 September United Kingdom agree in principle Mackenzie’s memorandum on Anglo-Canadian project. 
12 October  British & Canadians meet to finalise memorandum for Anglo-Canadian project. 
26 October  Oliphant departs Australia for UK. 
1 November  Montreal agreed as location for the Anglo-Canadian heavy water work. 





2 January  Conant speaks with Akers and Mackenzie via telephone, telling the latter he was sending ‘a letter that sounds 
'more harsh than was really intended' (i.e. the Conant Letter). 
7 January   Conant's memorandum on co-operation dated. 
13 January  Akers receives Conant memorandum. 
18 January  Mackenzie in Washington to meet Conant and Bush. 
26 January  Akers meets Groves and Conant to discuss Conant memorandum line-by-line. 
3 March   Halban told to postpone his visit to US. 
12 March   Mackenzie learns that the UK has vetoed Halban’s visit to US. 
1 April   Last of the equipment arrives at Montreal Laboratory. 
22 July   Bush and Stimson, in London, meet with Churchill, Anderson, Cherwell, Perrin. 
26 July   Groves in Ottawa, meets with Mackenzie. 
1 August   Anderson travels to Washington to negotiate Quebec Agreement. 
10 August   Anderson, now in Quebec, hands Churchill new agreement. 
12 August   Discussion on Experimental Programme of T.A. Montreal Group. 
19 August   Quebec Agreement signed; 
  Chadwick, Simon, Oliphant & Peierls arrive in North America. 
24 August   Llewellin begins repeated attempts to get in touch with Stimson to convene CPC (to 2nd September). 
1 September  Chadwick, Peierls and Oliphant in Washington for discussions with Conant and Groves. 
1 September  Quebec agreement concluded. 
3 September  Chadwick and Oliphant dine with Conant, and informally discuss CPC. 
8 September  First (informal) meeting of Combined Policy Committee, called by Stimson. 
13 September Mackenzie, Oliphant, Groves, Oppenheimer, Chadwick and Conant meet to discuss UK contribution. 
18 September  Oliphant and Chadwick meet with Groves and Oppenheimer in Washington; 
  Groves visits Montreal. 
19 November  Oliphant arrives at Berkeley. 





4 January  TA Technical Committee meets (across four days) to discuss future plans. 
9 February  Massey argues for release of Bates and Gunn. 
17 February Inconclusive meeting of the CPC; question of Canadian heavy water work referred to sub-committee. 
23 March  Rivett responds to British request for Burhop by suggesting a high-level approach including question of 
uranium ores. 
28 March   UK High Commissioner visits Montreal in an effort to bolster waning morale. 
13 April   CPC approval for 5MW HW pile in Canada. 
13 June   Agreement and Declaration of Trust. 
15 June   Smuts writes to Churchill, giving personal analysis of the implications of the atom bomb. 
23 June   Anderson speaks with Fraser about the secondment of NZ scientists. 
28 June   Peierls transfers from New York to Los Alamos. 
5 July  Marsden puts question of New Zealand support for UK Tube Alloys programme to acting Prime Minister Dan 
Sullivan. 
1 October   Australian government told no further physicists needed for Berkeley or Montreal. 
13 October  Mackenzie’s appointment as president of NRC made permanent. 
4 November  Discussion in Canada on future piles in Canada and UK. 





15 January  Second future systems meeting 
12 February  Third future systems meeting 
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25 April   Truman first briefed on Manhattan Project by Stimson and Groves 
8 May   VE Day 
14 May   Fourth future systems meeting 
29 May   Fifth future systems meeting 
7 June   Sixth future systems meeting 
26 June   UN charter signed at San Francisco 
1 July   Smyth completes preface to his report 
4 July   UK concurs in use of atomic bomb on Japan 
15 July   Potsdam conference begins 
16 July   Trinity test 
19 July   Eighth future systems meeting 
26 July   UK election results; Attlee replaces Churchill as Prime Minister 
26 July   Proclamation to Japan 
6 August   Hiroshima bombing 
12 August   Smyth Report Published 
  British statement on atom bomb published 
13 August   Canadian statement on atom bomb published 
28 August   Attlee’s memorandum on 'The Atomic Bomb' 
5 September ZEEP becomes operational at Chalk River: the first nuclear reactor outside the United States 
25 September Attlee writes to Truman, broaching idea of meeting to discuss nuclear issues 
1 October   South African CSIR established 
12 October  Attlee sends follow-up telegram to Truman 
14 October  Evatt presses for Australian inclusion in UK nuclear work 
16 October  Attlee writes to Truman suggesting immediate conference 
17 October  Dominions sent copies of Truman-Attlee nuclear correspondence 
1 November  Fifth printing of Smyth report incorporates British & Canadian statements as appendices 
8 November  Chifley telegrams Attlee asking to be kept informed of Washington discussions, making a case for Evatt to be 
included in discussions 
13 November Discussions, in Washington, about Cockcroft’s possible departure; Canadians argue strongly he should stay. 
15 November Washington Declaration 
22 November Directorate of Tube Alloys officially moves into Shell Mex House 
3 December Cockcroft confirms to Mackenzie that he intends to accept directorship of UK AERE 
15 December British request made to Smuts for in-principle agreement regarding uranium supplies 






1 January   Directorate of Tube Alloys becomes Department of Atomic Energy 
25 January  NZ Cabinet approves Marsden’s plans for New Zealand nuclear development 
15 February  CPC informed of British decision to build large scale reactor to produce plutonium 
1 March   Ninth future systems meeting (Canadian focus) 
10 April   Tenth future systems meeting (Canadian focus) 
13 April   Zinn visits Mackenzie to discuss directorship 
24 April   Bevin raises idea of a UK plant in Africa 
5 June   Eleventh future systems meeting (Canadian focus) 
29 July   Mackenzie returns to Canada from Britain, having secured Lewis for Chalk River 
10 September  Lewis arrives in Canada 
18 September Cockcroft hands over Chalk River Directorship to Lewis 











Appendix Two:  
Dramatis Personae 
 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide brief biographical sketches for each of the individuals 
named in the body of the text. Persons mentioned only in footnotes are generally omitted: these 
are often tangential or administrative figures. The focus is solely on individuals’ activities in the 
period 1939-1947, with prior details included only where directly relevant to the thesis. Details 
of later careers are similarly omitted except where they cast particular light on themes explored 




















23 Code for Uranium 233, a fissile isotope of uranium 
25 Code for Uranium 235, a fissile isotope of uranium 
49 Code for Plutonium – a reversal of its atomic number, 94 
94 Plutonium (atomic number 94) 
ACAE Advisory Committee Atomic Energy 
ADRDE Air Defence Research and Development Establishment 
AERE Atomic Energy Research Establishment (i.e. the British research centre at Harwell, though note that 
the acronym was in use before Harwell’s selection as the site) 
BCSO British Central Scientific Office, to 1944; thereafter British Commonwealth Scientific Office; 
sometimes referred to within UK correspondence simply as CSO. 
CDT Combined Development Trust 
Chalk River Canadian nuclear research facility; successor to the Montreal Laboratory; location of NRX and ZEEP 
CoS Chiefs of Staff 
CPAE Controller [of?] Production of Atomic Energy, i.e. Portal 
CPC Combined Policy Committee 
CSAR Chief Superintendent Armament Research; Penney’s post-war title.  
CSIR Council for Scientific and Industrial Research/Suid-Afrikaanse Wetenskaplike en 
Nywerheidnavorsingsraad (South Africa) 
CSIR [Australian] Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, created October 1945. 
CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation; replaced CSIR in 1949. 
CSO See BCSO 
CSSAW Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Warfare, original parent of the MAUD Committee. 
Cyclotron Type of particle accelerator pioneered by Lawrence in California prior to the Second World War; 
valuable for a variety of nuclear physics applications. 
D.At.En. Department of Atomic Energy 
D2O Deuterium oxide; that is, heavy water (see below). 
DepAtEn See D.At.En. 
DSIR Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (UK and New Zealand) 
DSR Director of Scienitific Research 
DTA Directorate of Tube Alloys, and by extension Director of Tube Alloys 
Dupont American industrial concern, involved in Manhattan Project delivery 
EM Electromagnetic (as in EM separation) 
Fast neutron Free neutron unslowed by multiple collisions. Fast neutrons possess significant kinetic energy, 
making fission far more likely if captured by a nucleus; however, the likelihood of capture (the cross 
section) is relatively low. Fast neutron interactions underpin nuclear explosions. 
GEN 75 Committee convened by Attlee to discuss atomic energy.  
GLEEP Graphite Low Energy Experimental Pile, the first reactor to enter operation at Harwell. Charles 
Watson Munro and various other New Zealanders contributed to its construction.  
H.M.G. His Majesty’s Government (i.e. any of the Dominion Governments, including the UK) 
Harwell A former RAF base, site of the Atomic Energy Research Establishment, and used therefore as a 
metonym for the establishment itself.  
HC High Commissioner 
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Heavy Water (D2O, deuterium oxide) A form of water wherein most or all of the water molecules are constituted 
with deuterium, an isotope of hydrogen with both a proton and a neutron, as opposed to the more 
common form which consists only of a proton. Particularly valuable as a neutron moderator sswithin a 
pile. 
HEU Highly enriched uranium. 
HW Heavy Water 
ICI Imperial Chemical Industries 
Los Alamos Site of the American theoretical physics and weaponization research work 
LSD Low Separation Diffusion (as in 'LSD Plant') 
Manhattan Project The American wartime nuclear weapons project, under US Army control and headed by General 
Leslie Groves 
MAP Ministry of Aircraft Production (and by extension, Minister of Aircraft Production) 
MAUD Name given to the committee tasked with considering the implications fo the Frisch-Peierls 
memorandum and the practicality of developing the bomb. Also referred to as M.A.U.D. and Maud, 
more or less interchangeably. The name MAUD derives from a message Bohr had had transmitted to 
Cockcroft from occupied Denmark; the final words, MAUD RAY KENT, were initially taken as some 
form of coded reference to radium or uranium. (The reality was more prosaic: they referred simply to 
a woman named Maud Ray, residing in Kent). 
Mayson Codename for nuclear weapons research proposed by Roosevelt for use in top-level correspondence 
between UK and US governments. 
McMahon Act The Atomic Energy Act of 1946. United States legislation placing the American nuclear programme 
under civilian control; it had as its consequence a significant restriction of nuclear interchange with 
other states, including the United Kingdom and Canada 
MI Military Intelligence 
MoS Ministry of Supply 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organizations 
NDRC National Defence Research Committee; American body chaired by Vannevar Bush 
NRC (Canadian) National Research Council 
NRX ‘National Research Experimental’, the second operational reactor at Chalk River. A heavy-water-
moderated, light-water-cooled experimental reactor.  
OSRD Office of Scientific Research and Development; American body headed by Vannevar Bush which 
took over most of the work of the NDRC 
Pile Original terminology for a nuclear reactor 
PJBD Permanent Joint Board on Defense  
Polymer Codename for heavy water 
Pu Plutonium 
S-1 Executive committee of the NDRC and OSRD, focussing on uranium fission. Also S1, S.1 etc. 
SAC Scientific Advisory Committee; Lord Hankey's committee 
Slow neutron Free neutron slowed by multiple collisions; less energetic than a fast neutrons, but with a larger cross 
section (meaning a greater likelihood of capture). Cannot therefore produce a nuclear explosion, but 
vital for production of nuclear energy in a reactor.  
Synchrotron Type of particle accelerator, comparable to a cyclotron but developed later; a key aspect of Oliphant’s 
post-war research programme 
T.A. (TA etc.) see Tube Alloys 
T.A.1 (Also TA1, TA.1 etc.) Name given to aspects of the Tube Alloys programme relating to fast neutron 
applications of uranium fission - i.e., the bomb project. This encompassed programmes for uranium 




TA2 (Also T.A.2, T.A.2 etc.) Name given to aspects of the Tube Alloys programme relating to slow 
neutron applications of uranium fission. These were initially believed to be relevant only to the 
production of power; the discovery that plutonium, a product of the reaction, was likely to be fissile, 
later meant that this branch of the work also assumed military importance. 
TRE Telecommunications Research Establishment; centre of UK radar research during the war. 
Tube Alloys Purposefully bland codename given to the UK nuclear programme from late 1941 
U-233, U.233 Uranium 233, fissile isotope of uranium. 
U-235 Uranium 235; fissile isotope of uranium. 
U308 A compound of uranium. 
Valley Name for the facility at Rhydymwyn where much of the British work on gaseous diffusion took place. 
X Code name used by the Manhattan Project to refer to the enrichment facility at Oak Ridge. 
Y Code name used by the Manhattan Project to refer to Los Alamos. 
YOKE See 'Y', above. 

















National Archives of Australia (NAA) 
A451  BL 340/1/1 (Professor Oliphant) 
A1068 IC47/35/1/3 (Decorations. U.S. awards to Australian nationals: Dr Frederick William George WHITE, Dr 
Marcus Laurence Elwin OLIPHANT, Professor Aubrey F. BURSTALL, Mr Neville Albert WHIFFEN.) 
A1608  AS65/1/2 (War Section, Visit of Professor M L Oliphant to Australia) 
A3300  217 (Visits - Oliphant, M L (Professor)) 
A5954  2164/1 (Press Cuttings - Atomic Energy Research. Visit to Australia of Professor Oliphant 1947) 
A5954 1905/15 (Scientific aspect of Australian war effort - concerning proposal that Professor OLIPHANT submit a 
report…) 
A 6119   OLIPHANT Marcus Lawrence Edwin (Part 1)  
A 6119  OLIPHANT Marcus Lawrence Edwin Part 2  
A 6119   OLIPHANT Marcus Lawrence Edwin Part 3  
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   Radiological Research – Special Research Committee 
Radiological Research – Publicity 1943-1947  
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AB 1/3  Transfer of Group from Berkeley to X  
AB 1/4A  Knoxville  
AB 1/4B  London T.A. Staff Movements  
AB 1/5  New York  
AB 1/6  Personnel (General) 
AB 1/7 Staff list of British scientific officers attached to the British Supply Council in North America 
AB 1/8 MAUD Committee - Minutes of Meetings 
AB 1/9  MAUD Committee - Papers relating to Atomic Bomb  
AB 1/34(A) Visit of Akers, Simon and Halban to United States of America  
AB 1/34(B) Directorate of Tube Alloys - Chalk River Project Canada General Correspondence with DSIR 
AB 1/35  Directorate of Tube Alloys Chalk River Project - Canada Reports 
AB 1/36 D.T.A. Chalk River Project Canada Sub-Committee on Water Treatment. Water Treatment Committee. 
[National Research Council]  
AB 1/37 MAUD Miscellaneous Papers and Correspondence with Sir Henry Tizard and General Ismay of the C.I.D. 
AB 1/38  Personnel - Sir George Thompson's Committee - Staff for Tube Alloy in U.S.A. and Canada 
AB 1/39  Personnel - Tube Alloy Central Organisation 
AB 1/44  Visits to U.S.A. and Canada - General  
AB 1/45  Visits to U.S.A. and Canada - Dr. J. Ferguson  
AB 1/46  Visits to U.S.A. and Canada - Major K. Gordon 
AB 1/47  Visits to U.S.A. and Canada - Dr. H. Halban  
AB 1/48  Visits to U.S.A. and Canada - Professor R. Peierls 
AB 1/49  Visits to U.S.A. and Canada - Professor F. Simon  
AB 1/50  Transfer of Halban Team to Canada  
AB 1/51  Visit to United States of America Dr. J. P. Baxter  
AB 1/52  Visits to U.S.A. & Canada Dr. Thelwall Jones  
AB 1/53  Permission to use and issue information obtained in working on Tube Alloy project 
AB 1/54  Public Statements 
AB 1/62  Canadian Organisation - Personnel  
AB 1/63  U.K. Organisation - Disbandment of MAUD Committee  
AB 1/64  U.K. Organisation - Transfer of T.A. from D.S.I.R. to M.O.S.   
AB 1/82  Uranium - Belgian Congo  
AB 1/83  Uranium - Australia  
AB 1/84  Uranium - Germany  
AB 1/85  Uranium - South Africa  
AB 1/86  Heavy Water - supplies and stocks  
AB 1/87  Heavy Water for Canadian Team  
AB 1/110  Investigation of nuclear physics developments in Germany  
AB 1/113  Heavy water Pile - Policy re erection in Canada  
AB 1/117  Heavy Water Pile - Canada - General  
AB 1/120  Canadian Papers - Outgoing Cables  
AB 1/121  Canadian Papers - Outgoing Cables  
AB 1/122  Canadian Papers - spare copies of Cables  
AB 1/123  Organisation of Montreal Laboratory  
AB 1/124  Organisation of Montreal Laboratory  
AB 1/125  Canadian Papers - Report on General Organisation  
AB 1/126  List of Staff; National Research Council, Montreal Laboratory  
AB 1/128  Anglo-American Relations  
AB 1/129  Anglo-American Relations  
AB 1/130  Canadian Papers - D.A.1 Correspondence  
AB 1/136  Canadian Papers - Staff Questions after 1st April 1943  
AB 1/138  Canadian Papers, General letters to and from Perrin  
AB 1/139  D.T.A. - U.K. General Information File  
AB 1/141  Cables (from Canada)  
AB 1/142  Montreal Laboratory - Security  
AB 1/143  Montreal Laboratory - Discussions with Engineers  
AB 1/144  Montreal Laboratory - Theoretical Physics Division  
AB 1/149  Removal of Montreal Laboratory to U.K.  
AB 1/150  Montreal Laboratory - Pilot Plant  
AB 1/152  Montreal Laboratory - Questionnaire to U.K. Staff on Postwar Movements  
AB 1/153  Montreal Laboratory - U.K.T.A. Establishment Buildings  
AB 1/154  X Metal for T.A. Establishment 1945  
AB 1/157  Correspondence on Uranium to and from Ministry of Supply  
AB 1/159  Halban correspondence re the setting up of Montreal Laboratory  
AB 1/160 Correspondence (B.C.S.O.) re Conant and Halban on Uranium production in U.S.A. - Halban's status 
AB 1/164  Discussions on meetings of Combined Policy Committee  
AB 1/165  Search for Tube Alloy site in U.K.  
AB 1/166  Organisation and cost estimates of U.K. experimental establishments  
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AB 1/169  Montreal Laboratory - Scientific Staff Policy  
AB 1/171  Correspondence with America - SR1. Branch Folder No. 69/40  
AB 1/175  I.C.I. M.A.U.D. File [MAUD Committee]  
AB 1/179  Canadian Indentions for Record  
AB 1/181  Correspondence re M.A.U.D. Committee I.C.I. Contract  
AB 1/182  U.K. Staff - Permanent Appointments  
AB 1/183  Policy on Staff for Department of Atomic Energy  
AB 1/184  Department of Atomic Energy Temporary Appointments  
AB 1/185  Return of Staff to U.K.  
AB 1/187  Staff General "A" - T.A. Team  
AB 1/188  Staff General "B" - T.A. Team  
AB 1/189  Incoming Cables for Prof. Cockcroft  
AB 1/193  Correspondence between Sir J. Cockcroft and Prof. J. Chadwick  
AB 1/196  National Research Laboratories Ottawa, Canada - Note book by B.H. Flowers  
AB 1/197  Canadian Project  
AB 1/198  Berkeley  
AB 1/199  Transmission of Reports  
AB 1/200  Technical (Canadian)  
AB 1/207  Correspondence between Sir John Anderson and Dr. Bush  
AB 1/208  Tube Alloys Consultative Council - M.O.S. Papers - Transfer of staff to Atomic Energy  
AB 1/210  M.A.U.D. Committee Professor J.D. Cockcrofts Correspondence  
AB 1/213  Correspondence on choice of site for establishment and organisation policy (M. Oliphant) 
AB 1/215  Staff for a experimental Tube Alloy station (Prof. M. Oliphant)  
AB 1/216  Employment of individuals at Birmingham University (M.A.U.D. Committee Work) 
AB 1/217  M.A.U.D. Committee Investigations - Provision of radium  
AB 1/218  Montreal Metal and metal for U.K.  
AB 1/219  Investigations of M.A.U.D. Committee - General Papers  
AB 1/220  Investigations of M.A.U.D. Committee - General Papers  
AB 1/223  Employment of Scientists evacuated from France  
AB 1/224  Work on M.A.U.D. Committee at Cavendish Laboratory (Requisition File)  
AB 1/225  Work on M.A.U.D. Committee at Liverpool University  
AB 1/226 Contract for experimental investigation regarding the possibility of developing a new explosive at Cavendish 
Laboratory 
AB 1/228  Work on M.A.U.D. Committee at Clarendon Laboratory  
AB 1/230  Provision of Uranium Hexafluoride for M.A.U.D. Investigations  
AB 1/231  M.A.U.D. Committee Investigations - Question of Patents  
AB 1/232  Work on M.A.U.D. Committee at Birmingham University  
AB 1/233  Disclosure of M.A.U.D. Committee Investigations to America  
AB 1/234  M.A.U.D. Committee Investigations Policy  
AB 1/236 Contract to render assistance and undertake investigations by M.A.U.D. Committee I.C.I. L 
AB 1/238  Report of M.A.U.D. Committee  
AB 1/239  M.A.U.D. Investigations - Transfer to D.S.I.R. [MAUD Committee]  
AB 1/242  M.A.U.D. Investigations - details of expenditure. [MAUD Committee]  
AB 1/243  Preliminary Arrangements  
AB 1/244  Preliminary Arrangements - Proposed transfer of Halban team to U.S.A. or Canada 
AB 1/246  Staff General  
AB 1/261  Correspondence with U.S.A.  
AB 1/263  Transfers to U.S.A.  
AB 1/264  U.S.A. general papers  
AB 1/265  Arrangements in U.S.A.ICI Staff  
AB 1/267  Arrangements in U.S.A. British Ministry of Supply Mission  
AB 1/270  Arrangements in U.S.A. - requests for books, reports, etc.  
AB 1/271  Canada - general correspondence  
AB 1/273  Transfer to Canada - general  
AB 1/274  Transfer to Canada - equipment  
AB 1/275  Arrangements in Canada - general  
AB 1/276  Arrangements in Canada - staff 1942-1943  
AB 1/277  Arrangements in Canada - staff  
AB 1/278  Arrangements in Canada - Reports from Professor Cockcroft, Montreal Laboratory 
AB 1/286  Directorate of Tube Alloys - Director  
AB 1/293 Patents, inventions, etc. Treatment of inventions made by U.S., U.K., or Canadian tube alloy workers of one 
Government only or in combination  
AB 1/294  Patents, inventions, etc. Proposed Anglo-Canadian Tube Alloy Patents Agreement 
AB 1/298  General - Colonial Empire arrangements  
AB 1/299  General - London Diary - Empire  
AB 1/326  Canadian organisation progress reports  
AB 1/327  Canadian organisation research programmes  
AB 1/335  Future Systems Group, Canada - minutes  
AB 1/343  Thorium - Australia  
AB 1/344  Uranium - Canada  
AB 1/345  Uranium - Cornwall  
AB 1/346 National Research Council - correspondence concerning M.A.U.D. Committee. [Atomic Energy Research 
Establishment]  
AB 1/347 M.A.U.D. Policy Committee - minutes - 1st to 9th meeting; M.A.U.D. Technical Sub-Committee minutes - 
1st to 4th meeting  
AB 1/349  National Research Laboratories, Ottawa - G.B. Cook - Book 0126   
AB 1/353  Correspondence with Sir James Chadwick  
AB 1/354  Correspondence with Sir James Chadwick  
AB 1/355  German activities  
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AB 1/356  Reports on German literature and correspondence  
AB 1/357  Co-ordination of British and American effort  
AB 1/358  Co-ordination of British and American effort  
AB 1/359  Organisation of work in the USA  
AB 1/367  Distribution of technical information and British Reports  
AB 1/368  Tube Alloys: Technical Committee; correspondence  
AB 1/374  Coordination of British and American effort. 
AB 1/376  Coordination of British and American effort  
AB 1/377  Coordination of British and American effort  
AB 1/378  Coordination of British and American effort  
AB 1/379  Canadian organisation  
AB 1/380  Canadian organisation: personnel  
AB 1/381  Policy discussions on processes to be used for Tube Alloys work in the UK   
AB 1/410  Progress reports: Tube Alloys organisation  
AB 1/416  Raw materials for Canadian organisation  
AB 1/444  Fuchs, K: appointment  
AB 1/445 Titterton, E.W: financial including miscellaneous correspondence regarding Bikini test and thermionic valve 
AB 1/446  Incoming cables: Canada  
AB 1/450  Tube Alloys: Technical Committee; meeting of 19 September 1943 
AB 1/452  Heavy water  
AB 1/456  Tube Alloys: progress report  
AB 1/457  Tube Alloys: progress report  
AB 1/458  Tube Alloys: progress report   
AB 1/460  Use of enriched materials  
AB 1/462 Tube Alloy Project: monthly progress reports for the Oxford Team, March 1944 - June 1946  
AB 1/463  Tube Alloys: miscellaneous reports  
AB 1/466  Technical Committee: Chadwick papers  
AB 1/467  Kowaski: miscellaneous papers  
AB 1/468  Tube Alloys Consultative Council: Sir Henry Dale's papers  
AB 1/475 Mr E J S Clarke, Finance and Supplies: notes on Combined Development Agency (CDA) history; metals 
history  
AB 1/477  Investigation by Maud Committee: general papers.  
AB 1/478  Investigation by Maud Committee: general papers.   
AB 1/481  Arrangements in the USA: staff  
AB 1/482  Tube Alloys Technical Committee: miscellaneous correspondence  
AB 1/485  Sir James Chadwick: atomic energy wartime papers  
AB 1/490  Inward telegrams from Canada  
AB 1/493  Applications for the return of personnel to United Kingdom  
AB 1/494  Manuscripts by Professor R Peierls, and MAUD Report  
AB 1/497  Visit of Mr Akers, British Central Scientific Office, to United States of America  
AB 1/498  Visit of Mr Akers, British Central Scientific Office, to United States of America  
AB 1/501 Combined Development Trust and Combined Development Agency; financial arrangements 
AB 1/503 Combined Development. Agency and Combined Development Trust; constitution, title and declassification 
thereof  
AB 1/504  Sir Charles Hambro; papers  
AB 1/505  Papers of Storke, mining adviser to Tube Alloys and Ministry of Supply  
AB 1/506  Combined Development Trust; personnel  
AB 1/507  Uranium; intelligence  
AB 1/509  Uranium; intelligence and prospecting  
AB 1/510  Diary of Combined Development Trust secretary  
AB 1/511 Combined Development Trust; visit by Hambro, Sayers and Storke to United States of America 
AB 1/512  Survey report; drafts  
AB 1/515  Organisation of Combined Development Trust  
AB 1/516 Combined Development Trust; Information Gathering Unit on Worldwide Uranium Sources 
AB 1/524  Visits of Americans to United Kingdom  
AB 1/525  Visits to United States and Canada; W A Akers  
AB 1/526  Visits to United States and Canada; M J S Clapham  
AB 1/528 Policy discussions on processes to be used for Tube Alloys work in the United Kingdom  
AB 1/530  Policy discussions on processes to be used for Tube Alloys work in the United Kingdom  
AB 1/531 Policy discussions on processes to be used for Tube Alloys work in the United Kingdom (extract from AB 
1/530)  
AB 1/537  Survey of world uranium sources for Combined Development Agency  
AB 1/538  Survey of world uranium sources for Combined Development Agency   
AB 1/541  Uranium; Eldorado Mine, Canada  
AB 1/543  Progress reports: Birmingham University, Professor R Peierls  
AB 1/544  Military use; theoretical work on the atomic bomb  
AB 1/545  Co-operation with USA on large-scale diffusion plant  
AB 1/547  Electromagnetic plant for United Kingdom  
AB 1/548  Nuclear Physics Subcommittee; correspondence  
AB 1/549  Cables between London and Canada; team transfer, patents, diffusion  
AB 1/550  London Technical Committee meeting January 1944 in New York  
AB 1/551  London Technical Committee meeting January 1944 in New York  
AB 1/555  First American journey of Dr H Halban  
AB 1/556  Second American journey of Dr H Halban  
AB 1/564  Censorship  
AB 1/565  Tube Alloys file list  
AB 1/566  Sir James Chadwick: policy papers  
AB 1/567  Sir James Chadwick: policy papers  
AB 1/568  Letters to Sir James Chadwick from Professor Peierls and Dr Moon at Los Alamos 
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AB 1/569  Diary of Dr Halban  
AB 1/570  Diary of Dr Halban, Montreal Project  
AB 1/571  Diary of Dr Halban, Montreal Project  
AB 1/572 Professor R E Peierls personal papers: correspondence with Akers, Arms, Blackman, Blok, Born, Bosanquet, 
Brown  
AB 1/573 Professor R E Peierls personal papers: correspondence with Akers, Arms, Blackman, Blok, Born, Bosanquet, 
Brown  
AB 1/574 Professor R E Peierls personal papers: correspondence with Feather, Fowler, Frisch, Fuchs etc 
AB 1/575 Professor R E Peierls personal papers; correspondence with Feather, Fowler, Frisch, Fuchs etc 
AB 1/576  Professor R E Peierls personal papers: correspondence with Placzek, Simon etc  
AB 1/577  Professor R E Peierls personal papers: correspondence with Placzek, Simon, etc 
AB 1/578  Tube Alloys; miscellaneous early history  
AB 1/581  Arrangements in USA: personal reports from Professors Chadwick and Oliphant 
AB 1/582  Arrangements in USA: personal reports from Professors Chadwick and Oliphant 
AB 1/585  Quebec Agreement 1943; Lord President negotiations  
AB 1/586  Uranium in the Commonwealth  
AB 1/587  Combined Development Trust; minor deposits, general  
AB 1/589  Thorium; general  
AB 1/596  Dr J D Cockcroft; appointment, promotion and confidential reports   
AB 1/600  Combined Development Trust; United Kingdom organisation  
AB 1/602  Anglo-US liaison arrangements for atomic energy  
AB 1/603  Combined Development Trust: internal administration  
AB 1/604  Early uranium search in Australia 
AB 1/605  British Liaison Office in US: administrative arrangements  
AB 1/606  Postwar control  
AB 1/608  Use of radioactive fission products as military weapons  
AB 1/610  First thoughts about UK graphite moderated and water cooled piles  
AB 1/611  Chadwick: views on UK experimental establishment  
AB 1/612  Cockcroft: correspondence with Clarendon Laboratory Oxford  
AB 1/614  MAUD Committee: reports on uranium  
AB 1/615  Chadwick correspondence for North America: two postwar letters from Titterton 
AB 1/616  Combined Development Trust: meetings of London Group  
AB 1/617  Combined Development Trust; ordinary meetings of London Group  
AB 1/619  French scientists employed on Tube Alloys Project  
AB 1/620  Miscellaneous cables: Cockcroft personal collection  
AB 1/621  Design and construction of British piles  
AB 1/622  UK effort in US: Chadwick and Penney correspondence 
AB 1/624  Los Alamos UK team: technical papers  
AB 1/626  Cabinet Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy: correspondence  
AB 1/628  Halban papers: correspondence and miscellaneous papers  
AB 1/629  Visits of expatriate French scientists to France  
AB 1/631  Professor R E Peierls: personal papers  
AB 1/633  Professor R E Peierls: personal papers  
AB 1/635  Professor R E Peierls: personal papers  
AB 1/637  Professor R E Peierls: personal papers  
AB 1/638  Professor R E Peierls: personal papers  
AB 1/639  Professor R E Peierls: personal papers; diaries 1942-1943  
AB 1/641  Professor R E Peierls: personal papers, diaries  
AB 1/642  Professor R E Peierls: personal papers, diaries  
AB 1/643  MAUD Committee: security  
AB 1/644  Tube alloys: copies of high policy papers  
AB 1/645  Tube Alloys; copies of high policy papers  
AB 1/647  Organisation of CPAE staff  
AB 1/648  Pontecorvo: report on trip to Port Radium, Canada  
AB 1/649  Wartime enquiries about possible uranium sources  
AB 1/650  MAUD investigations: information received from US and Canada  
AB 1/651  MAUD enquiries about uranium and heavy water  
AB 1/652  Arrangements in US: correspondence with Dr Webster  
AB 1/654  USA: return of UK staff to universities  
AB 1/655  General Policy Committee  
AB 1/656  General Policy Committee  
AB 1/657  Combined Development Trust: deed, members and organisation  
AB 1/658  Combined Development Trust: accounting arrangements  
AB 1/659  Tube Alloys and Combined Development Trust: Sayers correspondence  
AB 1/660  Combined Development Trust: diaries of Secretary  
AB 1/661  Combined Development Trust: London Group diary  
AB 1/663  Uranium: Anglo-US co-ordination of information  
AB 1/664  Uranium: Anglo-US co-ordination of information  
AB 1/665  Uranium supplies: progress reports to Anderson 
AB 1/667  Uranium: Australia  
AB 1/676  MAUD Committee: correspondence  
AB 1/678  MAUD Technical Committee  
AB 1/680 Combined Development Trust: action proposed regarding uranium and thorium supplies 
AB 1/682  Tube Alloys Project: organisation in United Kingdom  
AB 1/684  Legislation for domestic controls of Tube Alloys  
AB 1/685  Papers of Graphite Pile Group, Montreal  
AB 1/687  Theoretical work at Berkeley  
AB 1/688  Theoretical work at Berkeley  
AB 1/690  Work at Berkeley: Oliphant correspondence on electromatic process  
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AB 1/695 Michael W Perrin interviews with Dr Klaus Fuchs following his arrest for espionage, January to March 1950 
AB 1/700 Tube Alloy project: organisation of an independent British and Anglo-Canadian effort  
AB 1/701  Research and development in USA  
AB 1/702 Lists of Tube Alloys staff in Department of Atomic Energy, British universities, Canada and USA 
AB 2/18 Report on the visits to Chicago, Toronto and Hamilton, 20-22 Oct. 1943: F.A. Paneth  
AB 2/20  Notes on uranium deposits: F.A. Paneth 
AB 2/29  Chicago trip, 25-27 Jan. 1944: H.G. Thode  
AB 2/35  Report on a visit to Chicago 7-14 June, 1944: W.J. Arrol  
AB 2/37  Chicago discussions of 5-8 June, 1944: A.G. Maddock  
AB 2/38 Memorandum on Dr. S.G. Thomson's visit to Montreal 28-30 July, 1944: B.L. Goldschmidt 
AB 2/52  Report on a visit to Chicago, 30 July 1945: L. Yaffe  
AB 2/122  General information regarding the N.R.X. project: R. E. Newell  
AB 2/123 Organization of Engineering Division Chalk River and Montreal Laboratories - N.R.C: R. E. Newell 
AB 2/125  Future piles at Chalk River: J. D. Cockcroft  
AB 2/128 Suggested re-organization of the Engineering Branch at Chalk River in the light of present and future 
responsibilities and the formation of a crown company to administer the Atomic Energy Project: H. Tonge 
AB 2/139  Notes on visit to X - 18 May 1944: J D Cockcroft and R E Newell  
AB 2/162  A note on piles for the production of fissile material and of useful power: G. Volkoff 
AB 2/177 Minutes of a meeting held on 10 Oct. 1945, with Dr. E.P. Wigner, to obtain information about the effects of 
intense radiation on materials 
AB 2/192 Notes on: discussion with Colonel Warren in Washington, 25 Jan. 1945: J.S. Mitchell  
AB 2/196  Visit to Chicago 18-19 April, 1945: J.S. Mitchell  
AB 2/748  Experiments on the use of short controls in ZEEP: C.N. Watson-Munro  
AB 2/749 Progress report on control rod experiments with ZEEP dated 26 April 1946: C.N. Watson-Munro 
AB 2/773  Visit to X, 11 and 12 January 1945: D.C. Hurst  
AB 2/874  Supply of uranium and thorium for the Chalk River pile: J.D. Cockcroft  
AB 2/875  Co-operation with the United States  
AB 2/876  Co-operation with the United Kingdom  
AB 2/886 The Candian pile pilot plant: interim report on design and construction, constituting a final report by John R. 
Huffman  
AB 2/887 Memorandum on the production of radioactive elements in the Chalk River pile: J.D. Cockcroft 
AB 2/888  The development of nuclear physics in the universities of Canada: J.D. Cockcroft 
AB 2/889 Metal for low power experimental pile: memorandum dated 11 Dec 1944 from J.D. Cockcroft to W.W. 
Watson  
AB 2/892  The development of nuclear energy: J.D. Cockcroft  
AB 2/893  The future development of the Chalk River plant and laboratories: J D Cockcroft 
AB 2/901  Notes on a visit to Chicago on 11 Aug 1945: J.D. Cockcroft  
AB 2/916  NRX Project - progress report for: July 1944  
AB 2/918  NRX Project - progress report for: Sept 1944  
AB 2/919  NRX Project - progress report for: Oct 1944  
AB 2/920  NRX Project - progress report for: Nov 1944 
AB 2/921  NRX Project - progress report for: Dec 1944  
AB 2/922  NRX Project - progress report for: Jan 1945  
AB 2/923  Note on the siting of a United Kingdom high power pile 
AB 2/924  National Research Council, Canada: Montreal reports  
AB 3/6  Irregular meetings at AERE, Harwell  
AB 3/9  Miscellaneous notes on reports and meetings 
AB 3/10  German Notes - Report on German Literature  
AB 3/12  Letters to and from Hogg, Longair, and Bell 
AB 3/18  J F Jackson, Laboraory of National Research Council, Montreal  
AB 3/19  Letters to and from Longair, Bell and Vavasour   
AB 3/36  Correspondence with Progress Reports re Directorate of Tube Alloys  
AB 3/37 Correspondence between National Research Council, Canada, and Clarendon Laboratory 
AB 3/70 Correspondence of Professor Skinner as Deputy Director of Atomic Energy Research Establishment 
AB 3/105  Outgoing letters to the United States: ICI, Billingham; general  
AB 3/106  Outgoing letters to the United States: ICI, Billingham; general   
AB 3/109 Tube Alloys correspondence with Simon and Akers in United Kingdom and United States  
AB 3/111  Tube Alloys correspondence with Simon, Akers, Perrin, Chadwick and Peierls  
AB 3/119  M W Perrin correspondence with Tube Alloys and Ministry of Supply  
AB 3/129  American progress reports  
AB 3/131 Letter from F Simon to Sir Wallace Akers (Directorate of Atomic Energy) considering technical policy 
AB 3/152  Tube alloy meeting held at Old Queen Street on 27 June 1944  
AB 4/38  Review of X literature to 30 April 1942 Author(s): Not known  
AB 4/39 Interim report on the progress and programme concerning the fast neutron reaction. Author(s): K Fuchs, R 
Peierls  
AB 4/44  Review of X literature from 30 April 1942 to 14 October 1942 Author(s): Not known 
AB 4/425  X metal sub-committee. Review of existing state of knowledge as at March 1 1944 
AB 4/736  Comments on the Montreal research programme Author(s): L Kowarski  
AB 6/9  Employment of outside scientists as consultants to the Directorate of Atomic Energy 
AB 6/15  Consultants: general policy  
AB 6/21  Liaison with USA projects  
AB 6/22  Staff requirements at AERE  
AB 6/31  Correspondence with Prof. Chadwick 
AB 6/65  Supply of radioactive and stable isotopes from USA and Canada  
AB 6/77  Correspondence with British Commonwealth Scientific Office   
AB 6/102  Temporary loan of New Zealand scientists to AERE  
AB 6/103  Scientific and technical staff: organisation, general  
AB 6/105  Employment and naturalisation of aliens  
AB 6/106  Recruitment of staff from universities  
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AB 6/107  Professor R E Peierls (Consultant)  
AB 6/115  Security: general  
AB 6/116  Security: general  
AB 6/125  Relations with USA  
AB 6/130  Relations with Australia  
AB 6/131  Liaison with Canada  
AB 6/132 Liaison with Canada: barter account 'A'; Canadian expenditure and barter arrangements  
AB 6/139  Liaison with South Africa  
AB 6/141  Sir John Cockcroft's top secret and secret pad copies  
AB 6/144  Proposals for recruiting staff from North America (except Chalk River)  
AB 6/145  Sir John Cockcroft's lecture scripts  
AB 6/157  49 extraction in Canada  
AB 6/169  Polonium production, including Canadian standby plant  
AB 6/170 Dr. R. Spence's correspondence from Chalk River, Canada, about the setting up of AERE  
AB 6/171  Staff recruiting: Dr Spence; correspondence from Chalk River, Canada, and Harwell 
AB 6/175  Suitable sites for an atomic energy research establishment in the United Kingdom 
AB 6/177  GLEEP  
AB 6/180  Early studies for BEPO and GLEEP  
AB 6/183  General Harwell correspondence  
AB 6/184  Generalisite [sic]  
AB 6/185  Discussions on BEPO  
AB 6/186  Recruitment of staff for Engineering Division  
AB 6/187  Chief Engineer's correspondence  
AB 6/188 Pile Operating Committee: correspondence with Mr. R.F. Jackson, Deputy Chief Engineer 
AB 6/189 Staff requirements: copies of letters from Dr. C. Reid (Scientific Officer, Chalk River and Shell Mex House) 
AB 6/193 Papers belonging to Professor M L Oliphant (Consultant); including minutes of Cyclotron Panel of Nuclear 
Physics Sub-Committee  
AB 6/200  Progress Report on GLEEP: C.N. Watson-Munro. 29 Apr 1946  
AB 6/201  Monthly progress reports on GLEEP: Aug to Dec 1946  
AB 6/227  Report on a visit to Chalk River, Sept-Oct 1946: J. Thewlis  
AB 6/239  Liaison with Canada  
AB 6/244 Cables received by Mr. D.R. Willson (Head of EMR Division) while visiting Chalk River 
AB 6/245  Visit to Chalk River and Washington by D.R. Willson  
AB 6/286  Relations with Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, Chalk River  
AB 6/288  Uranium: procurement  
AB 6/292  Supply of radioactive and stable isotopes from USA and Canada  
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